Tracing the last breath: Movements in Anlong Veng by Wood, Timothy Dylan
RICE UNIVERSITY 
Tracing the Last Breath: Movements in Anlong Veng 
&dss?e?73&£i& frjjrarijsfass cassis^ scesse 
& w o O as 
by 
Timothy Dylan Wood 
A THESIS SUBMITTED 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
Doctor of Philosophy 
APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE: 
y' 7* 
Stephen A. Tyler, Herbert S. Autrey Professor 
Department of 
Philip R. Wood, Professor 
Department of French Studies 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 
MAY 2009 
UMI Number: 3362431 
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
UMI 
UMI Microform 3362431 
Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
ABSTRACT 
Tracing the Last Breath: 
Movements in Anlong Veng 
by 
Timothy Dylan Wood 
Anlong Veng was the last stronghold of the Khmer Rouge until the organization's 
ultimate collapse and defeat in 1999. This dissertation argues that recent moves by the 
Cambodian government to transform this site into an "historical-tourist area" is 
overwhelmingly dominated by commercial priorities. However, the tourism project 
simultaneously effects an historical narrative that inherits but transforms the 
government's historiographic endeavors that immediately followed Democratic 
Kampuchea's 1979 ousting. The work moves between personal encounters with the 
historical, academic presentations of the country's recent past, and government efforts to 
pursue a museum agenda in the context of "development through tourism" policies. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation emerges out of numerous years of involvement with Cambodia, 
beginning in 1998. Much of this time has been spent as researcher/student, but I have 
also worn the hats of volunteer, traveler/tourist, political monitor/advocate, and long-term 
ex-pat resident. Two initial four-month forays into Cambodia in 1998 and 1999 
preceded, but gave impetus to, the research project that became this work. My return to 
Cambodia in 2002 began largely with a focus on (re-)acquiring the language proficiency 
that I had very much lost in the lapse between stays in the country. Later that year, my 
work in the field began. My research on the conversion of the last Khmer Rouge 
stronghold into an in situ museum site was carried out through a series of one-month-long 
stays in Anlong Veng, returning to the capital of Phnom Penh for a few weeks before my 
returns to Oddar Meanchey Province. 
As much of my research activities were oriented toward historical mapping, 
sections of this text could be seen to complement the Tourism Ministry's unfinished 
"Anlong Veng Guidebook"—the history of the district, its individuals, structures, events, 
and decisions. This work was constructed with particular attention to making a 
contribution to those scholars who occupy themselves with the minutia of Cambodia's 
twentieth-century past and to whom I am greatly indebted and captivated. There were 
also some more anthropological topics in operation, and among these: the different forms 
of re-membering that express themselves in Khmer considerations of the past; 
commercialized pimping (versions) of the past; differences in understandings of a 
"museum"; the changing status of objects according to various institutional and local 
xii 
xiii 
arrangements; an ongoing influence of nationalism in the process of re-presenting and re-
constructing histories; a growing pervasiveness of a concern for (scientific) "accuracy"; 
the "touristicization" of a rural village and its people; and the trend of mobility/migration 
that seems to recur through post-1970 Cambodian historical events. Initially, this project 
sought to ascertain: how the villagers that occupy the sites (and areas around them) 
conceptualize, feel about, react to, and involve themselves in the Ministry of Tourism's 
museum project; what they see as important elements in the/their Khmer Rouge past; 
what/how they choose to present information; personal anecdotes and life stories that 
give greater understanding to daily life and interpretations in/of Anlong Veng. In sum, 
the goal of this research was to produce some understanding of how local informants 
relate to the sites that have been designated a "historical-tourist area" by national actors. 
Predictably, these concerns became supplemented by other complexities in the 
process. The institutional arrangements that work to produce a museum in Anlong Veng 
warranted a fair degree of attention. In the realm of governmental institutions, some 
observations arose about organization/structure, personalities of officials, and the 
processes by which decisions come to be made. Consequently, this research came to 
focus partly on the relations between the national government, ministries, 
academic/knowledge consultants, provincial departments, local (district-level) officials, 
and individuals selected as legitimate bearers of historical knowledge. 
Beyond the idea of garnering local reflection on a process of historical 
representation, guiding this work was a concern for the processes by which a national 
objective comes to be translated into an everyday reality in the Cambodian countryside. 
(There are a number of other contemporary expressions of this kind of observation, 
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including the debacles over the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Defense White 
Paper, as well as the RCG's management of the forestry sector.) I believe these matters 
may address the pluralistic direction of ethnographic inquiry in anthropological attempts 
to grapple with the notion of a "world system"—links between the plurality of local 
voices about local history in Anlong Veng, in connection with the politically-invested 
objectives of a national government, in the context of international demands and 
pressures. 
While the unfolding of fieldwork seemed to effortlessly follow an exponential 
trajectory—a relatively small quantity of fieldwork leading to massive description, 
reflection, and analysis, while simultaneously begetting larger inquiries (more 
informants, sites, relations, etc.)—I came to see my research as relatively conventional in 
its methodological expression; if there was a "giving over," it was only partial, heavily 
guided by the demands of a knowledge project. The circulation of research objects 
indicates that a drifting/following methodology (a-developin' among them others in 
different places, autres lieus) might have been more appropriate. Instead, my work in the 
field seemed to conform to quite traditional notions of participant observation, with 
formal and semi-structured interviews supplying the bulk of ethnographic data. I 
wondered if this more traditional approach is a preliminary requisite, falling in line with 
Marcus' notion of a "first project." The conventional methodology that emerged seemed 
necessary for becoming grounded, accepted, or embedded in the field site. After 
achieving a certain level of comfort in the region, perhaps a "second project" might enjoy 
greater possibility—including a series of breach experiments which continually come to 
mind (e.g., the subtle use of CPK vestments in interviews, or requesting Anlong Veng 
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villagers perform scenes from life under Pol Pot/Ta Mok for visiting tourists, etc.). There 
are ways in which the absurdity of this ministerial project summons the simulacral 
implosiveness of Baudrillardian games (Anlong Veng a la Disneyland or a la Colonial 
Williamsburg). 
In addition to questioning regarding a not-so-experimental methodology, I 
harbored reservations about my intellectual capacity in the research process, especially as 
patterns and themes appeared as the natural(?!) tendency of (my own) Western thought. 
Although the attempt to grasp patterns and concepts (Begrifferi) out of perceived reality 
may make for adequate social science, this tendency drifts far from the emanation of 
difference, the interpretation of gaps and interruptions, or Stephen Tyler's estranging 
"vision quest," which might characterize more creative academic projects. Further, in the 
writing of culture, this text betrays the dialectical character of ecriture (a mise en scene of 
ethnography): breaking within the coo-cooing of everyday running discourse, language 
seduces the subject with the supposed precision of assumed signifieds (a wordsmith's 
dilemma), but exhibits its radical instability in every moment of its paradigmatic-
syntagmatic procession—a veiled [availed] impossibility waiting to irrupt at every 
utterance, every tear. In sum, I would offer that although this work produces interesting 
ideas and reflections (spurred by interactions with Khmers around the project of historical 
self-representation), this research, emerging from a fairly conventional methodological 
approach recurrently encountered the trap of thematization and its totalizing effects. 
Perhaps these hesitations will have affirmed an unbounded provisional saying, otherwise 
their own (propre), right here in this text (en ce moment meme dans cet ouvrage).... 
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Notes on Informant Confidentiality 
Names of most informants have been changed to protect these individuals. The 
exceptions to this rule are individuals who are seen to be already in the public spotlight, 
principally officials. Following this journalistic convention and obscuring identity 
through other means are warranted because of potentially severe consequences for 
individuals who disclose sensitive information. Cambodia's history of violence, tradition 
of revenge, and propensity for reprisals based on politics or patronage clearly 
demonstrate the need for this precaution. 
Notes on Names 
According to Cambodian convention, family name precedes given name. When 
referring to Cambodians, this text follow that convention; this is obvious in the 
bibliography where the comma separating "last" from "first" name has been omitted. 
More generally, this works follow the journalistic practice of using the given name for 
subsequent references; for example, Sam Rainsy [Sam = family name; Rainsy = given 
name] would be referred to as Rainsy or even Mr. Rainsy. 
For Cambodians, one's actual name is reserved mainly for legal use; it is 
considered relatively impolite to address people by their proper names. Nicknames are 
the norm, and these are often derived from bodily characteristics—typically unfavorable 
characteristics, by Western or Cambodian standards (e.g. "Tubby," "Fatso," "Blackie," 
etc.)—or from a shortening of the given name, where generally the last syllable is used 
(e.g., Daravuth tnrtfn become Vuth it\). This name may or may not be preceded by a 
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formal or familial form of address. As an example, this author, Timothy (GHMJ or SHE), 
might be called Thy (thii E), Mr. Thy (lauk thii vxm % pronounced like "Mr. T"), Uncle 
Thy (pou thii n s), or Older Brother Thy (bang thii ua G). 
Notes on Terminology 
Cambodia (khembaudea rujHtjqi), Kampuchea (kdmpuchea fretfi)? Cambodian 
people generally refer to their country in two ways: the land of Khmers (srok khmaer 
jMfitsi) or the country of Kampuchea (brdtes kdmpuchea {utQMfiHtji). Descendants of 
Kambu (Kambu-ja) is one explanation of the original territorial designation. Thion offers 
interesting conjecture on the names of various countries within peninsular Southeast 
Asia; he asserts that names (references) pertaining to this area evolved from early Indian 
encounters, wherein the newly arrived re-mapped familiar ethnic or geographical terms 
onto new areas (yuon from Iona/Yona, kambuja from the Iranian Kambojas, Champa 
from Bengal).1 He reasons that each of these (new) designations derived from prominent 
but partial characteristics that the Indians observed among the Southeast Asian peoples: 
"Champa meant 'half-Hinduized,' Kampboja 'casteless' and Yona 'non-Hindu 
foreigner.'"2 The rendering "Cambodia" seems to reflect Portuguese influences in the 
Western naming of this area. Officially the name of the country is the Kingdom of 
Cambodia (preah reachanachakr kdmpuchea tnsntjmnratfi fratfi). Thus, "Kampuchea" 
indicates a more accurate transliteration of the Khmer signifier for Cambodia, but it is 
'Thion, Watching Cambodia, app. 5. 
2
 Ibid., p. 238. 
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imbued with the historical period of Democratic Kampuchea. In line with its explicitly-
stated rejection of foreign influences the Khmer Rouge sought a rendering of its name 
which more accurately reflected the way the name of the country is pronounced in 
Khmer. (The irony of this official xenophobia lies in a number of areas: the modern 
concept of nation and Angkor Wat as a symbol of that newly-gifted nationhood as well as 
the extra-national origins of theories of revolution from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao.) 
Cambodians and Khmer. "Khmer" (hi), used less often in this work as a 
reference to a group of people, denotes a person of a specific ethnicity. While dominated 
by people of this ethnic descent, Cambodia is in fact populated by groups of people who 
are of various backgrounds: Vietnamese, Chinese, Sino-Khmer, Cham, Kuy, Phnong, etc. 
In everyday use, "Khmer" (khmaer) is used to distinguish between groups, notably the 
ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese who populate the country; however, it is 
significant to note that Cambodians often refer to Sino-Khmer people simply as Khmer, 
neglecting any ethnic distinction. In this regard, this work will use "Cambodian" to refer 
to citizens of the country, without reference to ethnic origin. The spoken Khmer 
language rarely employs an equivalent of this term (brdcheaporloroat khmaer {utficiccsig tsi 
or brdcheachorn khembaudean {ptfitia tiBtrogia); "Cambodian people" (brdcheachorn 
khmaer {ptfitfa tsi) re-translated into English would be "Khmer people." "Khmer" has 
been a pivotal political rallying point as Cambodia was bequeathed a modern notion of 
the nation, with successive regimes making reference to the preservation and celebration 
of the "Khmer race" (puch khmaer ntitsi), where "race" broadly encompasses family, 
geno-, species, stock, seed (Sanskrit/Pali bija). 
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Cambodia's Communists: "Khmer Rouge." This remains the least specific of 
terms used herein. Originally, this was the epithet Sihanouk gave the Cambodian 
communist movement in the 1960s: "red Khmer" (khmaer krdhdm {gi|nui'H). My 
informants used the appellation to cover various episodes of the communist movement: 
pre-1970 stirrings, FUNK/GRUNK (1970-1975), DK (1975-1979), and post-1979 after-
effects. It is a label that spans the time prior to and after the formal existence of the 
organization that was led by Pol Pot. It can index the communist movement, its 
leadership, its peasant base ("base people"), the time period dating from 17 April 1975 to 
7 January 1979, a faction within the tripartite anti-Vietnamese coalition based along the 
border with Thailand, an outlawed guerrilla movement, and the villagers living in areas 
that ceased being under Democratic Kampuchea control in 1999. Nowadays, most 
English-language news reports refer to participants in this movement as former Khmer 
Rouge; however, a number of Cambodians (including tourism officials with whom I 
worked) continue to simply call them Khmer Rouge. Following the flexible use of the 
term by Cambodians (and informants for my research) in everyday speech, "Khmer 
Rouge" is used as a term of most general reference. When describing the moments 
within Cambodian Communist development, this work has attempted to eschew 
references to this vague label. In the context of discussing Anlong Veng, the term 
"Khmer Rouge" is used frequently, because it reflects (local) informant and Tourism 
Ministry usage; it also helps avoid the convoluted monikers that the movement assumed 
in its various post-1979 iterations (for purely pragmatic and strategic reasons): DK, 
CGDK, CPK, PDK, National Solidarity Party, PGNUNS, etc. Democratic Kampuchea is 
a more exact term. Although it is used to demarcate the "Pol Pot period" (1975-1979), 
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the official establishment of the government under that name did not occur until 1976. In 
this work, the broader definition is used, which incorporates the three years, eight 
months, and 20 days that began 17 April 1975. Similarly, the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea was founded in name in 1966. However, the organization bears roots from 
the Indochinese Communist Party (1931-1951). When the Indochinese Communist 
struggle was broken up along national lines (in accordance with the Geneva Convention), 
the Cambodian faction became the KPRP, later changed to the KWP to more accurately 
reflect its self-ordained Marxist-Leninist orientation. As the leaders of Cambodia's 
communist movement sensed the maturation of their struggle, the name CPK was 
assumed. However, the existence of this Party was kept secret, publicly declared only 
long after victory and capture of Phnom Penh. 
Notes on Language and Orthography 
The Khmer alphabet consists of 33 consonants (with built-in redundancy—two 
"voices" or registers), 20 vowels (each expressing two possible sounds), and 14 
independent vowels.3 The consonants are laid out in the Indie alphabet groupings (velars, 
palatals, retroflexes, dentals, labials, and miscellaneous). Technically, the Khmer 
language (its writing system/script) is categorized as an abugida or syllabic alphabet; that 
is, the component consonants each have an inherent vowel sound (e.g., kd n, khd s, kor R, 
3
 The rarely-used independent vowels are included in the transliteration chart below, in boxes which 
correspond to their equivalent sound. These vowels are derived from the eight Pali vowel sounds (sara 
!«:): a (H), a (ffi), / (fl), / (fjj),« (S), u (a), e (iJ), o (§)> and additionally ai (g). In addition to these are the 
independent vowels (with Sanskrit equivalents): /•/ (y reu), fl (y reur), Ifi (g leu), Iri (g leur). Lastly, the 
vowel § (ov), which is sometimes (mistakenly) interchanged with Si (ov) (Headley, Cambodian-English 
Dictionary; Huffman, Cambodian System of Writing and Beginning Reader; and Paen Setharin, Reading 
Studybook [trajftniujsma]). 
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khor ui, etc.) which can be modified by the addition of a vowel or diacritic (e.g., kaa m, 
khaa m, kea tn, khea xm, etc.). Subscript forms of consonants are used inconsonant 
clusters (e.g., srd pj, strd |M, etc.) 
Across English and French texts using Cambodian, the Khmer script has not been 
graced with a systematic or consistent transliteration system. Most authors implement 
their own system, sometimes building off previous attempts, other times inventing wholly 
new systems. The key sources for many transliterations are Huffman's adaptation based 
on the International Phonetic Alphabet and the more Roman-friendly system used by 
Heder and Ledgerwood.4 Encountering various renderings of the Khmer language in a 
Romanized script can been frustrating; thus, wherever possible I have included the 
Khmer script along with a transliteration. In choosing and developing a transliteration 
system, I pursued a couple goals, which sometimes became contradictory. With the 
system I have adapted (largely from Heder and Ledgerwood), I sought to preserve and 
convey the letters used in the language, even if letters are silent (e.g., reastr njcu) or 
radically differ from the English letter used (e.g., the final s on transliterated words, 
which would be pronounced as if it were an h). Additionally, I attempted to minimize the 
amount of diacritics that were required to render specific sounds. Exceptions to the 
scheme are names of places or people that are already commonly recognized and widely 
used, for example the province of Kratie (krdcheh roras); as well, informants provided 
their own transliterations of their monikers, sometimes diverging widely from established 
convention. The transliteration scheme adhered to in this work is as follows. 
4
 Huffman, Cambodian System of Writing and Beginning Reader, pp. 6-11; Heder & Ledgerwood, 
Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia, p. xvii. 
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To the non-Khmer-speaking reader, the long (natural) sound of the first register consonants will be 
indistinguishable from the shortened form produced by the bdntdk [-] as in dap [bottle] (long) and dap [ten] 
(short). 
Before a velar final, as in neak [person]. 
6
 When the final consonant, it is written nh, as inpenh [full]. 
7
 When the final consonant, it is writtenp, as inynap [night]. 
8
 When the final consonant, although written s, it has an h sound. 
9
 When subscript to another consonant, as in s 'aat [clean]. 
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Having hoped to use the Khmer Unicode recently developed for the Macintosh by 
XenoType Technologies, technical difficulties—-the unpredictable nature of Apple font 
technology rendering complex scripts through various OS X releases—made this 
unrealistic. I have instead relied on the old system of using a font that depicts the Khmer 
script; this work uses almost exclusively the Limon SI and Limon Rl fonts. 
Notes on Money and Currency 
The Cambodian currency is the riel. The riel is available in 50, 100, 200, 500, 
1,000,2,000 (rare), 5,000,10,000, and 50,000 note denominations. There are no coins in 
the country's currency. The Cambodian economy is largely dollarized; that is, US dollars 
are the principal currency that are used throughout much of the country. Thai Baht and 
Vietnamese Dong are also used, particularly in border areas. In former Khmer Rouge 
zones (along the west, northwest, and northern parts of the country), prices are often 
quoted in Thai Baht (but conversion was quite simple, adding two zeros to the price Baht 
to arrive at the price in riel). Although the exchange fluctuated between 3500 and 4100 
riel to the dollar during my stay in the country, this work generally uses the 4000 riel (i) 
to one dollar (US$) rate to simplify conversion. Often, prices were discussed in dollars, 
in which case I have not converted them into riel; when monetary amounts were 
discussed in riel, I have supplied the US dollar amount according to a 4000 riel exchange 
rate. 
Notes on Measurements 
Cambodia follows the metric system. For the most part (some distances being an 
exception), this work has as well. Electricity (power) is measured in kilowatts (kW) 
HBjhri (R.J). Conversion rates for common measurements are as follows: 
Area pjitti 
1 hectare (ha) ™?n<ui) 
10,000 sq. meters (m2) reprnm <H.ft> 
Length juffts 
1 kilometer (km) fi8jiHp(R.H> 
1 meter (m)tHip(H) 
Weight 9HB 
100 gram (g) pia CR> 
1 kilogram (kg) rajp-iHctui) 
Volume siujs 
1 liter (1) rajnciu) 
1 cubic meter (m3) Itipiu (H.R> 
2.471 acres 
2.471 acres 
0.62 miles (mi) 
3.28 feet (ft) 
3.53 ounces (oz) 
2.2 pounds (lb) 
1.06 quarts (qt) 
35.31 cubic feet (ft3) 
"So you been to school for a year or two 
And you know you've seen it all..." 
CHAPTER 1 
"Entering Cambodia by air from the west, the brief flight from Thailand to Phnom 
Penh offers a capsule view of many historic and contemporary features of the nation. 
One's first sight of the country is forested mountains which appear deserted and 
impregnable. Yet, in many such regions of Cambodia, especially in the east, live 'tribal' 
peoples who are perhaps descendants of the earliest inhabitants of Southeast Asia. The 
next significant view is a glimpse of the famous Angkor Wat, once a magnificent 
complex of structures built during the glory of the ancient Khmer empire and now 
monumental masses of grey-brown ruins set within the encroaching green of the jungle. 
The flight continues over Lake Tonle Sap, like a huge inland sea dotted with fish weirs, 
then along the Tonle Sap River flowing south to meet the Mekong. In the lowlands is a 
ubiquitous pattern of irregularly shaped rice paddies, their dikes spreading a great web 
across the countryside, broken by waterways, roads, and clusters of houses in villages and 
towns. Finally the traveller lands at a small, modern airport in Phnom Penh to be 
enveloped by warm, moist air. A drive into the city gives a jumbled impression of green 
palms, black-clothed figures, European villas, pile dwellings, and glaring sun....1 
"Near the central food market in Phnom Penh is a line of buses painted in 
flamboyant colors as if to give moral support to their rattletrap bodies. Boarding the one 
that goes to Kompong Kantuot the traveller begins his journey to Svay. By regular car 
the trip takes about half an hour, but the bus ride lasts an hour or longer because of 
numerous stops along the way to discharge some passengers and pick up others, or to 
1 
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satisfy the driver's whim to stop for a snack. Leaving Phnom Penh, one passes by large 
apartment buildings, stucco villas, and the airport which speaks of modernity. Then one 
enters the quiet countryside: miles of palms and rice fields, brilliant green in the rainy 
season and sere brown in the dry months, interrupted periodically by clusters of houses 
and shops, paths leading to distant villages, and serene Buddhist temples. Finally the bus 
coasts into the market place of Kompong Kantuot, the town nearest to Svay. The 
traveller now hails a remorque, a rural bicycle cab, for the three kilometer ride to Svay 
(often sharing the cab with other people who are returning home after marketing or a trip 
to the city). Going quickly past the shops lining the road through town, then the primary 
school, a temple, a village, and the inevitable rice paddies and palms, the remorque 
arrives at the path leading from the highway to West Hamlet Svay. Gathering one's 
bundles, one starts the short walk down the path that covers one's legs with mud in the 
rainy season and with dust in the dry season. If one has not already encountered villagers 
who are taking cattle to pasture or rice to the millers or going elsewhere, one is almost 
certain to see people fishing, wading, or bathing oxen at the huge waterhole along the 
path. The village is almost invisible behind the verdant growth of trees and bushes that 
encircle the hamlet, but one finally passes through a crude gate marking the entrance of 
West Svay. As one weaves among the thatch and wooden houses, people call out their 
usual greeting: 'Where are you coming from?' 'What do you have?' as they look up from 
their tasks or as they sit chatting at one another's homes. Children come running; the 
dogs set up a fearful clamor. One has arrived in Svay."2 
•3 
More than three decades after May Ebihara's fruitful and happy arrival in the field, 
this researcher lands in the land of smiling Khmers and some of the same idyllic features 
will reveal themselves in a long-unfolding scene of arrival. 
@t @t @> 
After ten hours in the air over the Pacific Ocean, I was sitting in the Narita airport, 
waiting for a connecting flight to deliver me to the balmy smog of one night in Bangkok. 
As I stared out the window, I saw that JAL had added a slogan to the tail of its Boeing 
747—"We support UNICEF"—and I was reminded of the murky history that marks my 
earliest awareness of Kampuchea. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Halloween pleas for 
candy were accompanied by pleas for donations for UNICEF. The explanation of this 
practice that I received as a child was that we were raising money to help the starving 
Cambodians who were being bombed. Later on, more popular references to 
Cambodia/Kampuchea would emerge from the Dead Kennedys and Spalding Gray as 
well as brief moments of informational endowments from Robert MacNeil and Jim 
Lehrer. Cambodia was something of an unknown and uninvestigated for me, somewhat 
surprisingly, given my undergraduate attention to Marxist revolutionary movements.3 
On the 4th of July weekend of 1997 in Seattle, Washington, I haphazardly ran into 
a friend from my days at UC, Santa Cruz, who had been working as a journalist in Phnom 
Penh. Having been familiar with my brigadista work in Nicaragua (shortly after the 
tenth anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution), he suggested I visit Cambodia. The 
enigma of the destination and the desire for another rewarding episode of solidarity work 
•
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drew me to this invitation. As we were ruminating on the possibilities of my travel to the 
far Southeast, a coup deforce was unifying a bifurcated government that had been left in 
place by the United Nations. Although not clear at that moment, the fight—principally, a 
slaughter of FUNCINPEC political leaders and generals by Hun Sen loyalists—was 
intimately related to events around Anlong Veng and its fading leadership.4 As Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh's negotiators made agreements with the Khmer Rouge leadership, 
Hun Sen responded to the threat of being beaten to the punch of integrating the ex-
communist outlaws. Yoked by cross-border trade with Thais along the Dangrek 
Mountains, these remnant forces had been eking out a troublesome existence. 
A good portion of that initial five-month trip in the rainy season of 1998 was a 
long, and mostly unsuccessful, search for work of the solidarity or volunteer variety. 
With upcoming parliamentary elections, most agencies in Cambodia would not commit to 
putting an idle foreigner to work. Nonetheless, the highlights of this preliminary 
exposure included: election observation, vast travel through the country's environs, 
volunteer work at a Veterans International project in the remote rurality of Tbeng 
Meanchey, and much preparation for a return the following year to take the reins of spin 
doctor for the country's leading dissident. 
In that next fin-de-siecle foray, I saw the supposedly democratic opposition 
dominated by an autocratic populism borne of an aristocratic heir to the country's most 
acclaimed abusive ambassador of an era passed.5 Pleasantly surprised by the critical 
capacities of the Party's cabinet members, I was simultaneously taken aback by the 
leader's desire to control every aspect of the Party as well as the nation's most militant 
trade union. Perhaps if I saw myself as Cambodia's hope for an incorruptible liberal 
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democratic tradition and had been the myopic target of a grenade attack a couple years 
earlier, I may have also seen the need to micromanage the vehicle for the country's 
populist expressions.6 The will of the personality governed and typically overrode the 
critical contributions of the Party elite, with his spouse (an heiress of another 
republicanism7) being the key exception. I established long-term friendships with the 
staff with whom I worked, and I greatly admired their youthful enthusiasm and critical 
thinking in attempting to shape the political destiny of their country. 
The rainier visit of 1999 provided the opportunity to work for Sam Rainsy, 
receive proper instruction in the Cambodian language, and explore more of the lay of the 
Khmer land. Arriving late on my own arrival scene, with my connections to Cambodia 
already in motion, my field research on the museumification of the Khmer Rouge 
movement would not formally commence until 2002. 
©@> @* 
A voyage or two to the 'Bodge* and the requisite intellectual preparation instilled 
a fascination with the people I had encountered as well as a profound interest in the 
complex history of this becoming-modern nation.9 Some of the lures that caught my 
fascination: the then-prince's political balancing act in the Sangkum Reastr Niyum'0; the 
enduring presence of Sihanouk and the resurgence of familiar historical figures 
throughout Cambodia's post-colonial period; the excesses of the Khmer Republic led by 
the Western-oriented, yet-mystical Lon Nol; extreme tendencies (social leveling, 
collectivization, secrecy, brutality) of Democratic Kampuchea; some cultural and 
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historical constants that contextualize the rise of the Khmer Rouge, providing antecedents 
and continuities with other regimes; and Hun Sen's master politicking in a context that 
hints at a return to 1960/1970s-style turmoil.11 
The initial project idea for my dissertation on Cambodia was a community-based, 
collaborative museum endeavor that would invite locals into a space to share their 
recollections of the recent past of their country and participate in some form of historical 
representation. The museum would be the dissertation project to which all involved 
(informants and researchers) would play participant. Although this concept piece drew 
together my interest in Cambodian history as well as some seductive theoretical 
possibilities that underwrite an experimental methodology12, the project was likely too 
ambitious for a doctoral dissertation, logistically difficult to implement, and culturally 
awkward (arrogant?) in suggesting that the foreigner was competent enough to share, in 
any managerial or collaborative way, the role of presenter of the native's history. Hun 
Sen's gift to my dissertation project arrived in the newspaper in late 2001; the prime 
minister decreed the preservation of sites within the Among Veng area for the purposes 
of preparing the region for historical tourism—a Khmer Rouge museum. 
While intrigued by the government-led efforts to construct a history museum, my 
initial reaction to the idea of converting the Anlong Veng sites into a sort of tourist area 
was largely fascination at the seeming absurdity of the project, an ironic sense of 
appreciation. Laying over 400 km from the country's bustling capital and 125 km from 
its capital of antiquity, Anlong Veng is remote for a tourist destination. I maintained an 
ambivalent relation to the prime minister's idea, which I largely characterized as the 
Cambodian government's newest attempt at "pimping its history of suffering." The sense 
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of absurdity has consistently been noted and sensationally conveyed by journalists who 
have authored pieces on the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold-becoming-museum, 
emphasizing the oddity of a KR "theme park."13 
A three-year hiatus from life in the 'Bodge had taken its toll on my Khmer 
linguistic capacity. The January 2002 arrival in the capital allowed the re-initiation of my 
tutoring sessions with Mme. Bora. I was introduced to this fascinating and effective 
teacher by a friend in 1999, and by that time she was already a popular tutor among a 
niche of ex-pats residing in the country's capital. In the early 1970s, Mme. Bora studied 
for her M. A. degree in French Literature at the Institute for Foreign Languages at the 
University of Phnom Penh; she also received instruction at the National Institute of 
Pedagogy. She married a military man who became a captain in the armed forces of the 
Khmer Republic. Through this marriage, she was distantly related to the dynasty of Lon 
Nol; on the rare occasions that she would talk about her past, she mentioned large family 
gatherings at the Marshal's villa that she attended. When the Khmer Rouge came to 
power, her husband was killed. During the Pol Pot years, she lost her three children and 
was deported to Battambang Province to work in a kitchen. She believes that she was 
supposed to be killed, which might have been expected for the wife of a Lon Nol soldier 
especially in the notoriously brutal Northwest Zone. However, she thinks that the local 
DK leaders simply forgot about her. The malnutrition she experienced during the Pol Pot 
years led her to become partially paralyzed, but leaving her sharp mental acuity intact. 
My lessons with Mme. Bora followed the established Cambodian pedagogy of learning 
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by rote and repetition, using the Khmer language books that are used by Cambodian 
schoolchildren. This traditional educational approach was interspersed with reading and 
discussing articles in the anti-CPP newspapers as well as random conversations about 
events in each other's lives. A couple months of tutoring and re-acquiring some 
linguistic competence preceded the first venturing out to the long abyss of fieldwork. 
The blue sign preliminary visit. In order to reach the long ditch of Anlong Veng 
from the capital, one risks life and limb on National Route 6 that follows the eastern 
coasts of the Tonle Sap river and lake to the town of Siem Reap 310 km away. Road 
conditions in Cambodia vary largely with the weather and national priority (political and 
economic), making arrival at one's destination by ground travel relatively 
unpredictable.14 I wagered that motorcycle provided the best odds for successful travel, 
but this mode of travel increased vulnerability in other ways. From Kompong Thorn 
town, the mid-way point from the capital, much of the highway seemed very much like I 
had left it in 1999: a deteriorating road, showing remnant chunks of pavement from its 
pre-war life and large stretches of dirt track marked by large ruts, gouged by the wheels 
of cargo trucks. Construction was underway—commune elections in 2002 and national 
elections in 2003 may have contributed to that endeavor—with significant enough 
grading allowing some traffic to reach 100 kph. The complication of dry season was the 
fine dust that was stirred up by vehicles, which blinded all other travelers in their wake. 
Even through the challenges of road conditions, the rural thoroughfare provided 
magnificent views: "miles of palms and rice fields, brilliant green in the rainy season and 
sere brown in the dry months, interrupted periodically by clusters of houses and shops, 
paths leading to distant villages, and serene Buddhist temples," as an academic kin has 
already noted. 
Arriving in Siem Reap absolutely filthy—after 4 hours in the dusty plumes of 
Kompong Thom Province—still left me 125 km from Anlong Veng. What became my 
monthly "commute" to my fieldwork site took me along the now-smooth circuit past the 
ancient temples of Angkor Wat, Pre Rup, Preah Khan, and, lastly, Banteay Srei where the 
bitumen ends and the laterite and hard pack begin. Rumors of an improved road quickly 
eroded as I maneuvered my way through a pitted dirt track past Kbal Spean, Srei Noy 
Village, and through the beautiful forest (prey s 'aat tjtirmn), which formed a natural 
defense shield around the greater Anlong Veng area.15 With time, I witnessed selective 
logging from this jungle, and each visit revealed the evidence of destroyed bridges and 
vehicles connected with de-forestation. Later, acreage of green was cleared to found new 
villages along the road through Oddar Meanchey Province. Like Longvek some 400 
years earlier, the natural defenses of Cambodia—in this case, the jungle palladium around 
the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold—were succumbing to the pursuit of wealth, only the 
trees were becoming the coinage themselves.16 
After a 2.5-hour journey from Angkor to Anlong Veng, I arrived late on the 
scene: March 2,2002. Not only had former Khmer Rouge military commander Ke Pauk 
recently passed away in the remote town,17 an entourage from the Ministry of Tourism 
led by Deputy Minister Dr. Thong Khon had toured the day before my arrival. However, 
I encountered their many remnants: about 30 little blue signs in the town of Anlong Veng 
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and its surrounding areas that demarcate sites of historical interest: "Pol Pot Was 
Cremated Here" (kdleng dot khmaoch pol port mauflmgiH tiro cm), "Ta Mok's House" 
(phteah ta mok ft* ITIHR) (this appears in a couple locations), and "Pol Pot's Secret House" 
(phteah samngat pol port tfc&fenti tiro tin), which was so secret I could not find it. The 
government delegation had erected signposts at the various sites within Anlong Veng 
district that would be included in its historical-tourist area. I caught up with the reports 
of journalistic acquaintances who conveyed the pronouncements that gave new interest to 
this once-embattled stronghold; Thong Khon stressed the pedagogical role of the 
historical sites for Cambodian youth as well as visiting internationals.18 
Anlong Veng, the former Khmer Rouge stronghold in Cambodia's 
northern border with Thailand, is rarely visited today, except by a handful 
of hardy foreigners. But if a government tourism zoning plan takes off, the 
jungles and mountains of the desolate area will become one of 
Cambodia's most popular destinations after the Angkor temples.... 
Officials hope that many of the approximately 330,000 tourists that 
visit Angkor annually will make their way on to Anlong Veng. 
The government has brushed aside criticism that it is morally 
unethical to make money from a horrific chapter in the history of the 
country that Cambodians are still trying to overcome. 
'We do this not as revenge but to educate the new generation about 
what the genocide has done to this nation,' Deputy Tourism Minister 
Thong Khon said during a recent visit to Anlong Veng.19 
From my first impressions20, the town felt very small, the nightlife (and day life) 
was not much beyond generator-powered karaoke and movie VCDs, and the quality of 
the food seemed to attest to a lack of resources. The people of Anlong Veng were 
definitely poor, in ways that the former Khmer Rouge of Pailin were not, based on my 
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1999 visit to the Northwest. Some have speculated this difference may be tied to the fact 
that Anlong Veng was the last Khmer Rouge base to defect/surrender to the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces, and that a significant level of distrust of the villagers still 
remains within the government and the RCAF. Hence, there may have been a diminished 
impetus for heavily subsidizing the reintegration process. Regardless, the inhabitants 
seemed optimistic about foreigners making the 4-hour car ride from Siem Reap21 to their 
town in order to visit the blue signs (many of the sites have yet to be rebuilt). It was odd 
(and perhaps bordering on the absurd), given that the residents seem unaccustomed to the 
presence of foreigners (parang tnnti). There was a lot of staring going on: the villagers at 
this American (aakeang mmfc) who could speak a bit of their language; and me at the 
villagers who were, as a whole, distinctively rural Khmer. 
My first full day solo in Anlong Veng, as related in my travel diary, presents what 
may constitute an ordinary Westerner's experience of touring the area's Khmer Rouge 
sites: 
Yesterday was my day to play tourist in Anlong Veng. I think I hit 
all the sites. I got up early and headed up the mountaintop. It is 
something of a rough road. Again, I can't imagine Anlong Veng being a 
big seller in the rainy season. The first site I stopped at was the place 
where Pol Pot was sentenced after his ousting. Not much to see but a 
partially built structure. There were some soldiers hanging out there— 
pretty funny guys. They had captured this small animal and were keeping 
it in a cage.... The soldiers were very helpful and pointed me in the 
direction of Pol Pot's house (10 km away); I had somehow missed the cut-
off for the cremation site already. The station where the soldiers were is 
200 m from the Thai border. It is so obvious that the KR danced in and 
across this border. It is also obvious how easily it would be (for the Thais) 
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to support this movement. All these soldiers are RCAF (and a Cambodian 
flag flies at each of the sites), but I am certain just 4 years ago these guys 
were fighting the RCAF. My general assessment is that everyone is happy 
that the war is over (except for Ta Mok maybe, who is no doubt missing 
his multiple mansions). 
On the way to Pol Pot's house, there is Ta Mok's (other) house. 
The ruins of the structure itself was not that impressive, but the grounds 
and view were quite nice. From the cliff area, he had a magnificent view 
of Anlong Veng below (on a clear day). There were some benches set up 
on the cliff amongst the bamboo. Quite pleasant. There was also 
something described as a "school" on the premises.... My guide Rik (a 
real kind guy who was missing many of his front teeth, but made up for it 
in the number of dogs that crowded his/our presence), led me to the top 
and bottom of the waterfall on the premises. There was no water, so it 
was not as spectacular as it could have been. From the school to the 
waterfall is probably about a 1-km walk. At the bottom of the waterfall, 
there were many empty rocket shells. So the waterfall was not only of 
aesthetic value but also served as a dumping ground. There was a sign (in 
Khmer) at the school that suggested tourists give lOOOr per person to the 
guide. Given this guy is not likely to see too many tourists for a while, 
and because I made him do the hiking to the waterfall, I left him with 
3000r. A good day to be a tour guide. 
I made the 7-km trek from Ta Mok's waterfall estate to Pol Pot's 
house. All the while, I kept thinking that these guys really had it good. 
They lived liked kings in these magnificent mountains of natural beauty. 
Remote and peaceful. Lots of trees and jungle brush. A few ponds along 
the road. This was peaceful living. On the way to Brother No. 1 's 
'house,' one passes a number of 'guard houses.' They have the requisite 
Ministry of Tourism blue sign, and they seem to be occupied. I can't see 
much tourist interest in actually "viewing" these, except to note the 
number of stations protecting Pol Pot. Just before Pol Pot's estate, there is 
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a sign that says 'Khieu Samphan's House.' There is a small, highly 
unused path which I opted not to follow. I think this structure must be on 
the 'to be rebuilt' agenda. 
Pol Pot's house was in ruins. In fact, I am not even sure it was the 
correct site. There was just a slab of concrete and a couple walls. 'Khieu 
Samphan's Office' seemed to be in better shape. There was a massive 
open area that I guess could have had a house in it. It looked more like an 
area that would have been used as a pool (but is now dried out). Maybe I 
should have taken one of those soldiers with me as a guide (as they had 
offered).... The structures in Anlong Veng were less intact and rely heavily 
on the visitor's imagination and deep historical knowledge. The temples 
in Siem Reap (reconstructed or not—Ta Prom) offer more to the Western 
visitor. Just hanging out in Anlong Veng is probably the most interesting 
aspect to the area. The people speak and look a bit different than other 
Khmers, and they seem curious about the barang that visit. But even this 
charm is going to wear away with time. 
From Pol Pot's ruined mansion, I headed back to find the 
cremation site.... I pulled up and a Khmer gentleman offered himself as a 
guide to the site. My guide, Somdara, has been tending to the site for the 
last three months. He said he was an international police in Phnom Penh 
before he decided to move to Anlong Veng. He led me down a path about 
2 m wide, lined with red sticks put in place by CMAC. As one walks the 
path, one can see the holes left from previous mines that have been 
removed. This was a little sketchy as far as I am concerned. I have to 
state that mined territory really wigs me out. I am glad the Halo Trust is 
doing its job. 
So Brother No. 1 's last remains lay under a corrugated tin shelter. 
A small rubber tire is visible through the ash. Some bottles or adornments 
have been placed at the head/tail of the cremation site. And it lays in the 
midst of a mine field. This is the end of Saloth Sar, a man many people 
describe as kind and intelligent and others describe as the mastermind of 
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Cambodia's killing fields. Whatever one's thoughts or feelings about the 
man, this grave site is less than spectacular. About 10 m from the 
cremation site is the remains of the house in which he spent his last days. 
No walls in this rubbish, only a Western-style toilet that has been broken. 
About all that one can make out is that the house was quite small."22 
Contact with the Ministry of Tourism was initiated in June 2002. This began with 
a meeting with Dr. Thong Khon, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Tourism, who is 
most responsible for implementing the Anlong Veng museum. At the time that the 
Khmer Rouge came to power, he had been studying medicine, but the communists 
seizure of power arrested his doctoral endeavors. Eighteen members of his family died 
during Pol Pot's rule. A decade later, the People's Republic of Kampuchea government 
would appoint him mayor of Phnom Penh. In this role and his current position, he has 
consistently shown an appreciation for the government's role in education: increasing the 
number of teachers at all levels of instruction, enrollment of all school-age children, and 
the importance of education to the enrichment of the country's youth.23 In my first 
informal interview, Khon laid out what he saw as the general aims of the project, 
principally to demonstrate "the crimes of the genocidal regime." The specific role of the 
movement's last stronghold to this end is as an historical site showing "the political life 
and lifestyle" of the Khmer Rouge, "for example, how Pol Pot worked, how the 
organization ran its meetings."24 Reconstructing the structures which housed this 
lifestyle is a primary task. 
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The "museum" is to encompass 38 destinations in Anlong Veng and its 
surrounding area, including many residences of the last Khmer Rouge elites, Pol Pot's 
cremation site, and the makeshift court where Pol Pot was sentenced by his former 
comrades. The dilapidated structures are to be reconstructed exactly as they were in the 
past by the same carpenters who built them originally.25 Objects such as radio trucks, 
prisoner cages, wartime billboards, personal possessions (e.g., furniture) of the former 
KR elite, as well as video and photographic materials are to be put on display within one 
of the main structures of this in situ museum.26 In order to accomplish this endeavor, the 
Ministry is compelled to proceed along some logical stepping stones as it authors its 
"master plan" for Anlong Veng: demining the areas where tourists will be visiting, the 
construction of a major signboard in the center of Anlong Veng town detailing the area's 
historical offerings, training of tour guides, and locating funding to support 
reconstructions and restorations. Once completed, the master plan will go to the Royal 
Cambodian Government for approval, upon which the actual rebuilding of the sites will 
be able to commence. 
In our initial conversations, one of Khon's overwhelming concerns was the 
approach to the historical material that would generate the content and overall message of 
the historical-tourist areas. The method the Ministry of Tourism was to pursue would 
begin with accurate documentation; as Khon said, "First, we must get exact, real 
documents. Based on these, we can do everything."27 The Ministry, with the 
participation of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), was to organize 
research teams to interview Anlong Veng residents about the history of specific sites in 
the area that related to the Khmer Rouge and its leaders. The Ministry would collect this 
16 
data and send it to DC-Cam for confirmations and corrections. The information provided 
by Anlong Veng locals would be cross-checked with documents, principally in the DC-
Cam archives as well as some held by the Royal Academy.28 DC-Cam has over the 
years become the de facto repository for documents and materials (photographs, video, 
etc.), relating to the Khmer Rouge while in power as well as any information about their 
time before and after Democratic Kampuchea, that might help shed light on the crimes 
committed under Pol Pot. As stated by its motto, the mission of DC-Cam is "searching 
for the truth." The function of this organization is the preservation of historically 
relevant documents but also the collection and preparation of evidence for a trial of 
Khmer Rouge members who committed atrocities. 
Authenticity/validity (principally, the idea of a singular truth about a series of 
historical events) and accurate documentation (as a means of securing truth) emerged as 
key themes in conversations with a number of Ministry of Tourism officials (working 
group members), as they pored over materials from DC-Cam, interviews with people 
from Anlong Veng, and other documents assembled by professors at the Royal Academy 
of Phnom Penh. Khon and others provided a sense that what is needed is a scientific 
approach, methodology, and understanding for the depiction of Khmer Rouge life— 
through the examination of documents deemed authentic, cross-referenced with 
interviews from individuals.29 
In late 2002, the key issues plaguing the Tourism Ministry's efforts were 
landmines and a lack of funding. The Cambodian Mine Action Committee (CMAC) had 
been charged with clearing the mines from the tourists destinations in Anlong Veng. 
(The other major de-mining organization, the Halo Trust, which occupied a massive 
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compound in Anlong Veng town, was not involved in the tourism effort, as their mandate 
for the area focused solely on making land available to new inhabitants/farmers.) With 
funding from Germany, CMAC's Demining Unit 6 extended its normal humanitarian 
duties to include the removal of mines and UXO from tourist destinations in Sierh Reap 
and Oddar Meanchey Provinces, in conjunction with the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of 
Culture and Fine Arts, and the Apsara Authority.30 In Anlong Veng, this work focused 
on mines in and around National Route 67 and the individual locations along the 
escarpment near the Thai border where tourists would be guided. 
Financing the establishment of a historical-tourist area in Anlong Veng proved to 
be the larger hurdle for the Ministry of Tourism. Although Prime Minister Hun Sen 
issued the edict to begin the conversion of the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold into an 
historical-tourist area, the Royal Cambodian Government was not prepared to supply 
funds for the initial signposts, nor did it allocate the US$15,00-30,000 that the Ministry 
estimated it required to develop a master plan, which would be submitted for royal 
approval. As well, the national government would not be in a position to cover the lion's 
share of support for carrying out the actual reconstruction of sites and collection of 
artifacts that would come to constitute the museum. Tourism officials at all 
administrative levels repeatedly communicated that they lacked any monetary support to 
carry out this project and that, consequently, they were forced to seek funding from the 
business community.32 
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Cambodia's western terrain is largely flatland in the center contained (and 
protected) by a series of low mountain ranges, clockwise from the southwest to the north: 
Elephant Mountains, Cardamom Mountains, and Dangrek Mountains. The areas of the 
east, and northeast particularly, are dominated by rolling hills covered in dense jungle. 
At the heart of the country is the great Tonle Sap Lake, a violin-shaped basin which 
quintuples in size as seasonal fluctuations in rainfall reverse the river's current. Four 
rivers—Tonle Sap, Bassac, and the upper and lower Mekong34—drain the floodplains of 
the country's interior; a Quatre-Bras cross (chdtommuk BSJHS), or an immense K, forms at 
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the confluence of these rivers just outside the main gates of the Royal Palace in the 
capital city of Phnom Penh.35 A complement of lesser rivers (steung wa) empty into the 
central lake, completing a hydrological network that appears "a bit like the spokes of a 
wheel."36 The radial originating in the Dangrek Mountain Range, Stung Sreng (fStif tniti), 
etches its reach to the shores of the great lake carving out a long pit or ditch (Anlong 
Veng HsStJa) which cuts through Oddar Meanchey Province before dissecting Siem Reap 
from Banteay Meanchey.37 Smaller rivulets, such as Anlong Veng's Chiik Stream (H Sn), 
supply the tributary with mountain-range runoff and floodwaters of the monsoon season. 
The kingdom's territory is divided administratively into 20 provinces (khaet tstj) 
and four municipalities (krong Tfiia).38 Provinces range having from three to 11 districts 
(srok jam), called quarters (khan siui) in the municipalities. Districts are further broken 
down into communes (khum ui) or subdistricts, called wards or precincts (sdngkat Mtiisi) in 
the municipalities.39 A small number of villages generally make up one commune; the 
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unit of administration within the village is the household. Anlong Veng is one of five 
districts in Oddar Meanchey Province.40 This northern province of victory is bordered by 
Preah Vihear to the east, Siem Reap (home to Angkor Wat) to the southland Banteay 
Meanchey to the west. The district's five communes include: Lumtong (cu9ti), Anlong 
Veng (Hatiftti), Thlat (gin), Trabaing Tauv ({Rmtimf), and Trabaing Prey ({pmti{mij). The 
district stretches from a dense jungle in the south, Prey S'aat (tpifijin), up to the Thai 
border in the Dangrek Mountains. 
The town of Anlong Veng is about 12 km from the base of the mountain range, 
which forms the natural border with Thailand. Most of the 30 or so historical-tourist sites 
are within Trabaing Prey Commune, which technically includes the areas along the top of 
the escarpment along the Thai border. Informants describe "Anlong Veng" (the district 
below, or, Anlong Veng proper) in contrast to the various areas of the escarpment: Pass 
808 (ijjfi tfod), Choam Pass (pR ft), Mountain 200 (g laoo), Kbal Ansaong (rrpnjgtsjiy). In 
terms of how Cambodians talk about the place, the primary sites of interest are: Ta Mok's 
house on the lake, Ta Mok's house on the cliff, Pol Pot's house, Pol Pot's cremation site. 
Some lesser sites include the building in which Pol Pot was sentenced, Khieu Samphan's 
house, the burial site of the Son Sen family, and Ta Mok's "hospital." The sites are 
marked by the presence of little blue signs that simply state in Khmer and English the 
name of the site. 
In 2002, the population of the district was said to be approximately 40,000. I 
received estimates that 20% of the residents are from other provinces (new arrivals, or 
"new people" to borrow a category from the past), while the remaining 80% are former 
Khmer Rouge soldiers and families. A massive influx of people to the district, in search 
of economic opportunity, are equalizing that ratio. Ethnically, the area remains quite 
homogeneous, with Khmer (and Sino-Khmer, who often identify as Khmer) constituting 
almost the entire population; surprisingly (given the Khmer Rouge's war rhetoric and 
antagonistic relationship with Vietnam), a small number of ethnic Vietnamese have 
moved to the area, to take up employment in woodwork (ornate carving).41 
Although administratively re-integrated, the area's technological infrastructure 
was very much on par with other remote towns in the Cambodian countryside. As early 
as 2002, rumors spread that mobile phone service was imminent. Since this 
communications means did not arrive until almost three years later, contact with the 
outside world was confined to local two-way radio (ICOM) and travel. Electricity was 
available through a local grid that was powered by a large generator; it ran from 6AM to 
10PM with a two outage periods in the morning and the evening. Supplementary power 
was available for those residents or business owners who possessed smaller generators of 
their own. Well-water was available at some individual homes/businesses or was 
collectively shared at centralized pumps, which were typically hand operated, although 
some could be drawn by generator power. Besides lighting and power tools, electricity 
was consumed for television and karaoke. Given that reception offered only one or two 
Thai stations, much viewing was of movies on VCD (a lot of Chinese action flicks); the 
town seemed well-supplied with VCD equipment, harboring a number of food stalls, 
drinking establishments, brothels, and karaoke venues which broadcast VCD sound and 
images. 
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Three principal variety stores dominated local commerce, offering goods from 
hardware to office supplies to packaged food and drinks. The new market provided stalls 
of assorted household goods and cooking ingredients as well as fresh produce. Various 
repair shops were frequent, typically specializing in autos, trucks, motos, or hardware; 
sometimes these operations were linked to a petrol station. Four pharmacies intermingled 
with other business ventures, typically run by an employee from the hospital and his 
family (e.g., one shop vending drugs and nuptial materials).42 Non-governmental 
organizations with a presence in Anlong Veng included Medecins Sans Frontieres, World 
Food Programme, Red Cross, CMAC, and the Halo Trust. Some Samraong-based 
agencies (e.g., Zola and Health Unlimited) also provided services in the district. 
In 2002, Anlong Veng had seven guesthouses, two of which seemed to double as 
brothels. The most established accommodations were offered at the homes of two deputy 
district chiefs, October 23 and Prodigal Son guesthouses, the former being more 
established and the latter being more upscale. Four restaurants (pochniythaan tmtiacoiJia) 
with made-to-order food (mhaup kommdng gutiHti) constituted the upper crust of local 
cuisine. Eateries (haang bay untitnai), with pre-cooked offerings (mhaup chdmensrap 
HUHHSIMTO) laid out in pots, abounded; the exact number becomes imprecise as market 
benches, offering small specialty meals, such as curried vermicelli noodles (num 
bdnhchok auniR), and coffee shops, that provide pre-prepared snacks, mingle together in 
the market's food area. This variety is further supplemented by occasional fruitshake 
(teukkrdlok sfitngjfi) and other roadside drink stands. 
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Anlong Veng's history can be demarcated in a number of ways. One might 
pinpoint the original pre-history of Anlong Veng as beginning in Year Zero or even 
before, as pre-triumph liberated zone or pastoral scene of the Sangkum era. The district 
town rested at a heavily-forested crossroads, where the old Route 63 from Siem Reap met 
Road 69 which joined Samraong and eventually Sisophon to the west and Choam Khsan 
(Preah Vihear) to the east, and where a village market was large enough to give Anlong 
Veng a plot on the map.43 The long hole etched by the Stung Sreng had been referred to 
as "thieves' village" (phum chaor mfrtni) in earlier times, claim some of its current 
residents, as the remote locale might provide cover for bandits or criminals on the run. 
Rural economic life consisted of farming and extracting resources from the surrounding 
jungle, very much like areas of Cambodia that remain forested today. 
An emergent historicity, a pre-History, encompasses the Democratic Kampuchea 
period, 1975-1979. Under Pol Pot and even during the war against Lon Nol, Anlong 
Veng fell within Region 106 (Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey). At least as early as May 
1972, it had already succumbed to the Khmer Rouge's growing liberated zone, providing 
a forested town not far from the eastern front of the NADK's drive to take over Oddar 
Meanchey completely.44 (The following year it was well within the GRUNK's liberated 
interior.45) Democratic Kampuchea administration consisted of seven zones 
(phoumipheak frairm) subdivided into regions or sectors (tdmbdn mis), both levels cut 
across pre-revolutionary administrative units.46 The secretary of Region 106 (Siem 
Reap-Oddar Meanchey) was Pa Thol (alias Soth) who answered to his superior at the 
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North Zone, secretary Koy Thuon (alias Khuon).47 After the early 1977 (26 February - 6 
March) purge of most of the Zone's top cadre, Anlong Veng fell into the re-designated 
Sector 44,48 This early purge would ultimately put Thuon's rival, North Zone military 
commander Ke Pauk, in charge of the area and send Soth and hundreds within his 
network {khsae roryeak tsjira:) of patronage to their tortured deaths at Santebal 's S-21 
security office, now known as the Toul Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes. The net 
effect for the subjects of the communist revolution remaining in the areas around Anlong 
Veng were more severe living conditions: harsher punishments, communal eating, and 
more drastic adherence to Angkor's policies. 
The district's becoming-historical takes off with the retreat of the Cambodian 
Communists into Thailand as the Vietnamese, that "historic enemy," invades the territory 
and liberates the population from a revolution which had gone awry (bending north-
and/or Westward). This "pre-History," following Pol Pot, embeds itself within the post-
DK but pre-Ta Mok years: the Vietnamese occupation and the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK), 1979-1989. Some of the post-revolutionary population fled to the 
Thai border with their old masters and found temporary accommodation, support, and 
oppression within a string of refugee camps dotting the border from Koh Kong to Preah 
Vihear. The Khmer Rouge and other seemingly patriotic, but noncommunist, factions 
formed bases and new recruiting (conscription) grounds, many of which were the very 
same camps that were meant to provide humanitarian assistance to the anticipated 
starving masses.49 The June 1982 re-organization of the refugee system under UNBRO 
and the formation of the tripartite Khmer coalition transformed the "safe zone" of camps 
into a series of military bases for making war with Cambodia's interior; put starkly, the 
"volag archipelago" (with support from the US, China, Thailand, and the UN) helped 
sustain a guerrilla operation against a government in power and essentially resuscitated a 
Khmer Rouge on the verge of dying out.50 
Anlong Veng's becoming-historical (for post-mortem purposes of tourist 
consumption) emerges with its capture by the NADK. With Vietnam's September 1989 
withdrawal of its occupying military forces, the Khmer Rouge was able to make inroads 
into the country's territory. A scythe of bases was formed along the western to northern 
borders, and area commanders were reshuffled.51 From the 1990 to 1998, Anlong Veng's 
struggle was headed by Ta Mok. The area was mobilized for war; however, Mok's 
leadership saw infrastructural improvements attempted, funded by a guerrilla economy 
bolstered by logging. As the organization negotiated with the other factions of the 
prolonged conflict in the lead-up to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), the Khmer Rouge, calling itself the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), 
pursued a strategy of "continuing to obey the rule just enough to make the UN believe 
that it wished to remain part of the process."52 This strategy ultimately proved self-
destructive, and through the mid-1990s, the Khmer Rouge suffered a series of military 
defeats and defections to the government which gradually left Anlong Veng as the sole 
stronghold from which to continue its military struggle, with Pol Pot setting up his 
headquarters in its mountain encampment in 1994. Engagements with government forces 
would force advancements and retreats across the district's foothills, while Pol Pot and 
the new intelligentsia continued their international presence through their wild head 
offices at Kbal Ansaong. 
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Exiting the Beautiful Jungle that provides the cover of a provincial boundary, the 
traveler continues through less-densely forested former battlegrounds (still populated 
with the occasional military/security checkpoint), encountering the first few scattered 
huts on the fringes of Lumtong Commune. Passing through this subdistrict's major 
intersection—a wider patch of red-soiled road than the traversing Route 67—and passing 
by its major structures (an old school, a new school, and two soldier compounds), the 
final water-crossing into Anlong Veng town is reached: a wooden bridge made of locally-
felled timber, tree rounds split in half and laying lengthwise to form a short crossway. 
Huts of straw become houses of wood, and structures with concrete foundations 
begin to map the edges of the main drag. The wide boulevard shows the deep red of 
Cambodia's jungle soil mixing in the dusty beige of an oft-traveled country road. A moto 
repair shop, a car mechanic, a car washing station, a canteen style eatery, small 
pharmacy, nuptial paraphernalia rental outlet, a local bodega, and an electronics repair 
shop are some of the first establishments intermixed with residences along the east side of 
the route; a singular concrete row house (phteah Iveng tjsttyti) peaks above this otherwise 
one- and two-story landscape. Woodworkers, the town's two prime restaurants 
(Mohaleap Guesthouse and Thour Thea), another car wash, and the new market consume 
the west side of this entrance. The market fruit sellers line the exterior (roadside) edge to 
the town's commercial center, mixed amongst and across from the moneychangers and 
jewelers; the clearing across from the produce marketeers forms a narrow taxi station and 
cargo depot. Further along, mechanical parts/hardware store stores, pharmacies, eateries, 
variety stores, and another rhoto repair site fill the dusty thoroughfare before it intersects 
the town roundabout. In the distance, the wilderness that was once a decade-long 
battlefield still exhibits the lush green of the tropical flora. 
The town circle is centered on a recently-contributed cement pyramid topped by a 
white dove perched on a globe; its circular foundation is populated by deer with nagas 
stretching the descents of the pyramid's cornered edges. Emblazoned on its southward-
facing front lies the inscription: "Gift of Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia, Route No. 67,104 km long, constructed by the Supreme 
Command's Military Engineering Forces lastingly built 19 June 2000."53 Highway 67 
forms the north-south continuing leg of a T-intersection, the offshoot to the east joins 
Anlong Veng with neighboring Trabaing Prassat District. That newly-graded eastward 
segment houses the World Food Programme compound, a police station, district office, 
and Region 4 Military Headquarters on its south. The northern landing, between this 
road and the lake, harbors a petrol station, car mechanic, and the three neighboring 
residences of the district chief and two of his deputies. Further to the east, the traveler 
will arrive at the radio communications center (TO 50), the regional ice factory, and the 
schools built under Ta Mok and under Hun Sen. 
The road to Trabaing Prassat and the northern extension from the roundabout 
form the rounded corner of the lake which swelled when Ta Mok imposed a weir on the 
Chiik Stream in 1993. Present-day descriptions of this man-created reservoir often 
appeal to gothic or eerie references, focusing on the dead and decaying trees stretching up 
from the shallow lily-clogged waters.54 Those of a productivist sentiment might view the 
lake for its ecological offerings, a rich source of decomposing plant material supporting 
fish propagation or the hydrological foundations of a future ecb-tourist resort. 
Proceeding north from Hun Sen's roundabout endowment of township, passing wooden 
houses on both sides of the street, the visitor encounters the Ta Mok Hospital on the east, 
a medical compound and accompanying structures whose size resembles the health 
facilities of a provincial capital or even an urban hospital. Past the Halo Trust compound 
on the west, the traveler sees the town's largest dining venue, Choum No Tror Cheak 
Restaurant, just before the O Chiik Bridge. Beyond the weir and bridge, various small 
businesses—car washes, petrol stands, another radio communications center—and homes 
line the dirt thoroughfare. About 1.5 km from the Anlong Veng roundabout emerges 
another 3-way junction: the major line continues north toward the mountain border with 
Thailand; the westward spur leads to the provincial capital of Samraong and another 
border town, O Smach, whose infamy lies with a different stronghold.55 At the heel of 
this spur rests the remains of the old market, dilapidated commercial stalls that are 
gradually becoming the domain of expanding neighboring residences. 
The 10 km of Highway 67, which run between the old market site and the base of 
the Dangrek Mountains, becomes increasingly rural. The stretch exhibits rice fields and 
forest, and the sides of the red path are sparsely populated by more modest homes, many 
with small gardens of banana trees encircling their front and back yards.56 Two schools 
are present along this route, occasional rickety drink stands (which also make for tiendas 
vending basic necessities) crop up, a few carpenters and wood carvers have set up 
workshops near their homes, and dirt single-tracks splinter off toward the more remote 
habitations within Anlong Veng's sparser jungle.57 Two-thirds of the way to the foothill, 
the route is intersected by the ministerial village of Srah Chhouk. This community pays 
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historical tribute to the Ta Mok years, as woodworkers dominate the hamlet that was 
home to the now-destroyed saw mill, adjacent the new pagoda. Beyond the lotus pond 
village arise the foothills, forest, the escarpment, and scenes of historical tourism. 
One has arrived in Anlong Veng, after the war. 
Road north to the Dangrek Mountains 
"...and other things that we will probably never know about in our lifetime— including, 
perhaps, an invisible cloud of evil that circles the Earth and lands at random in... " 
CHAPTER 2 
Scholars have argued that Cambodia's historical fate has been significantly tied to 
its geography, positioned between the two rival powers of a Sinicized Vietnam (Annam) 
and an Indianized Thailand (Siam).1 With the fall of the Angkorian empire in the 15th 
century, Cambodia's rulers—regional warlords vying for territory, resources, and royal 
favor—alternately turned to one neighboring country for support against the existing 
sovereign who was allied with another neighboring country or foreign force. In 1863, 
Norodom I was approached by the French (made interested in a backwater of potential 
riches by the writings of Henri Mouhot); Cambodia's agreement with this outside power 
secured continued existence of the monarchy and kingdom under the French Protectorate 
in the Union Indochinoise. The last ruler enthroned by the colonial authorities, an 18-
year-old Norodom Sihanouk, was chosen for his youth, apparent malleability, and for his 
genealogical confluence, which brought together two rival houses of royal ancestry.4 
After a brief period of independence granted under Japanese occupation during Word 
War II, Sihanouk royally crusaded for, and secured, formal independence from France in 
November 1953.5 
This Lord Papa (sdmdech ov wtHf^ ), as he is called, presided over what is 
retrospectively sometimes deemed Cambodia's "golden years": infrastructural 
achievements, massive support of education, artistic/architectural endeavors, and a 
beautiful, cosmopolitan capital city.6 The Sihanouk years can be nostalgically 
reconstructed to loosely conform to a vision of the royal social order, in which patronage 
29 
30 
to the king and making merit at the pagoda find their return to the kingdom's subjects via 
great works, infrastructural improvements, and social institutions that benefit the majority 
of the population—a Buddhist social order that reproduces the monarchy and the country 
through the sangha? However, views of Sihanouk and the Sangkum era vary widely.8 
Sihanouk abdicated the throne in order to "compete" in post-Geneva electoral politics, 
and through his Sangkum Reastr Niyum he played fulcrum and overseer to the aspirations 
of parties from the Right (Liberal Party) to the Left (Democrat Party and Pracheachon 
Group).9 While the atrocities of DK period may encourage a nostalgic rendering of the 
past, the conditions of social life during the Sangkum period were far from idyllic.10 
Through the 1960s, with his Sangkum experiment, Sihanouk increasingly alienated the 
country's right wing (most notably, in halting the flow of US aid). This period witnessed 
a growing political divide between right and left, an economic divide created by 
(nepotistic) nationalization, decreases in foreign aid, increased pressures on peasants to 
produce more rice for less return, and the consequent socio-political opposition 
(exemplified by the April 1967 Samlaut rebellion).11 
An anti-US stance, nationalization of industries, and positioning leftists in 
government helped bolster Sihanouk's national popularity with the peasant majority and 
garner patience from leftist insurgents (further enforced by Vietnamese tutelage), but 
these policies created a situation which was intolerable to the Cambodian elite—army, 
businessmen, merchants, and administrators. This balancing act became increasingly 
strained as his "Buddhist Socialism"—which outwardly preached neutrality and non-
alignment, but secretly allowed weapons to be floated across the country to Vietnamese 
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Communists—ired upper-class pro-US, republican interests. Approaching the end of 
this decade, the personalistically-managed Sangkum began to unravel.13 
On 18 March 1970, Sihanouk was ousted in a coup led by his formerly loyal 
General Lon Nol and his cousin Prince Sirik Matak, ushering in the brief period known as 
the Khmer Republic.14 The Lon Nol regime is marked by the country's dramatic 
entanglement in the Second Indochina War.15 Far from realizing democratic aspirations, 
Lon Nol's brief reign exhibits the broken promises of a liberal democracy as well as 
rampant corruption (particularly within the military); these detriments worsened in 
combination with the US bombers (recently freed from operations in Vietnam) ravaging 
the countryside and driving peasants into the city or the maquis.16 A capital beset by the 
influx of refugees from the provinces and mired in pro-Sihanouk demonstrations and 
anti-conscription protests exacerbated the widening division between the urban upper 
class on the one hand, and the urban and rural poor, on the other.17 
In the countryside and clandestinely in the cities, veteran pro-independence 
fighters and communist agitators had organized in increasingly harsh and repressive 
circumstances; with the coup, the deposed monarch threw his lot in with the "red 
Khmers," which brought additional rural support as well as a respected public face. The 
revolutionary movement, which had come into existence under Vietnamese tutelage, 
owed much of their military success to their eastern comrades.18 Spurred by Hanoi's fear 
of a pro-Western regime in its neighboring country, the North Vietnamese Army stepped 
up operations within Cambodia, clearing out FANK troops and turning control over to 
GRUNK. By June 1970 (months after Operation Breakfast had served up a complicated 
repast of ordnance-infused vegetation), the neighborly comrades had helped liberate large 
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swaths of Cambodian territory.19 The December 1971 failure of Lon Nol's Chenla-II 
offensive (led by Col. Um Savuth20) in Kampong Thom left a bleak military situation for 
the Republic.21 By 1973, a communist takeover appeared imminent; it would take the 
revolutionary organization another two years to complete its march to victory and seize 
the city as the country entered the new year of 2519 BE.22 In sum, what ensued after the 
overthrow of Sihanouk was the erosion of democratic ideals with the consolidation of 
Marshall Lon Nol's rule.23 And this to be followed by the betrayal of communist ideals 
with the consolidation of Pol Pot's rule. 
When the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea captured Phnom Penh in 1975, the 
CPK ordered the evacuation of the capital's population, which had swollen to 2 to 3 
million,24 and transferred them to the countryside to assume agricultural work.25 
Residents from the cities were functionally classified as "new people" (neak thmei HR§) 
or "April 17 people," even though an overwhelming number of them were refugees from 
the countryside, who had only recently fled the bombing in rural areas to seek safety in 
Phnom Penh.26 These designations differentiated evacuees from the revolution's 
privileged "old people" {neak chas ffmnfii) or "base people" (neak moulathaan HRHWBIB).27 
The stated goals were the destruction of all remnants of feudal and capitalist society. 
With what it described as "the end of over two thousand years of history," DK brought 
the end of money, markets, private property, religion, the education system as well as the 
restriction of free travel, certain clothing styles, and traditional cultural elements. 
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In some ways the revolution was consistent and nationwide. Money was 
not in use anywhere, for example, and in national terms there was no 
education system, no freedom of movement, and no postal service. With 
rare exceptions, Buddhism, like all religious practices, was outlawed, and 
defrocked Buddhist monks were made to perform agricultural work. 
Gambling, sport, jewelry, and extramarital sex were forbidden. 
From zone to zone and even within zones, the intensity of these various aspects of DK 
life differed widely.29 Writing of the most de-privileged group in DK, Heder's oft-quoted 
characterization summarizes that new people were "last on distribution lists, first on 
execution lists, and had no political rights."30 As well, in its first wave of violence, the 
revolutionaries sought to physically eliminate the threat posed by lingering personnel of 
the ancien regime. Maintaining its secret existence until 1976—operating under the aegis 
of the (revolutionary) Organization (angkaar badevoat H^ ffiJuBina)—the newly victorious 
CPK set out an ambitious agenda of social transformation, guided by self-reliance 
{khluon tiipeung khluon ggnasa), independence-mastery {aekreach m 'chas kaar a 
fmtjjHiMffii), and building and defending (kdsaang kaarpear nrmgamimi) the country.31 
Source: Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 268. 
In addition to the violence that took hold, the comprehensiveness and speed of the 
transformation likely mark its unusual status in history.32 In the countryside, workers 
were assembled into cooperatives {sdhdkdr wmmnii).33 "Those new rural proletarians and 
the somewhat better-off base people were organized into self-contained communities— 
villages, cooperatives—which had and were encouraged to have considerable autonomy 
to regulate internal affairs so long as the overall directives from the top were carried 
out."34 However, exceptional production goals from the Party were expected of each 
unit's members, and long workdays were required in attempts to attain those goals.35 
Many scholars note a ten-day work cycle, which would be interspersed with one day of 
"rest," filled with political education, livelihood meetings (brdchum chiivapheap 
p3Sifnci), or self-criticism (kaartitien svaytitien mi§ttijaMm5ttija) sessions.36 Food was 
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rationed, and communal eating was enforced in almost all areas.37 Subjects were 
questioned regarding their class background, which brought suspicion upon many. As 
failures arose, more violence followed. Rather than re-examining production goals and 
distributions plans, the CPK focused on finding and eliminating "enemies" who were 
sabotaging the revolution. More failure brought more violence, and the Party further 
purged its own ranks (including regional leaders), widening the scope of its inquisition, 
purification, and smashing {kdmtech mats) of enemies (khmaang shia). Vietnam was 
blamed for the supposed spies (kinh rtm) frustrating the CPK's efforts. Policies of violent 
aggression against its neighbor eventually led to full-scale war between Cambodia and 
Vietnam, with Vietnam quickly conquering the ailing DK regime.38 
Differing characterizations have been applied to the rule of the CPK from 1975 to 
1979. Vickery, for example, deems the near-four-year rule as a revolution based on 
peasant resentment, which he takes pains to distance from the Marxist tradition.39 His 
characterization of Cambodia's conflict in the 1970s is based on a class analysis that 
focuses above all on a growing divide between a privileged urban elite (addicted to 
commodious living and foreign luxury goods) and a rural poor, les autres (long exploited 
by usury and taxation tied to the corrupt urban centers), which erupted into a violent 
confrontation.40 Vickery gives an economic history of 20th-century Cambodia that 
emphasizes the possibilities for "Asian revolutions," upon which he explicates 
characteristics of the Pol Pot faction (French-educated intellectuals)—"sensitivity to the 
national question" and sense of entitlement based on their "superior education"—that 
play out accordingly; this development combined peasant rage and anti-Vietnamese 
chauvinism.41 His description of pre-DK life gives the impression that the privileged 
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elite almost deserved the horrific retribution they received—the revolution was not the 
cocktail parties to which they had become accustomed.42 
Alternatively, Kiernah views the regime in terms of race (overshadowing class 
and organizational imperatives) and the growing centralized control exercised by one 
faction within the CPK—"racialist ideology and the quest for total power."43 Throughout 
his accounts of the DK era, he prioritizes centralized directives and the ethnic massacres 
they effected.44 His examination of atrocities itemizes suffering and death along ethnic 
lines, with a particular focus on the "genocide" against the country's Cham minority. His 
description of a becoming-dominant faction establishes his definition of DK as a racist 
totalitarian system.45 
Short devotes much attention to Pol Pot's individual character—his ominous 
silence, the enigmatic nature of his pronouncements, monopoly on power while micro-
managing the smallest details, a manipulative decision-making technique used for 
directing Party policy, and self-aggrandizement—and he seems to conform to a variation 
of Kiernan's argument: Pol Pot saw socialism as a means, while the end was building up 
the Khmer race.46 With this personalist twist, he argues that power over the revolution 
always remained in the hands of Pol Pot.47 
Chandler, whose position has been called a "conventional anti-Communist 
perspective," characterizes the policies and practices of the CPK as extreme examples 
brought on by "the purest and most thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist movement."48 He 
argues that elements of DK find parallels ("standard operating procedure") in other 
socialist countries—China's Great Leap Forward, Soviet collectivization, and violent 
purges in both countries.49 However, Chandler's work often elucidates factors that imbue 
37 
DK with a distinctively Cambodian character, illuminating cultural continuities and 
discontinuities that are not adequately captured in the Marxist-Leninist label.50 
Heder, whose ideas about the internal workings of the movement have shifted and 
evolved over time, argues against both Vickery's non-Marxist rendering of the CPK 
movement as well as the racist totalitarianism that constitutes Kiernan's view.51 At the 
same time, his focus on the ideological upbringing in the movement's struggle tends to 
bolster some features of Chandler's viewpoint. Particularly in terms of the KPRP 
inception in the ICP and up to the CPK's 1975 triumph, Cambodian communism has 
exhibited the embrace of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary model, transmitted through 
Vietnamese tutelage. His work has consistently examined how the concept of class has 
operated through the CPK exercise of power during DK.53 These four perspectives 
delineate some of the emphases that emerge and reverberate through debates about issues 
of authority, killing, and genocide. 
The period of Democratic Kampuchea, 17 April 1975 to 7 January 1979, meant 
considerable hardship and horror for the Cambodian people, and these difficulties have 
received significant attention from governments to social organizations to academics.54 
Through the waves of scholarly considerations, key points of contention and debate 
emerged, and some continue to persist. The issues that arise and still garner attention and 
scrutiny center on various characteristics of CPK rule: the structure of DK authority, the 
nature and scope of its violence, variation of conditions across time and place, the causes 
of mass killing, the DK security apparatus, opposition to its rule, ideological influences, 
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the death toll, the applicability of "genocide" to describe the atrocities, historical 
antecedents, and continuities with policies/practices of previous regimes vs. an "aberrant" 
phenomenon. The after effects of these debates spill over into other realms: legal 
definitions of genocide; trials for crimes against humanity; the character of revolutionary 
movements; manifestations of Marxist-inspired agendas; and the consolidation of 
ideological hegemony through presentations of history (narratives of history), which 
sometimes manifest in museums. 
Early contributors who dominated the discussion of DK history (Kiernan, Vickery, 
Heder, Chandler, Barnett, Etcheson, and Thion) in the mid-1980s have been supplanted 
by more recent works (Short, Etcheson, and Heder), which resolved some of the 
controversial issues and offered new and modified views of the regime.55 Very little 
information seeped out from the borders of Cambodia under Democratic Kampuchea, and 
early reports became the arsenals of propaganda and other political objectives.56 
One initial source for information on the revolution was refugee accounts, which 
Vickery claims still come to shape the dominant perception of life under the CPK. The 
vision of Cambodia 1975 to 1979 that emerges from these accounts—further circulated 
and sensationalized by journalists' disseminations—Vickery calls the "standard total 
view" (STV) of Democratic Kampuchea. It is a composite of some of the most extreme 
examples from journalistic and refugee accounts, which he claims also circulates in some 
early academic writings as well as widely in media representations of the period, and he 
argues that it "has permeated public consciousness to such an extent that it has become 
conventional wisdom." He describes the perceptions associated with this historical 
version of the regime: 
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DK tried to exterminate all those who during the Sihanouk and 
Lon Nol periods had served in the military or had held civilian 
administrative posts, were otherwise urban elite, and all other 
'intellectuals,' meaning all who had more than basic primary schooling, in 
particular doctors, teachers, technicians; and the members of these groups 
who survived only did so by concealing their identities between 17 April 
1975 and early 1979, or whatever earlier date they managed to escape 
from Cambodia. 
In addition to direct extermination of such class enemies, the 
STV holds that the regime deliberately abolished schooling, medical care, 
and religion; sought to destroy the family, in particular by tearing children 
from parents; and, through deliberate efforts to deprive the population of 
an adequate diet, caused the deaths of large numbers of those people who 
escaped the extermination dragnet. Ethnic minorities, in particular the 
Muslim Chams, are supposed to have been special extermination targets; 
and there have been statements to the effect that attractive women were in 
danger simply by virtue of their physical qualities.... The policies imputed 
to the new DK government, according to the STV, were perverse and had 
no rational basis in either economic or political necessity; and the people 
who were the chief victims, the former town dwellers, being tired of the 
war in 1975, welcomed the revolutionary victory, and would have 
cooperated willingly in efforts to restore and redevelop the country. 
The basic STV also holds that the policies outlined above were 
invariant as to time and place; the scenario was true everywhere, all the 
time, between April 1975 and January 1979. The explanation offered for 
such aberrant policies is 'communism,' or by the more sophisticated, 
' Maoism,' in particular its cultural revolution.58 
A centrally-planned, willful extermination of the population on a class or other basis or 
for no reason, led by irrational or "evil" people—a metaphor for hell on earth—seems to 
be the gist of the STV, which would appear as an academic strawman if elements of this 
view did not continue to crop up in present-day representations of the Khmer Rouge. 
Although he acknowledges that some elements of the STV may bear relative accuracy at 
some moments, Vickery challenges the monolithic character of this vision of DK rule. 
Consistent with his other works, this deconstruction begins with an emphasis on spatial 
and temporal variation, largely by privileging his first-hand knowledge of Cambodia over 
the accounts of refugees or versions publicized by journalists.60 
The best conditions for longer periods under CPK rule appear to have been in the 
East, Northeast, and Southwest Zones (but for different reasons) before 1977.61 
"Temporal variation" in analyses of the DK period is essentially an indication that 
conditions countrywide began a serious decline in the 1977 to 1978 time frame, sharp in 
some areas and gradual in others.62 According to Vickery and others, the Southwest 
Zone (Kampong Speu, Takeo, Kampot, and Kandal Provinces), under Pol Pot and Ta 
Mok, was one of the best managed: enough food with unlikely executions unless the 
strict disciplinary guidelines were not observed. Detailed accounts confirm few random 
killings as well as a propensity to integrate willing "new people." This comparatively 
more favorable situation emerged in the "zone of Pol Potism par excellence," where 
discipline under the leadership of Ta Mok, was strictly enforced.63 Vickery credits the 
zone's favorable conditions in part to early revolutionary transformation of most of the 
sectors (dating to the early 1970s), a good supply of food (a result of a relatively 
successful agricultural organization), and well-fed, well-entrenched base people, who 
were not relocated, perhaps harbored support for the new regime, and were more ready to 
accommodate an influx of evacuees. Further, he indicates that there appeared to be no 
general policy (or at least a noncompliance with one) to kill professionals or military 
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officers from the Lon Nol regime, allowing regional leadership to sort out the new 
arrivals; the composition of this leadership appears strict but better educated than in other 
zones.64 The fate of evacuated new people depended largely on the available food (which 
was adequate in most of the Zone's sectors), the ratio between new and base people, and 
the level of class animosity. "Life was best where a small number of new people were 
thoroughly mixed with the old, worst where a large community of new people was 
segregated from the base population."65 
Until the arrival of the Southwest cadre in 1977, the Northwest Zone (Battambang 
and Pursat Provinces) is generally recognized to have been the zone with the worst 
conditions. There is notable variation even within this zone. Battambang Province 
(Sectors 1, 3,4, and 5) was historically Cambodia's leading rice producing area, and it 
also contained the site of the 1967-68 peasant rebellion at Samlaut. However, in spite of 
these favorable factors, social conditions were generally quite bad—brutal cadre, settling 
of personal scores, and the mismanagement of rice supplies—with Sector 3 being a 
notable exception.66 In attempting to explain the emergence of this situation, Vickery 
considers a number of possible causes: Battambang was the last area to come under CPK 
control; the area's military commander, Gen. Sek Sam let, had negotiated a peace with 
the CPK in exchange for arms and food prior to 1975; and "in Battambang the rice 
merchants, userers, landlords, and military were known as individuals and the object of 
personal grudges."67 Within Pursat Province (Sectors 2, 6, 7), conditions were some of 
the worst in the country. The province had been one of the country's poorest, exhibiting 
a rough topography (mountains and forest), which made agricultural work especially 
harder for new people. This region seems to have had the highest numbers of deaths, but 
42 
mainly due to illness and starvation.68 Perhaps most importantly, and true for the zone as 
a whole, was that the cadre who took over control of the Northwest were relatively new 
to the movement and lacked experience. They were also faced with an influx of evacuees 
from the Southwest Zone, the "second deportation," in late 1975 and early 1976.69 
Drawing from information on Sector 5 and the second deportation, Kiernan enumerates 
four themes: food shortages; coping with a labour surplus (occurring at harvest time); a 
lowered priority for the peasantry, as it came to be swamped by new people; and the 
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"intermittent use of terror for social control and labor discipline." 
In an early response to reports of brutality in Democratic Kampuchea, Kiernan 
offered an assessment of the Northwest Zone similar to that of Vickery.71 In this text, he 
points out that Battambang and Siem Reap were not strongholds of the Khmer Rouge 
movement during the war, and thus in 1975 cadre who took control of these regions were 
under-trained and understaffed; he further argues that there is a direct correlation between 
lack of training and high levels of brutality. In addition, this region had not been the 
beneficiary of Khmer Rouge irrigation and construction works in the early 1970s as other 
areas had (notably Kampot and Kampong Cham). Because of its agricultural potential 
and sparse population, Battambang was the recipient of numerous city dwellers evacuated 
from Phnom Penh (for lack of food). Kiernan argues that leadership by inexperienced 
soldiers in an area with unique, dramatic socio-economic tensions—numerous powerful 
moneylenders and widespread debt as well as a high proportion of landless peasants— 
which combined with the burden of a massive influx of city dwellers, set the stage for a 
brutality that was more extreme than in other areas under the Organization's control. 
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In 1977, the leadership of the Northwest Zone was purged, and cadres from the 
Southwest Zone arrived to assume control, a move meant to accentuate the Party Center's 
control over the country. Vickery suggests a varied impact of the Southwest Zone 
cadre's seizure of control.72 Kiernan's version of events stresses starvation on a large 
scale, mass killings, and the disruption of rice production and distribution.73 A second 
purge and re-organization occurred in mid-1978, this time carried out by the newly-
trained cadres of the West Zone.74 
The West Zone (Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, and Koh Kong Provinces) 
was carved out from the Southwest Zone in April 1975 and placed under the control of 
Chou Chet. Conditions were already dictated by the area's rough geographical 
circumstances, which meant poor soil and poor peasants.75 Vickery's brief treatment of 
the Zone is varied; in many sectors, organization was solid enough to provide adequate 
food, but brutal leadership among some locales meant many killings.76 Kiernan's 
treatment of the West Zone is confined largely to its expansion into the Northwest, 
shortly after the March 1978 elimination of Chou Chet.77 
Originally called the North Zone (alongside Special Regions 103 and 106), the 
Center Zone (Kampong Thorn, Kampong Cham, and Kratie Provinces) shows dramatic 
local particularity. Vickery reports that in most sectors before 1977, food was adequate 
and killings were restricted to officials and officers associated the Lon Nol regime.79 
Even prior to the purge, some areas within the North-Center Zone presented violent rule, 
while circumstances in neighboring sectors were tolerable. "Such extreme differences 
among contiguous units at that low level seem to have resulted from the personalities and 
attitudes of the village cadres rather than from factional divergence in policy."80 In 
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addition to personality differences as a source for variation, Vickery stresses the context 
of an incomplete consolidation of administrative control of the zone at the end of the war, 
with key provincial towns remaining under Lon Nol authority up to April 1975, as well as 
a conflict of visions, with Koy Thuon's gradualist approach at odds with his deputy, Ke 
Pauk.81 Further, Vickery suggests that the persistence of sufficient food may be 
attributable to Ke Pauk's power: the North Zone was able to retain its rice stores without 
reprisal from CPK leaders. 
Until the mid-1978 purges, the Eastern Zone (Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, and 
Svay Rieng Provinces) exhibited good food production and distribution as well as 
minimal oppression; this is credited largely to the different background and orientation of 
the Eastern Communists.83 The governing faction was guided by a different vision of the 
implementation of communism, the relationship with Vietnam, and perhaps the 
role/usefulness of Sihanouk.84 Vickery conveys that CPK policies in the East until 1973 
tended to be popular with the peasants (as food was abundant, prices were low, and 
brutality was absent); after this time, peasants were confronted with greater hardship as 
they were called upon to provide provisions and personnel for the revolutionary 
struggle.85 Prior to the 1978 purge, the East Zone was blessed with many productive 
agricultural districts and the administration was populated with disciplined Communists 
with much experience.86 Vickery's claim to variation under Democratic Kampuchea over 
space and time has been largely embraced and reinforced in contemporary and 
subsequent accounts produced by scholars of the period. However, what this diverse 
historical landscape says about the overall character of the revolution, its organization, 
and its influences remains in contention. 
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Out of the variation that characterized Democratic Kampuchea, a corollary 
emerges that links the members of the present-day regime—including Heng Samrin, Hun 
Sen, and Chea Sim—to the CPK's pre-history: the narrative of "the good East," the 
Cambodian Communist alternative to the Pol Pot-dominated CPK.88 Kiernan is the 
principal academic architect of this (re)vision of history, but other scholars echo his 
claims; the narrative's political existence is sustained in, by, and through the activities 
and individuals of the Cambodian People's Party. The privileging of the East 
commences with a return to the early communist beginnings in Cambodia, the anti-
colonial Issarak movement that made common struggle with the Vietnamese against the 
French.90 The KPRP convened its First Congress in 1951, and up to half of its ranks 
were from the eastern provinces.91 In Cambodia, Saloth Sar and a group of French-
educated comrades worked their way into the top positions of the party as early as I960.9" 
The promotion of Saloth Sar to secretary at a February 1963 meeting, after Tou 
Samouth's mysterious disappearance, was clouded by irregularity as Sao Pheum lost the 
contest "not by a vote but by opinion." While Saloth Sar's faction struggled to 
consolidate its control, the veteran communists, many in the East Zone, maintained their 
political positions.94 Given a long history of military cooperation with the Vietnamese, 
the East Zone cadre were less willing to assume an offensive position vis-a-vis Vietnam. 
Although the Vietnamese demanded the continued use of Sihanouk through the 1960s 
and refused to provide arms to the CPK maquis, the nascent communist struggle 
benefited greatly from Vietnam's support and guidance, a "relationship, it seems rich in 
nuance and complexity."95 Consequently, the position of the faction of East Zone cadre 
(against the Pol Pot Center) was to favor an independent struggle, but one which was not 
hostile to Vietnam.96 Vickery agrees in reasoning, "Since the leading cadres [in the East 
Zone] were largely from the Pracheachon and older ICP tradition, the special character 
of their zone may well have been due to a conception of socialism closer to that of the 
Vietnamese."97 
According to the good East narrative, the moderate communism of the veteran 
cadre manifested as some of the most humane policies, ensuring the best conditions 
during the Democratic Kampuchea period, at least until the purge that began in late 1977 
culminated in military seizure and massacres in May 1978. The zone exhibited fewer 
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executions, with large-scale deaths not occurring until late 1976. With the exception of 
Sector 21 around Memut (which exhibited some starvation), food rations in the rest of the 
zone provided adequate nourishment for the first two years of DK.99 Imposition on the 
zone's populace of the much-resented policy of communal eating was significantly 
delayed. Normal workday hours were followed, the practice of Buddhism was allowed, 
and varied forms of dress were tolerated; urban evacuees were allowed to search out 
relatives and friends, and restrictions on travel and on foraging were looser.100 Relations 
between cadre and peasants were typically good, as the movement was long established 
in the region, and some policies had met with popular support.101 Unlike other areas, 
where suspicion of class background meant the dis-use of technical professionals, the 
East Zone provides examples where engineers were employed in the design of irrigation 
projects102 or at least were not targeted for their professional skills.103 Kiernan cites Sao 
Pheum's approach to administration: "the aim of the revolution was improvement in the 
standard of living, not the enforcement of poverty or misery in order to teach people what 
it was like to be poor."104 An unsuccessful attack on Vietnam ordered in March 1977 
combined with Sao Pheum's failure to arrest colleagues and clients who appeared on 
security lists (issuing from the security headquarters in Phnom Penh) brought suspicion 
on all the administrative cadre of the East Zone—Pheum and his entire network.105 The 
1977 purges, made possible by the alliance of Yin Sophi, Sector 21 Chief of Security 
(santesok MSHS), and Peam, head of the Eastern Zone Office (and appointed by Pol Pot), 
culminated with the military take-over of the zone in May 1978 by Ke Pauk's Center 
Zone troops. 
It should be noted that this purge of perceived "enemies"—said to be 
"Vietnamese heads, Cambodian bodies" (kbaalyuon khluon khmaer finromasatsi)—that 
peaked in March to May 1978, created a massive influx into the detention cells of S-21, 
the largest death toll of any zonal purge during Democratic Kampuchea.106 Beyond the 
purge that brought the upper echelon to S-21, from June to July, Ke Pauk's troops 
massacred villages in an attempt to "sweep clean" the area. "In the most extended and 
systematic outburst of state-sponsored violence in the DK era, [pro-government forces] 
killed off entire villages suspected of harboring 'traitors.'"107 From July 1978, much of 
the populace began to be forcibly relocated out of the East Zone, many of these migrants 
would die of starvation or selective killings in the process.108 In this context, a number of 
lower-level and middle-level cadres escaped the purges by fleeing across the border into 
Vietnam, while others revolted against the newly-entrenched Center troops. These 
fleeing East Zone cadres formed the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation in 
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December 1978, under the leadership of Heng Samrin, a former commander of the zone's 
Division 4.109 Weeks later with military support from the Vietnamese, the rebels 
resumed their assault, quickly conquered the Democratic Kampuchea forces, and 
proclaimed the People's Republic of Kampuchea.110 The Hanoi-trained veterans of 
communist struggle and the East Zone cadre who sought to foster a more moderate 
revolutionary transformation constitute the lineage to which the Cambodian People's 
Party traces its ideological and historical roots.1'l 
In sum, the narrative of the Good East suggests that the legitimate communist 
struggle began in 1951 under the support of the Vietnamese from the context of the 
Indochinese Communist Party. Although differences emerged within this regional 
solidarity, the support of the Vietnamese both on the battlefield and ideologically aided 
Kampuchea's victory over the Lon Nol regime and its US imperialist backers. However, 
according to the narrative, the revolution was hijacked by the "Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique," 
which savagely starved and murdered the Khmer people. The legitimate, or "good," 
communists, who came principally from the East Zone, narrowly avoided extinction at 
the hands of Pol Pot's military accomplices, Ta Mok and Ke Pauk, and his SantebaVs 
torture/execution center, S-21, and fought back. The true revolutionary people's party 
ousted Pol Pot from power, bringing an end to the DK reign of terror, and thereby saving 
the Cambodian people and the Khmer race.112 This national narrative would prove 
indispensable in the PRK consolidation of its control of Cambodia both domestically and 
in the face of international isolation.113 Frieson asserts that the PRK leaders 
demonstrated an interest in distancing their "Communist" government from the supposed 
communism of Pol Pot; the means by which this dissociation is effected emerge in 1) 
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maximizing the "genocidal" reading of DK and thereby 2) minimizing the PRK leaders' 
(former) involvement in the brutality.114 The outward projection of a good East Zone, 
with better living conditions and kindler, gentler polices during the early, pre-KUNFS 
years, seems amenable to these ends. 
In his first critique of the good East narrative, Heder points out how Kiernan's 
account must perform intellectual acrobatics in order to establish a coherent "good East": 
incomplete biographical data on leaders, temporary exclusions of certain sectors, and the 
selective exposition of sector/zone policies. "In comparing the East with other CPK 
structures and leaders, particularly the South-west Zone of Ta Mok, Kiernan overdraws 
his case and essentializes these structures to give them a false coherence, putting himself 
through numerous convolutions to do so."115 At the core of this critique is the charge that 
piecing together evidence to show a difference between zones—and labeling one the 
good, pro-Vietnamese, moderate "revolutionaries"—retrospectively reproduces what was 
a political by-product of the fact of zones being demarcated. "The trope of evil Khmer 
Rouge is replaced by those of the evil Paris Group and evil Southwest versus the good 
East. Kiernan's view is based on an ahistorical snapshot that freezes the dynamic in mid-
1978, without taking into sufficient account what happened before and particularly after 
that juncture."116 Heder maintains that contrary (and suppressed) evidence suggests 
Kiernan's dichotomy, which privileges the East, is inadequate and that a much more 
varied and varying landscape was the rule. 
In his attacks on Kiernan's ideas about the CPK leadership, Heder asserts that 
Kiernan's image of a "Party Centre," dominated by a French-educated Pol Potist faction, 
is misleading, because: 1) Kiernan ignores how Party structures were largely inherited 
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from Chinese and Vietnamese Communism; 2) "friends" of Pol Pot were not exempted 
from purges; 3) the uppermost leadership (e.g., Nuon Chea and Ta Mok) were not French 
educated; 4) Ta Mok represented the kind of figure that Kiernan asserts the Pol Potists 
would eliminate; 5) the differential designation of "warlord" to describe Ta Mok and Ke 
Pauk but not Sao Pheum; 6) the misapplication of urban/rural labels as a means of 
denigrating the "Pol Potists"; 7) overstating the power of Pol Pot's in-laws to the neglect 
of key (non-relative) individuals (e.g., Nuon Chea); and 8) failing to acknowledge that 
early opposition to Pol Pot came from within as well as outside the French-educated 
milieux.117 He succinctly asserts that Kiernan's categories fail to explain the purge of Pol 
Pot proteges and that Kiernan's portrayal of a confrontation between Pol Pot et al against 
the East Zone radically ignores a more dynamic widespread opposition to Pol Pot, which 
Heder examines by reference to S-21 confessions. It is the imminent purge in late 1978 
of the Southwest Zone cadre for which Kiernan's false dichotomy cannot account; 
ultimately, Kiernan's work "reifies geographical expression to create positive and 
negative political labels and anthropomorphized political entities."118 
Heder's most recent work offers a contrary view that radically contests the 
underpinnings of the good East narrative.119 The thesis of this new perspective is that the 
DK leadership (Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea) was not anti-Vietnamese (at least in terms of 
theory), but on the contrary, was very committed to a Vietnamese model of revolution. 
Ignoring Vietnam's cautioning that this model was not appropriate to Cambodia, the 
leadership pushed forward with armed struggle and revolutionary violence, which 
produced (perceived) "successes" that further legitimated the correctness of their 
decisions and actions. Constituent to this argument is the assertion that the division 
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between "Khmer Viet Minh" and "Khmer Rouge" is a false dichotomy, and that the 
leadership (which until the end was dominated by ICP veterans) recurrently fell back on a 
Vietnamese model of revolution.120 From Heder's account, it seems Cambodian 
Communism commences with certain intellectuals beginning to differ with the 
revolutionary analysis imposed on them by their comrades to the east—that of a "national 
liberation revolution" subordinate to Vietnam locally and the Soviet Union globally. 
Heder's strategic history of South Vietnam demonstrates how elements within the 
Cambodian Communist movement came to see a similarity (and equality) between the 
two countries.122 Nuon Chea's decision for armed struggle, which Saloth Sar endorsed 
on 25 February 1968, demonstrated de facto Party approval for a decision made by 
leading cadre on the ground. Heder's important assertion is that: although the KWP's 
launching of armed insurrection broke with Vietnamese and Chinese advice, the 
Cambodian Communists still acted according to a Vietnamese scenario (the model for 
South Vietnam).123 Heder aptly describes the defiance of Hanoi as the CPK engaged in 
its independent pursuit of the Vietnamese people's war script.124 From this analysis, a 
simple pro/anti-Vietnamese dichotomy, which underwrites the good East narrative, fails 
to capture the complexity (and influences) of the relationship between the struggles that 
unfolded in both countries. 
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Scholars generally approach the pattern and scope of violence during Democratic 
Kampuchea in terms of episodes within CPK rule. Two brOad waves of violence appear 
in the period. The first was the immediate post-triumph elimination of the ancien regime. 
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The second wave can be divided into two series of purges that the CPK carried out within 
its ranks.125 Throughout the DK period, "assertive killings" and deaths from disease, 
starvation, and exhaustion occurred, with more violence and worsening social conditions 
festering into a symbiotic downward spiral. 
Quinn's framework for DK atrocities articulates four realms in which violence 
was deployed: destroying the old society (evacuation, banning feudal and bourgeois 
social institutions and styles, and settling of scores), achieving rapid social transformation 
("Purification Campaign" and the dismantling of cities, Buddhism, the family, private 
property, money, the monarchy, and individualism), "political prophylaxis" (suppression 
of rebellions, purges, Santebat), and defending against an external threat.127 Locard 
traces out the development of "enemies" in DK (after the initial internal threat of the 
ancien regime, "enemies of the past," had been addressed) as: "enemies of the present" 
(principally new people, but could be anyone, who voiced opposition to Angkor's 
policies); "hidden enemies" within the revolutionary ranks, Party apparatus, or provincial 
administration; and "enemies of the future" (those who harbor counter-revolutionary 
beliefs).128 
Chandler argues that the Party Center followed the Maoist doctrine of "permanent 
revolution," which thereby necessitated the creation of counterrevolutionary "enemies," 
the search for and purge of which constituted crucial elements of the regime's rule.129 
The CPK idea of "external enemies" included foreign powers—principally the US (CIA), 
USSR (KGB), and Vietnam—and it was conjectured that these powers were colluding 
together for DK's overthrow. "Internal opponents" included "new people"—and those 
who were not of abase background were more politically suspect130—but also, more 
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importantly, were hidden enemies \khmang bdngkdb sfatrati), "microbes" (merok renin) 
"burrowing from within" (sii roungphtey knong Mjtitfiga), Party members betraying the 
revolution.131 Further however, like Stalin and Mao, Pol Pot saw potentially bourgeois 
thought (attitudes, sentiments, customs, etc.) as buried deep in the consciousness of all 
citizens. Taken together, SantebaVs task to root out internal enemies was to be vast, 
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permanent, and merciless. 
A significant share of the death under the DK regime has come to be interpreted 
in terms of local rule. Zone-, sector-, district-, village-, and cooperative-level cadre 
confronted with overambitious demands issuing from the CPK Standing Committee (e.g., 
Pol Pot's Four-Year Plan) and ill-equipped and inexperienced in managing workers!— 
many of whom themselves were adjusting to much harsher social conditions (especially 
insufficient food and a lack of health care) than they had been used to, either in the city or 
the countryside—often resorted to violence as a quick means to resolve challenges. This 
realm of violence cuts across Quinn's four-fold schema, involving the settling of scores 
as well as the forced compliance with a rapid social transformation and may even be 
linked to a perceived threat. Local interpretations of directives from above, local 
implementations of Party policies, and the assertion of control by inexperienced and 
undisciplined cadre in demanding situations compose this remainder category, which 
Heder calls "discretionary" and Thion calls "assertive" killings.133 Implications of this 
categorization attend both to Vickery's description of violence as spontaneous acts, or 
poor responses to situations, as well as to Kieraan's concerns about how "race" was 
addressed by directives for implementation in the countryside. 
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With the CPK triumph in April 1975, cities were emptied of their inhabitants and 
sent into the countryside to take up agricultural work.134 The initial forced migration, a 
precondition for the CPK's radical social experiment, and subsequent deportations (in 
1976 and 1978) contributed to non- violent death as residents were ushered out of urban 
centers on foot without provisions or tools.135 The ultimate fate of "new people" would 
depend largely on the particularities of the zone and/or sector which became their 
destination. The geographical foundations for variation lie in each area's wealth or 
poverty of soil and the relative salebrosity of terrain, and this combined with issues of 
manpower: in ideal situations, properly organized and sufficient quantity of workers, with 
enough harvest (or supplementary resources) to feed and reproduce the workforce. In 
contrasting the experiences of deportees ("new people") to returnees, Short demonstrates 
that while food was used as a means of control, the starvation of new people was not an 
issue of policy but resulted from a failed system—dangerously low grain stockpiles, non-
existent health care, and the preponderance of patron-client relations—that perverted the 
CPK central directives.136 He concludes that the contradictions that seemed embedded in 
policy were resolved by local cadre interpreting directives within real local conditions, 
which inevitably worked to the continued disadvantage of new people.137 The social 
leveling at an exceptional pace in the early phase of Democratic Kampuchea rule, April 
1975 to January 1976, appears to some as "war communism"; the regime hastily pursued 
its objectives with the Party carrying out "storming" attacks on the vestiges of the old 
society—institutions and personnel.138 Centralization efforts contributed to a dire 
economic situation, as greater shares of harvests were expected to be transferred to the 
State. 
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De-centfalization (in Party structure and historically) provided the political 
context for social conditions to vary, whereby areas with the most-established veterans of 
CPK struggle tended to be more disciplined, more able to pursue their vision of 
revolutionary transformation, and to minimize killing. Competing ideological factions 
within the Party Central Committee waged battle against each other in the terrain of zonal 
and regional administration. Pol Pot, who had secured control of the Party, formed an 
alliance with Ta Mok in mid-1975, and the Southwest Zone's security chief, Kang Kek 
lev ("Duch"), rose to assume control over the national security apparatus at S-21.139 
"The central government attempted to gradually concentrate power, reduce the internal 
autonomy of the collective farms and cut back on the independence of the regional 
leadership."140 
The newly victorious revolutionaries were tasked with addressing a potential 
threat posed by the vanquished members of the republican army and government. 
However, in the April to June 1975 period, widespread killings appear as a disorganized 
elimination of the ancien regime enacted through popular anger and victim's 
empowerment.141 Initially, the directive against the defeated regime focused on the 
officer corps and police. Although the CPK issued orders (in September 1975) reversing 
the policy and ceasing the killing of Lon Nol officers and civil administrators, scholars' 
interviewees indicate in some areas the defeated personnel were still executed.142 The 
situation seemed to be: a policy to kill, followed by a policy to not kill, then an inability 
to stop. The CPK gradually brought the random killing to a close, and the Party more 
closely focused its approach to enemies. (From September 1976 to September 1977, more 
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formal procedures guided the round-up, interrogation, and execution of Lon Nol officials, 
student returnees, deserters, "Hanoi Khmer," etc.) 
The January to September 1976 time frame, Chandler describes as the apogee of 
the regime, even though social conditions deteriorated (especially in the Northwest).143 
The later phase (April 1977 to December 1978) appears dominated by an intensification 
of class warfare, specifically weeding out "enemies" within the revolution. Ambitious 
policies continued to be pursued, in particular the CPK's Four-Year Plan. Chandler 
pinpoints the weaknesses of Pol Pot's ill-conceived policies: over-reliance on 
"independence-mastery" and unquestioning faith in revolutionary zeal; rice as a sole 
priority; lack of attention to infrastructure; and unrealistic visions of heavy industry 
development.144 The failures to achieve rapid success contributed to the turn toward 
focusing on "enemies" and saboteurs, but Pol Pot's faction also claimed to be defending 
itself from coup attempts.145 Unexplained explosions in Siem Reap (25 February 1976) 
and Phnom Penh (2 April 1976) provided greater motivation to the CPK leadership to 
defend against impending attack.146 
The process by which the Pol Pot faction consolidated its grip on the Party and 
the nation was through extensive purges, employing the loyal cadres of trusted zones to 
eradicate suspected/rival factions in other areas.147 It is apparent that intra-Party political 
competition and the suspicion of enemies, traitors, and saboteurs became intertwined 
agendas; and the inability to meet production goals was consistently interpreted as a 
willful act of subversion.148 Using the rhetoric of class warfare, the Pol Pot faction, via 
its centralized security apparatus (Santebat), arrested, tortured, and killed its opponents, 
and it produced documentary "evidence" (forced confessions) of its success in purifying 
the movement. The key mechanism by which the CPK carried out its purges was a 
school that had been converted into the head security office (S-21) for the DK regime.150 
Prisoners were apprehended for two reasons: 1) the Party's suspicion of the individual, 
and/or 2) being named in others' confessions. Routine torture was employed to extract 
confessions of treasonous activities on the part of the accused as well as to supply the 
names of co-conspirators. The techniques available were enumerated in the 
Interrogator's Manual, and their use is clearly discernible from notes appended to 
confessions.151 
Numbers and the patterns of killing are plainly indicated in the well-kept 
execution schedules; an overwhelming majority of S-21 's victims were from within the 
Khmer Rouge movement itself.152 The comprehensive nature of S-21 (extermination) 
and the climate of fear that its activities produced, facilitated the elimination of "strings," 
the "patronage networks which were the basis of political activity in Cambodia."153 
Given its purpose of "ferreting out and eliminating the suspected, imagined, and potential 
opposition," remnants of the "old society" ceased to enter S-21's cells by mid-1976.154 
With the obsessive search for "microbes," and the elimination of the Party intelligentsia, 
the end result was a cycle of paranoia and degeneration of the movement. "Tuol Sleng 
became literally and symbolically the Khmer version of the revolution devouring itself 
and its own."155 Chandler highlights the ominous Josef K.-like situation suffusing S-21: 
prisoners guilty because they had been accused. Interrogators were compelled to 
"recover" memories (counterrevolutionary transgressions in the mind), validate the 
Party's (prior) verdict, and generate a historical text of the crime as evidence.156 
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One of the earliest purges, especially of Central Committee members, was 
wrought on the network of Koy Thuon, secretary of the North Zone (until early 1976) 
who had been transferred to Phnom Penh to become Minister of Commerce.157 Chandler 
maps out the purge of senior leaders, their shared characteristics, and their relationships 
beginning with Suas Neou (Chhouk), Ney Saran, Keo Meas, and Non Suon (in November 
1976) then Koy Thuon, Touch Phoeun, and the "democracy activists" (in January 1977). 
The details of these key individuals' backgrounds and positions clearly show that the 
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initial purge focused on Party intelligentsia, whose vision differed with Pol Pot. As 
well, Short provides evidence of a "low level insurgency" (which he describes as a 
Cambodian historical constant), which afforded a basis for the purge of certain DK cadre. 
In documenting the various policies the CPK leadership pursued in order to eliminate 
internal enemies (traitors) and external enemies (Vietnamese), Short describes S-21 's 
initial purpose as the furnishing of "proof which would support purges that the Party 
"leadership had already decided to carry out," but "generated a self-perpetuating cycle of 
suspicion and fear," producing "new 'evidence' of Vietnamese perfidy."159 He 
characterizes the enemies in Pol Pot's mind as "moderates": those who thought the 
socialist revolution was too extreme and (relatedly) those who questioned the need to 
resist Vietnam.160 
Chandler asserts that two likely reasons spurred Pol Pot's attack on the 
Northwest: 1) mixed results of agricultural expansion efforts, and 2) information from the 
S-21 confessions. His analysis of that area re-iterates the varied nature of conditions 
within the Zone, the predominance of new, inexperienced and unconnected cadre in local 
leadership, and the Center's interpretation of its dire state resulting from saboteurs rather 
than the unrealistic demands ofCPK policies. Consistently refusing to fault their own 
extreme policies and unattainable goals, the Party Centre attributed shortcomings to 1) 
Party policies not being implemented fully enough and everywhere, 2) saboteurs, and 3) 
old class attitudes (e.g., "propertyism"); this became the basis of the April-May 1977 
purge of the Northwest. The overwhelmingly inexperienced cadre were "accused of 
hoarding or destroying the harvest, deliberately starving the people under their 
jurisdiction, allowing others to flee the country, offering Cambodian territory to the 
Thais, plotting with Cambodian exiles, and trading rice with to Thailand."161 In March 
1978, Pol Pot's faction purged Chou Chet and his West Zone; soon after, it targeted the 
East Zone cadre. The second (or extended) wave of purges clearly demonstrates a 
targeting of bourgeois/counterrevolutionary tendencies within the Organization (i.e., 
traitors in the Party) and within the individual via confessions and torture, which ushered 
in a profound reign of terror. 
Chandler notes that the final purge, as the CPK began to instigate war on 
Vietnam, produced a dramatic swell of zone cadre into S-21. He also points out that the 
purges in late 1978 (before the collapse) had fewer, but higher ranking, targets (e.g., the 
Minister of National Defense); the illogic of the purge (i.e., the continuous need for 
enemies) and SantebaPs mission (i.e., to validate the Center's suspicions) allowed no one 
to remain safe.162 The purges followed a familiar pattern: smashing the old leadership 
and replacing it with Ta Mok's Southwest or Ke Pauk's Center forces. Pol Pot's goal of 
a purified Party with a well-fed, productive population ready to fight Vietnam produced 
dilemmas for local cadre trying to implement these policies, which inevitably led to terror 
and death. Successive purges and deportations exacerbated problems in the rural areas, 
as a (new) leader's lack of connection to the governed tended to encourage the resort to 
violence. To explain its continued failures, Khmer Rouge leaders sought out new 
enemies within, propagated rumors of an imminent Vietnamese invasion, and became 
increasingly suspicious of zone secretaries who had prior contact with Vietnamese cadre. 
Generally, throughout Democratic Kampuchea, the forced leveling of all classes and the 
emphasis/obsession with treason (that motivated the purges) appear to have caused: 1) a 
permanent excuse for petty vengeance (manifesting in assertive killings) where cadres 
were inexperienced and undisciplined, and 2) the destruction of the best zone and the 
even the modest successes of others.163 The deteriorating situation was exacerbated by 
Pol Pot's focus on national defense (more than the economy) and fighting Vietnam.164 
Emphasizing internal factors, Becker argues that what should have remained a limited 
border conflict quickly became an uncontrollable situation (ending in invasion) largely 
due to the CPK elite becoming victims of their own overblown rhetoric and their 
mentality of being true nationalists and saviors.165 
"When the Angkor prescribes a task, you must comply with the order!"166 The 
nature of DK authority has figured centrally in debates among scholars of Cambodian 
history and politics. Vickery's ideas about variation and peasant resentment as primary 
factors in DK suggest a significant degree of decentralized control.167 Whatever policies 
may have been dictated from the Party were filtered though regional elites whose 
localized authority (shaped by peasantist demands or rage) produced different 
interpretations and implementations, which accounts for much variation during the 
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regime's rule. Others have suggested that centralized authority was largely problematic 
due to the semi-autonomous regions that were effected in the struggle against Lon Nol.168 
Contemporaneous with claims of de-centralization in DK were accounts of a highly 
centralized authority. Barnett claims that the Pol Pot group always had the initiative after 
1975 and sought to impose and further consolidate its rule; DK was ruled by terror, using 
the power of arbitrary execution to enforce its new policies (evacuation of the cities, 
destruction of money, elimination of private property, etc.).169 According to this account, 
even regional differentiation in implementation of policy does not disprove that the 
central authorities were imposing their rule by terror from the beginning. 
Kiernan's presentation of the CPK regime argues that, in spite of regional 
variation, the Center's quest for total power was increasingly successful.171 Having risen 
to positions of power with the Party as early as 1963 and exercised its dominance 
throughout the Party apparatus by 1973, the Pol Pot faction's consolidation of control 
nationwide found allies in the military commands of Ta Mok and Ke Pauk.172 This quest 
for power by this "CPK Center"—"unceasing, and increasingly successful, struggle for 
top-down domination"-—and the (racist) means by which it pursued this end, ultimately 
generated more hardship, more struggles, and more opponents, all of which proved self-
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defeating for the CPK regime. This view of top-down domination is echoed by 
Locard, who describes Cambodia under the CPK as a "vast prison."174 Heder and 
Tittemore also document the coordinated chain of command that provides evidence of 
centralized control and responsibility for policies of mass execution: initially, Khmer 
Republic military officers and senior civil servants; in early 1976, enemies of the 
revolution; and from late 1976, spies within the Party ranks.175 
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Etcheson' s survey of the issue focuses the debate on whether the locus of violence 
was decentralized and the spontaneous result of vengeful peasants (a la Vickery) of 
centralized and thereby planned and controlled (a la Quinn).176 Based on evidence 
garnered by DC-Cam—including newly-discovered bureaucratic records of security 
services as well as satellite mapping surveying—Etcheson concludes that the DK's 
economy of violence is clear: "violence was carried out pursuant to orders from the 
highest political authorities of the Communist Party of Kampuchea."177 Following Ieng 
Sary's statements regarding a national security committee—consisting of Nuon Chea, 
Son Sen, and Yun Yat—answerable to Pol Pot, Etcheson makes clear the command 
structure that governed the S-21 security facility (under Duch's directorship), even 
though this line of command from Pol Pot to Nuon Chea to Son Sen to Duch has been 
strongly suspected for a long time.178 He admits that elucidating a further relationship 
between S-21 and zonal and sectoral security centers is complex and difficult, and yet his 
scattered evidence (i.e., a couple examples of communications) does little to concretize 
his repeated assertion that "the works of Democratic Kampuchea's internal security 
apparatus were ubiquitous across the territory of Cambodia and that these works were 
centrally controlled by the top leadership of the Communist Party."179 Further, he 
describes data within DC-Cam's "evidence" that suggests a certain fraction of killings 
did not fall within this chain of command, but were the purview of local administrators; 
in addition, he leaves open the possibility of mass killings resulting from the violent 
spontaneity that Vickery describes.180 By the conclusion of his discussion, Etcheson's 
arguments about violence pursuant to orders from CPK elites become more restricted to 
violence within the security system that was directly ordered by those who controlled the 
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security apparatus. However, local administrators or others—undisciplined and/or 
spontaneous—could have also carried out mass killings that are not directly traceable to 
Pol Pot et a/.181 To the extent that the evidence shows the leading faction within the CPK 
using the security apparatus to eliminate its enemies and increasingly consolidate its 
control, Etcheson's claims simply echo Kiernan's assertions regarding a quest for total 
power. The upshot of Etcheson's contributions to this debate on centralized authority 
seems to be a latter argument supporting an increased estimation in the DK death toll, 
greater addends being attributable to supposedly better-documentable executions within 
the DK security system (and according to satellite-mapped mass graves). 
Heder re-visits the question of authority and notes the propensity of a "top-down 
conspiracy paradigm" in interpreting the Holocaust and a reproduction of this tendency in 
the consideration of other situations of mass murder, including views of Democratic 
Kampuchea. This interpretative approach emphasizes personalist and authoritarian 
elements in what is perceived as an intention to commit genocide, and it is evident in 
Kiernan's The Pol Pot Regime as well as his own co-written piece with Tittemore, Seven 
Candidates for Prosecution. His analysis divides killings into "obligatory" (ordered by 
the Center) and "discretionary" (committed by local delegated authorities); his depiction 
of Center, zone, sector, and district interactions supports the claim that a tight chain of 
command was sufficient for ensuring obligatory killings, but "probably most" of the 
killings were discretionary, in which a looser and more diffuse hierarchy arbitrarily 
expanded the categories of "enemy" {khmang giti) according to the latitude afforded 
Heder's analysis examines the ways in which various subgroups fared given the 
elasticity of the "enemy" category. With regard to the treatment of ''new people," Heder 
presents/cites numerous Center directives that urge local cadre to practice compassion, 
re-education, and judiciousness toward evacuees. In a contradictory fashion, at special 
meetings and study sessions, leaders called for increased vigilance in seeking out "tigers" 
among the trees—remnants of the defeated military and police, spies, and saboteurs— 
leading to expansive executions.185 Further, Heder argues that official policy of "non-
punitive re-education" became an impossibility given the rural socio-economic situation, 
a situation exacerbated by the arrival of evacuees in the cooperatives and which thus 
contributed to discrimination against, and discretionary executions of, new people. 
Although there were no direct instructions to kill new people en masse, local cadre 
(following their orders to seek out enemies while applying "fantastic and elastic labels") 
killed new people for: complaining, stealing, perceived threats, "laziness," disobedience, 
attempted escapes, and organized opposition.186 As well, the Buddhist sangha (sang &%) 
was to have its top leadership eradicated, analogous to the fate of the Lon Nol bdndasak, 
leaving lower-level monks at the discretionary authority of lower-level cadre; this 
discretion varied widely, and thus the fate of the sangha can be said to mirror the general 
population as a whole.187 Similarly, the Cham leadership was to be killed, but the 
remaining minority population was to be assimilated: only their difference was to be 
erased.188 This ban on Islam met with open rebellion in September-October 1975 in 
Krauch Chmaar, which was met with nationwide repression by the CPK (and likely 
precipitated Pol Pot's November 1975 endeavor to split up Cham 
communities/concentrations). Lastly, Heder's discussion argues that while officially 
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Chinese were to be assimilated, many cadre suspected them because of their pasts as 
"new people," "upper class," and "special class strata" and thus treated them with 
brutality. 
In re-evaluating these various data, Heder re-presents his 1997 analysis, which 
argued that the (1977 and 1978) killings were the result of an intensification of class 
struggle (not race) emanating from Pol Pot.189 His recent reflections modify/extend the 
earlier analysis by asserting that the ever-escalating killings were the result of 
discretionary authority in the context of an intensification of struggle against ill-defined 
enemies, even as these killings went contrary to central policy (which was calling for 
assimilation and the abolition of social hierarchy).190 Drawing on "revisionist" 
scholarship on Stalinism as well as (pre-1942/Wannsee) Nazism to scrutinize the 
totalitarian/intentionalist model, Heder concludes that autonomy at lower levels could 
derive from "centrally-authorized chaos" (as in the Stalinist case), demonstrating a 
"chaotic decision-making process in which increasingly radical and murderous 
improvisations by local officials played a significant role."191 (In this way, "racism" is 
expressed in the (overzealous) attempt by local authorities to achieve uniformity and to 
adhere to the Party line.) Heder's concern is not to subvert arguments that show 
responsibility falling on the DK senior leaders, but instead to extend the limited 
jurisdiction of those "most responsible" to include the culpability of district level cadre 
and thereby broaden and deepen investigations. His critique of the top-down model and 
his emphasis on "discretionary killings" reposition the "myriad thugs" or "instruments of 
terror" (as Locard calls them) who might otherwise be thought to be less responsible 
simply because they are seen to have been following orders.192 
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Three decades after the Khmer Rouge was ousted from power, the human toll of 
Democratic Kampuchea's atrocities has yet to be exactly determined. The "unbearable 
uncertainty of the number" continues to spark discussion; while original estimates ranged 
widely from 30,000 to 4 million, more realistic contemporary figures vary between 
740,000 and 3 million (see the chart below).193 A part of the vast discrepancy in 
estimates can be attributed to the distinction between natural and excessive deaths, as 
many death toll figures fail to indicate whether the sum they are reporting includes 
persons who would have been expected to die during the near-four-year time period or 
not.194 According to demographic definition, excessive mortality "includes all deaths that 
would not have occurred under normal conditions, that is deaths due to war, famine, 
overwork, absence of the most basic health care, migration to hostile epidemiological 
environments, etc." 5 A second conceptual divergence involves direct (executions) 
versus indirect deaths (starvation, disease, exhaustion, etc.); as there is dramatic 
difference in views of the nature and degree of direct violence perpetrated by the DK 
authorities, the magnitude of this difference is further reflected in the total estimate. In 
addition, the research continues to uncover more data about aspects of DK that (re-)shape 
ideas about the killings and their organization.196 A third element that complicates 
calculations is the general dearth of reliable data points. While there is a consensus that 
the 1962 Cambodian census provides the most reliable population count prior to the war 
of the early 1970s, subsequent information is interrogated for its origin, the political 
67 
interests it serves, and/or its methodological rigor.197 "Available figures vary widely and 
are occasionally ludicrous, depending on whether the source is friendly or hostile to the 
DK regime."198 
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figure. 
Early in the process of estimating the Khmer Rouge death toll, two methods of 
accounting predominated. The first technique is a retrospective counting, in which 
random sampling was extrapolated to the population as a whole.199 Before offering his 
own estimates, Kiernan surveys some previous approximations produced from the 
samples of other researchers (Osborne, Heder, Ebihara, Honda); this review sets a 
presumed realistic range for the figure he provides. Osborne's 100-person sample in 
early 1980 produced a death rate of 25 percent, which would produce 2 million deaths 
projected nationally; however, Kiernan reasons that the peasantry, which suffered lower 
deaths rates, is under-represented, and thus 1.5 million is assumed to be a more realistic 
projection.200 Similarly, Heder's 1,500-person sample from 1980-81 is broken down into 
categories with a corresponding death rate; the aggregated figure also yields 1.5 million 
(20 percent death rate nationally).201 The projections derived from Ebihara's hamlet and 
Honda's survey suggest a death rate over 20 percent and thus a toll of 1.6 million, thus 
justifying a claim that overall "at least 1.5 million" excessive deaths occurred under 
Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979.202 Kiernan's calculations rely on a sample of 500 
Cambodian survivors in 1979 and 1980. The data dissects the sample into new and base 
people and further categorizes each subgroup as shown below: 
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Approximate Death Tolls in Democratic 
Social group 
urban Khmer 
rural Khmer 
Chinese (all urban) 
Vietnamese (urban) 
Lao (rural) 
Total new people 
rural Khmer 
[Khmer Krom] 
Cham (all rural) 
Vietnamese (rural) 
Thai (rural) 
upland minorities 
Total base people 
Total Cambodia 
Kampuchea, 1975-1979 
1975 population Number who perished 
"New People" 
2,000,000 
600,000 
430,000 
10,000 
10.000 
3,050,000 
"Base People" 
4,500,000 
[5,000] 
250,000 
10,000 
20,000 
60.000 
4,840,000 
7,890,000 
500,000 
150,000 
215,000 
10,000 
4.000 
879,000 
675,000 
[2,000] 
90,000 
10,000 
8,000 
9.000 
792,000 
1,671,000 
Percentage 
25 
25 
50 
100 
.40 
29 
15 
[40] 
36 
100 
40 
J l 
16 
21 
Source: Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 458. 
The chart includes a lengthy notation on the various addends from different 
sources used to reach the sum of new people.203 Drawing primarily from extrapolations 
from his sample, but also dabbling in, at times precarious, demographic projection, 
Kiernan's 1996 survey estimates a death toll of 1.671 million. With greater attention 
given to demographic projections (Migozzi, Banister and Johnson, Heuveline) in 2003, 
Kiernan offers a slightly revised figure of between "1.671 and 1.871 million people, 21 to 
24 percent of Cambodia's 1975 population."204 Problems appear in Kiernan's method, 
such as inadequate information on the sampled population and the lack of (verifiable) 
death dates, complications which arise precisely out of the chaos created by Cambodia's 
civil war and DK rule.205 As Heuveline notes: 
The sample-based approach is of course much easier to implement 
than the census-based one and under certain conditions the results can be 
confidently extrapolated to the entire population. These conditions are 
difficult to meet in post-crisis situations that typically prevent the use of 
traditional sampling procedures. This might be particularly problematic 
when the mortality risks and patterns vary substantially across sub-
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populations, as was the case in Cambodia among ethnic minorities and, 
among Khmers, between the new and base people, or simply across 
regions differently affected by civil war.206 
He argues that the distribution of subgroups is not well documented, and therefore the 
relative size of "risk groups" can only be very roughly estimated. The survey is 
geographically limited; thus, accessibility to various risk groups varies, especially 
immediately following the crisis. Accordingly, Kiernan's sample may be skewed toward 
former urban dwellers who were most at risk and therefore more likely to flee to the 
border camps (where most interviews were conducted). Politically and ethnically 
motivated killings insert another problematic angle, in that a surviving relative is required 
for mortality to be recorded; the complete elimination of a family will not be recorded at 
all, while surviving family members form statistical "clusters." Given that it sometimes 
took years for family members to track down other surviving relatives, sampling risks the 
possibility of double counting.207 
A second method for estimating the death of toll during Democratic Kampuchea 
employs demographic accounting techniques exclusively.208 Vickery, who offers the 
lowest estimate proceeding from this method, subtracts the normal deaths that would 
have been expected during 1975-79 from the total mortality to determine the excess 
mortality for which the Khmer Rouge can be held responsible. The seemingly simple 
operation of producing a mathematical difference is complicated by how one reaches the 
population figures at either end of the equation. Vickery begins with the 1962 census 
figure of 5,740,000 Cambodians. Subsequent estimates were achieved by the 
compounded application of a growth rate of 2.2 percent. "More sophisticated tinkering" 
with growth rates produced population estimates of 7,029,000 to 7,524,000 (for 1970) 
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and 7,864,000 to 8,768,000 (for 1975).209 The conflict between Lon Nol and the FUNK, 
the US bombardment of the countryside, and massive migration of newly-created 
refugees complicate an accurate projection of the 1975 population; the war "altered the 
normal growth rate and took a high death toll"; given the unreliability in the wide 
variance in estimates, Vickery assumes the CIA's figure of 7 million for the 1970 
population and 7.3 million for 1975, "as good a guess as any for our purposes."210 The 
1980 CIA estimate begins with the UN 1970 population estimate of 7.060 million 
(projected from the 1962 census figure); taking into account birth rate decreases and 
death rate increases as result of the war, the CIA puts the "most likely" population at 
7.384 million for 17 April 1975.211 Vickery deviates slightly from the CIA report, 
because of its "impressionistic" estimates of the death rates, which were combined with 
demographically-generated birth rates.212 He reworks the CIA birth rate figures, rejecting 
the division of rates into "new people" and "old people" categories; he asserts that in 
areas where conditions were better, both categories would have exhibited similar birth 
rates. Instead of a bisected birth rate varying through DK's nearly four years of rule, 
Vickery asserts a crude average birth rate of 30 per thousand for the entire population, 
which yields an increase of 825,000; adding the absolute decline of 400,000, Vickery's 
count for total deaths is 1,252,000. Given that he expects normal peacetime deaths to be 
511,200 for the period, he arrives at "740,800 deaths in excess of normal and due to the 
special conditions of DK. He further claims that 300,000 resulted from execution, 
while more than half of excessive mortality was due to starvation, illness, and 
exhaustion.214 
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Although Vickery admits the impossibility of determining the death toll with 
more accuracy, it is clear that his estimate succeeds or fails based on the figures he 
chooses (often rough estimates, good guesses, and "sophisticated tinkering") and the birth 
and death rates he assumes.215 In fact, the inaccuracy of any component data becomes 
amplified in the compounded estimated results, and the fact that he employs educated 
guesses suggests a greater margin of error for his numbers. At the time of the CIA report, 
the US was backing a coalition that included the Khmer Rouge and willfully ignoring 
charges of "genocide" that were leveled at the ousted organization. Thus, Vickery's 
assumption of CIA figures may reproduce a desire (on the part of the US) to under-
represent the 1979 population so as to produce a lower death toll and downplay Khmer 
Rouge atrocities.216 
Kiljunen's estimation of the DK death toll, on behalf of the Finnish Inquiry 
Commission, is 1 million or slightly less. He begins with the UN calculation of the 1970 
population of 7.1 million and a 1975 population of 7.3 million.217 He asserts that a 
consistent rate of growth (2.8 percent) would have produced a population of 8.3 to 8.5 
million in 1981; acknowledging the difficulty for the PRK government in estimating the 
post-DK population, he still accepts the census figure of 6.7 million. Taking into account 
the return of refugees, Kiljunen reconciles the difference to yield a figure of 7.4 million. 
Without detailed explanation, Kiljunen states that this number suggests a death toll of 1 
million; however, incorporating a decreasing population growth rate due to war and DK 
policies (1.5 percent, for example) could yield a lower death toll, closer to 700,000.218 
These rough estimations find statistical brethren in Ea's 1987 analysis of 
Kampuchea's population trends, which approaches 1970 to 1980 as a decade of 
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demographic and socio-economic decline (with signs of recovery only beginning to 
surface around 1981).219 Ea notes the difficulties associated with demographic data (i.e., 
reliance on individual estimates and fragmentary data as well as their political 
manipulation), and seeks to avoid these problems by comparing the "hypothetical 
population" of Kampuchea in 1980 (10 million) to his estimation of the actual population 
(6 million).220 Three observations are made immediately obvious in the analysis: a quasi-
stagnant population 1970-74; a steadily declining population 1975-78; and a continued 
decline 1979-80. In attempting to quantify these trends, Ea asserts that 600,000 deaths 
due directly to war occurred during the Lon Nol period, with another 100,000 indirect 
and 600,000 normal deaths. Reacting to "impressions and unverifiable estimates," Ea 
advances numbers and rates of growth "somewhat arbitrarily." By these rough 
calculations, death (normal and excessive combined) during the Democratic Kampuchea 
period are estimated at 1 million, broken down into 900,000 as a result of disease, 
starvation, etc. and 100,000 resulting violently. The strength of Ea's analysis is its 
attempt to statistically account for the cumulative effects of catastrophe; however, the 
self-admittedly somewhat arbitrary (and somewhat logically reasoned) numbers are as 
open to criticism as the unverifiable sampling of Kiernan's approach. 
The demographic analysis of Banister and Johnson works backwards in order to 
attain a population modeling that links up the 1962 census figure with the Cambodian 
government's Department of Statistics survey that calculated the year-end population in 
1980 to be 6,589,954. By examining sex and age composition in the 1980 survey they 
are able to generalize about 1970-74 population trends as follows: 1) "the underlying 
mortality conditions of the 1970s, though atrocious, were not terrible enough to account 
75 
for the excess losses among working age adults," and 2) "no reduction in the birth rate 
resulting from famine or dislocation in the early 1970s, in spite of the civil war and 
bombing."223 Similar to Ea, Banister and Johnson calculate a projected population that 
would have existed in 1975 had there been no disaster; starting with a 1970 population of 
roughly 7 million, they postulate a hypothetical 8 million.224 By taking into account 
emigration, fewer births (due to deaths and migration, but not a reduced birth rate), and 
wartime excess deaths numbering 275,000, the authors produce a 1975 population 
estimate of 7.3 million. They further estimate that the population at the end of DK rule 
was around 6.36 million. A no-disaster projection for the second half of the decade 
would render an end-year 1978 population of 8.2 million. The 1.8 million-person 
difference is explained by: 
• Net emigration of 218,000. 
• A dearth of 570,000 births compared to the expected level. 
• Excess deaths totaling about 1.05 million225 
The majority of deaths are explained by a lack of medical care, food shortages, and 
forced migrations during Democratic Kampuchea; however, this massive loss of life does 
not adequately account for the skewed effect on age within the post-DK population. By 
re-examining the mortality data of the early 1970s and applying the age-sex structure data 
from the 1980 survey, the authors further assert that "on average, during each year of the 
four Khmer Rouge years, ten percent of men and almost three percent of women in young 
adult and middle age were killed, above and beyond those who died due to the general 
mortality situation."226 
Heuveline, a determined demographer, evaluates the various attempts to estimate 
death tolls for 1970s Cambodia, acknowledging, "Demographic reconstruction is, 
however, hindered by the uncertainties of measurement in each component, which are 
compounded in the estimate of the residual component."227 His 1998 article, the purpose 
of which is to locate an acceptable range of estimates, employs some sophisticated 
statistical reflections to estimate the "excess mortality"—1) violent death and 2) general 
increase in mortality beyond the expected 800,000—experienced by Cambodians from 
1970 through 1979. The titular conclusion offers a range of 1.17 to 3.42 million excess 
deaths, achieved as a residual figure from forward projecting from 1962 (census) to 1970 
and backward projecting from 1992 (UNTAC voter registration) to 1980.228 While this 
broad range is endowed with more certainty, it does not contradict outright any previous 
estimations. 
Similar to Banister and Johnson, Heuveline employs age-sex structures in the 
population to analyze the causes of death, violent mortality as a component of excessive 
mortality. Violent deaths during this ten-year period ranged from 1.09 to 2.16 million, 
and the author estimates 600,000 to 2 million during 1975 to 1978 generating a middle 
value of 1.1 million. Although the statistical presentation appears sound and rigorous, 
it is clear that the decomposition of the excess mortality within these ten years remains 
problematic. The assertions about deaths resulting from various factors—1970-72 anti-
Vietnamese pogroms, 1970s bombing, 1970-75 civil war, Khmer Rouge executions, 
general decline in mortality during Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnamese invasion 
fatalities, and the 1979-1980 famine—seem tenuous, even though the author has used 
age and sex structures to better approximate these figures. Further, what appears 
neglected is the sense of the cumulative effect of excessive death—increased infant 
mortality, decreased life expectancy, worsening social conditions—as each successive 
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year (1971,1972,...) begets smaller and smaller population increases; the neglect of year 
to year developments arises from the author's choice of a "residual" method (which was 
warranted given the lack of reliable statistics). 
Heuveline himself acknowledges the problems involved in statistical renderings 
of excess mortality that use two population estimates. First, he notes the unreliability of 
1975 population estimates; the turmoil of the civil war in the early 1970s complicates any 
attempt at accurate estimation. Second, there is the questionable reliability of 1980s data, 
ranging from 5.7 million (US Bureau of the Census) to 7 million (Banister and Johnson); 
debate about the extent of the 1979 famine casts doubt on an accurate reverse projection 
of the population to the point when the CPK was ousted. Third, Heuveline questions the 
estimation of births; fertility decline cannot be accurately known, and the variation for 
this unknown could be as high as 300,000.230 
While early estimates of the death toll based on sampling/interviews (Kiernan, 
Osborne, Sliwinski) produced higher figures than subsequent demographic analyses 
(Vickery, Ea, Kiljunen, Banister and Johnson), and no bearable (soutenable) figure was 
attained, there has been an upward trend in estimates over the last decade.231 More 
recently, a second calculation by Heuveline and Etcheson's work alongside DC-Cam 
have approached approximations of excess mortality around 2 million, a significant 
numerical jump from the first wave of academic considerations and nearing the presumed 
exaggeration of the PRK government. 
Heuveline's second calculation seeks a total for the decade 1970 to 1980, from 
which component causes of death (US bombing, civil war, famine, etc.) can be subtracted 
to produce a residual excess mortality for the DK period. To this end, he employs UN 
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data gathered in the run-up to the 1993 elections and an approach based on birth cohorts. 
Following a smooth growth rate from the 1962 population of 5.7 million, Heuveline 
arrives at 7.7 million for Cambodia's 1970 population. The retro-projection from the 
1993 statistics gives a January 1980 population of 6.4 million.232 The excess deaths 
(among people born in 1970) for the decade is given as 2.52 million—the average of two 
residual numbers (2.41 and 2.63 million), achieved from the two data points, projected 
forward and backward respectively, and accounting for various migrations. Adjusting 
this total for the civil war (300,000), the 1979 famine (300,000) and the excess morality 
of those born after 1970 (300,000), Heuveline claims that Democratic Kampuchea 
exhibits 2.2 million excessive deaths.233 Following the assumptions of Heder, Sliwinski, 
Kiernan, and Vickery, Heuveline claims that half of excess deaths, 1.1 million people, 
were violent deaths.234 
Etcheson's estimations derive from his participation in DC-Cam's Mass Grave 
Mapping Project. His quantification begins with the critique of the PRK death toll before 
incorporating an approach that appeals to a discourse of technological accuracy.235 
House-to-house surveys conducted by the PRK government led the Research Committee 
on Pol Pot's Genocidal Regime to make public on 25 July 1983 that 3,314,768 people 
perished during Democratic Kampuchea.236 However, Etcheson highlights some flaws 
that show this number is inflated by as much as 50 percent. First, the surveying "did not 
adequately account for the fact that extended families are usually spread out across more 
than one household or village," which suggests double counting plagues the total.237 As 
well, the government exhumed mass graves and added the number of (unidentifiable) 
corpses to the number that emerged from the survey interviews.238 DC-Cam's 1995 
review of the numbers determined that a logical overestimation of 50 percent would put 
the actual death toll nearer to two million. The mass grave survey research pursued by 
DC-Cam in the late 1990s and early 2000s combines GPS/GIS mapping with fieldwork 
to locate and investigate the 20,492 mass graves, which it dates to the CPK regime, and 
its 1,110,829 known victims (perhaps as high as 1.5 million).239 By proximity to the 125 
zonal, sectoral, and district security centers and also from anecdotal evidence, Etcheson 
reasons that the mass graves contain the corpses of those who were almost exclusively 
the victims of execution.240 
In order to ascertain more general figures on total mortality under Democratic 
Kampuchea, Etcheson returns to earlier sampling surveys. He notes the surprising 
similarity reached by various attempts using the sampling method: Kiernan's 1.67 
million, Heder's 1.7 million, Sliwinski's 1.84 to 1.97 million. He also notes the apparent 
uncertainty scattered throughout demographic analyses: CIA's 1.2 to 1.8 million, 
Banister and Johnson's 1.05 million, and Heuveline's 2.2 million. Etcheson's third 
approach re-visits Osborne's assertion that 31 percent of deaths were by execution, which 
would suggest, when employing DC-Cam's findings, a total death toll of 3.3 million 
people. Similarly, Sliwinski argues that 40 percent died from executions (and 36 percent 
from starvation and 13 percent from disease); Heder's survey estimates 33 percent of 
deaths among new people were from executions, while among base people it was 50 
percent; Heuveline's most recent estimate argues that 50 percent were due to violent 
death. Thus, Etcheson is led to conclude that the original PRK figure may not have been 
a propagandist exaggeration, but instead that "three million Cambodians died untimely 
deaths during the Khmer Rouge regime."241 In the end though, Etcheson accepts 
Heuveline's number of 2.2 million excess deaths, which reaffirms the 1.1 million number 
of executions determined by DC-Cam's mapping project. 
Etcheson is keen to restate some of Vickery's early critique of mass grave data as 
a means of highlighting the conclusion that his mapping methodology suggests.242 
Certainly, the idea that only forensic scrutiny would be needed to determine the timing, 
cause, and nature of death (whether execution graves or pits for starved persons or a 
combination of both) remains a valid point of skepticism, but one which DC-Cam has 
sought to clarify and presumably will be answered in time as it receives greater funding. 
More in line with Vickery's critiques of refugee accounts and the resurfacing of Issarak 
atrocities in Khmer Rouge horror narratives, Etcheson states: 
Although it appears entirely possible that certain socially acceptable and 
politically shaped myths may influence the precise contours of the 
narratives collected by mass grave mapping teams, it seems highly 
improbable that these social pressures would extend so far as to the 
fabrication of ruins of former prison facilities, the placing of physical 
evidence such as shackles in those ruins, or the construction of anguished, 
but false, accounts of relatives killed in the Khmer Rouge extermination 
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centers. 
Etcheson himself reviews the quality of the research teams, suggesting that 
quality has varied but generally improved over time; in fact, he provides an example in 
which a team's hesitation leads to an underestimating bias in the death toll. Two more 
examples lead him to assert an "inherent conservatism" underlying the project's numbers. 
He does give credence to some of Vickery's challenges (which are also echoed by 
Kiernan), notably the impossibility "to precisely apportion the number of deaths from 
execution versus those from illness and starvation," which leaves open to question 
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whether the security centers (and their executions) alone were filling the graves. Vickery 
cites on informant who states that the mass graves in one province were for hunger 
victims, while executions were carried out in isolated forested areas. He also suggests 
that the mass graves may also contain some of the 500,000 war dead, and it would be 
difficult to distinguish.244 Etcheson acknowledges the charges from Vickery and Kiernan 
with an example that exceeds the dependence on Yathay.245 Further complicating 
Etcheson's determination, and generating some additional "noise," is the question of 
discerning "normal" versus excess mortality for the remains that fill the mass graves. 
What is the number meant to represent to an audience that receives it? Does it 
impart a sense of meaning to survivors of the murderous revolution? Are these large 
sums of victimhood a statistical sword wielded against the committed cadre who thought 
they were bringing a glorious Utopia to the Kampuchean people? Does the wide variation 
in estimates come to insult one's intelligence by assuming that a reader cannot spot 
propaganda when it leaps out from the page? Does a higher death count endow more 
purpose or significance to a "genocide" trial? The (already-politicized) rendering of the 
death toll resulting from the policies and actions of DK cadre are subsequently re-
deployed for political purposes. Early estimations—which continued to be reproduced 
and re-circulated in the media, academic presentations, and international agency 
reports—were often products of political agendas. For example, Kiljunen suggests, "By 
exaggerating the number that fell victim, the desire was to convince at first the 
international community of'Pol Pot's policy of genocide' and thus justify the actions of 
Vietnam."246 Social science methodology is called upon to offer some sort of solace to 
either the propagandizing underestimating perpetrators or the suffering survivors or some 
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combination in between.247 It is a dark science that employs demographic analyses to 
crisis situations whose chaos leads to an inability to actually know the magnitude of its 
atrocity.248 Can it be that 1 million people's (excessive) deaths somehow went missing? 
Perhaps there is a sense of relief underlying Etcheson's newer number, because it 
purports that these (formerly missing) deaths will now be systematically and 
scientifically counted, using the most modern means available. However, Vickery's 
lowball estimates would lead one to charge that Etcheson's new-found mortality have 
been conjured from the statistical ashes—conjured precisely in the overestimation of the 
1975 population—raising concerns that the magnitude of Cambodia's suffering is 
populated with "ghost casualties," the distorted reflection of the ghost soldiers that 
populated Lon Nol's ranks. 
These estimations of the human cost of Democratic Kampuchea answer to the 
demands of presentations of Cambodia that foreground/amplify Cambodians' suffering 
under CPK rule as well as a conscientious concern for an accurate demographic rendering 
of the effects of the atrocities.249 Perhaps a greater number offers an odd comfort to those 
that have survived, knowing that their personal suffering is somehow accounted for and 
reflected in societal-level suffering; higher estimates may reconcile better with survivors' 
own experience of their suffering. As Etcheson states, "Many Cambodians believe, 
almost as an article of faith, that the Khmer Rouge killed more than three million people 
during the Democratic Kampuchea regime."250 The 3.3 million figure, this unbearable 
comfort, is annually re-affirmed by government propaganda on the Day of Hate (May 20) 
that re-broadcasts this death toll to Cambodians. The discomforting academic estimates, 
even as they increase toward the government's "official" number, reinforce how 
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mediated the experience of the DK regime has become for those that have survived and 
especially for those pursue its' complexity. 
As Kiernan has stated, the outright denial of genocide in the Cambodian case, and 
even more so, attempts to block legal or academic inquiry into the case, should not be 
confused with differing viewpoints regarding the atrocities that occurred in Cambodia 
from 1975 to 1979.251 Kiernan relates the tale of a small group of individuals who sought 
to stymie the founding of the Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) as well as his 
appointment to its head.252 Outright denial that genocide—or, that "anything serious 
occurred"—under DK is credited to Bunroeun Thach. Deemed a convert of Thach as 
well as a Khmer Rouge apologist, Kiernan criticizes Sorpong Peou for "having opposed 
legal accountability" for the leaders of DK.253 Interrogating the source of the Wall Street 
Journal attack, Kiernan itemizes the overt and covert anti-CGP campaigns launched by 
pundit Morris (and his Congressional Republican accomplices); the minutiae of Morris' 
under-handed dealings in publications, politics, and power come to light in Kiernan's 
play-by-play account.254 In the drawn-out narrative, Kiernan establishes a key point: the 
"political chicanery" (of KR allies seeking credibility for their demands regarding 
genocide investigations) should not "be confused with differing definitions of genocide 
or with scholarly debate about the nature of the tragedy."255 
It is up to the tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), to parse out the differences between various legal 
charges—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggression, mass 
murder (domestic law), etc.—and the nature of evidence required, and to measure it 
against the kind of documentary evidence available in the Cambodian case. However, 
the charge of "genocide" specifically has received much scholarly attention (in addition 
to the overtly political manipulation mentioned above). The international Genocide 
Convention states that the crime of genocide means killing members of a group "with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religions group, as 
such."256 The application of "genocide" must confront the nature of the violence and 
killings under Democratic Kampuchea, specifically 1) the systematic killings that were 
carried out through the security apparatus as well as 2) the assertive killings which may 
or may not have devolved out of interpretations by local authorities. The cleavages that 
form within the debate among academics largely reflects how authors represent and 
analyze DK spatial and temporal variation, the scope of its violence, the nature of the 
regime's authority, various explanations of how the atrocities occurred, as well as the 
death toll and the qualitative characteristics represented by those statistics. 
Kiernan is one of the earliest and indeed most prolific advocates for labeling the 
CPK atrocities of 1975-79 "genocide." Kiernan's position contends that the CPK 
committed genocide (multiple genocides) against minority groups within the country, as 
the Party sought to systematically exterminate the ethnic Vietnamese and Cham 
populations. (He also claims that Democratic Kampuchea committed genocide against 
the Chinese, not because this group was targeted for execution, but because DK forcibly 
disallowed any Chinese community.257) While Kiernan's works break down killings and 
harsh rule for all ethnic categories, Cambodia's Cham minorities figure most prominently 
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in his argument.258 Even though Cham people themselves did not necessarily perceive 
their own victimization as constituting "discrimination"—because of the regime's radical 
egalitarianism, regardless of race—Kiernan argues that their persecution by the CPK 
targeted their cultural distinction. "If this was merely the application of the same 
regulations to all citizens of Democratic Kampuchea, it must be conceded that the all-
embracing nature of these regulations and their strict enforcement represented a serious 
attack on minority groups."259 However, Kiernan's second charge is that Chams were 
specifically persecuted and discriminated against for being Chams; that is, they were 
forced to eat pork, their language was prohibited, their urban and rural communities were 
dispersed and demoted to "depositee" in the process. 
In his review of CPK political considerations of Chams, Kiernan asserts that 
concern for national and racial grandiosity was an underlying theme of the CPK Center 
and especially Pol Pot's thinking (despite only one surviving statement by the regime 
directly about the Cham minority).260 Kiernan specifically states that by 1975 some 
restrictions on Chams (that may have been war measures) were in place, and there was 
"no sign of a CPK policy to disperse the Chams"; after 1975, the massacre of Chams 
became a centrally organized genocidal campaign, despite variation across areas. 
Displaying his peculiar sense of thoroughness, Kiernan proceeds by a sector-to-sector 
assessment of each zone. His analysis sets the Cham death toll at 90,000 (over one 
third of the Cham population).262 The "genocide" committed against the Chams is 
established by two points: 1) that Cham people were persecuted (targeted for their 
cultural distinctiveness and other reasons), and 2) the disproportionate character of their 
persecution in relation to other and Khmer groups—forced to eat pork, to speak only 
Khmer, to disperse all Cham communities. Based on this different treatment, Kiernan 
argues that Chams were deliberately singled out because of their race and that 
Democratic Kampuchea "pursued a campaign of racial persecution against the Chams" 
and therefore conforms to the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
Etcheson as well has been a major proponent of applying the term "genocide" to 
describe the inhumanity that occurred under Democratic Kampuchea. His arguments 
suggest that previous uncertain hypotheses about the applicability of "genocide" resulted 
largely from a lack of adequate, reliable data or independently-verifiable evidence. 
"There was little or no physical evidence that would explicate the specific mechanism 
through which the Khmer Rouge could have carried out such large-scale killings, nor was 
there much hard evidence demonstrating that the Khmer Rouge leadership in fact had 
been in command of any such bureaucratic apparatus. This 'data vacuum' on the 
Cambodian genocide is now a thing of the past."264 However, his summary of DC-Cam 
and CGP efforts since 1996—including the many on-line databases that have been 
created—is confined almost exclusively to records from Santebal, and it repeatedly 
details anticipated accomplishments to come.265 
Both Heder and Chandler assert that Kiernan's argument about ethnic minorities 
generally ignores the political aspects of their group (e.g., Chinese perceived as "urban" 
and "capitalist"). Chandler states: 
While DK attacks on the Vietnamese minority (nine-tenths of whom had 
already been expelled in 1975) had racist overtones, the death rates for 
Chinese (half the 1975 population) and Cham (one in three) can be more 
simply explained by other factors: the Chinese as the country's 
"capitalists" were political enemies and as urban dwellers were poorly 
prepared for arduous' rural labor, while the Cham were one of the few 
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groups to resist DK depredations. It is difficult to construe DK policies 
toward the Chinese as racist and genocidal when the leadership 
assiduously cultivated links with Mao's China and when over 1,000 
Chinese technicians resided under privileged conditions in DK. Most 
importantly, Kiernan's argument fails to explain why, if the 400,000 
minority victims of DK were its principal targets, 1.3 million ethnic 
Khmer also died in the maelstrom of the late 1970s. Kiernan has written a 
prosecutor's brief to indict Pol Pot and his colleagues for genocide under 
the terms of the 1948 UN Convention—a text which recognizes ethnic and 
religious victims, but glaringly excludes political ones. 
Heder makes a similar argument, although he reaches somewhat different conclusions. 
With regard to Kiernan's centerpiece analysis of the Chams, he fails to properly consider 
that the CPK approached that national question in terms of class (i.e., "non-proletarian-
ness") rather than ethnicity, even if that meant Chams were persecuted with genocidal 
results.267 Kiernan's conclusions about the Chinese—that the genocidal persecution was 
not racially based—depends on his own stereotyping (i.e., all Chinese are bourgeois), 
which plays into the PRK categorization of Chinese as not real victims of the Khmer 
Rouge and therefore were less entitled to post-DK political posts.268 Conversely, Heder 
argues that the Cham and Chinese minorities faced the same problem: "the way in which 
ethnic stereotyping was fitted into a paradigm of class, such that every intensification of 
the class struggle meant the intensification of attacks on ethnic groups stereotyped as 
problematic in terms of class background and tendencies."269 Kiernan's own mortality 
statistics, according to ethnicity, suggests that mortality was based on class identity, with 
increased ethnic mortality as that category was correlated to a higher class. Heder's 
critique takes on the issue of intentionality as it operates in Kiernan's book: namely, that 
while the destruction of the country in the attempts to transform it can be viewed by 
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Kiernan as an unintended consequence, genocide is construed as centrally planned—thus 
conforming to a literal reading of the Genocide Convention's "intent to destroy."270 
Rather than eschew the "genocide" label altogether, Heder draws off expanded notions 
from Hannum and Hawk as well as Fein's sociological definition. Heder produces an 
alternative interpretation that argues that direct or indirect destruction of a group, 
regardless of motivation or rationale, constitutes genocide.272 Thus, Heder claims that the 
underlying dynamic to DK's "genocidal" practices, far from being biology or ethnicity, 
was socio-political. 
Vickery's analysis of Cambodia's "peasant revolution" largely denies the 
applicability of "genocide": the systematic killings carried out by the CPK elite (i.e., 
purges) were political in nature (e.g., based on the perception of traitors/enemies) and at 
times were responses to rebellions; non-systematic killings in the countryside were the 
expression of peasant rage (against a privileged class) or the result of poor leadership in 
the face of difficult circumstances which had been exacerbated by the war; death from 
starvation, disease, and exhaustion varied according to regional and sectoral 
conditions. As for the Chams, Vickery asserts that his interviewees indicate that there 
was never a central policy to eliminate the Chams.274 The Vietnamese minority is 
perceived to have been too statistically small by 1975 to support an argument of 
genocide, a "benign bloodbath."275 
Like other scholars who disagree with the use of "genocide," Locard finds other 
egregious offenses more applicable to the CPK's deeds: crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and crime of aggression. However, Locard's review of these atrocities focuses 
specifically on the Communist nature of the regime (contra Vickery's non-Marxist 
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characterization of the Organization). "The mass killings the Khmer Rouge carried out... 
hardly fall within the terms of the 1948 International Convention on Genocide, since their 
crimes were political, not racial. They killed for ideological motives, and certainly not 
because the victims belonged to a particular race, as was generally true in Communist 
countries."276 Although Locard sees DK as a small faction maintaining its power through 
a policy of violence and terror, he simultaneously views the repression as politically (not 
racially) guided, aimed at enemies real or imaginary; thus he prefers the term "politicide" 
to "genocide."277 In Locard's analysis, the war communism (beginning with the 
rustication of the cities' inhabitants), that characterized the early phase of DK, made 
possible a series of criminal practices: radical breakdown of social institutions, 
suspension of liberties (religion, expression, association, travel), deprivation of physical 
liberty, summary executions, forced labour, torture, and exploitation.278 His review of 
the deaths of ethnic minorities (specifically the Chams) asserts that their persecution 
followed the political goal of abolishing religion. Locard claims that increased mortality 
among the Chams (40.6 percent of their population according to Sliwinski) was largely a 
result of resistance to the abolition.279 He further explicates the long process of mental 
degradation and abuse (forms of dehumanization) that preceded extermination. However, 
far from constituting genocide, Locard argues that these heinous crimes against humanity 
were driven by political considerations in the context of an authoritarian state (and a 
long-established autocratic tradition). 
Short's objections to "genocide" evaluate Cambodian society from a different 
angle. A key component of Short's distaste for the use of the term involves the 
representation of the DK period as a "unique aberration."280 As discussed above, Short's 
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biogf aphically-based tome argues for understanding Cambodian violence in a socio-
cultural continuum which links atrocities of the Issarak, Sihanouk's violent suppression 
of opposition, DK atrocities, CPP-inspired attacks on Sam Rainsy and FUNCINPEC 
activists, vigilante justice, and acid attacks on mistresses. At the end of this enumeration 
of cultural traits, Short flatly states that the actions of the Pol Pot regime—having "not set 
out to exterminate a national, ethnic, racial or religious group"—do not conform to the 
clear definition laid out in Article II of the Genocide Convention.281 While 
acknowledging "crimes against humanity"—the enslavement of the people "on so grand 
a scale and with such unrelenting savagery"—as a more appropriate label, Short's 
rejection of "genocide" (like many authors) quickly moves to evaluate the political 
interests underlying the charge.282 Short documents the political use of "genocide" by 
the Vietnamese in 1979 at Tuol Sleng and by the US in the 1990s, and he charges that 
foreign powers' approach vis-a-vis "genocide" and a Khmer Rouge trial (making the 
crime fit the punishment) demonstrate a larger policy of non-involvement in Cambodia, 
even as its corruption and impunity are well documented.283 Similarly, Vickery contends 
that "genocide" only comes into consideration when politically convenient, or more 
generally, what counts as "human rights abuses" changes according to political 
circumstances; he claims that the term "genocide" was forbidden within UNTAC 
discourse, principally because any critical views of DK would undermine the 
international (i.e., anti-Vietnamese) effort against the PRK government.284 Locard notes 
that the first use of the term to describe the atrocities in Cambodia came from the USSR, 
defending the Vietnamese invasion of the country.285 Heder examines the ways in which 
a genocide trial has been politically manipulated by Prime Minister Hun Sen, shaping a 
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legal process that will allow impunity/amnesty when politically necessary. His analysis 
makes clear that "fairness and truth" are not the priorities underlying Hun Sen's actions; 
instead, "genocide" circulates in rhetorical and legal venues as a means to control and 
neutralize (potential) political opponents, changing its definition to suit the needs of the 
moment.286 
In discussing the Genocide Convention and Cambodia's 1991 Paris Peace 
Accords, Thion notes how law and treaties are valued only when they do not contradict 
current policy. He estimates 1 to 1.5 million people died in Democratic Kampuchea, and 
he states that the 1970-1975 war, notably the drastic effects of US saturation bombing, 
was a pre-condition for "genocide."287 However, he is exceptionally, and savagely, 
critical of the ignorance, unfounded idealism, and lack of imagination (which encouraged 
secrecy and brutality) of the Pol Pot clique within the CPK. Thion eschews 
suggestions that Chams were persecuted on the basis of race/ethnicity—or that there was 
a racist motive underlying CPK policies;—but were victims of a general policy to 
eradicate religion. He acknowledges that the majority of human loss was due to 
starvation, disease, and exhaustion which had resulted from the CPK's unrealistic 
economic policy. In his more extreme moments, Thion's reflections on "genocide" (as it 
came to be defined but never used in a court of law) note how every mass killing will be 
considered genocide if its memory is being manipulated to achieve geo-political ends. 
Part of Thion's argument is the Orwellian situation in which mass crimes, which 
obviously constitute "genocide" committed by world powers (e.g., massacres or 
suppression of aborigines), do not garner legal attention, while atrocities in other lands 
that fail to formally align with the Genocide Convention are pursued by these same world 
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powers.290 In considering the (lack of) applicability of the term to the Cambodian case, 
Thion examines the legal systems (traditional and colonial) in the country as well as the 
cultural regulations of behavior; more significantly, he demonstrates how a genoeidal 
trial of a political elite would appear "ludicrous" to most Khmers, although leaving open 
the possibility of a cathartic reconciling effect. 
If the multiple perspectives, which constitute an academic rendering of the use 
and abuse of DK history, do not resolve the "genocide" question, then everyday usage 
may make the definitive case: ex post facto convention rather than dejure Convention 
becomes the standard. In colloquial usage, the very general sense of "genocide"— 
suggestive of unjustified State-sponsored mass murder—seems to have taken hold. The 
designation, "crimes against humanity," a broad category of offenses (which appears 
more apt), seems to fail to express the enormity of Cambodia's historical episode. Thus, 
in names and discussions, "genocide" seems indelibly inscribed on the Kampuchean 
revolution of the 1970s: the stone placard announcing Tuol Sleng Museum of Genoeidal 
Crimes, Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program, US Congressional records, and 
the numerous texts that bear the (more colloquial) indictment.292 
Through the various analyses it becomes apparent that the most systematic 
killings committed during Democratic Kampuchea were carried out by the regime's 
Santebal, the central S-21 office and its countrywide network of security facilities. The 
task was to hunt down "enemies," a category itself that shifted with the needs and 
circumstances of the faction that was in a perpetual struggle to assert, consolidate, and 
maintain its control. The non-systematic (and even the obligatory) killings follow a 
political (and not racial/ethnic) rationale, whereby lower level cadre bore more authority, 
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and therefore more responsibility, for the decisions to execute. If Democratic 
Kampuchea is interpreted as "communist" in some sense of the word (without denying 
Cambodia's particular historical antecedents, cultural trends, or other mitigating factors), 
then the question of genocide speaks to the way in which state-sponsored violence by 
Marxist-influenced regimes is interpreted and represented. This open-ended discussion 
will also touch on the political uses to which these representations (and their correlative 
concepts) are put to political or ideological use... or given voice in monuments to 
histories. 
"Now you can go where the people are one, 
Now you can go where they get things done. 
CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVES 
By a stroke of comparative advantage, Cambodia's agricultural economy, 
dominated for centuries by rice production, has been complemented in its post-war 
decade by two key growth areas: textiles and tourism.1 Statements by international 
lending institutions indicate that Cambodia's recent growth "continues to be underpinned 
by garment exports, tourism, construction, and agricultural expansion."2 In 2006, the 
garment industry grew by 20 percent, tourism increased 26 percent, and agriculture 
expanded by 4.4 percent.3 In addition to the country's growth industries, it should be 
noted that the Cambodian economy is buoyed by substantial aid inflows, official 
development assistance (ODA), which averaged approximately 12 percent of the 
country's GDP from 1999 to 2003.4 Since 1996, a group of Cambodia's development 
partners—country representatives, lending institutions, international development 
organizations—known as the Consultative Group (CG) has met to formulate pledges of 
funds in direct assistance and loans to support Cambodia's poverty reduction and overall 
development efforts.5 Over the years, these pledges have averaged US$500 million per 
year, representing 17 percent of Cambodia's GDP.6 These contributions do not include 
the services and products contributed from NGOs involved in development efforts, which 
do not factor into the national budget. 
The gains in garments have been due largely to an export quota system between 
the US and Cambodian governments, which helped stimulate and maintain demand. The 
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PRK government formally recognized the private sector in the mid-1980s, and it was not 
until January 1992 that the US lifted its embargo against Cambodia. In October 1996, the 
two countries normalized trade relations; on 30 May 1997 (two months after the grenade 
attack on a Sam Rainsy-led demonstration), Cambodia was designated "least-developed 
beneficiary developing country" under the US Generalized System of Preferences easing 
the trade restrictions and tariffs involved in doing business with Cambodia for particular 
items of production. A bilateral textile agreement was signed on January 1999 which 
established the export quota system for Cambodian garment manufacturers.7 (The 
competitive bidding alone for garment export quotas in that year lifted government 
revenues by 40 percent, and the US became the largest market for Cambodian 
garments.8) In December 2001, this agreement was extended for another three years. 
During this period, garments grew from a US$26 million industry in 1999 to US$2 
billion in 2004, employing some 245,600 people.9 However, the relaxation of trade 
restrictions from the multi-fiber agreement (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing) was set 
to expire in 2005, as mandated by the WTO; already in November 2004, two large 
factories closed, leading to the loss of nearly 10,000 jobs. Cambodia was left to scramble 
for ways to cope as it was put in competition with China in the realm of garments.10 
Although the garment industry is the largest revenue generator for the Cambodian 
economy, it remains an industry clustered around the capital city of Phnom Penh whose 
factory floors staff a relatively narrow population segment, primarily women, a large 
percentage of whom are young and recently arrived from their rural communities of 
origin.11 Similarly, although tourism is considered the country's second key industry, its 
growth has been limited in terms of organization and breadth of benefits. With the end of 
the quota system, "tourism is the only identified source of growth in the foreseeable 
future."12 
Cambodia's tourist offerings are broad historically and geographically, and they 
be roughly divided into four groupings.13 
1. Foremost among these are the Angkorian and pre-Angkorian monuments, 
whose ruins and renovations draw the most tourist interest domestically 
and internationally. The Angkor Archaeological Park (including Angkor 
Wat, Bayon, Ta Prohm, Preah Khan, Banteay Srei, and many more) is the 
most famous, but grandeurs of the past in mixed states of (dis)repair can 
be found across the country: Koh Ker and the hotly-contested Prassat 
(Preah Vihear); Banteay Chmar (Banteay Meanchey); Phnom Chisor, 
Angkor Borrei, and Tonle Bati (Takeo); National Museum (Phnom Penh); 
Sambor Preah Kuk (Kompong Thom); and Wat Nokor (Kampong 
Cham).14 
2. Nature-based tourism or natural recreation areas, based on geographic 
criteria (typically, a water body or mountain) and primarily frequented by 
Cambodians, also span the nation's territory, with at least one of these 
geographical "resorts" {form 'niy'thaan iHtwaitJiB) in each province: Teuk 
Chou rapids and the Popokvil falls (Kampot); the beaches of Kep and 
Sihanoukville (Kampong Som); waterfalls and coastline sites in Koh 
Kong; the shoreline of Tonle Bati (Takeo); Chambok stream and the pine 
forests in Kirirom National Park as well as Ompe Phnom riverfront resort 
(Kampong Speu); Phnom Da and Phnom Neang Kang Rey mountain 
picnic areas (Kampong Chhnang); Phnom Sompov (Battambang); 
Champey Waterfall Resort (Oddar Meanchey); Phnom Santuk Resort 
(Kampong Thom); Teuk Chha Resort and the twin mountains of Phnom 
Srey, Phnom Bros (Kampong Cham); Kampi Resort with Mekong 
dolphins (Kratie); waterfalls and Yeak Laom Volcanic Lake (Ratanakiri); 
Bou Sra and other waterfalls (Mondulkiri).15 
3. Service-oriented tourism, with sites usually overseen by NGOs, invites 
visitors to familiarize themselves with artisans and their crafts by touring 
production facilities. Supplementing the dominance of Angkorian 
interests, Siem Reap offers many of these foreigner-oriented outings: Dr. 
Beat's Jayavarman VII Children's Hospital, the Siem Reap Silk Farm, 
Artisans d'Angkor wood and stone-carving facilities, the Crocodile Farm, 
and Akira's Landmine Museum.16 
4. In addition to the ancient history offerings, historical tourism dealing with 
modern times has recently emerged. Some of these focus on 18th- and 
early 1 9th-century pasts, such as the old capital of Oudong or the Bokor 
casino and Kep seaside villas.17 Others highlight the country's wartime 
past: Siem Reap's War Museum which opened in 2002, the Tuol Sleng 
Museum of Genocidal Crimes (Phnom Penh), and the Choeung Ek 
"Killing Fields" site. 
Cutting across these four categories are a number of nationally-oriented sites, such as the 
Royal Palace/Silver Pagoda and the Cambodian Cultural Village theme park (completed 
in 2003), which one might position as a cultural supplement to the Angkorian offerings. 
Cambodia also provides tourists venues for extreme leisure activities, such as the firing 
range near Pochentong Airport and the numerous go-kart tracks in the capital and the 
seaside resort of Kampong Som.18 
As recently as the mid-1990s, the lingering lineaments of the Khmer Rouge— 
particularly along the southwestern border as well as in areas near the northern 
stronghold of Anlong Veng—and their occasional attacks on travelers threatened to 
cripple the country's tourism industry.19 Although the war was waning through this 
period and large sections of the Khmer Rouge were defecting, the decreasing capacity of 
the outlawed group executed increasingly desperate and disparate attacks, seeking to rob 
the governing regime of its post-UNTAC legitimacy. In conformity with the 
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organization's desired logic, stories of attacks discouraged potential tourists from 
visiting; this avoidance was reinforced by political instability, exemplified in a 1997 
grenade attack on an opposition party demonstration, carried out by forces close to Hun 
Sen.20 Assaults plagued Cambodians and occasionally the country's foreign visitors: in 
April 1994, three foreign travelers were abducted from their taxi, which was en route to 
the seaside resort town of Kampong Som (Sihanoukville); three international backpackers 
were kidnapped from a train near Kampot in July of that year and executed after two 
months of captivity; a professor from Texas and her driver/guide were shot and killed 
while traveling to the Banteay Srei temple in a five-car convoy in January 1995; and 
Christopher Howes, a British de-mining expert and his Khmer interpreter were kidnapped 
by Ta Mok's forces in Siem Reap and shot at Anlong Veng in March 1996.21 With the 
death of Pol Pot in April 1998 and the capture of Ta Mok in March 1999, the aversion to 
risk-laden travel in the embattled territory subsided, but the reverberations of these events 
maintained a low arrival rate for tourists to Cambodia for some time. Cambodia's 
embattled heritage meant more than the languid threat of Khmer Rouge assaults; war-torn 
conditions also meant poor roads, sparse adequate accommodations, few capable staff, 
and a dearth of health facilities for would-be guests—all of which reflect a larger post-
conflict situation plagued by a lack of human capital and weak government institutions.22 
A series of additional obstacles in the late 1990s confounded Cambodia's 
attempts to harness its tourist potential. The IMF suspended loans to the country in 1996 
because of the government's poor performance in reforming and managing its forestry 
sector. The Asian financial crisis hit the following year, as did the grenade attack and 
factional fighting that signaled continued political instability. To curtail the 
reverberations of these effects, the Royal Cambodian Government fostered peaceful 
sojourns through various endeavors. Outlined in the government's development plan are 
four initiatives for tourism: the open skies policy, the facilitation of visas, intra-fegional 
tourism, and the prosecution of child sex tourists and drug traffickers.23 Its development 
plan also notes that improved physical infrastructure and maintaining a climate of peace 
are essential to fostering tourism's continued growth.24 A "visa upon arrival" practice 
was instituted to ease entrance and breath life into a fatigued tourism. The government 
piloted an "open skies" policy in 1997, but not until late the following year did a few 
flights from a singular carrier, Bangkok Airways, commence landings at Siem Reap 
Airport.25 (Formerly, all international air traffic had been routed through Phnom Penh's 
Pochentong Airport.) Even though the policy stipulated that visitors had to spend at least 
one night in Siem Reap, fears were confirmed that visitors would now skip the capital 
and shorten their stays, costing jobs and hurting the tourism industry in Phnom Penh.26 
Open skies led to increased arrivals in the country but decreased lengths of stays and 
therefore a decrease in revenue growth.27 At the time, employment in the tourism 
industry was minimal and government revenues from tourism had remained small; prior 
to the new policy, visitors were already spending less time in Cambodia than they would 
on average in Thailand or Malaysia.28 In order to lure greater numbers and take 
advantage of Siem Reap's growth, Cambodia's Tourism Ministry planned grand events 
and festivals to highlight its heritage headliner. A three-day millennium party (30 
December 1999 to 1 January 2000) at Angkor Wat, billed as "Angkor Festival 2000," 
included thousands of dancers, traditional boat-racing, theatrical performances, and 
fireworks.29 Subsequent opulent offerings at the ancient ruins included the exclusive Jose 
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Carreras concert in December 2002; for the US$500 to US$1000 tickets, guests were 
treated to a gourmet dinner as well as the tenor of opera entertainment at the ancient 
temple. Galas of this genre aimed to shore up a perceived lack of "first-class" service 
available to tourists, a reputation that had marred the industry's development.30 
Since the cessation of domestic hostilities, Cambodia has engaged in significant 
regional cooperation measures and organizations to better integrate its economic 
development and to better promote its tourism potential specifically. Numerous regional 
cooperation frameworks encourage this integration; the major organs are ASEAN, 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
Cambodia participates in additional inter-country forums, many of which are of limited 
resources, including Agency for Coordinating Mekong Tourism Activities 
(AMTA)/Mekong Tourism Coordination Office (MTCO), Asia Cooperation Dialogue 
(ACD), Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), 
Bay of Bengal Initiatives for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), Cambodia-Lao-Vietnam (CLV) Tourism Development, Emerald Triangle 
Cooperation Framework, Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), Pacific Asia Travel 
Association (PATA), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), and World Tourism Organization (WTO).31 The Asian Development Bank's 
participation in the interstices of this matrix is schematized as follows: 
Source: ADB, The Greater Mekong Subregion Tourism Sector Strategy, p. 55. 
In November 1999, Thai, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia agreed to launch a joint 
promotional campaign to attract visitors. The "Great Wonders of Suwannaphumi" 
included: Thailand's Grand Palace and Wat Phra Kaew; Myanmar's Pagan and 
Mandalay; Cambodia's Angkor Wat; and Luang Prabang in Laos.32 To further this 
enterprise, the four Buddhist countries agreed to cooperatively develop road and air 
transportation links. On 1 August 2000, Thailand and Cambodia established a bilateral 
"Agreement for Implementation of Tourism Cooperation" for the 2001-2002 year. 
Signed by Cambodian Tourism Minister Veng Sereyvuth and the Chair of the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand, Adisai Bodharamik, this accord would facilitate visitor arrivals to 
and within the two countries through marketing- and infrastructure-related issues, 
destination development, and human resources.33 According the agreement, a 
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cooperative marketing Venture, under the slogan "Two Kingdoms, One Destination," was 
launched in November. Package tours emphasized one product, the "Khmer Civilization 
Route," stretching from Thailand's Nakorn Ratchasrima Province to Cambodia's Siem 
Reap.34 The Thais agreed to assist the Cambodian Ministry of Tourism in its master plan 
for Preah Vihear, Ratanakiri, and Mondulkiri Provinces, which was finalized in 
September. Scholarships were made available for Cambodian tourism personnel to 
receive training in Thailand. In November 2002, the six countries of the GMS developed 
a strategy of 11 flagship programmes, including tourism (11th), because it was recognized 
as a major engine of socio-economic development in the region.35 
In addition to the facilitation of flight and entry, elite grandes fetes, improving 
stability, a gradual mending of the infrastructure, and regional cooperation, Cambodia's 
tourism has been boosted by considerable foreign direct investment (FDI). The subsector 
was the largest recipient of FDI from 1995 to 2005, which contributed significantly to the 
expansion of hotels, guesthouses, and travel agencies in Siem Reap, Phnom Penh, and 
Kampong Som.36 The success of the tourism subsector—a composite from the services 
sector, including hotels, restaurants, transportation, communication, and construction— 
has been most often quantified in the dramatic increase of visitors to the country, with 
exceptional gains in the new millennium's early years.37 A growing middle class and a 
concomitant perception of safety and stability has encouraged tourism among 
Cambodians to rise significantly since the defeat of the Khmer Rouge; in 2006, the 
country's 7.76 million domestic tourists made up 82 percent of total tourism numbers.38 
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Visitor Arrivals to Cambodia in 1998-2006 (by All Means of Transportation) 
Mode of Arrival 
Phnom Penh Int'l 
(PNH) 
Siem Reap Int'l 
(REP) 
Subtotal 
(by air) 
Subtotal 
(by land & boat) 
TOTAL 
Percentage 
Change 
1998 
175,910 
10,423 
186,333 
100,191 
286,524 
+30.9 
1999 
234,382 
28,525 
262,907 
104,836 
367,743 
+28.3 
2000 
264,649 
87,012 
351,661 
114,704 
466,365 
+26.8 
2001 
274,689 
133,688 
408,377 
196,542 
604,919 
+29.7 
2002 
320,187 
202,791 
522,978 
263,546 
786,524 
+30.0 
2003 
269,674 
186,298 
455,972 
245,042 
701,014 
-10.9 
2004 
316,748 
309,373 
626,121 
429,081 
1,055,202 
+50.5 
2005 
416,396 
440,125 
856,521 
565,094 
1,421,615 
+34.7 
2006 
427,389 
599,675 
1,027,064 
672,977 
1,700,041 
+19.6 
Source: Ministry of Tourism 
Growth in Tourism Sub-Sector, 2000-2005 
Real Gross Vale Added (billions riet) 
Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Share of GDP (%) 
2000 
821 
46.6 
5.8 
2001 
1026 
25.5 
6.9 
2002 
1118 
20.1 
7.1 
2003 
959 
-14.3 
5.7 
2004 
1514 
47 
8.4 
2005 
1933 
27.7 
8.9 
Source: Ballard (CDRI), Annual Development Review 2006-07, p. 27, Table 2.3. 
Tourism Receipts, 2000-2005 
Total (USS millions) 
Annual Change (%) 
Average receipt per tourist (USS) 
Percentage of GDP 
2000 
304 
43.1 
652 
8.3 
2001 
380 
25.2 
629 
9.6 
2002 
454 
19.2 
577 
10.6 
2003 
389 
-14.2 
555 
8.5 
2004 
603 
55.1 
572 
11.5 
2005 
840 
39.1 
603 
13.4 
Source: IMF, Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, p. 42, Table 7. 
Employment in Construction and Tourism-Related Industry, 2000-2005 
Construction 
Total 
Percentage of total 
Hotels and Restaurants 
Total 
Percentage of total 
2000 
70,000 
1.3 
19,000 
0.4 
2001 
84,000 
1.3 
10,000 
0.2 
2002 
120,000 
1.8 
24,000 
0.4 
2003 
153,000 
2.2 
27,000 
0.4 
2004 
195,000 
2.6 
30,000 
0.4 
2005 
234,000 
3.0 
43,000 
0.5 
Source: IMF, Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, p. 61, Table 25. 
Domestic Tourism, 1998-2004 
Tourists 
Growth 
1998 
422,000 
50% 
1999 
1,012,000 
140% 
2000 
1,215,000 
20% 
2001 
1,464,000 
20% 
2002 
1,757,000 
20% 
2003 
1,821,000 
4% 
2004 
4,251,000 
133% 
Source: Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of the Interior (World Bank, Halving Poverty by 2015?, p. 70, Table 4.5). 
The importance of tourism to the country's economic development has been 
attested in government statements: 
Tourism has indeed played a key role in the socio-economic development 
as it creates employment opportunities, enhances living standard [sic] of 
local people and generates national revenues. At the same time, tourism 
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brings in foreign direct investment and hard currency, thereby contributing 
principally and actively to the core objective of poverty reduction. 
Furthermore, cultural tourism is a dynamic source of the influx of tourists, 
who admire and are aspired [sic] to explore cultural heritage. Therefore, 
the diversity of culture and heritage needs to be appropriately conserved, 
safeguarded and maintained for the benefit of next generations. 
Issued by two of Cambodia's financial ministers, this statement provides the 
popular understanding of the benefits of tourism to socio-economic development. 
Although formal economic indicators demonstrate growth for the country (i.e., national 
revenues), the social implications!—and even the creation of jobs and raising of living 
standards—draw a less rosy picture of tourism's impact on life in Cambodia. 
First, like other economies centered around tourism, Cambodia is subject to the instability 
that characterizes the industry.40 Tourism is largely at the whim of international changes, 
external conditions that encourage or discourage travel and remain outside the control of 
the national government: oil prices, global recessions, currency fluctuations, military 
conflict, terrorism, political situations in neighboring countries (e.g., ousting of long-time 
strongmen), health epidemics (e.g., avian influenza pandemic), etc. Designated "Visit 
Cambodia Year," 2003 provides a striking example of how the infectious intersection of 
some of these factors can wreak havoc on a tourism-dependent economy. Instead of the 
million foreign arrivals the Tourism Ministry had forecasted, the sector's growth was 
dampened by anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January, the SARS outbreak, the US 
invasion of Iraq in March, and election-related uncertainties (i.e., FDI's "wait and see" 
approach in pre-election periods).41 
Second, the majority of tourism revenue goes out of the country. Economic 
trends for tourism in the early 2000s demonstrate a sharp increase in foreigner arrivals 
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but without a commensurate growth in net revenue or jobs. Even as foreign arrivals 
increase, the country's tourism revenues do not necessarily parallel this growth. Despite 
a near 30 percent increase in arrivals in 2001, only 35 to 45 percent of tourist 
expenditures that year remained in country, most of the spent money went to foreign 
companies.42 More dire estimates put the domestic remainder at closer to 5 percent, as 
foreign countries provide the infrastructure, accommodations, transportation, food, and 
other supplies Cambodia's tourism has lacked due to conflict.43 Further, the type of jobs 
thus far generated by tourism growth in Cambodia has been largely casual, non-skilled 
employment, such as construction work. More permanent jobs that would have a greater 
impact on poverty have remained statistically insignificant.44 
Although growth has taken hold, foreign tourism (like export-oriented garment 
manufacturing) concentrates around these three urban centers; the sector's expansion 
tends to favor high-income groups (as poverty is most severe in the countryside).45 Even 
the growth for unskilled laborers (construction, in particular) demonstrates uneven 
benefits.46 The labour and employment linkages to tourist growth, particularly in Siem 
Reap, have been largely shaped by proximity, road quality, social networks, and trust of 
employers. The physical infrastructure either hampers or enables a community's 
members to participate in the nearby tourism enterprises; jobs are secured through ties of 
family and friendship and reinforced through communication about the reputation of a 
potential employer.47 In terms of agricultural linkages, poor soil, inadequate water (from 
a lack of irrigation capacity), and the widespread use of fertilizers and pesticides have 
largely excluded local producers from supplying food to the tourist centers, especially 
where there is tourists' preference for organic produce. Physical infrastructure further 
mediates the supply of food; road improvements (e.g., from Poipet to Siem Reap) have 
enabled outside agricultural products to arrive quicker and therefore fresher. 
Interestingly, although social networks significantly shape the supply and positioning of 
labourers, this networking is absent in the sale of agricultural goods, leaving farmers to 
confront the market as individuals; they compete against foreign wholesalers who enjoy 
purchasing arrangements with hotel and restaurant managers.48 Thus, in addition to 
regional cooperation, Cambodian tourism efforts have been oriented toward "pro-poor 
tourism development" strategies. These include diversifying tourism destinations toward 
the involvement of rural communities, providing training in tourism-related skills, and 
improving agricultural and other linkages (roads and food).49 
In addition, random attacks credited to (Khmer Rouge) bandits still occasionally 
struck the itineraries of visitors. On 22 March 2000, seven robbers armed with AK-47s, 
pistols, and knives hijacked a tourist boat on the Tonle Sap, 30 km north of Phnom Penh; 
the 88 passengers (half of them foreigners) were tied up while the bandits made off with 
US$100,00 worth of cash and goods.50 Travel on rural roads through the remote 
countryside is still plagued by bandits, especially Route 64 linking Kampong Thorn and 
Preah Vihear. The spread of banditry emerges out of the post-conflict conditions, where 
numerous disenfranchised but armed people in the countryside—former Khmer Rouge or 
others—make use of the tools available. In recent years, significant efforts have been 
made to eliminate the prevalence of guns throughout the country.51 
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PARTIAL NARRATIVES IN THE LONG DITCH 
An overarching development strategy for Cambodian tourism has been to 
multiply possible destinations, through the new discovery of ancient monuments, 
improving access to previously remote ruins (e.g., Koh Ker), creating more water-side 
"eco-tourist" resorts, and fabricating more (modern) tourist sites. This is consistent with 
some economists' perspectives that suggest, "Cambodia will need to sustain this growth 
by finding ways to diversify its tourism offerings.... Making new areas of Cambodia, 
beyond Angkor Wat, true tourist destinations will rest in large part on whether and/or 
when the government would be able to provide sufficient security and infrastructure." 
Two years after the last bastion of insecurity crumbled, to the list of diversifying tourist 
destinations was added the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area in remote Oddar 
Meanchey Province. The diversification into (and on top of) the recent past was initiated 
by Hun Sen's 14 December 2001 decree, with development on the plan beginning the 
following year. 
Kingdom of Cambodia 
Nation-Religion-King 
Royal Government of Cambodia 
No. 13 s.n.N.h (<« f M. B] 
Circular on 
Preservation of remains of the victims of the genocide 
committed during the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1978), 
and preparation of AnlongVeng to become a region for historical tourism 
Following the liberation of 7 January 1979, numerous graves were left behind 
throughout the entire territory of Cambodia as physical testimony of the crimes 
committed against die innocent Cambodian people by the genocidal Pol Pot regime. 
Right away, the authorities and citizens made efforts to take the remains of the victims 
and to preserve mem carefully, some in stupas, and some in other forms of appropriate 
memorial. However, the government has observed tfiat since that time these memorials 
have not been properly maintained. 
In order to preserve the remains as evidence of these historic crimes and as the 
basis for remembrance and education by the Cambodian people as a whole, especially 
future generations, of the painful and terrible history brought about by the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime against the people and territory Of Cambodia during the period 1975-
1978, lasting 3 years, 8 months and 20 days, and especially to preserve and prepare the 
Anlong Veng region to become a historical museum for national and international tourists 
in the future, the government issue the following directives: 
1. All local authorities at province and municipal level shall cooperate with 
relevant expert institutions in their areas to examine, restore and maintain 
existing memorials, and to examine and research other remaining grave sites, 
so that all such places may be transformed into memorials, with fences, trees 
and informative plaques for both citizens and tourists; the Ministry of Culture 
and Fine Arts and the Ministry of Tourism shall issue further technical 
guidelines, and shall appoint expert officials to work together with the local 
authorities on mis issue. 
2. With particular reference to the Anlong Veng region, in the district of Along 
Veng, Otdar Meanchey Province, which was of historic importance in the 
final stage of the political life Of the leaders and military organization of Pol 
Pofs Khmer Rouge, the Ministry of Tourism shall continue to make efforts, as 
previously directed by the government, to cooperate with the local authorities 
and with all relevant ministries and institutions, especially with the Ministry 
of Land Management, Construction, and Urbanization, Military Region 4, the 
Cambodian Mine Action Center and the Documentation Center of Cambodia 
to eradicate mines, to prepare a sound master plan, to research document, to 
establish a historical museum, and to search for sources of grant in order to 
preserve all historical evidence and to transform Anlong Veng into a national 
region of historical tourism. It is absolutely prohibited to encroach on or 
subdivide land in an anarchic manner, or to undertake any form of 
construction in Anlong Veng that has an impact on this historic region without 
government permission, except for construction of housing for residents of the 
village and commune, in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of 
Land Management, Construction and Urbanization. 
3. Efforts shall be made to implement the above provisions before 7 January 
2002, the 23ri anniversary of the overthrow of Democratic Kampuchea. On 
receiving this directive, all relevant ministries and institutions and local 
authorities Shall implement it effectively. 
Phnom Penh, 14 December 2001 
Prime Minister 
[Signed and sealed] 
Hun Sen 
The circular puts into relation two very different kinds of historical evidence: 1) 
stupa and grave site memorials—"physical testimony of the crimes committed"—and 2) 
a region that formed the stronghold for the organization credited with these crimes. Not 
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only is the evidential physicality of a divergent nature, but the time periods that the prime 
minister addresses are temporally distant. The remains, and graves that housed them, 
date to the 3 years, 8 months, and 20 days in the late 1970s when Pol Pot's CPK ruled the 
country. The historical importance of the Anlong Veng region derives from "the final 
stage of the political life" of the organization long after its ouster, principally 1989 to 
1999. However, both genres of historical memorialization are cited for the purpose of 
remembrance and education.53 Initially when conveying the motivation for this project, 
Tourism Secretary of State Thong Khon had focused on the presentation of past crimes of 
Pol Pot, as a logical necessity of sites that relate to the Democratic Kampuchea past, a 
view which is consistent with general government statements. Later meetings with Khon 
revealed a strong concern that the younger generation was not being properly informed 
about the Democratic Kampuchea period or were tending to harbor disbelief. 
Forgetting the past has become a growing concern, especially among older 
Cambodians. The country is populated by a super-majority of under-30 youth, who did 
not experience CPK rule themselves. Further, the country's war-ravaged recent past is 
not covered in the Cambodian educational curriculum. Soon after the 7 January 1979 
victory of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, history of the Khmer 
Rouge was presented to young people in highly politicized terms that sought to foment 
revenge against the ousted regime and garner support for the Vietnamese-backed 
government.54 Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, new textbooks were issued that 
omitted instruction on the Khmer Rouge, one of the established parties to the quadpartite 
reconciliation effort.55 A decade later, the Ministry of Education designed and produced 
a n^-grade social science textbook that included a chapter on the 1975-1979 period; it 
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printed 25,000 copies of this new attempt at coverage in 2002, only to recall the books 
because of problems of accuracy.56 That same year, 15 high schools in Phnom Penh 
experimented with using a survivor's account, First They Killed My Father: A Daughter 
of Cambodia Remembers by Ung Loung, as the text for teaching about the DK years.57 
Most recently, DC-Cam released a concise history textbook (published in Khmer and 
English), A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) by Dy Khamboly, that was 
specifically intended to fill the pedagogical lacuna. However, a government review panel 
deemed the work as unsuitable, suggesting that the text could play supplementary reading 
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or reference source for a future Ministry of Education textbook due in 2009. 
Given the long-term absence of historical instruction on DK within the country's 
education facilities, awareness and information about the traumatic past is largely left to 
surviving relatives (parents), popular culture, and conversations among friends.59 
Although many parents find it too difficult to discuss the details of the horrific episode 
with their children, knowledge of the Pol Pot years is frequently the received memories 
of elders. "In the absence of a shared national story about the Khmer Rouge, a thousand 
conversations, fractured by politics, rumor, myth and the varieties of human experience 
are being passed down to a sometimes skeptical younger generation."60 A growing 
recognition has emerged that senses a disbelief on the part of children in response to the 
superlatives of suffering which reach their ears. As DC-Cam's director states, "We are 
not in a position to say how much the young people know exactly. They do not come out 
and say they do not believe, but they express doubts because it is so difficult to 
comprehend what happened."61 Previous ideologically-driven presentations and 
proclamations may contribute to a reticence to fully embrace stories of past suffering. 
I l l 
Other scholars argue that the disbelief among youth may also be reinforced by the lack 
(or severe delay) injustice being meted out to the CPK's senior leaders.62 Regardless of 
the specific causes of a tendency toward historical disbelief, the project initiated by Hun 
Sen and implemented under Thong Khon's leadership is cast as the preservation of 
"physical testimony" and "evidence" of the 1970s atrocities for future generations. In the 
1980s context, government memorials and its staged trial indicated the content of this 
(new) history; more contemporary government statements about the pedagogical role of 
DK sites (for posterity) also reflect this re-use of history. 
Thong Khon and other officials, who are also affiliated with the Anlong Veng 
project, presented the institutional organization of the historical-tourist endeavor. At the 
uppermost levels, the Ministry of Tourism was to continue to spearhead the project in 
cooperation with a number of other ministries (Culture and Fine Arts; Economy and 
Finance; Education, Youth, and Sports; Land Management, Urban Planning, and 
Construction), Chhang Youk at DC-Cam, academics at the Royal Academy of Phnom 
Penh (principally, History Professor Son Samnang), and the military personnel from 
RCAF's Region 4. Within the Ministry of Tourism, the Working Group on Anlong Veng 
was composed of: Minister of Tourism Veng Sereyvuth, chair; Thong Khon, deputy chair 
(and permanent representative for Anlong Veng); Ros Ren, in charge of cultural tourism 
development; directors from six of the ministry's departments (Cultural Tourism 
Development; Human Resources; Marketing and Promotion; Planning and Provincial 
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Development; Tourism Industry; and ASEAN and International Organizations); Chung 
Sokkhemarak, from the provincial tourism office in Oddar Meanchey; and Chum Sarak 
Vich, secretary. A further Secretarial Sub-Group of the Working Group on Anlong Veng 
has the duty to conduct research and formulate reports for the Working Group; its 
members include: Chum Sarak Vich, head; Dr. Sun Rany (Ph.D. in Tourism); one 
representative from Marketing and Promotion; and two representatives from the 
Administration and Financial Departments. 
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The national ministry oversees provincial-level departments that facilitate tourism 
activities. The Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism is headed by Kan Rithy, who 
maintains communication with the ministry in the capital about activities and progress in 
Anlong Veng. The department is relatively new, having come into existence in 1999, 
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only after the parliamentary elections. The new office of the provincial governor also 
oversees the activities of the tourism department. Rithy's deputy director, Chung 
Sokkhemarak, represents the department at the ministry's Working Group on Anlong 
Veng, and he heads his own provincial-level Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism 
Working Group on Anlong Veng. His four subordinates in the working group all reside 
in Anlong Veng, three of which are former Khmer Rouge members. His deputy in the 
working group, is a young man, Sophorn, who describes himself as Ta Mok's adopted 
son. The other members are: Ly Kimheng, a woman who was a teacher during 
Democratic Kampuchea and later a medical officer in Anlong Verig; Nut Krem, 
apparently ail appointment of the district chief; Chan Hana, the only non-KR member and 
the functionary who liaises with the military about the security situation in the area. This 
working group is to recruit local residents to act as tour guides within the historical-
tourist area. 
In addition to the inter-ministerial and institutional cooperation as well as the 
bureaus throughout the tourism hierarchy, development of the Anlong Veng tourist area 
is to be assisted by the participation of the RCAF.64 In this district, military control 
ultimately rests with the Region 4 command.65 Region 4 soldiers are expected to help 
secure old possessions of former KR elite, now in the hands of local inhabitants, as well 
as current information about the area. Additionally, their regular duty to maintain 
security and safety are also applied to the tourism effort, particularly as de-mining is one 
of the Tourism Ministry's most-urgent goals. 
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After my initial visit to the Ministry of Tourism, Solida, the administrative 
assistant to Secretary of State Thong Khon, became intent on me meeting his friend and 
colleague Khemarak, Deputy Director of the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism. 
This meeting transpired in Thong Khon's office, while Khon was in the United States 
attending to family matters. Also present was Vich, who was Deputy Director of the 
Tourism Ministry's Cultural Tourism Development Department and the Secretary of the 
ministry's Working Group on Anlong Veng. His duties with regard to Anlong Veng 
include examining technical aspects of the project, research, methodology, and 
budgeting. Vich's English was certainly stronger than that of Khemarak, so he provided 
most of the explanation and translation. Introducing himself via an enumeration of 
relevant curriculum vita entries as is typical in Cambodian business affairs, Vich said he 
received his B.A. in archaeology, and he had spent six years at the ministry, during which 
he received training in sustainable tourism development. There had been difficulty with 
the budget, but the first order of business was knowing the history about the sites and 
studying the history of the Khmer Rouge. Then, they would be able to write a text about 
Anlong Veng: the life ("ups and downs") of the Khmer Rouge. In studying the history, 
they would consult documents from the Cambodian Documentation Center. (At that 
moment, the working group—Sarak Vich and Khemarak—was waiting for guidelines 
from the ministry, before meeting with Chhang Youk.) Vich had participated in two of 
the several ministerial delegation visits to Anlong Veng District. The delegation included 
representatives from the Ministries of Culture and Fine Arts, Economy and Finance, 
Education Youth and Sports, and Land Management Urban Planning and Construction as 
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well as the Cambodian Mine Action Committee (CMAC) and Khemarak on behalf of the 
Oddar Meanchey Tourism Office. The delegation's purpose was to observe the general 
situation for making the master plan. The Ministry of Tourism, with the Ministry of 
Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction, was to generate the plan, which 
would require an initial US$15,000 (70 million riel); the Ministry of Tourism was tasked 
with finding the funding source for tourism facilities, texts, and tour guides. No 
estimates were yet available about the total cost of the Anlong Veng project. Logically, 
the money would come from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, because the central 
government and the prime minister in particular were very keen to develop the area. 
In Vich's view, the first point of this collaborative effort was to get true 
information and gather together all documents. The second priority was to interview 
people in order to compare their information with the documents. The third task was to 
write the final text on Khmer Rouge life. At the time of this initial acquaintance, the 
ministry's working group had not yet met as a whole, so hammering out a master plan 
seemed to be very much in process and proceeding slowly. Khemarak's main purpose 
for his upcoming visit to Anlong Veng would be to tour the sites, to formulate a 
questionnaire for garnering information, and to interview some people about the current 
situation. The questionnaire was designed to ask specifically about each site (Pol Pot's 
trial site, Ta Mok's house, etc.). They sought to ask everyone in the district about the 
sites; however, they were concerned that witnesses or important people, who are still 
living, may be afraid to give true information, which suggests a familiarity with 
propagandist articulations of history. Thus, the documents used for comparison would be 
of great importance. Based on the way Vich and Khemarak described the project, it 
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seemed that the museum's primary objects of representation are lifestyle (mostly 
communicated through residences) and historical narrative. They expressed a keen desire 
to reconstruct these sites as depictions of how the Khmer Rouge lived and went about 
making decisions, based on a thorough and accurate grasp of the regime's history and the 
history of the particular sites themselves. While Vich and Khemarak offered slightly 
variant ideas about methods and steps to complete the project than Thong Khon, they saw 
some ways that I would be able to assist them in their work. In particular, they wanted 
help preparing the English-language text on Anlong Veng (possibly derived from the 
Khmer version) for guides and visitors. They also asked about research and techniques, 
with a specific focus on the questionnaire. There was a general agreement about 
triangulation or double-confirmation of data as an appropriate means to achieve and 
ensure veracity. 
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DC-Cam was created out of the US Congress' Cambodian Genocide Justice Act 
of April 1994 which enabled the Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) at Yale 
University to bring the Phnom Penh center into existence as a field office the following 
year. Outliving its original two-year mandate, DC-Cam finds support from nationally-
based aid programs and non-affiliated charity groups. The Center's activities are guided 
by two key endeavors: 1) to promote accountability for crimes committed during 
Democratic Kampuchea, and 2) to offer a permanent resource—recording and preserving 
historical knowledge—for researchers and the general public. Pursuant to these 
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interconnected objectives, DC-Cam has become the largest depository of information 
(evidence) about the 1975-1979 period, assumed the role of defacto recipient for newly 
uncovered primary material on the CPK, and continued research and documentation 
efforts. It is inundated with archival materials, much of which (some 30,000 photographs 
and 400,000 pages of documents) has yet to be properly catalogued and preserved. A 
significant section of this stock is records from the S-21 interrogation center and the 
CPK's Santebal. The Center's actions have included cataloguing archive material, 
documents preservation, numerous research endeavors, legal training workshops for 
those involved with the Khmer Rouge tribunal efforts, hosting conferences, presenting 
historical film footage, offering a public information room for researchers, and publishing 
a monthly (now quarterly) periodical in Khmer and English, Searching for the Truth 
(svaeng rork kaarpet tMtunmiciti). DC-Cam also disseminates historical data through its 
various publications on issues relating to genocide. In conjunction with Yale University, 
DC-Cam has compiled four extensive databases (bibliographic, biographic, 
photographic, and geographic) relating to the DK period.66 DC-Cam's mission and 
historiographic endeavors align with scholars who seek an intellectual determination of 
genocide that purportedly assists understanding and, more importantly, prevention.67 The 
center's research, documentation, preservation, and memorialization project has 
circulated internationally and has been suggested as a model for the study of other 
genocidal episodes (e.g., Rwanda). Presently, DC-Cam is seeking to erect a permanent 
site (training institute, library, museum) that would combine its public services and 
archiving capacities. 
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Chhang Youk, the Cambodian-American from Texas who directs DC-Cam, 
discussed the Tourism Ministry's decision to include him in the Anlong Veng project, 
mainly as a consultant on the authenticity of documents being used to reconstruct the 
political life of the Khmer Rouge. During my early conversations with Youk, his 
numerous activities included: overseeing new exhibitions at Tuol Sleng—"victims and 
perpetrators" and "then and now"—which had photos as well as a Khmer Rouge 
biography (from 25 years ago) and a present statement; dialoguing with holocaust 
museum experts from the Jewish Foundation; negotiating with USAID on 
innovating/renovating Tuol Sleng, with a projected budget of US$275,000; opening a 
permanent center on the land that DC-Cam has near Tuol Sleng; hosting a group of 
Khmers from Chicago; and contributing to the War Museum in Siem Reap and the 
Kompong Cham museum in Memut. The historical-tourist plan for Anlong Veng was 
clearly a minor side-project for Youk and his center; in fact, given the project's tendency 
toward commercialism, his reluctant (and always self-minimizing) involvement is 
explained by his overwhelming concern for accurate documentation, historical 
preservation, and the true historiographic account of the Khmer Rouge. 
DC-Cam has been involved with the tourist project in three ways. First, DC-
Cam conducted interviews in Anlong Veng on two occasions, supplementing the Tourism 
Ministry's interview mission findings from February 2003,68 Because of the sensitivity 
pertaining to a tribunal, DC-Cam only asks about dead people; they ask living people 
about the sites (who, how much, when, etc.). Second, DC-Cam worked on producing a 
GPS map of the sites in the area, which formed the basis for the Tourism Ministry's large 
billboard.69 Lastly, DC-Cam researched and provided biographical information on Pol 
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Pot and Son Sen. There were formal meetings, but in Youk's view they were not 
constructive; usually after the meeting was completed, nothing got implemented. The 
purpose of DC-Cam's participation in the project is to ensure the accuracy of the 
representation. Youk gives support in terms that will not lead to the commercializing of 
genocide sites, and he has a clear understanding of this role. He was asked to help, and 
he can provide information to educate the public about that part of the country and the 
leadership there. He states, "The sites should not be commercial, because it is a memory; 
a memory cannot be commercial." Youk's presentation of his involvement with the 
Ministry of Tourism was keen to divorce the pedagogical role of historical remembrance 
and memorialization from the commercial objectives of tourist development. In his 
mind, there is clearly a way to separate the (good) historical education from the (bad) 
dominance of the market. He flatly disagrees with supporting the project as it is being 
implemented. He describes what he sees as the typical approach to tourism development: 
when the government develops any tourist site, they will have "roast chicken and blue 
tents" right there at the sites. He harbors doubts about the fate of these historical sites, 
because he favors a deep understanding of these places. He wants to incorporate Anlong 
Veng into the genocide sites (which he is already in the process of maintaining); in his 
view, the purpose should be memorialization, not commercialization. This purist view 
appeals to sentiments that value the sanctity of sites and the requirement for them to not 
become the (over-)developed "blue tents and roast chicken" sites that are seen throughout 
Cambodia's (domestic) tourism resorts. (Although Thong Khon had expressed similar 
concern for the pedagogical, this was frequently tempered by the need to identify funding 
supports for the project.71) At the time I spoke to Youk, he mentioned people (including 
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ministry officials) speculating on land in Anlong Veng, and land prices were going up; a 
couple years later, numerous outside interests in the region had sparked a dramatic spike 
of land prices. 
"Based on the way they develop, I can see that they do not understand tourist sites 
and therefore that they cannot understand historical sites." Youk told an anecdote about a 
woman on a bike who could not cook. She was told by the government to make food for 
tourists who were fast approaching. She emphatically explained that she could not cook. 
However, the officials insisted that her cooking skills did not matter, because tourists 
would devour anything. While not a complimentary picture of visitors, the tale 
underscores the idea that opportunities abound in the path of tourists and should be seized 
regardless of what resources might be available. Youk argues that the Ministry of 
Tourism should take local input into what they want tourists to see. "The concept of 
tourism is unclear when it comes to local development. The ministry does not understand 
local tourism; they must educate the local villages. Nobody is going to tourist sites, 
because the vendors are too aggressive; it is because they lack an understanding of 
tourism. The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum has a shop with souvenirs. But this is how 
the Ministry of Tourism sees tourism: roast chickens, drink shops, child sellers chasing 
after you, parking right in front of the temple." Youk surmises that the government's 
views, understanding, and edicts emerge from this experience of tourism.72 
Youk told Secretary of State Thong Khon and his Ministry of Tourism that they 
must: stay away from commercialization; produce accurate information using proper 
methods; provide original source material on the Khmer Rouge; prevent commercial 
development (before the business people begin); and not include Anlong Veng in the 
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"Cambodia 2003" package. However, the ministry wants DC-Cam only to verify the 
information which the ministry seeks to publish; it does not welcome feedback on the 
project's larger, overall vision. Youk has had correspondence with the Royal Academy 
of Phnom Penh (Iv Chang and Sombo Marnara), and his center shared what documents it 
has. The academy sent interviews to DC-Cam, which the center corrected/verified and 
returned. DC-Cam sent information on Pol Pot and completed a book on the leader for 
the academy to use. Youk says openly that whatever they have asked for, DC-Cam has 
given them. DC-Cam has completed its visits, interviewed many people, collected 
enough information On Pol Pot and Son Sen, and possesses thorough biographies of these 
two. The ministry has sufficient information; whatever else they want to use, they will 
send a copy to DC-Cam for verification. That is all that Youk wished DC-Cam to be 
involved in the project, because he "does not believe in commercialization, but rather that 
knowledge should be preserved in a scientific way. Beyond that, we have no role." 
Youk holds a list of 77 genocide memorial sites in Cambodia. "These other genocide 
sites have no sponsor," a reference to the Red Dot support for the signs in Anlong Veng. 
"They are memory. Why give attention to Pol Pot's grave? I am there to preserve the 
memory; in things that are commercial, I do not have a say. [The Anlong Veng project] 
will expand, not the knowledge to the public about history, but expand the connection to 
Preah Vihear for tourists from Thailand. To me, I see it as an expansion of territory, to 
connect to Preah Vihear, to make Preah Vihear more accessible to tourists, in the sense 
that Anlong Veng is a route to Preah Vihear." 
When asked about the historical significance of Anlong Veng, Youk says he does 
not see why attention is paid to that part. Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea are not dead 
yet; this project is "giving them honor before prosecuting them—it is confusing. Pol 
Pot's and Son Sen's graves are expected. It is logical to preserve historical sites, and Pol 
Pot's grave is an historical site. In terms of how one preserves the houses of Khieu 
Samphan and Nuon Chea, why ask other people when one can ask the living people? 
The Ministry of Tourism does not dare ask the living people (Khieu Samphan, Nuon 
Chea, Ta Mok). The political motivations are clear. Instead, they ask the villagers there 
who have a vague memory. Again, why preserve Khieu Samphan's house? What is 
significant about where he slept? People cannot differentiate between information and 
propaganda." Here, Youk's critique of the government combines with a continued 
suspicion of the former Khmer Rouge rural villagers; their capacity for "accurate" 
memory of the past is questioned as well as their ability to discern the import of 
government messages. As for the leaders, Youk hints that the government's 
representation of history in Anlong Veng emanates from ideological considerations: the 
government discounts the leaders' accounts, because they are propaganda, even as DC-
Cam agrees to assist in verifying the valued veracity of data from all sources.73 
Nevertheless, the thrust of Youk's critique of the government remains focused on 
commercialism rather than possible (DC-Cam-approved) propaganda from the country's 
new leaders. 
Plans to meet my liaison from the Ministry of Tourism in Siern Reap were re-
routed.74 On a sunny day of the Lord, I left the Angkorian capital, expecting an afternoon 
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rendez-vous in Anlong Veng, at the house and hotel of a deputy district chief.75 It is hard 
to underemphasize how the road conditions affect all activities in the Cambodian 
countryside. The better parts of rural routes through these northern provinces are covered 
in laterite, a red gravel that provides exceptionally efficient drainage: within a half hour 
of a drenching downpour, the road is dry enough to traverse again. Large vehicles scar 
the thin gravel layer, gouging deep ruts in the clay and dirt underbelly of the highway, 
which can pool water and muddy an otherwise smooth double-track.76 
The predetermined place of convergence was the (guest)house of Assistant 
District Chief Dom Chhony. Although the district chief and two of his assistants all offer 
accommodations to visiting officials and non-officials, Chhony's October 23 Guesthouse 
seems to be the most popular.77 Being a new arrival, I was uncertain of the guesthouse's 
location. On first approach, I questioned the young children roaming in front of the 
lodging house. "The owner of this house is named Chhony?" Neighbors had already 
guided me to this structure, but the kids seemed to have no idea about whom I was 
inquiring. The lady of the house emerged, and I asked if a provincial tourism official was 
a guest. Shortly into our mutual confusion, Khemarak was delivered by moto to the 
guesthouse. His taxi ride along the potholes from Siem Reap had taken some five 
hours.78 
My lacerated landing in the long ditch allowed me to experience the district's 
medical offering first hand. I had sustained minor wounds, but a thorough cleansing was 
warranted. I arrived at the health center, a historical-tourist site, and the folks there said 
the doctor was out at lunch—emergencies during mealtime are not recommended. I was 
going to let my non-urgent care experience at Ta Mok's hospital pass, but after meeting 
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up with Khemarak, I had an insistent chaperone to accompany my return to the three-
story hospital. A large white concrete building set behind the one-story wooden health 
center, this hospital looms in a large compound with lakeshore standing. A few patients 
occupied the cots that lined the open-air rooms. The general hygiene seemed on par with 
other provincial hospitals I had seen, certainly not spotless or even well-lit; a persistent 
layer of dirt that refuses to be mopped away from the tiles and the free flow of air seemed 
to also exhibit a free flow of bugs, bacteria, and dust inward and disease and medical 
supplies outward. For my minor injury, the care was impressive, a triple cleansing: a 
sterile water solution cleansed my soiled limbs; a familiar betadine scrub for antiseptic 
effect; and a colorful finishing coat of gentian violet to keep the scrapes clean and dry 
and otherwise s 'aat. During my stays, many more visits to the Anlong Veng Health 
Center would be required, most for fieldwork, a couple for treatment. 
Bandaged and ready for research, my liaison and I delivered two copies of the 
letter of introduction that Thong Khon had been kind enough to supply. This letter for 
provincial and district elites describes a research mission in the district's historical-tourist 
area and asks that they allow and aid my efforts. The first delivery was to District Chief 
Yem Sann. This former regiment commander conveyed toughness; he certainly seemed 
to be a veteran of Cambodia's wars: hard, muscled body with a long, cold stare. I felt 
intimidation emanating from this seasoned warrior. After warmly receiving the 
ministerial correspondence, the chief discussed with Khemarak the topic of Thai tourists 
traveling through Anlong Veng to get to Siem Reap. Anlong Veng's unofficial border 
crossing and the relatively straight shot to Angkor, albeit via uneven surfacing, makes the 
former Khmer Rouge stronghold a tempting conduit for the inflow of tourists from 
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Thailand. At this moment, the tours of Thai sightseers were infrequent, requiring special 
permission, since the border had not yet been formally opened. Our second dispatch 
delivery was to Region 4 military headquarters, which stands across the street and 
slightly east of the district chiefs residential outpost, forming a convenient nexus of 
power east of the town roundabout. This brief acquaintance allowed me to greet an 
information specialist with the RCAF as well as the military liaison for Khemarak's 
working group. All in attendance seemed entertained (amused?) when I spoke Khmer, 
which lent a mood of humor and light-heartedness to my initial introductions, which 
always had something of an awkward air to them, perhaps because anthropology 
(noreakvichea ailoji) is even less frequently heard in Khmer than it is in English.79 As 
playing provincial postmen was our primary purpose, Khemarak and his foreign associate 
left further interviewing to future encounters. 
A welcoming dinner for the new-arrived foreigner took Chumnor Tracheak by 
storm.0" As it was our first meal together, this higher-end dining experience—the most 
upscale restaurant, offering spacious outdoor seating, a view of the lake, and the most 
exotic meats on any of the town's menus—seemed a suitable venue, and much-valued 
delicacies featured in the main course.81 Our partying twosome joined Sophorn and some 
of Khemarak's friends and former colleagues from the Department of Health who were in 
town holding informal seminars on HIV/AIDS. As I had picked up giardia in the tourist 
haven of Siem Reap and had quite reasonably started the antibiotic regimen to treat the 
invader, alcohol was contraindicated. This story of micro-organisms and medicines 
lacked any power of persuasion with my imbibing new friends, and "get the foreigner to 
drink" seemed to be the game of the night. Mealtimes, often imbued with alcohol, 
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became a dominant vehicle for Khemarak to provide his ideas and plans for the museum. 
He would be certain to include my presence at official meetings (presumably to add an 
air of formality), but discussions over food offered the more informative discourse. 
Khemarak seemed to enjoy the position of authority and especially the role of host. 
However, he also seemed to harbor an almost humorous relation to his own authority, as 
he would often grin, laugh, and act dismissive as he proposed his own ideas or pursued 
aspects of the project's implementation. 
The Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng, 
headed by Khemarak, has five members, of whom the most active, involved, and public 
is Sophorn. This young-looking 21-year-old makes it immediately known to strangers 
that he was Ta Mok's "adopted son" (usually leaving aside the fact that Ta Mok had 
"adopted" at least 30 boys). Sophorn was born in Anlong Veng District on the Dangfek 
Mountains in 1981. His father is originally from Kompong Chhnang; his mother is from 
Kompong Cham. Sophorn has three younger brothers and two younger sisters. His 
parents joined the Khmer Rouge in 1970, and they moved into Anlong Veng Commune 
(down from the mountain) in 1990. His mother was a midwife and studied medicine in 
China for seven years. His father is a well-known surgeon and was a student of the most 
famous Khmer Rouge doctor and DK Minister of Health, Thiounn Thioeunn (t)s tt^a). 
Sophorn's father, Uy Koem Ly, performed almost all the amputations done in Anlong 
Veng District during the post-1979 war.83 From age 7 to 14, Sophorn lived with Ta Mok. 
127 
As he retells the story, the commander had no kids but wanted to have a son, so he asked 
Sophorn's parents if their boy could come live with him. (In his version, Ta Mok had a 
son that died in the war in 1979; one son-in-law, Meas Muth, remained a close ally in the 
direction of DK territory.84) Sophorn lived with Ta Mok in Thailand's Ubon Ratchathani 
Province for three years and studied Khmer. At age 10, he went to Anlong Veng with Ta 
Mok, because the Khmer Rouge was fighting the Cambodian People's Armed Forces. 
Sophorn lived at Ta Mok's house on the lake and soon began studies at the "concrete 
school" (i.e., Ta Mok's school). At age 14, Sophorn moved to the mechanic's office. He 
had long wanted to be an auto mechanic, straying far from the medical expertise 
demonstrated by his elder kin. Anlong Veng did not have many schools for developing 
his skill, so he studied in Thailand for four years learning how to work on cars and trucks. 
In 1998, he worked for the German Red Cross as a Thai-Khmer interpreter, which lasted 
one year. Because the war had ended, he could go to Phnom Penh in 1999 to live with 
his grandmother; he returned to Anlong Veng two years later. 
From my initial interaction, Sophorn seemed very open about his past, and he 
offered to assist me in his capacity as a tourism official in the area. I frequently saw 
Sophorn "offer" his services to visitors to the region; he would typically be one of the 
first faces confronting foreigners before their further forays could commence. (It took a 
short series of visitors to get a sense of how his radar for newcomers operated.) Sophorn 
was certainly willing to share his personal narrative freely with me, specifically his close 
ties to Ta Mok. Almost surprisingly, he never seemed to have any fear of 
retribution/reprisals for discussing what he experienced.85 He did occupy a unique 
position, being one of Ta Mok's many (adopted) "sons." While he would have access to 
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personal knowledge of Ta Mok's daily activities, the actions of the organization's elites 
must have been beyond his capacity to understand at such a young age. Nonetheless, 
Sophorn seemed to feel free to relate information about Anlong Veng as if he had 
experienced everything first hand. Although Sophorn comes across as being young, he 
also has an air of being well-off and well-educated (perhaps more in street smarts than 
formal education); it appeared that he wanted this his knowledge/training to be 
recognized. During his initial recounting of his life events to me, the priority of studying 
and getting educated was a recurrent point in the narrative. Sophorn enthusiastically 
expressed his interest in the Tourism Ministry's museum project, stating: 
Because Anlong Veng has a lot of houses of Khmer Rouge bosses—Khieu 
Samphan, Pol Pot, Ta Mok—tourists want to come and see these sites. It 
is mostly Khmer people that want to visit here, when they have free time 
and money. They want to see Pol Pot's grave, Ta Mok's house, Pol Pot's 
house, Khieu Samphan's house, because they were the chiefs of the 
Khmer Rouge, and people want to know about the life of these chiefs... 
The museum will change Anlong Veng for villagers; when many tourists 
come, business will be good. 
In addition to working for the Department of Tourism, Sophorn maintained other 
ventures, primary among them was language instruction. Positioned across the street 
from the Ta Mok school, in a room attached to his parents' house, he founded the Thai-
English Schooling House (kreuhsthaan seksaa pheasaa dngMes-thai ^HisMfinfiiwiatatRw-
ttf). With his housemate and business partner, Kevin, Sophorn managed this modest 
teaching facility that handled up to 60 language students, scattered into slots according to 
hour and level. Sophorn offered Thai classes to about 40 young locals, while Kevin 
provided English instruction to about 20. Kevin is originally from Kompong Chhnang 
Province; he had only arrived in Anlong Veng two months prior to my own arrival. 
Sophorn had invited him to seize the business possibilities of the post-war era by moving 
his private tutoring from his home province to the newly-integrating, former Khmer 
Rouge stronghold.86 His presence was part of the influx of "new people" that provided 
many of the owners and staff of frequented business establishments in Anlong Veng. 
When Sophorn offered to help, it was clear his familiarity with the area's people 
and places would be the greatest asset. Kevin also offered to assist my research, and his 
language skills enabled him to become an apt translator for my informant interviews. 
Kevin's demeanor aided this interpretive work. He exhibits a gentle, almost shy and 
somewhat nervous, personae; these traits seemed to effectively play into the deference, 
respect, and obeisance that is typically expected in the face of elders and authority 
figures. At the same time, he humbly demonstrates that he is educated, remaining loyal 
to a penchant for accuracy, like when he would kindly help an informant by offering his 
opinion of how a word might be correctly spelled. These quiet and nearly sly interactions 
with people seemed to be borne from a keen awareness of social mores, an awareness he 
was willing to share by overtly making plain the customs for the visiting foreigner. His 
smaller frame and a mild disability from childhood (a lingering limp) perhaps augmented 
his disarming presence for interviewees. We encountered some typical translator issues 
(not to mention geographic challenges): sometimes I would receive summaries of 
answers rather than the whole answer; interrogations involving "how?" might produce 
opaque responses; my taking notes during the (Khmer) answer, only to realize with 
Kevin's translation that I had totally missed the point.88 The regular research routine 
would begin with the foreigner abducting the teaching staff from the Thai-English 
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School House, and the threesome would ride off on the big moto in search of subjects to 
be interviewed. Sometimes, Sophorn would arrange interviews in advance, allowing me 
to snatch away only half of the language school's faculty. The meetings that we arranged 
for research also assisted Sophorn in his role within the working group. Typically, 
Sophorn would allow me to direct the questioning, and he would listen contently, 
seeming to already know the texture of the memory being related. In the midst of some 
interviews, he might reference his small note pad to concur about dates on which events 
occurred or buildings were constructed. Occasionally, he would interject in the 
discussion and amend his inventory of dated data. A quadpartite, mutually-assistive 
dynamic often developed: Sophorn allowing my research to progress; me providing 
opportunities to confirm/modify his raw data (that would later inform the working 
group); the informant sharing thoughts and reflections, with Sophorn sometimes assisting 
his/her remembering; Kevin translating as well as interpreting the direction of 
conversation. 
The five people who compose the provincial Department of Tourism's Working 
Group on Anlong Veng, most of whom live in Anlong Veng, are almost all former 
Khmer Rouge. The Deputy Director of the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism, 
Khemarak, heads this group, and he is actively supported by Sophorn. Three additional 
individuals from Anlong Veng further assist Khemarak's endeavors. The group's deputy 
director, Cpt. Chan Hana, who escaped CPK rule in 1976, was recruited by Thong Khon 
to be a liaison between the military and the Tourism Ministry. His principal tasks have 
been to manage visitors on the mountain and accompany any delegations that arrive to 
complete work on the historical-tourist area. Nut Krem, permanent officer for Anlong 
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Veng in the provincial working group, was a company commander under Ta Mok, and he 
also describes himself presently as an aide to District Chief Yem Sann. Another member, 
Ly Kimheng, moved to a CPK-controlled liberated zone in 1970 and took up duties 
managing food distribution. After the 1975 seizure of Phnom Penh, she became a 
language teacher at a primary school. She came to the Dangrek Mountains in 1980, 
where she worked as a medical officer at first before returning to teaching. Her interest 
in the tourism project springs from business potential as well as sharing her memories, 
documents, and artifacts from the Khmer Rouge years; she has currency and textbooks to 
include in the museum. Through my occasional involvement with the working group, I 
came to see that Khemarak was the sole conductor of the slow-paced, cacophonous 
orchestration that was the historical-tourist project; he seemed to be the individual most 
actively involved and informed about the development of the "museum." Rarely 
spending long periods of time in the district, his modus operandi was represented in one-
or two-day visits to the Anlong Veng, during which he would disseminate his 
decisions/plans for the museum (with prior Ministry of Tourism approval, presumably) 
and gather what preparatory information was needed for his next task.89 The lack of 
phone service in the area complicated coordination; consequently, Khemarak's arrival in 
the district for his blitz-forschung was often something of a surprise. 
After some consultation with and encouragement from my liaison, we decided it 
would be best to begin familiarization with Anlong Veng through formal interviews with 
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local administrative elites, military commanders, and tourism officials. The order of 
research would progress through the district chief, his three assistants, the district's five 
commune chiefs, and representatives from the many soldier compounds in and around the 
town.90 We recognized that all these interviews might not be possible during this first 
visit, as Khemarak had a whirlwind tour of the province planned for my initiation to 
former Khmer Rouge country.91 The higher the rank of an Anlong Veng official, the 
more that person tended to know about the museum; they also had greater stakes in the 
outcome of the project. All of the district-level officials emphasized how life had 
become simpler and more enjoyable with the transition to peace. The district chief 
described this positive emergence in terms of a stable life in contrast to a mobile 
existence (i.e., constantly carrying supplies while advancing and retreating). "You can 
see by your own eyes that life is easier. People have their own houses, enough 
equipment, roads, schools, and a hospital. Compared to other areas, Anlong Veng is 
equal to other areas under government control before." An assistant district chief phrased 
the benefits of peace in terms of families being able to reunite, both in terms of relatives 
in other provinces and also soldiers coming home to their loved ones. There is a general 
recognition that the standard of living has improved, and infrastructural improvements, 
particularly roads and the new Hun Sen Primary School, have already benefited the 
community. New road work, performed by the prime minister's special engineering 
corps, connected Samraong, Anlong Veng, and Trabaing Prassat (in Oddar Meanchey) to 
Svay Chrum Village near the base of Preah Vihear Temple with wide flat dirt roads.92 
(After years of guerilla fighting, the pot-holed Route 67 into Siem Reap also appeared as 
a major accomplishment.93) There was a perception that, with the end of hostilities, 
subsistence farming had become easier—"less dependent on weather," as the upper-
echelon informants would say—even as farming equipment was dramatically lacking. 
One assistant district chief asserted that land problems had been resolved. During the 
war, different factions had gone to different places; upon their returns, there were mutual 
claims to the land. These disputes were resolved by local authorities.94 
The celebrated post-conflict achievements formed a constellation of development 
for these higher-up officials: good roads for trade and travel, schools that would educate 
their children, and a proper hospital to prevent unnecessary deaths.95 Education, in 
particular, was held up as a symbol of progress (the presence of schools) as well as 
familial success (erudition of their children). "War" (sdngkream Mb{tnH) was consistently 
equated with a lack of development; "development" (qphivoat arti^a) was the new 
priority.96 The contrast between the hardship of struggle and the accomplishments of 
peace was a much repeated theme among those grateful to resume life after decades of 
fighting. A government official, outlining his view of the district's importance, 
emphasized the war's cessation in Anlong Veng. "It is the site of the last battle. The 
fighters joined with the government to fight the Khmer Rouge. When finished, my 
people have land, houses, and rice fields, and nobody makes war anymore. My heart 
[chett Btj] and my people's heart are the same; nobody wants to fight anymore."97 The 
sites of Anlong Veng are characterized as the remnant infrastructure for making war. In 
the eyes of a number of district personnel, the potential for tourists to be drawn to these 
relics of post-1979 Khmer Rouge life stands as an outgrowth of peace. 
With the erosion/destruction of some minor ancient temples in the jungle and the 
transfer to Siem Reap of numerous Angkorian artifacts, which Ta Mok had amassed, the 
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new museum would represent a way for the district to participate in the country's 
growing tourism trade.98 All the district-level officials seemed very optimistic about 
economic possibilities in Anlong Veng once the project is completed, including a "trickle 
down" to local subsistent farmers. They pointed to the museum as a possible vehicle for 
the promotion of local (already-existing) cottage industries. "If there is a new museum, 
Anlong Veng has handicrafts—wooden sculpture, furniture, and making pictures of Pol 
Pot—that could be included." A proud district chief underscored the resilience of his 
local subsistence economy in the face of tourist revenues or their absence: 
If many tourists come or not, the residents' everyday business can survive 
by themselves without thinking about tourism; the business of farming 
allows people to feed themselves and make a living. On the other hand, 
when the Ministry of Tourism opens the museum, there will be many 
tourists. The local government in Anlong Veng District will have 
revenues from tourism; but the farmers will also get some money from 
tourism (e.g., selling things to the visitors—rice, other foods, rattan 
baskets, handicrafts). Villagers will have many profits; the weaker people 
[i.e., not so rich, with a low level of education] can make mats to sell at 
the market. 
In addition to the potential difficulties facing residents (largely around farming by 
hand), some other challenges were also acknowledged. An assistant chief pointed to the 
remnant problem of landmines; the district's legacy as battlefield meant mines had been 
laid all over. The government was asked to use NGOs to clear the land. This official 
stated that everybody had land, although farming equipment was lacking; but in regards 
to mines, he stated that the "old land" (land long used for farming) was all cleared, but 
that "new land" (that people start to develop with rice fields and establishing villages) is 
still mined. However, he also shared grander visions of the tourism project, in particular 
an idea to forge a road circumscribing the entirety of the O Chik lake, which would allow 
greater accommodations, excursions, and resorts for visitors. Consistent with barriers 
expressed at the Tourism Ministry, the key impediment to this leader's vision was a lack 
of committed investors to initiate the clearing and construction endeavor. 
The idea of trickle down benefits from tourism reverberated at the commune 
level. Even though these lower leaders were less familiar with the overall project and 
were tasked with different duties of governance, they still were conceptualizing ways for 
their commune constituents to profit from an anticipated influx of tourists." Trabaing 
Prey Commune is home to most of the sites included in the historical-tourist area; 
technically, the commune's borders include the areas upon the escarpment.100 The chief 
of this commune had witnessed a proliferation of tourism signs, but his focus was 
oriented toward the basic infrastructural needs of those residing in his region (a five-year 
plan responsive to villagers' prioritization of their needs): schools, a medical clinic, 
wells, orchards, and irrigation for these gardens. He views the museum efforts as 
belonging to a separate branch of administration, and thus his involvement with the 
project's progression is unlikely. However, he acknowledged that the endeavor's 
completion may bring about some positive changes (namely, revenues) that will facilitate 
his local construction/improvement efforts. Having only vaguely heard about a project 
involving Ta Mok and Pol Pot properties by casual mention from higher-ups, the Thlat 
Commune Chiefs immediate reflection was that Anlong Veng—the place of this "last 
breath of the Khmer Rouge leaders"—was important for tourist development objectives; 
however, his commune's 5-km distance from the town and its lack of historical sites 
meant the museum project might have little benefit to his community.101 In spite of this 
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perceived removal, he encouraged Thlat residents to provide guesthouses (for those 
traveling on to Trabaing Prassat District), to beautify the roads with flowers, and to offer 
comfortable rest stops that will allow visitors to appreciate the commune's landscape. 
Similarly, the Lumtong Commune Chief saw the supply of handicrafts (primarily, rattan 
baskets) as a potential effect of the museum project, even though his commune lacks any 
officially-designated sites. The leader of the most remote Trabaing Tauv Commune had 
been informed that the residences of certain Khmer Rouge elites were to be re-
constructed, but his awareness of details was lacking. Nonetheless, he saw tourism in its 
capacity to foster happiness, "because people will see tourists and soldiers join together 
to ensure security in the district." He was also inspired to pursue separate tourist-oriented 
development in his own commune. A new dam under (re-)construction and its 10-km-
long reservoir, south of the road to Samraong, have provided the logical possibility of a 
resort, not too far from Prassat Rovieng.102 
Not surprisingly, one of the immediate impressions for visitors to Anlong Veng is 
the overwhelming presence of various uniformed personnel associated with military, 
police, and security purposes.103 Large compounds are visible from the main 
thoroughfare as well as occupying large tracts of cleared land amidst some of the more 
remote parts of the district's forest. The area hosts numerous bases and offices, whose 
staff duties overlap in geography and reinforce in functionality. Foremost among these 
facilities is the RCAF Region 4 District Headquarters, directly east of the Anlong Veng 
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District Office, under the command of two colonels and a brigadier general.104 The duty 
of this group is to protect the border and natural resources as well as to deal with theft. 
The commanding officer stated that his duties with regard to the Tourism Ministry relate 
only to security problems that might arise; no issues have arisen that require his attention. 
An information specialist under his command claims to assist the tourism efforts by 
(secretly) observing sites on a regular basis and monitoring everyday activities of 
individuals in the district. Region 4's most senior encampments in Anlong Veng are: 
Brig. Gen. Yem Peum's Brigade 43 (kdngporl tauch nticisunts) in Lumtong, 10 km south of 
Anlong Veng town, which has no direct involvement in tourism; and the Regiment 403 
(kdngvireasenaa thorn nWictMaiti) Ground Forces for Border Protection, located in 
Trabaing Tauv Commune, under the command of Lt. Col. Thoeung Thea, which ensures 
a safe environment for tourism and people in general (including foreign researchers) in 
areas along the border with Thailand.105 The Front Headquarters for Division 2, which 
receives orders from the Ministry of National Defense, occupies a compound near the 
entry driveway to Ta Mok's lakeside villa. Five to ten high commanders reside in this 
camp to observe extraordinary developments in Anlong Veng's situation (and Oddar 
Meanchey Province generally).106 Gendarmerie forces are encamped at two sites in the 
district: the 2nd Provincial Headquarters stands alongside (north of) the Lumtong Primary 
School; and the Anlong Veng District Headquarters occupies the compound between the 
Region 4 office and the Ta Mok schoolyard. The former is tasked with arresting soldiers 
who break the law, catching ordinary thieves and robbers, and escorting offenders to 
court, while the latter assumes more general duties of providing security for all of the 
district's residents as well as playing first responder for military police matters (i.e., 
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before the 2nd provincial gendarmerie). Anlong Veng District Military Headquarters is 
south of Lumtong Primary School. In times of peace, the 20 soldiers under the command 
of 1st Lt. "Tha" have almost no duties; its typical authority is to provide protection along 
the road and maintain security throughout the district. The significant deployment and 
garrisoning of forces in Anlong Veng recalls the war-torn legacy of the district's recent 
past; it also suggests, as some informants did, that the inundation of troops (on top of the 
integrated former Khmer Rouge fighters) reflects a continuing distrust or nervousness on 
the part of the central government in Phnom Penh. 
Anlong Veng Police Headquarters rests on the west side of the Anlong Veng 
District Office, on the south side of the road to Trabaing Prassat.107 The compound itself 
is home to four police groups: provincial police (5-6 officers), district police (100-200), 
provincial tourist police (3), and district tourist police (5).108 The district police 
headquarters has a "jail" (a small room with shackles) where perpetrators can be held for 
48 hours before being escorted by provincial police to the prison in Oddar Meanchey's 
capital. The tourist police forces, which report directly to the Ministry of Tourism, have 
been established to protect visitors, to check special papers of those coming from 
Thailand, and to address tourists' complaints. In addition to these more centralized 
provincial and district police bureaus, each commune maintains a small police contingent 
and station, although there may not be a separate office or jail. These local constables 
and their village-level counterparts (if there are any) deal with a wide variety of crimes 
and complaints, but perpetrators are brought to the district precinct. 
The organizational relationship between the Ministry of Tourism and the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces is expressed through the Region 4 military command, via 
Regiment 403. The two companies, which are stationed on the Dangrek Mountain, have 
their normal duty to protect the border augmented by the (additional) demand to watch 
over sites of historical/tourist interest.109 The current status of this relationship is 
maintained without financial contribution (salary, uniforms, food) from the Tourism 
Ministry, although promise of future revenues might operate as a guarantor or sign of 
good faith. 
With all the ministerial and departmental organization, district and commune 
administration, and military-security management—all proceeding at a syncopated 
adagio—the idea of what constituted a museum remained elusive. The seemingly erratic 
character of Cambodian endeavors manifested in Anlong Veng, producing a prolonged 
multivocality in the conception of the object (and its form). Complexity and differences 
in people's awareness, knowledge, and understanding of the "museum project" provided 
conflicting and vague presentations of what was to be done. There also seemed to be a 
division in how different administrative levels approached the issue of implementation. 
Under direction from the prime minister (the 14 December 2001 circular), the 
Ministry of Tourism with assistance from other ministries was to construct a "museum" 
in Anlong Veng according to some notion of "historical tourism." Even among 
individuals at this level, what was supposed to constitute the museum was highly 
varied—essentially, an accurate portrayal of political life during the Khmer Rouge 
regime (not necessarily limited to its post-1979 position) involving at least two primary 
sites, Ta Mok's lakeside residence and Pol Pot's mountaintop house, and some 30 or so 
more secondary sites. There was a recurrently stated interest in making the primary sites 
"like before" by 1) gathering up many (already-looted) "artifacts," and 2) involving the 
constructors of the original houses. All of this was part of a stated effort to recreate the 
sites, according to descriptions provided by villagers presently residing in the area. This 
upper administration level (the ministries) worked mostly with district-level officials in 
Anlong Veng (evidenced if by nothing else than the fact that visiting ministerial 
delegations meet at the district officer's house rather than the district office, across the 
street). 
Control of the enigmatic "museum" remained in the hands of central government 
officials in the capital (Phnom Penh), the Oddar Meanchey Governor's Office (in 
Samraong), and those in the highest positions within Anlong Veng District, to the almost 
total exclusion of the commune chiefs and their councils (let alone village-level leaders 
or ordinary villagers). Local-level governance had been part of an effort to decentralize 
decision-making and development (at least, that is what the liberalist propaganda 
proclaimed around the 3 February 2002 commune elections). The main responsibility of 
commune councils is infrastructural improvements; irrigation systems are an especially 
important concern during the rainy season, but schools—education = development—and 
roads are also common priorities. An outsider like myself would think that the 
participation of the commune chiefs and their councils would be integral to the 
(implementation of the) museum project, because the anticipated influx of tourists would 
put increased demands on the area's roads and irrigation systems as well as the daily 
activities of resident villagers. At the very least, one would expect a significant amount 
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of participation on the parts of the chiefs from Trabaing Prey and Anlong Veng 
Communes where the bulk of the historical-tourist sites reside. Surprisingly, the 
commune chiefs were radically uninformed about the government's efforts; most claimed 
to have only heard small bits from the district chief about what was in the works. They all 
seemed to be aware that a museum of sorts was being built, which would utilize the 
houses of Ta Mok and Pol Pot. As the commune chiefs were unaware of the tourism 
development details, the villagers tended to be even less informed. This underscored 
suspicions that these villagers, many of whom are former Democratic Kampuchea 
soldiers and farmers, are having their wartime past represented for them among the places 
they still inhabit. Seen in terms of a social history museum, the (tourist) project appeared 
radically lacking in community involvement, but hierarchy and top-down leadership are 
well-entrenched historical trends in Cambodia. 
The tourist projects that tended to occupy the attention of some commune chiefs 
were "resorts," and these drew from a sketchy idea of "strategic tourism" that was being 
exploited by the provincial Department of Tourism and, perhaps, the Oddar Meanchey 
Governor's Office. The "resort" has a particular Cambodian expression, typically 
involving a water body lined with picnicking areas (often, wooden platforms with straw 
thatch roofs) and a variety of mobile food and souvenir sellers.110 Beyond the hyper-
commercialization that is fostered, what seems particularly characteristic (and perhaps 
shocking) is that the "resort" area is pushed right up alongside whatever happens to figure 
as the tourist site. This sort of approach was already evidenced at the in situ restaurant at 
Ta Mok's cliff house in 2002. However, the "resort" as a commune-level endeavor in 
Anlong Veng District seemed to be in part the brainchild of the provincial tourist 
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officials. Beyond these grand manifestations of "strategic tourism" were more modest 
efforts at commune/village-level beautification, construction of guesthouses, and various 
local improvements that commune chiefs hope will persuade tourists to visit their area or 
even stop for the night. 
To restate: early on, a division appeared among government levels with regard to 
tourism projects in Anlong Veng District. On the one hand, the Royal Cambodian 
Government (mainly the Ministry of Tourism) with district authorities (and perhaps some 
participation from the Oddar Meanchey governor) were involved in the construction of a 
not-yet-well-defined museum project that is understood in terms of historical-tourist 
development. On the other hand, there were commune-level efforts that appear to have 
their primary support from the provincial-level Department of Tourism (located in Oddar 
Meanchey's capital) and are following a concept of "strategic tourism." This situation 
produced odd contradictions. For instance, the fairly remote commune of Trabaing Tauv 
claimed to have secured the commitment of $5 million from some US Army engineers 
for a well-defined project; meanwhile, the Ministry of Tourism was forced to seek out 
sponsors to proceed each step of the way to fund its not-yet-stable notion of a "museum," 
with an anticipated US$30,000 price tag for the drafting of its master plan. 
This convenient bifurcation of the administration of tourist endeavors in Anlong 
Veng is complicated by the presence of the "Oddar Meanchey Provincial Working Group 
on Anlong Veng." This entity was headed by the multi-sited Khemarak, who maintained 
a residence in Siem Reap, an office in Samraong (the Department of Tourism), and a 
work site in Anlong Veng. The working group, whose majority of members are former 
Khmer Rouge, conducted most of the on-the-ground work that was then presented to 
Tourism Ministry officials (who have their own ministerial level working group) arid then 
circulated to academics at the Royal Academy of Phnom Penh and experts at DC-Cam. 
Although the various ministries sponsor visits to Anlong Veng for the purpose of fact-
finding, surveying the sites, and holding meetings (with the district authorities)—these 
outings sometimes seemed like tourist visits of their own—it was Khemarak's working 
group that was most active in pushing the completion of the work (historical 
documentation, logistics of tourism management, etc.). All the "historical tourism" 
endeavors in Anlong Veng by the Ministry of Tourism (and likely the "strategic tourism" 
projects as well) were originally intended to converge as part of the ministry's 
"Cambodia 2003" campaign, a (marketing) package that aimed to make that year the 
biggest for Cambodia's re-nascent tourist industry. 
@* @» ®> 
In the course of my research, the Tourism Ministry's Anlong Veng Historical-
Tourist Area vision was never fully realized; in fact, the vision itself seemed to lack 
coherence throughout much of my stay in Cambodia.111 Informants—working group 
members, individuals contracted to reconstruct sites, and caretakers of sites—were all 
quite honest about the relative lack of progress on the project, although a lack of funds 
was an often-cited reason.112 Hun Sen's circular had initiated the project, putting 
numerous government committees into relation under the Tourism Ministry's direction, 
but it had not allocated a specific budget for its implementation. 
Although a separate museum structure was not erected, scattered indications of 
progress irregularly materialized. Days before my first visit to Anlong Veng, the 
Tourism Ministry had erected blue signposts at nearly all the sites it wished to include in 
the historical-tourist area. In order to complete its first task, the ministry found funding 
from Red Dot, an advertising and publishing company that produces Leisure Cambodia, a 
magazine featuring articles on various aspects of Khmer culture, historical sites, food, 
and folk tales. In exchange for covering the cost of the informational signs, the 
sponsoring company was granted the right to supplement each sign with advertising. 
Historical-Tourist Signpost in Anlong Veng 
The bilingual signpost follows a basic design. The name of the site is centered at the top 
in rounded Khmer script (dksdr moul Hfymtu), with an English translation immediately 
below. The public service message calling for assistance in preserving the site and the 
identity of its institutional authority occupy the lower half of the placard. Immediately 
below the Ministry of Tourism identification rests the advertisement for Red Dot's 
magazine. Below and on the right side is an advertisement for the company itself, RedDot 
Ideas Unlimited. The irony has not gone unnoticed that the slogan for its periodical—"A 
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Tabloid Expounding Cambodia in Her True Glory"—is attached to sites associated with 
the Khmer Rouge, one example of the oddities that can emerge from the intersection of 
tourist marketing and a very marketable tragic past.113 The blue signs, put up in early 
March 2002, remained the most overt indicator of the Tourism Ministry's endeavor for 
about three years; in 2005, none of the anticipated sites had been rebuilt, and 
administrative control over the project appeared to eroding (along with the dramatic 
transformation of a district newly at peace).114 
Multiple ministries are involved in the implementation of the museum directive— 
coordinating and complicating its completion—and these government bureaus dispatched 
very short-term (often, one-day) reconnaissance delegations to Anlong Veng on an 
irregular basis. In August 2002, a four-person group from the Ministry of Land 
Management, Urban Planning, and Construction, accompanied by Oddar Meanchey's 
Third Deputy Governor Yim Thin and the Tourism Ministry's Under-Secretary of State 
Ros Ren, arrived to discuss plans for the district's historical areas. This conference was 
principally a forum to disseminate decisions that had been executed at various 
government offices. First, two groups had been established to work on Anlong Veng: the 
first group (geographical) was already in the midst of its 5-day mission to accumulate 
statistical information; when finished, this data would be supplied to the second group 
(preparation), located in Phnom Penh, which would provide detailed reports on the 
terrain. Second, the Ministry of Tourism had already generated three maps of the Anlong 
Veng area and were still amassing stories about the tourist sites in the district. Third, it 
was decided that the selection of tour guides, ten for Thai and ten for English, would 
occur through an application process with Khemarak as the point person and hiring 
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reviews to be completed by the Tourism Ministry's Director of the Department of 
Training. Fourth, the ministry would seek out guards (two to three per site) for the tourist 
destinations, asking the military to offer personnel but whose salaries would come from 
the ministry. Fifth, two tourism offices would need to be constructed, one in the flatlands 
near Anlong Veng town and one on the mountaintop. Sixth, guidebooks in Khmer, Thai, 
and English were to be produced by an inter-ministerial conference including Ros Ren 
and Chhang Youk; this discussion would select appropriate stories to be included from 
the national documents at DC-Cam, after which the prime minister will be asked to 
approve the texts. 
At the time of the august visit, I was afflicted by my first bout of dengue fever, 
and some locally-purchased pharmaceuticals, taken with ever-increasing frequency, 
allowed me to be conscious and upright for the distinguished delegation. My attendance 
at the morning informational session was unnecessary, but accompanying the group in 
the afternoon tour of the Dangrek Mountains, from the bed of the district chiefs pick-up, 
was strictly non-optional. Needless to mention, my role was definitely more silent 
observer than anything else, consumed with embarrassingly concealing my sweat-
drenched, fevered state. As we toured the sites—running the gamut from Pol Pot's grave 
to Ta Mok's cliff house to Pol Pol's Kbal Tonsaong mountain retreat—there was some 
casual chatter about the sites before Sophorn would take on the role of tour guide. He 
had clearly supplemented his own memories with information provided from a host of 
former Khmer Rouge locals, as I would witness during our interviews in the months to 
come. He rattled off names and dates—who lived where, when things were built, by 
whom, etc.—in a rote manner. These presentations were reminiscent of the children who 
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used to populate the areas around Angkor Wat; these underage guides would grab visitors 
by the hand and lead them through the ruins while reciting, almost monk-like chanting 
{sautr Mip)—because clearly their had learned this by heart {Hen sautr ujawtji)—an 
ancient history lesson in a foreign language, an incantation {sautr mon wftiHs) for the 
tourist.115 Sophorn performed the role admirably, interjecting his own personal relation 
with Ta Mok alongside the second-hand information he had acquired about the sites: a 
prodigal son's recital {kaar sautr mmitf) of historical facts. 
Gradually at first, then all of a sudden... Khemarak spent a number of months 
negotiating with a property owner about using his house as a district tourism office. 
During a 3-hour drop-in visit to the district in late 2002, he formalized the lease of what 
might have become the Department of Tourism Anlong Veng Office. In the end (more 
than a year later), on a small patch of land, a modest, one-story structure was built 
(separate from the much admired house Khemarak had initially sought), which would 
function as the meeting room and informational outlet for tourist activities in the district. 
(No new office was erected on the mountain; however, a guard's station along the main 
road through Choam Pass, housed a man who assumed responsibility for tourist 
concerns.116) Other than Khemarak's office objective, progress on the construction of a 
Khmer Rouge historical-tourist area in Anlong Veng was largely at a standstill. For a 
several-month period at the end of 2002, the biggest development in terms of the museum 
was likely the foreign social researcher running around asking questions of officials and 
visitors. The Royal Academy and DC-Cam had largely concluded their research mission 
in 2002.117 CMAC de-mined the requisite areas, completing its mandate in early 2003 
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and yet leaving in its wake the message to stay on designated paths and to tour the 
mountain only with a local guide, as areas may still be mined. 
There was always news of impending changes to (always immanently) occur— 
ticket sales, border opening, phone service—but these nearly always took more than a 
year to be realized. However, at the economic base, the formal integration of the budding 
services industry—restaurants and guesthouses—was executed quickly. The owners of 
local businesses were summoned to a meeting convened by Khemarak's department to 
discuss the licensing process that would allow them to (legally) operate their tourism-
supporting enterprises. The provincial office was taking steps against "exploiters" (i.e., 
outlaw enterprises as well as corrupt officials) in Anlong Veng District and requiring 
accommodations and food providers to legally register their business and obtain a license. 
These permits were issued to individual owners to be displayed at their establishment in 
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order to prevent police or other authorities demanding "informal fees" from them. The 
license cost 50,000 riel per year; once a business registered, it could simply renew the 
license annually.119 Any new businesses seeking to open must obtain a license and must 
contact the village, commune, and district chiefs as well as the Office of the Governor of 
Oddar Meanchey and the provincial Department of Tourism. This meeting and the 
regulations it sought to impose effected a positioning of economic endeavors within the 
government's administrative bureaucracy, the creation of legal/illegal categories of 
commercial ventures, a control mechanism for corruption, and a generation of revenue 
for the tourism office. A symbiotic system of revenues harnessed the business owners' 
interests to operate above board, protecting them from would-be off-the-cuff competitors 
as well as additional "official" demands for operating fees. 
Further tourism income would eventually be sought through direct sale of tickets. 
Although the design and issuance of the tickets was conceptualized in late 2002, their 
actual dispensing would not begin until June the following year; even then, the sale of 
these visitor's vouchers would be rather erratic. I began to collect photos of sites to assist 
in Khemarak's design agenda as well as for him to include in a future guidebook and to 
make presentations to the ministry. The sites in the historical-tourist area would be 
divided into four zones for ticketing purposes; these zones roughly align with the clusters 
of structures associated with discrete regions: 1) Anlong Veng (from town to Srah 
Chhouk), 2) Cherag Phnom Village and Choam Pass, 3) Darm Chrey, and 4) Kbal 
Tonsaong.120 
Zone 1 
• Ta Mok 's Lakeside House 
• Pol Pot's House (lake) 
• Anlong Veng Primary 
School 
• Ta Mok's Middle House 
(lower) 
• Ta Mok's Sawmill 
• New Dam 
• Anlong Veng Lake 
-OChik Bridge 
Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area Zones 
Zone 2 
• Khieu Samphan 's House 
• Ta Mok's Warehouse 
• Mine Production Site 
• Pol Pot's Secret House 
• Pol Pol's Cremation Site 
• Pol Pot's Sentencing Site 
• Khmer Rouge Statues 
Zone 3 
• Ta Mok's Middle House 
(upper) 
• Nuon Chea 's House 
• Son Sen's House 
• Ta Mok's Cliffhouse 
• Ta Mok's Waterfall 
• Political Conference Hall 
• Guesthouse 
• Radio Site 
• Ta Mok's Mango Field 
Zone 4 
• First Guardhouse 
• Second Guardhouse 
• Pol Pot's Holiday House 
• Khieu Samphan's Office 
• Khieu Samphan's House 
• Pol Pot's Mountain 
House 
• Radio Site 
Purchase of these partitioned paper passes was to commence at the close of 2002; 
Thai and Western visitors were to be issued billets at a cost of US$2 per zone. 
Cambodians would be allowed free entry, in line with the protocol of the Angkor 
Archaeological Park. A new, straw kiosk/checkpoint was erected in September 2003 
along the driveway to Ta Mok's lakeside villa, and this irregularly staffed ticket booth 
made available entry passes only for this one site. (The ticketing of the other zones and 
sites was deferred to a future when the museum exhibited a more finished offering.) 
Statistics that were tracked toward the end of the year indicate that the district received 
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on average ten foreigners per month; many more Thai visitors arrived, but tourism 
officials believed a significant portion came for eco-tourism.121 Monthly numbers for 
Khmer nationals, from other provinces, ranged from 50 to 300. 
In January 2004 tour guides were selected, ten English-speaking guides and ten 
Thai-speaking guides; their training would commence nine months later. Thong Khon's 
directives stated that candidates for tour guides (meakkeates agtsfiifi) would be selected 
from among the villagers who know the actual history (brdvoatt cheak sdaeng tplritJimMti) 
of the area; consistent with this idea, former Khmer Rouge made up the majority of tour 
guides. Consequently, Khemarak saw to it that training impressed upon these individuals 
the importance of not saying good things about the Khmer Rouge. He emphasized this 
point by saying that the tour guides cannot tell visitors that Ta Mok was good, "because it 
will confuse tourists." In private discussions, he mentioned the problematic example of 
Sophom, who is an active member of the working group and openly compliments Ta 
Mok's leadership to everyone, including journalists. 
In mid-2004, the first five-page draft of the master plan was completed, although 
its contents were kept under pre-approval wraps at Ros Ren's office at the Ministry of 
Tourism. Around the same time, in the center of Anlong Veng on the northeast side of 
the roundabout, the Ministry of Tourism erected a new, much larger billboard detailing 
the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area. This mega-signpost employs the same map 
that has guided the project since its onset, but on a much grander scale. The singular pole 
for a foundation adds a very industrial look to the placard, as it towers above neighboring 
homes. 
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Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area Billboard 
Toward the end of 2004, it was rumored that a guidebook was finally being 
composed.122 The ongoing efforts of the ministry and its accomplices included the 
difficult task of maintaining a 10,000 m2 area around each of the remnant historical sites, 
because as Khemarak stated, "we are thinking 10 to 20 years into the future." There are 
places where people have already set up businesses near the tourist sites, like the bustling 
bazaar sprawling between the sentencing site and Pol Pot's ash heap. Khemarak appears 
unconcerned, stating "the market near Pol Pot's grave is only temporary. In the future, 
we will move the market to a place along the road to Ta Mok's middle house." In 
addition to preservation, funding sources remained a primary concern. 
There is quite a wide range of opinions about the significance (or lack thereof) of 
constructing a museum about the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng.123 While the Ministry 
of Tourism (in Phnom Penh) offers one perspective, locals in the forested district offer a 
variety of alternative views. The variation is so dramatic that providing some examples is 
warranted. The significant differences revolve around why/how the museum should be 
conceived, for whom, and what purposes it serves. (There was a general concern about, 
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or desire for, involvement in the Ministry of Tourism's project. Whatever money tourism 
might bring, villagers harbored a clear idea that working with the ministry must make for 
lucrative employment.) In general, informants agree in differing ways with the statement 
that Anlong Veng is an expression of "the last breath" of the Khmer Rouge. A former 
tourism worker stated: 
I think a museum is very important for this area; it is also my idea, which I 
have thought about for a long time, that a 'war museum' (pipoa 
sangkream nciniiMtJunH) be built here. If the Department of Tourism makes 
the museum, it would be better than now. I see many people arrive, and 
they do not know about the places. They only come and take pictures and 
then go home. If a museum is built in Anlong Veng District, it will 
provide many advantages. We can get money from tourists, and we can 
let the world know that Anlong Veng is peaceful and used to be the site of 
a hot battle. There are also a lot of connections between Oddar Meanchey 
and Siem Reap Provinces; so the Ministry of Tourism can get money from 
tourists. For example, if a tourist arrives in Siem Reap, they will travel for 
three days. They will have heard about Anlong Veng from the Oddar 
Meanchey Department of Tourism. They will come for one day, and then 
they will want to go to Prassat Preah Vihear as well. With regards to the 
museum, it has more advantages than I can tell. 
Although there were some statements about the Anlong Veng museum 
performing an important educational function for Cambodians in regards to learning 
about Khmer Rouge history, officials affiliated with the Ministry of Tourism were quite 
frank about their optimistic hopes of this project garnering revenue; this pimping of the 
past begs the question of revenue for whom? A few local (military) residents also played 
up the significance of the museum in its pedagogical function for Cambodia's youth, 
specifically for conveying an understanding of the destruction wrought by war; as one 
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RCAF colonel noted, "because of war, we have nothing, just broken things." However, 
the articulation of the educational and cultural preservation functions of the museum was 
rare among my informants. Instead, there was an overwhelming emphasis on the 
economic advantages of constructing the museum in Anlong Vettg.124 
The Tourism Ministry's hybrid designation of Anlong Veng as "historical-tourist" 
encapsulates at least two agendas which can be competing or contradictory. In the realm 
of historical memorialization, the Ministry of Tourism, the provincial Department of 
Tourism, and involved academics advance accuracy of representation as an overriding 
(over-writing?) goal. These agents seek to construct a/the representation of Anlong Veng 
history—posed as the "last breath of the Khmer Rouge"—and (re-)erect physical 
monuments to convey this understanding. Establishing the validity of any version of this 
past is fraught with discrepancies, contradictions, multiple perspectives, etc. to such an 
extent that even the most rigorous "scientific" approach might be strained to produce a 
presentation of any coherence.125 Exemplifying how interpretive divisions manifest for 
locals, my informants' responses fell into one of two camps: pro-Pol Pot and pro-Ta 
Mok. Although the majority side with the latter, it is clear that one's affiliations show 
through in presentations of memories of events, sites, and movements.126 Other sources, 
and possible realms of differences in "accuracy," are journalistic accounts, which have 
demonstrated a poor track record during certain periods in Cambodian history. Officials 
at the ministerial level seem intent on depicting the horrors of the Khmer Rouge and how 
the Organization's ongoing war devastated the country. While using KR-constructed 
sites as historical markers, the Ministry of Tourism seems to gloss over the fact these 
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sites are considered by a number of local villagers to be enduring testaments of the 
heroism of particular Democratic Kampuchea leaders.127 
Informants offered an increasingly wider range of reflections on the "museum" 
and the sites it contains. A key respondent suggested a notion of utility as an interesting 
criterion for evaluating historical importance: those sites that are to be endowed with 
significance are those places that provide a direct benefit to the people on a daily basis 
(e.g., the road and the dam). This response aligns easily with views of Ta Mok as a local 
hero whose accomplishments are still visible and usable; it casts historical importance 
according to endurance/utility, enduring utility. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Tourism, which does not operate as if Ta Mok were a local hero, seems guided by the 
idea that any site with concrete remains (or simply the presence of concrete)—a historical 
foundation or a foundation for the "historical"—is worthy of receiving the blue historical-
tourist site marker. For example, the newly-recovered "Khieu Samphan's House" site is 
indeed a "site," as opposed to a "non-site," given that it harbors remnants of previous 
structures and inhabitance. There are certainly traces of a past, and the most notable 
(beyond scraps of wood laying asunder) are the wells. The earthy presence of remains 
reinforces the hypothesis that the Ministry of Tourism designated "historical-tourist" sites 
that exhibit foundations or "groundings"—such as a hole in the ground, a latrine, or a 
bomb shelter. This plays out similarly for "Pol Pot's Secret House," as the presence of a 
concrete slab, a perimeter wall, and a trench give evidence of a real site. 
Although frankly stating his belief that the museum would bring tourists and 
money, another military official was very candid about sharing what he believes to be the 
thoughts of Anlong Veng residents regarding Ta Mok. In this informant's eyes, the 
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leader's status as a great patron is attested by the enduring presence of man-made 
constructions: hospital, school, bridge, and dam. It seems that the construction of the "Ta 
Mok Museum" (as many Khmers refer to the project) might possibly augment this 
prestige. In a similar vein, the caretaker of Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa suggested that 
historical tourist sites are significant, because they are testaments to the fact that the 
Khmer Rouge were protecting Cambodia from neighboring countries. Thus, the 
importance of the museum is primarily local: either as a means to garner money from 
tourists for the district or as a monument reminding people (or reflecting their attitudes) 
of Ta Mok's achievements. (It is extremely doubtful that the ministry would cast Ta Mok 
in such a favorable light.) 
Somewhat differently, one of Ta Mok's drivers appeared unaware, and even 
nonchalant, about the museum project. He downplayed the significance of the museum 
for Khmers, especially local residents, conveying that the site is mainly for interested 
foreign tourists (tesdchdr bdrortes tBMBjmtBM). The attitude seemed to be that the 
museum (Ta Mok's lakeside villa) is nothing special, because all the Anlong Veng 
residents have visited and seen it. This informant provided a curious analogy: "People in 
Anlong Veng do not want to visit, because they have been here a long time. It is the 
same as having a daughter; you do not want to see your daughter all the time, you want to 
see another." There is certainly another end of the spectrum, especially common among 
the "base people" who I interviewed, which registers a lack of awareness with the 
ministry's plans, perhaps indicating a lack of local involvement or education about the 
project, even at the commune and sub-commune levels. 
As it was relayed via Khemarak, ministry officials, and local tourism personnel, 
the plan for the museum seemed to shift. The idea of restoring and re-building structures 
remained relatively constant.129 Over time, the re-construction plans became more 
selective, focusing on a few key sites (Pol Pot's house and the sentencing site). 
Initially (and through 2002), Thong Khon had envisioned 28 sites scattered throughout 
Anlong Veng District, clustered around Anlong Veng Town, Choam Pass/Darm Chrey, 
and Kbal Tonsaong. In addition to select residences and other sites of historical 
importance, a new museum building would be constructed near the site where Pol Pot 
was tried and sentenced in 1997. The museum would exhibit artifacts from the post-1989 
period as well as photographs, documents, and any video material the ministry could 
obtain. However, as the tourism office sprouted and Khemarak achieved limited 
successes in developing tourism in the district, the idea about the location, form, and 
content changed. Among the working group members, the (pre-master plan) working 
idea of the museum was to deposit any artifacts, acquired from former Khmer Rouge, at 
Ta Mok's lakeside residence. The meeting hall was a logical choice for a number of 
reasons. It was the most complete and stable of all the Khmer Rouge buildings: over-
engineering meant that the floors, walls, and roof were intact. The near-total looting of 
the site meant that ample sheltered space was available for whatever contents could be 
amassed. Significantly, the robust structure was perhaps the most visited, given its 
proximity to town, easy access, and scenic views of the lake.131 
In addition to the range of perspectives on what constitutes a "museum," there 
existed among my informants a variety of views regarding what should be considered 
content. The museum seemed so loosely-defined, or under-determined, that informants 
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perceived possible historical "artifacts" as diverse as: leadership documents, individual 
stories, a radio truck, and Khmer Rouge proverbs.132 As of 2004, the objects secured for 
(future) exhibition included: 30 photographs purchased from Anlong Veng residents, 
three iron cages that had been used as holding cells, and a video cassette that talks about 
the activities of Ta Mok and Son Sen when stationed at Preah Vihear Temple. 
Khemarak had personally bought old Khmer Rouge documents from locals and sent them 
to the inter-ministerial group, which determined the documents' fate with regard to the 
museum. The acquisition of artifacts became more complicated as former Khmer Rouge 
quickly became aware of the monetary potential of their paraphernalia.134 Khemarak 
acknowledged that: "We really need to find all these different things (books, placards, 
etc.), but we also really need money to deal with the people who have these objects. 
People understand that the old things from the Khmer Rouge are very expensive, so if we 
want them, we have to buy them from them." 
Chhang Youk wrote about a young former Khmer Rouge soldier from Anlong 
Veng who traveled to Phnom Penh in an effort to sell memorabilia from DK's post-1979 
period. He was offering DC-Cam two photo albums (each picture priced at US$1,500) 
and a video of Khmer Rouge leaders in conversation with one of Cambodia's political 
parties. His offer of sale at the lowest price was skewed to favor DC-Cam, because "he 
would rather they be contributed to the Documentation Center of Cambodia's cause of 
searching for the truth and finding justice for the millions of people who had been 
executed by the Khmer Rouge regime."135 DC-Cam's "donations only" policy forbids 
the center from "trading memories of the victims' agony for dollars" with enterprising 
Anlong Veng residents. Although Youk Chhang sees the post-conflict commercialization 
of suffering as improper, the Ministry of Tourism, in its desire to develop Anlong Veng 
for the influx of tourists, does not share the ethic of placing objects from a history of 
suffering beyond value. A year after Youk Chhang's missive, Thong Khon explained to 
me that he had acquired a video from former Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng at a price of 
US$3,000. 
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To complicate matters, not only did the conception of the museum portend 
multiplicity in terms of content and form (which? what?), but the museum's conception 
begot divergent stories of origin and author-ity (whose?). Stories of Ta Mok's historical 
preservation efforts emerged, and certain residents credited the whole idea of a museum 
to their local hero. One of Ta Mok's sons-in-law offered his idea about potential 
exhibition objects for the museum, stating "if the government thinks the museum is good, 
then it is good.... All the things have been destroyed, so we cannot find things to put in 
the museum. Everything is new. The history of Anlong Veng is important: what we did 
before, how people lived during the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng, and what the 
situation was then." He would like to make a "true document," a history of Anlong 
Veng, to be included in the museum. However, he continued his assessment by echoing 
the earlier museological intentions of Ta Mok: 
Ta Mok said before that the house on the lake was not really his; it was to 
be made into a museum. Ta Mok's real house is in Teuk Chum. TaMok 
used to capture things from smugglers which he would then put in the 
house in which he used to live. When the government came, they took 
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some of these things. When Anlong Veng was liberated again, he tried to 
collect the old things again. Finally, the government army came and took 
all the things. Thus, he said that the house on the lake is no longer his 
house and that he wants it to become a museum with ancient artifacts such 
as statues, busts, etc. captured from Thai smugglers. Everything I am 
saying is true; I am Ta Mok's son-in-law, and I am afraid you do not 
believe me. Ta Mok wanted to put everything in the museum: ancient 
statues as well as documents and pictures from Democratic Kampuchea. 
As it was explained, Ta Mok's idea was to transform his lakeside villa into an exhibition 
hall for local consumption, which would have included ancient artifacts captured from 
smugglers, paintings of locations of Khmer national interest, and even Democratic 
Kampuchea memorabilia. One informant claimed to have been enlisted to create a 
museum for Ta Mok on the land now occupied by the district chief and two of his 
deputies. He further asserted that Nuon Nov, Ta Mok's "minister of culture," had 
received THB 10,000,000 specifically for the museum project. Ta Mok wanted him to 
include in the museum: 1) a book (translated into Khmer from Japanese) about the 
Vietnamese army entering Cambodia and killing many Khmer people; 2) ancient artifacts 
(Ta Mok asked people to collect antiques in Anlong Veng and Trabaing Prassat Districts, 
and Ta Mok had many artifacts at his lakeside house); 3) paintings/reproductions of 
photos in the Japanese book showing thin and sick children dying of starvation; and 4) 
paintings of rice farmers.136 
It is hard to imagine that a town and organization seized by war had the time or 
resources to erect memorial sites; further, the inclusion of revolutionary artifacts hints at 
a well-developed sense of self-reflection on the part of Khmer Rouge elites. Among the 
murals that already cover the walls of the villa are depictions of Angkor Wat and Prassat 
Preah Vihear; according to the painters, Ta Mok's in-law, and other Anlong Veng 
residents, Ta Mok had intended to share these images of national grandeur with villagers, 
many of whom never had the opportunity to visit these sites. Further items for exhibition 
included statues and busts that were captured from smugglers, all of which have been 
subsequently seized by the government army. According to those relating Ta Mok's 
intentions, these objects were to be complemented by documents and pictures from the 
Democratic Kampuchea period. 
The question of who advocated the idea of a museum first seems quite secondary 
to the way in which these claims about originality operate around the legend of Ta Mok 
and his organization. Beyond revering Ta Mok as a local and indeed national hero, these 
assertions cohere around a particular nationalist sentiment that portrays him and the 
Khmer Rouge loyalists in Anlong Veng to be defenders of Khmer sovereignty as well as 
conservators (and potential curators) of its glorious past. Given that the PDK renounced 
its commitment to communism in 1981 (albeit for pragmatic reasons), the popular 
anxiety around territorial incursions by the Thais and Vietnamese—derogatorily referred 
to as siem twjH and yuon ma, respectively—may have remained one of the lasting 
ideological elements that held sway through the movement's final decade.137 This 
understanding fuels the belief that Ta Mok remains a hero of the Khmer people, and it is 
fueled by: 1) the fact that the Vietnamese were a major force (with Heng Samrin's 
Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation) in the 1979 invasion of Cambodia and 
control thereafter; 2) the decades-old dispute with the Thai government over Prassat 
Preah Vihear; 3) continuing claims of border incursions by both the Thais and 
Vietnamese; and 4) the more recent anti-Thai sentiment that exploded into riots in 
January 2003. 
However, the view of Ta Mok's greatness does not meet with unanimity among 
Anlong Veng's former Khmer Rouge. Some commune chiefs expressed differing views 
with regard to the two central historical figures of the museum site(s), while other 
residents offered hagiographic renderings of Pol Pot and/or Ta Mok. The style of 
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leadership and relative personal merit of each focuses these discussions. Ta Mok was 
Secretary of the Southwest Zone during the Democratic Kampuchea period, and it is 
widely acknowledged that his troops (with Ke Pauk's Central Zone soldiers) carried out 
the purges of the Northwestern, Western, and Eastern Zones that eventually allowed the 
Pol Pot faction to consolidate its control on the waning movement. Once ousted from 
power (by the invading Vietnamese army), DK control was broken into three areas: Koh 
Kong (West), Pailin (Northwest), and Preah Vihear/Anlong Veng (North), the last of 
which was under Ta Mok's control. Ta Mok initiated a trial of Pol Pot in 1997 for the 
slaying of Son Sen (in the Dangrek Mountains, a ministry-designated tourist site), and 
this trial allowed him to maintain command of the remaining Khmer Rouge that were 
active in Anlong Veng. Former employees (drivers, guards, painters, etc.) and other local 
villagers emphasize the gentle and intelligent nature of his governance. All informants 
who had close association with the leader, convey that he was thoughtful, reasoned, 
lacking feelings of resentment/vengeance, and took a very hands-on interest in the 
activities and labour of those under his rule. Most informants echoed the concise idea 
that: "Ta Mok always helped lighten people's burden by providing them clothes, 
mosquito nets, blankets, hammocks, medicine and food. He constructed a concrete 
bridge, a hospital, a school, an army headquarters, three gravel roads, an ammunition 
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factory, a sawmill and a plant that produced counterfeit money." 
One of the first informants to signal a divergence in views of Anlong Veng's 
Khmer Rouge leadership framed the issue for museum representation: 
We should compose texts about the Pol Pot leaders and write about how 
Khmer people fight each other. There will be differences between 
compositions from each person, because some people know a lot and some 
people know a little. Some people write that Pol Pot was a good person. 
The weakness of Pol Pot is that he did everything without law or courts. 
He did it himself without taking into account people's ideas; but he made 
good because he made it easy for people to talk with each other.... In the 
past, the river had many fish and could feed everyone in Anlong Veng, but 
now the fish are depleted. Now, there is law, but people do not follow it. 
Some people say that Ta Mok is good. Some Khmer Rouge people in 
Anlong Veng District support Pol Pot, some support Ta Mok. In the past, 
Ta Mok and Pol Pot stayed together in the same boat [i.e., worked 
together]. After, they fought each other, and some people followed Pol 
Pot and some followed Ta Mok. The story is very complex (smoksmaanh 
MRWWinj). 
The informant's own opinion favored Pol Pot. He conveyed familiarity with Pol Pot's 
weaknesses: Pol Pot was wrong, because he did not establish the law (courts)—"when 
someone does something wrong, he is responsible for his mistake; maybe he will be 
killed without people hearing about it." He thinks that Ta Mok wanted to orchestrate a 
coup against Pol Pot, but then it was only "a little fight." "The commander never kills his 
subordinates, but subordinates kill their commanders. For example, Lon Nol set up the 
coup to overthrow Sihanouk. It is no different with Pol Pot and Ta Mok; Ta Mok tried to 
bring down Pol Pot." The description of divergent leadership styles subtly segued into 
and out of political divergences. He explained that the split between Ta Mok and Pol Pot 
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emerged before UNTAC, during the Peace Accords, 1991 to 1993. 
At the negotiations in Paris, Pol Pot discovered that communism had 
ended throughout the world. Because Pol Pot understood that communism 
was over, he told his people to negotiate with the government to stop 
fighting. He wanted his soldiers and people to join with the government 
so that there would not be two Cambodias. He asked Ta Mok about the 
money and told him he should give it to people as they return to their 
provinces, so that they can buy cows to set up farms upon their return. 
The amount for each person was to be one million riel. Pol Pot 
commanded Ta Mok to give out the money. Even though Pol Pot had 
asked Ta Mok to give one million riel, each person received only 20,000 
riel. After dividing up the money, Pol Pot would ask people to go back to 
their birth provinces and stop fighting. Pol Pot sent Khieu Samphan to 
negotiate with the Hun Sen government; if negotiations had gone well, 
then Pol Pot would give the people money, ask them to stop fighting, and 
let them go home. This could not happen, because Ta Mok did not agree. 
Pol Pot thought that if Ta Mok took control, it would not last more than 
seven months. Ta Mok wanted to take control; he liked fighting and did 
not want to follow Pol Pot's ideas. Pol Pot is a good person, because he 
sees the situation in the world, changes his view, and supports an end to 
fighting. Pol Pot was educated in Paris and could speak many languages. 
Khieu Samphan is very educated, but Pol Pot was better because he could 
lead everybody.... When Pol Pot gave speeches, he did not have to look at 
the text. Ta Mok did everything without documents, only spoke; he never 
had meetings before doing anything. Some people like Ta Mok; some 
people like Pol Pot. But in fact, people stayed with Pol Pot, because he 
did not want Khmer people to continue making war. During Ta Mok, if I 
talked like this, I would be killed. Pol Pot gave permission to make farms 
on the mountain and allowed people to do business with the Thai. Ta Mok 
did not; he would not even let people use make-up. I speak truly, but that 
if you ask other people, they will speak differently. They will say that Ta 
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Mok is better. What I have seen with my own eyes, what I have lived, and 
what I did, I can tell you. I do not lie to you. 
A commune chief offering similar reflections, said that Ta Mok (not Pol Pot) would often 
come visit people in his commune. "Pol Pot always remained on the mountain. Ta 
Mok's habit as a leader was to stay in direct contact with the people and to know the 
situation with his own eyes. He did not like to see documents from other leaders; 
although other leaders were satisfied with viewing documents, Ta Mok wanted to see if 
documents were right or wrong. For example, Ta Mok would ask people to make a 
bridge, and he would stand there and watch. Pol Pot was different; he only commanded 
from a distance." 
In addition to local hero worship variances in conceiving a museum, a growing 
tension of originality and authority at the administrative level was exposed among my 
broadening informant base. As the story goes, the district chief knew that a man (one of 
my informants), who had been close to Pol Pot, was very clearly familiar with the sites, 
and he asked my informant to make a map of all the places belonging to Ta Mok, Pol Pot, 
and Khieu Samphan, providing him paper and markers. The district chief called a 
meeting in October 2000 with a Department of Tourism official who had come from 
Samraong (likely Khemarak). The draft of the map was displayed and taken into 
possession by the department official, without any compensation provided. In 2002, 
signs appeared at a number sites in Anlong Veng District. The meeting had included a 
number of local people who are familiar with the sites. At the time, the district chief was 
not content with the individuals who had been selected to work with the department, so 
he asked the local experts to work with the district tourism office. My informant, who 
had been put in charge of the district effort, describes this as being the reason "why the 
district and the provincial tourism office are against each other." He further explained 
that at a meeting with members of the department's Working Group on Anlong Veng, he 
was told, "It is useless to be a district tourism officer, because you have not received the 
position from the province." He was subsequently edged out of the project, mainly 
because his district-level appointment was not a paid position. From that time on, the 
district chiefs initial interest in the Anlong Veng museum had been taken over by the 
ministry and its correlative provincial Department of Tourism. 
The identification of a tension between the Department of Tourism/ Ministry of 
Tourism and the administrators of Anlong Veng District elicit some interesting 
observations. If the district chief had been interested in the local development of a 
history museum in Anlong Veng, the character of the project may have been much 
different. Whatever the situation before, the district chief seemed to be already engaged 
in selecting and retaining together people who evidenced intimate knowledge of the sites 
and events. Given the accounts related by my informants, it seems the district chiefs 
project would have encouraged much greater involvement from people at the local level. 
Instead, the current project is being managed and implemented by relative outsiders; the 
more authority the new figures have in the project, they less they tend to know about the 
sites. Further, membership in working groups and positions in departments and 
ministries are typically purchased with cash, not historical knowledge. As it stands, the 
project unfolds quite slowly, while those who could implement the project in a local, 
"base" (moulthaan Htugia), or self-reliant fashion are excluded from the decision-making 
process or tapped for information with no compensatory currency.140 Regardless, the 
issues of acquisition of information/materials without compensation and intra-
governmental rivalries suggest a picture of a project which is more consistent with the 
Cambodian norm of corruption and personalist fiefdoms. 
From 1998 to 2002, a group within the RCAF Region 4 Development Sector was 
tasked with researching and looking after the Khmer Rouge possessions as the army was 
securing its war victory.141 Rong Samlaut, a young soldier in this protective unit, 
stationed at Son Sen's Darm Chrey house, would occasionally guide tourists who arrived 
on the mountain, receiving a couple dollars for directing these visitors away from 
landmines. The experience overseeing war relics, interacting with visitors, knowing 
some English, reading and writing Khmer, and being related to a well-respected military 
commander made him a suitable candidate to work for the Ministry of Tourism, which he 
did at the beginning of 2002 as chief of a planning section in the district. The director of 
the provincial Department of Tourism appointed him to work on the mountain. Later in 
the year, Rong Samlaut asked to take a leave because his name had not appeared in the 
government's salary registry, which meant he was not receiving an income for his work, 
nor re-imbursement for work-related expenditures.142 "When I requested money to do 
research, they did not accept my request. I needed money to go study about each area. I 
used my own moto and my own money, repaired the moto myself, and spent my own 
money on petrol." Two months after stopping work, he heard that his name had been 
entered in the list. Officially, the government believes that Rong Samlaut is working at 
the Department of Tourism. The superiors at the Ministry of Tourism are not aware that 
he no longer Carries out this work, and the salary that he should be receiving is going to 
someone from the Department of Tourism who bought his name in the list.143 (Rong 
Samlaut heard from a friend that someone was using his name.) Because the salary goes 
to the name of Rong Samlaut, the person who bought the name must use the moniker in 
official circumstances.144 
Rong Samlaut has met the tourism official who uses his name and in fact had 
been an acquaintance before the nominal purchase. "However, he has never told me that 
he bought my name; maybe he is shy/embarrassed. If ['Rong Samlaut'] works well, I am 
very happy, because he uses my name. Many people know my name already. But when 
['Rong Samlaut'] does not work well, the reputation falls on [Rong Samlaut]." Although 
Rong Samlaut understands that, in some respects, his reputation is in the hands of "Rong 
Samlaut," he conveyed no intention of confronting the nameholder or correcting the 
situation. He thinks that his imposter may have some problems when Ministry of 
Tourism officials arrive in Anlong Veng, because his photo is in his dossier at the 
ministry (the Department of Tourism only has the photo of the imposter). However, the 
practice of purchasing the names of individuals in the salary registry is so common, it is 
difficult to see how/why the ministry would confront the individual on his formal 
appellation. The name-exchange story offers one window into Cambodia's well-
established corrupt institutional practices. Lower-level (provincial) officials, 
unbeknownst (and not a concern) to ministry-level elites, sell names of employees and 
stock their offices with friends and family. Although name buying is presented as a 
common act, the "impersonators" are often too afraid/embarrassed to talk about it openly. 
Late in my research activities, a key informant revealed a wealth of information 
about more shady dealings underpinning the Ministry of Tourism's museum project in 
Anlong Veng. He confirmed that the name of Rong Samlaut had been purchased for 
US$500 and that the liaison for the exchange at the Department of Tourism was a well-
established working group member. When asked why people would pay such a large 
quantity of money for a job, my informant replied, "because they think the authority from 
the job will give them money." And so, the imposter who works under the rubric "Rong 
Samlaut" received two new assistants in 2004, both of whom bought the names of others 
for US$300 apiece, some of which went to "Rong Samlaut." 
The Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism exhibits the expected corruption 
and nepotism of many other Cambodian government institutions. A key individual in the 
provincial office received his high posting because of his familial ties to a Tourism 
Ministry elite. Another tourism official had a reputation for antiquities acquisitions. 
These transactions were facilitated by a former Khmer Rouge who knows about ancient 
artifacts in Anlong Veng and Trabaing Prassat Districts and was subsequently granted a 
position in the department's working group. It seems that each member of the 
Department of Tourism's Working Group has engaged in non-transparent, nepotistic, or 
even criminal behavior to secure the job they have. The idea that the members have 
bought their way into the department—with money or through blood relations, or worse, 
helped arrange the illicit sale and smuggling of Khmer artifacts to Thailand—suggests a 
radical lack of commitment to completing the project. The primary goals of the 
participants seem to be garnering money and securing objects or positions that would 
bring more money. A self-interested assemblage, endowed with the responsibility of 
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building a museum, does not emit a professional image, and it is perhaps as absurd as 
Hun Sen's Anlong Veng museum dictate in the first place. Although overwhelmingly 
concerned with various (corrupt) paths to wealth, the working group's chief offers the 
possibility that an historical-tourist area might materialize. Khemarak demonstrates a 
genuine interest/passion in the project, and it seems his will is the primary force driving 
the museum endeavor. The various less-than-honest practices intersecting, and at times 
dominating, the museum project places the work in a more common/familiar Cambodian 
politico-administrative space.145 
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While tourism endeavors appeared snail-paced, the socio-economic 
transformations afflicting the newly-peaceful former stronghold proceeded at break-neck 
speed. In the 2002-2003 timeframe, the areas of Anlong Veng District and to its south 
underwent considerable construction. Previously, long stretches along the road from 
Siem Reap exhibited no population, with only the occasional small village or military 
outpost. A number of these expanses came to be filled with entirely new villages or 
witnessed the growth of what were earlier villages of only a few houses. (The jungle 
stretch of road, 30 km south of Anlong Veng, remained the most uninhabited area.) Not 
only had there been a growth in number and size of villages, some of the areas of 
residence along the road in Oddar Meanchey Province exhibited numerous motos as well 
as some cars and trucks. It appeared that some wealth had settled in the former frontier 
area that separated Anlong Veng from the market town of Phum Srey Noy. 
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Logging in the Anlong Veng area was also underway. My observations suggest 
that before the dismissal of Global Witness as Cambodia's forestry monitor, much of the 
local timber was put to local use, building houses or making furniture. Later, it became 
readily apparent that some lumber was reaching Siem Reap while other wood was being 
illegally exported to Thailand; the effect of the logging conveyed a not-so-inconspicuous 
secret.146 It is difficult to adequately hide logging activities (even at night), especially if 
the routes used are the same as those marketed as paths to tourist sites (or are the main 
routes of daily economic activity). It is clear that an (unlikely) growth in tourism might 
spark tension between this development strategy and the profit-seeking from logging. 
Before that possibility emerges, the muddy roads remain torn up by vehicles that would 
not enjoy public (or international, Consultative Group) scrutiny. 
In addition to the roadside "development" on the way to Anlong Veng, the district 
itself was subject to many construction efforts. Along the roads through Lumtong 
Commune, to Thlat Commune, and through Trabaing Prey Commune, many large, 
wooden houses—mansions by rural Khmer standards—cropped up. A growing number 
of residents in this otherwise poor countryside had secured the necessary resources to 
construct large homes for themselves. Wood, harvested from the surrounding forest, 
remained cheap relative to other parts of the country. Exported timber from Oddar 
Meanchey Province can undergo a 400-percent mark-up before its arrival in Siem 
Reap.147 The inflation on timber resulted not only from greed and scarcity, but from the 
long series of bribes that had to be paid to transport the (unprocessed) wood from Anlong 
Veng to other areas. The end result was that lumber traders could erect large wooden 
mansions in Anlong Veng that would cost enormous sums in other provinces. 
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The town of Anlong Veng itself was always undergoing a shifting facelift: new 
shops and residences were constructed along the main road through town, some 
completely new businesses, others reconstructions of older structures. The new 
construction sometimes re-shaped the town's main commercial artery, as houses and 
businesses were re-erected closer and farther away from the trafficked thoroughfare. 
Landmarks (in the form of structures) constantly shifted over time, as locations were built 
and rebuilt; descriptions of locations started to include references to no-longer-existent 
buildings. Logically, the skyline of Anlong Veng town also changed. There were no 
houses over two stories, and previously the only objects piercing the local sky were 
ICOM radio towers (notably, one at Ta Mok's lakeside villa and one at the UNICEF 
compound near the center of town). Two phone towers were erected in early 2003; 
however, service was long delayed due to, from what people told me, a "debate over 
costs" (fees to the district administrators).148 Anlong Veng was blessed with phone 
service in October 2003, with both major providers—Mobitel (012) and Shinawatra 
(become CamShin) (011)—establishing networks.149 This improvement encouraged 
business and facilitated the traffic of people and goods in/to Anlong Veng. As phone 
service came on line, a second power plant (near the old market) began operations. 
Beyond individually-run generators, the earlier singular power supplier (near the new 
market) had enjoyed a monopoly on the utility.150 The ignition of competition had the 
immediate effects of 1) extending power supply to almost 24 hours per day (5 A.M. to 2 
A.M.), and 2) reducing the cost from 5,000r/kW to l,000r/kW. (At the same time, a water 
processing facility opened in Anlong Veng, which similarly lowered the cost of safe 
drinking water.151) Due to the reduction in cost and/or ubiquitous supply, electricity 
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usage dramatically increased—more lights at night, more and louder karaoke, more 
televisions—with an apparent disregard for cost or conservation.152 
Entertainment technologies became increasingly more modern as well as more 
used and abundant. Television offerings from Phnom Penh (TVK and TV5) lacking clear 
reception had been supplemented by two Thai stations. With improving electronics, 
television viewing took a distant backseat to VCDs, which principally offered karaoke 
and Chinese action films. For a small town, Anlong Veng became well-supplied with 
VCD equipment, harboring a number of food stalls, drinking establishments, brothels, 
and karaoke venues which broadcast the digital sound and images.153 A well-frequented 
restaurant near the roundabout exceeded VCD reliance, for a time boasting the only 
satellite TV in Anlong Veng (an acquisition reliant upon pirating from Thai cable). In 
terms of cultural fare, this popular breakfast venue substituted its old movie viewing with 
the various sports offerings on cable; morning meals came to be served with sights of 
professional wrestling, women's volleyball, and occasionally auto racing. 
The district's infrastructural accomplishments were largely completed in 
anticipation of the opening of the Thai-Cambodian border crossing at Sakngam/Choam 
Pass which was celebrated on 24 November 2003. A large ceremony of speeches, 
dancing, award-granting, and commerce was held in the space between the two 
checkpoints and attended by all the Cambodian district-level officials, tourism staff, and 
their Thai counterparts. The formerly forested frontier was transformed into a wide open 
performance space that would transition into formal visa inspection and issuance office. 
The finishing touches—including de-mining by CMAC (mostly removing caltrops) and a 
bit of road work—was accomplished in the hours before the grand celebration. The 
opening witnessed a large number of Thai visitors to Anlong Veng town and a good sum 
of Khmers to the shopping area just beyond the Thai checkpoint.154 The movement was 
heavily weighted southward, with a massive increase in busy-ness and traffic for the 
Cambodian side.155 Lining Cambodia's national limit were vehicles waiting for cargo to 
be transported into the country. At Choam Pass, a vast crossroads filled with stalls 
vending a variety of goods (tobacco, alcohol, VCDs, wood products/furniture, and 
produce). The Khmer market abuts the west edge of the Pol Pot sentencing site and 
stretches as far as the road that leads to the deposed's last resting place.156 The free trade 
frenzy is crowded with vendors, many of whom moved from O Smach in order to hawk 
their Cambodian wares to visitors that venture across this border.157 From this nascent 
cross-border commerce, one can discern Anlong Veng's transformation from a rural town 
to a mid-sized commercial hub, and in quite rapid fashion, brought on by an influx of 
"day-traders," consumers, and eco-tourist/historical-tourist visitors from Thailand. 
Anlong Veng also came to be plagued by some of the urban social ills that have become 
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the hallmark of many of Cambodia's border towns. Methamphetamines (yama) and 
groups of juvenile delinquents described as "gangs" began emerging in the district just a 
short time after the border opened. A level of lawlessness was perceptible in the words 
of local residents and sometimes with a degree of deep frustration.159 
With the border opening negotiations came agreements about Thailand's 
assistance in making a new, paved road that would connect the international crossing to 
the town below (12 km away) and on to Siem Reap (another 85 km). That the entire 
stretch to Siem Reap would be graded and surfaced by the Thais was always highly 
questionable. However, de-mining and widening of the road by the RCAF began soon 
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after the border opened (January 2004) in the area north of the forest leading past Sralao 
Sraong to Lumtong and in most of the areas in Trabaing Prey Commune. Initial evidence 
of Thai involvement was the presence of a Thai construction team, residing at the district 
chiefs house, lying in wait with five bright yellow-colored construction vehicles. While 
this equipment decorated the yard, Cambodians shared legendary tales of how well and 
how fast the Thais could build roads; they optimistically expected the stretch of Route 67 
from the border to Prey S'aat to be finished before the first rainy season. According to 
my informants who inhabit roadside residences, controversy among local elites stalled 
road construction. The Thais brought materials to the base of the mountain, but locals 
reported that some "big men" were interested in changing the course of the road. These 
power barons, whose land holdings in Cherng Phnom and Srah Chhouk lie a distance 
from the existing main road, sought to have the road diverted (or a new road constructed) 
so as to pass next to their property.160 Yielding to the elites seemed incredibly illogical 
given that de-mining along the existing road had already transpired. By 2005, the Thai 
workers had deserted the chiefs residence, leaving the strings of patronage to determine 
the pot-holed passageway's mounting macadamization. 
A year after the border opening (2004), the town and its surrounding area had 
undergone more tremendous structural change: more shops and restaurants cropped up; 
commerce and business-related activities increased; and land prices skyrocketed. Some 
of the new wealth (for the construction) was certainly tied to logging, lumber, and 
furniture enterprises. Travelers en route from Siem Reap encountered numerous small 
trucks and pick-ups carrying felled logs, cut lumber, and furniture (many tables, chairs, 
and bed frames); the traces of massive logging trucks were obvious in the destruction 
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wrought on the road and especially the bridges.161 A dramatic increase in vehicles in 
Anlong Veng points to a different socio-economic development. By 2005, the abundance 
of autos gave the impression that almost everyone had a car or a truck, providing the odd 
occasion to see sedans and other models parked at small thatch and wooden houses along 
the district roads.162 The number of SUVs—a status symbol of Cambodian elites— 
dramatically increased as well. The traffic and ownership patterns seemed to mimic 
Phnom Penh, suggesting a similar growing divide between rich and poor. 
As one approached Anlong Veng from afar in late 2004, the clearest signs of 
development appeared in the skyline, as four towers prick the town's airspace. Closer 
inspection revealed an incredible proliferation and augmentation of individual homes. 
However, the largest construction effort undertaken in that year was a new market to the 
east of the main road and south of the district office, called the "Anlong Veng New 
Market."164 The owner of the land for the new retail space is the wife of a former DK 
ambassador; she worked in cooperation with a Siem Reap-based company, which 
provided investment and construction. The new market towers above a cement 
foundation (measuring 54 m by 63 m), topped with a broad, red roof that starts 4.5 m off 
the ground. Four hundred stalls make up this new market, each offered on 90-year leases 
to vendors. My recurring visitor's standpoint would suggest that in general, Anlong 
Veng's population was surging: a lot more people in town doing a lot more business. 
Informants indicated that while there had been an increase in "new people" 
coming to Anlong Veng to start businesses, many poor local people were selling their 
land and returning to their home provinces.165 This demographic shift suggests a 
tendency toward gentrification taking hold in the town: middle- and upper-class people 
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coming to constitute a local economic dominance focused around cross-border commerce 
and local industry (logging and woodwork). Many large houses sprung up along the road 
to the mountain as well as along the road to Samraong. Some of this construction was 
new residences on old plots of land, but there was also a significant degree of additional 
structures being added to existing residences.166 The new construction occurs on land 
owned by those in positions of authority (commune and district level) and military 
commanders, those well-connected to powerful elites (through historical relations), and a 
couple wealthy "new people." The combination of large estates of the few with the 
meager thatch huts of the (more remote) many further suggests an increasing (or 
increasingly apparent) discrepancy between rich and poor. The exodus of some residents 
from Anlong Veng may suggest a reintegration, either in other former Khmer Rouge 
zones (e.g., Pailin) or in their homelands;—the beginning of a reconciliation for the 
Anlong Veng former Khmer Rouge as they more freely (re-)merge with the population as 
a whole throughout the country. However, in some ways, the economic processes which 
position Anlong Veng as tourist center and cross-border commerce hub have also 
generated disparities which are encouraging poor residents to emigrate; the irony is that 
these fleeing former Khmer Rouge are/were a primary draw for tourism (perhaps more so 
than the physical non-sites that make up the "museum"). 
GUIDED NARRATIVES 
Remnants of the Democratic Kampuchea in the north under Ta Mok's leadership 
sought to found and maintain control of military sectors which followed the Dangrek 
Mountains, lining the border of Thailand and Kampuchea. This ushered in waves of 
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movement: mobility, migrations, adaptations, and changing names/places, etc.; the dates 
of demarcation (stable markers) for a "history" are left unclear and shifting.167 From 
1979 to 1989 (another "/?re-history"), DK hangers-on found refuge in Thailand in border 
camps that were set up by the United Nations and other aid agencies. This "archipelago 
of camps" (Vickery) was thoroughly enmeshed in the political maneuverings and 
objectives of foreign nations, but the upshot was the resurrection of Pol Pot's Khmer 
Rouge into a sustainable fighting force continuing to pester the Vietnamese-backed 
government in Phnom Penh. During this period, the whole of Anlong Veng was 
occupied by the government and Vietnamese soldiers and the Khmer Rouge sought 
refuge on or across the Thai border in the Dangrek Mountains. Various informants have 
described the region as simply covered with dense forest or barely visible Vietnamese 
military camps scattered amongst the trees. Thus, while Anlong Veng waited to be made 
historical, Ta Mok and other leaders gathered their strength in Thailand, ranging in places 
from Trat to Sakeo to Otra and Phu Noy. 
The 1989 Vietnamese withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea allowed the Khmer 
Rouge its "first" liberation of Anlong Veng, which marks the beginning of the area's 
history proper. With the end of a decade of Vietnamese presence, Anlong Veng 1989 to 
1998 became the time of "the last breath of the Khmer Rouge."168 An oscillating dry 
season offensive/wet season re-entrenchment cycle was set in motion. With the newly 
independent government army ill-prepared to fight a persevering guerrilla force, Ta 
Mok's troops secured a (re-)"liberation" of Anlong Veng. Capturing the town and 
mountain region did not automatically produce a scene of stability. As a former teacher 
related, "In 1994, after the UNTAC period, war re-erupted; there was fighting every year, 
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but a lot of damage occurred in 1994. That year, during the dry season, the government 
soldiers captured Anlong Veng for two months; perhaps in April, the Khmer Rouge 
fought back and won. In fact, it took the government army two months to secure control 
of all the communes in Anlong Veng; after arriving in Anlong Veng town, they only 
stayed for about one week before the Khmer Rouge pushed them back." The seemingly 
secure(d) liberation continued to participate in the chaotic flow out of which it had 
emerged. Constant conflict characterized Anlong Veng, subjecting populations and sites 
to movement and reconstruction.169 
Within this historical timeframe, there are two moments which exhibit massive 
construction efforts, and these follow on the liberations of the Anlong Veng. The initial 
arrangement of villages occurred in 1990 with some residential efforts begun in the 
following year. The fighting of 1994 spurred a retreat, return, and rebuilding; this took 
on greater importance as key cadre emigrated to the area from other regions under Khmer 
Rouge control, notably Pailin and Koh Kong. With the initial secondary liberation, the 
site of Anlong Veng becomes transformed: it changes into Khmer Rouge "possession" 
(but an elusive grasp); and this possession effects (continues) ongoing change. It is 
during this period that physical markers of a Khmer Rouge presence—absence, a trace, 
...—are founded, with most of the locales in Anlong Veng proper (what becomes the 
"historical-tourist area") coming into being in the early- to mid-1990s. Sites that are both 
captured by and escape the Ministry of Tourism form a story of movement. The central 
idea, broadcast by informants, is that what remains in Anlong Veng is the legacy of an 
infrastructure for making war.170 The sites are thus conceived as what was physically 
necessary to establish a stronghold, to fight the Vietnamese-backed PRK government, 
and to build and defend (kdsaang kaarpear fifinamimi) the country of Kampuchea. 
Subject to the pressures of social life and war, these infrastructural remains were in their 
own state of movement.172 
Battlesites around Anlong Veng 
Source: Phnom Penh Post, April 10-23,1998, p. 8. 
The areas of concern include the mountaintop regions of Pass 808, Mountain 200, 
Bruise Pass, Sago Palms, and the Wild Ox Head, although more bases stretching along 
the escarpment all the way to Preah Vihear (Sectors 1001 and 1002) could also be 
examined.173 The national location of some of the sites are not clearly known; that is, in 
fighting to protect Kampuchea from Vietnam and Thailand, some of the bases where 
perhaps in Thailand at that time or have now fallen into disputed areas that will likely be 
considered Thailand in the future.174 (Somewhat regrettably, this work will not address 
the remnants of the Otra and Phu Noy camps which have very clearly been on the Thai 
side of the border, in Sisaket province.) In recognizing the lasting sites as the potential 
for future historical-tourist significance, it is interesting to note that continued movement 
(advances and retreats) may have established foundations for tourism in other territories 
had the war continued beyond 1999. 
The Khmer Rouge leadership had divided the border regions of Cambodia 
amongst certain key cadre: Pol Pot in Koh Kong/Trat, Ieng Sary at Phnom Malai, etc. Ta 
Mok's consolidation of troops in 1989 initiated a particular migration. Not only were 
forces moved across the nebulous border, but his former associates from the Southwest 
Zone were summoned toward the northern citadel.175 The arrival stories of informants 
provide partial views of the development of Anlong Veng's mobile infrastructure for 
warfare.176 A violent political schism erupted in 1997, followed by Pol Pot's death in 
1998, exacerbating a process of decomposition that may have already been underway 
(even before the Khmer Rouge assumed power in 1975). (The collapse of the Khmer 
Rouge organization due to mass defections is documented in some "departure narratives" 
provided by regiment commander informants.) Fighting between the Khmer Rouge and 
the Cambodian government soldiers caused further splits as some units seized the 
moment to defect, and others joined Ta Mok in his retreat to Phu Noy in Thailand. 
(Informants sometimes describe this factionalization in geographical terms, noting that 
whole communes either retreated or defected.) Suffering further divisions, Ta Mok 
escaped with few supporters and found temporary refuge among border (de-)marcations. 
He was finally apprehended in 1999. The "reintegration" deals and procedures form the 
background for the commencement of a museum. With the area militarily secured and 
villagers becoming part of the dominant Cambodian society (again), the Ministry of 
Tourism initiated the plan to re-build Anlong Veng into a museum. Although nearly all 
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of these sites are in ruins (some only having a concrete foundation), the ministry's project 
was to design a master plan that would include detailed research about the locales, re-
construction of the buildings, and training of local tour guides. By following strict 
procedures for accuracy and validity, the ministry endeavors to transform a disparate and 
decaying mass of sites into an in situ "museum" (an historical-tourist area) for both local 
and foreign consumption. 
The "historical-tourist" designation is both simultaneously a grounding 
(spacialization, the production of physicality) and based on groundings (physical 
foundations). In this respect, the agents of memorialization are attempting to produce 
certainty and accuracy out of mobility and instability.177 This securing of stability takes 
place in physical, geographical form (sites) as well as "textual"—"// n 'y a pas hors..."— 
form (History as presented in guide books).178 The functionalist approach—perhaps a 
product of pragmatist tourist efforts rather than historical reflection—betrays a lack of 
creativity, perhaps part of larger social trends: rationalization (a predominance of MBA 
and management instruction in Phnom Penh) and imitation (foreign organizations' 
nostalgia and re-invention of culture—NGOs doing salvage ethno-practice), or maybe the 
product of the pressures of a cash nexus (a political economy of the contemporary 
Cambodian situation and the complications of corruption).179 
From 1982, the education facilities in TaMok's region of control—an escarpment 
above the district town ofAnlong Veng—consisted mainly of very small schoolhouses 
dotting the liberated zone, along the Thai border. After seizing the town below in 1989, 
greater improvements were sought. In 1993, a school was erected not far from the 
present-day district office. The school was built of concrete and stood three stories high; 
the period of construction lasted from 1993 to 1995. This became the facility at which 
students from grades 1 to 7 could receive instruction from the district's 14 teachers. 
The students' lessons were arranged by a teacher's committee that sought to 
approve and select lesson plans from the Sihanouk years in combination with the new 
ideas of the Khmer Rouge elite and to synthesize these into study books for grades 1 to 7. 
At this time, there was war and study was realigned toward teachers assisting the 
transport of military materials andpunji stakes to the central battlefields... 
Because of the movements of battle, teachers sometimes could carry out 
instruction only a couple times per month. At this time, teachers did not receive a salary, 
but received some support in the form of useful materials and provisions. As well, 
teachers grew and developed with the added assistance from the teaching techniques of 
Thai instructors in Anlong Veng. From this undertaking in 1995, the school continues to 
be used to this day. 
Informants elaborated on the degree of educational institutionalization before, 
during, and after the Democratic Kampuchea period (1975-1979). Specific to Anlong 
Veng, it seems that the defeated DK forces established schooling facilities, first 
throughout the villages and then concentrated in the main schoolhouse built under the 
direction of Ta Mok. Some outside observers' reports on the DK period have 
emphasized the organization's desire for a total elimination of education (and every other 
social institution). Although grand social upheaval transpired, hindsight seems to be 
demonstrating that these sensationalist accounts are overstated; my informants have 
provided recollections of various schooling endeavors at various times by the Khmer 
Rouge.181 
Before 1975, in liberated zones under the control of the National United Front of 
Kampuchea (FUNK) forces, village schooling was initiated or continued. Informants 
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stressed the teaching of the Khmer language as a focus. The Khmer Rouge teachers may 
have also taken on the role of youth leaders through the revolutionary youth 
organizations, as one informant indicated. Further, any skill in pedagogy could be used 
to instruct in a number of ways: formal Schooling, youth groups, "soldiers' discipline" 
training, political education, etc. 
As early as 1982, the ousted Khmer Rouge forces outside Anlong Veng made 
efforts to begin schooling their young. A school was put together along the Thai border 
in the Dangrek Mountains, but because of the vagaries of war, the school was subject to 
some mobility. After the Khmer Rouge's "first" liberation of Anlong Veng, each village 
had a small school, but in 1991/1992, the Khmer Rouge built a big two-story school out 
of wood, which was used until 1994. The structure was built in the same place the RCAF 
Region 4 military headquarters now stands, and it was approximately the same size. The 
school had two rooms on each floor, and each room could hold 40 students. Some levels 
(grades 1 and 2) were asked to continue studying at the village schools; the Khmer Rouge 
found it necessary to gather students of grades 3 and 4 to study at the new school. Grade 
levels counted upward from 1, with no grades higher than 5; grade 5 students studied 
with the grade 4 students. The school burned down in the fighting of 1994. The area of 
the former school is not designated a site by the Ministry of Tourism, and currently the 
area is used by the Cambodian military. 
The Ta Mok school is located 600 m east of Anlong Veng's central roundabout, 
along the road to Trabaing Prassat District. The aging white three-story concrete 
structure stands on the east end of the large school yard, dwarfing the newly-constructed 
one-story building painted in now-classic colonial moutardejaune. Oddly, the royal blue 
indicator sign at the entry gate to the compound, marking the ministry-designated 
historical-tourist site, reads (the same in Khmer and English): "Anlong Veng Primary 
School." It is commonly acknowledged that the Ta Mok school is presently used for 
secondary education, while the new Hun Sen Primary School covers elementary 
instruction. Almost ironically, the sign appears to suggest that the newly-constructed 
education facility became immediately historically important. Regardless of the words 
conveyed by the sign, most informants simply refer to the historical site as the "Ta Mok 
School." 
Construction of the stone school began in May/June of 1993 and was completed 
at the end of 1995. When teachers finished instructing students for the day, they went to 
help the Thai engineers build the school. The school was not yet completed when 
fighting forced everyone to retreat again in 1994; when the Khmer Rouge returned, they 
rebuilt the school. In 1995, students from all the villagers were collected to study at one 
school. The school was used for a year, before the Khmer Rouge became afraid that 
government helicopters might attack the very visible school and kill all the students. 
Thus, the school was not used from 1995 until 1998. Anlong Veng district had an 
education committee composed of five members. Its first meeting was in 1990, and its 
duties included: to prepare study plans; to schedule the timetable; to prepare study 
techniques; and to instruct the teachers in pedagogy. 
The narrative of a former superintendent indicates a serious concern for education 
(specifically in the post-1981 time frame, but also in the 1970-1973 period). Although 
he suggests that education focused around rudimentary learning (reading, writing, and 
arithmetic), the management of 124 teachers over two administrative districts (Anlong 
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Veng and Trabaing Prassat) seems to constitute a large task for a war-sieged regime. 
Further, the onset of construction of a large, three-story stone school in 1993 
demonstrates significant resource allocation to this social need. The school 
superintendent of Anlong Veng and Trabaing Prassat was assigned to play principal to 
the 14 teachers who provided instruction at the new stone school. Advanced instructors 
were assigned to the stone school, while the remaining bulk of teachers (approximately 
110 instructors) continued to teach at their village schools. Two different kinds of 
textbooks were consulted for use in the Anlong Veng schools (while under Ta Mok's 
control): 1) books that were part of the Democratic Kampuchea program which 
originated from Ieng Sary's office for education, and 2) books that came from UNBRO. 
The teachers were given the option of which to use, and most seemed to pilfer from both 
sources. It is significant that teachers developed their own textbooks, using materials 
from the government and Thailand. The very subject that was an exception to this self-
generated instruction was history, which came directly from the top leaders.183 
When the large stone school stopped being used after one year, the five 
individuals on the education committee ceased gathering the teachers at the district; the 
committee divided itself so that members could go train teachers in the villages. In 
addition to village education in the post-1979 period, it is also clear that at least some 
Khmer Rouge teachers instructed at or near the Phu Noy refugee camp in Thailand. (This 
camp played sanctuary to the Khmer Rouge on an as-needed basis.) The physical 
manifestations of education in Anlong Veng are expressed in this series of schoolhouses: 
small schools in the villages, the large wooden school (at Region 4 headquarters), then a 
stone school (slightly east), and back to the villages. There is a certain mobility exhibited 
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through the district's education efforts (augmented by the education committee's own 
training movements), which parallels the movement of Anlong Veng "residents" in other 
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ways. 
The Anlong Veng Health Center received patients in the area for all kinds of care. 
Before, this health center was one small wood building that sat on the lakeshore. In 
1992, additional construction was performed: a two-story concrete structure, which was 
Ta Mok's idea. It had 20 doctors that were divided into two groups, surgeons and 
general care. The doctors had some study from before 1975 and received some 
instruction from Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn and some Chinese doctors. The majority of 
admitted patients were victims of malaria. Other sick or wounded could be treated by the 
doctors, without having to send any patients (except for Khmer Rouge elite) to Thailand, 
except for a few upper echelons who sought treatment abroad. The average population 
of admitted patients was 120 to 150 people. Some of the medicines and other medical 
supplies came from aid and some were purchased. Since 1998, the hospital still treats 
patients suffering a variety of ailments. 
Because everything associated with Ta Mok and Pol Pot is considered for 
historical-tourist value, Anlong Veng as a functioning town in Cambodia's rural north 
offers a number of "sites" that also involve everyday practices. The "Ta Mok Hospital," 
which was built in the early 1990s and went unused from 1995 until 1998 because of 
fears of helicopter attacks, remains the primary health outlet for villagers. The wooden 
health clinic is used for admitting patients as well as doing lab work (most commonly, 
malaria tests), and the large stone hospital houses those whose health needs require 
longer treatment. Medecins sans Frontieres also contributed an office to the area 
associated with the hospital. The "Anlong Veng Primary School" is now used for 
secondary students, Hun Sen's Primary School having taken over from Ta Mok. 
Although a new structure is being constructed to replace the old district office, this 
former meeting place is still used to conduct trainings and to hold special NGO events. 
The dam/bridge forms a section of road that is daily traversed by villagers and creates the 
lake which provides for many local people's livelihoods. The potential re-creation of "Ta 
Mok's Sawmill" (even in the midst of a moratorium on logging) might constitute another 
functioning site for district production. To the extent that these sites are used, they 
appear quotidian or even commonplace. However, the drive to make the district into a 
museum area seems to imbue the locations with a significance beyond the everyday.185 
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Before the lakeside villa, there was a small hillock upon which a small house and 
mango tree was planted (before the bridge was built). Ta Mok began building a larger 
house in 1994, but the house was burned down by advancing government forces as they 
approached the residence. The following year, he began construction anew of a stone 
house; the sand, concrete, and bricks were all supplied from Thailand, technicians were 
Khmer and Thai, and the plans were Ta Mok's ideas. The construction workers who 
built this house were Moeung, Daul, Loun, Phon; after it was built, an artist named Eng 
(now in Cherng Phnom) drew the pictures of temples and the map. In the house were a 
wooden bed, a guest room, and a room below for materials and firearms (as well as a 
hiding place for safety when there was fighting). Ta Mok wanted to build on the lake 
shore, because he enjoyed the natural landscape it offered, and he appreciated special 
Khmer food dishes like turtle and very fine spirits. The building was constructed using 
eight wooden pillars, which formed a place for receiving Thai diplomats and leaders that 
came for meetings. The idea of using massive pillars in erecting the house belonged to 
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Ta Mok, who wanted to preserve the structure for posterity for future Khmer generations. 
Ta Mok lost his leg when he stood and watched a tractor pulling dirt and leveling the 
ground; the tractor touched a mine which exploded, causing Ta Mok to lose his leg at 
Point 1003 Village 50, after which he was taken to Thailand to recover (although some 
witnesses say that Ta Mok lost his leg by stepping on a mine himselfwhen he went to 
oversee his own arms cache). 
The villa consists of four structures that were constructed and re-constructed at 
different periods, beginning in 1990.186 Over the course of time, these buildings housed a 
relatively stable group of people, including Ta Mok, various family members and adopted 
sons, bodyguards, drivers, and cooks. The site is located perhaps 500 m from the main 
town road, with a fairly rocky path leading to the property.187 The dam blocking the O 
Chik was constructed through the early 1990s, creating what is now the lake, upon whose 
shore the villa now rests. 
The O Chik Bridge lies 500 mfrom the roundabout in the center ofAnlong Veng. 
It was built under Ta Mok's control in 1991. Pot Pol disagreed with Ta Mok about 
building this bridge. But Ta Mok did not listen to Pol Pot. The construction took place 
over a two-year period during which machinery and technicians were brought in from 
Thailand. Before the bridge construction, the O Chik stream was a small rivulet of 20-
30 m width. Up until the time that Ta Mok arranged the construction of the bridge, the 
transport of all sorts of materials and armaments had been quite difficult. The 
construction of the bridge was divided in to three stages: 
1) 1990-1991: making of a weir and traversing the stream at the bottom 
of the weir 
2) 1992: construction of a bridge that was lower than the weir, which was 
subsequently destroyed in 1994. 
3) construction anew beginning in 1994. 
The primary site at the villa, overlooking the O Chik Lake—the one which seems 
to capture the attention of informants—is the large meeting hall on the estate, whose 
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second/present incarnation was completed in 1996. The interior walls of this hall are 
painted with murals that depict various historical sites (Angkor Wat and Prassat Preah 
Vihear), a map of the country, and a waterfall scene. The first building that was 
constructed, a house, now forms something of a carport exhibiting one of Ta Mok's "tiger 
cage" prisons. The remaining two structures were residences for Ta Mok and his support 
staff. 
Nowadays, the caretaker of the estate is a man in his 50s named Roeung who first 
arrived in the Dangrek Range in 1987. During his initial years in the Anlong Veng area, 
he looked after Ta Mok's house on the escarpment, an experience that led working group 
member Nut Krem to appoint him the custodian to the villa. Roeung's historical 
movements are summed up in following orders: "From 1996 to 1998,1 stayed in the rear 
on the mountain and made mines. During that time, I worked in a number of fields: when 
they required me to work in handicrafts, I went; when they required me to clear mines, I 
went there; when they required me to make mines, I went." Roeung had a leg amputated 
in February 1982 after he stepped on a mine, but he says he has never stopped being a 
Khmer Rouge soldier. Roeung and his conflictive stories {roeung tfjia) form the 
welcoming presence that first greets visitors to the lakeside house. 
When the group from Pailin broke away, the Thais had a stranglehold on the 
leaders. Pol Pot had built a secret house in Trabaing Prey in 1990, a place about which 
only the very high leaders knew. 
Pol Pot's Secret House is so secret, it is easy to miss.189 Built at the end of 1996, 
the construction of the site seems contemporaneous with other construction efforts. Ta 
Mok had wanted all the top leaders—Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn, Chan Youran, Mak Ben, 
Tep Khunnal, Kao Bunheng, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, and Pol Pot—to move closer 
to his house on the lake. He had intended to build houses for them along the main road. 
As one informant indicated, "After the Khmer Rouge became aware that Hun Sen had 
outlawed the Khmer Rouge, they became scared. Because they were afraid the 
government would come fight, the Khmer Rouge prepared a lot and began moving 
around." The fear of RCAF/Thai cooperation in 1996 in an assault from the west seems 
the motivation for construction of these safe houses.190 
One notion of accuracy—the correctness of location—arose in the search for Pol 
Pot's Secret House and Khieu Samphan's House, both located in the flatlands below the 
mountain. With Sophorn's momentum, stories had circulated that these two sites' 
labeling had been switched. After many extended stays in Anlong Veng, I began to 
doubt some aspects of the memory of Ta Mok's adopted son-become-tourism official, 
mainly on the basis of his age (an impediment to clear, first-hand knowledge). The time 
period that seems most crucial for the construction of what are now deemed historical-
tourist sites is 1989 though 1994; Sophorn would have been between 8 and 13 years old 
during that period. It is quite possible, and even likely, that he is too young to have clear 
memories of sites, especially if he did not have a regular presence at them. The certainty 
he asserted with regards to destinations may derive from the work (interviews) he 
conducted with the Department of Tourism. Some of the information he presents to 
tourists (at a fee) is certainly second-hand, a product of work with government offices, 
because he would have been too young to know certain information or to have been 
present at particular historically significant events. Regardless, he was insistent about 
the "Khieu Samphan's House" site, which he claimed was mislabeled "Pol Pot's Secret 
House," and his insistence may be the sole or primary reason that the Ministry of 
Tourism was (entertaining the possibility of) acknowledging that the sites were 
mislabeled and the signs were misplaced/switched.192 This issue of proper demarcation, 
specifically in relation to these two sites, broaches the issue of whether his (intimate) 
knowledge of Anlong Veng areas flows from the Ministry of Tourism's efforts and/or 
whether the ministry's decisions are largely informed by his claims to know. With its 
overriding concern for "accuracy" and cross-checking, it is difficult to imagine the 
ministry endowing any one person with an overwhelming authority with regards to sites. 
The capture/seizure of "authority" seems to be one of the primary goals of this historical 
memorialization, aggregating the mini-prerogatives of informants into an edifice of 
authority. 
My venture to the (newly discovered) "Pol Pot's Secret House" site was guided 
by the resident owner of Ta Mok's Middle House (lower) whose certainty about the 
location was admittedly established by village rumor.193 It is difficult to gauge whether 
the rumor emanated from the presence of the Ministry of Tourism sign which states "Pol 
Pot's Secret House" or whether the sign reflected the village expertise, even though my 
guide was skeptical about anyone in the hamlet knowing with first-hand certainty. 
Subsequently, other informants (from other villages) added corroborating information to 
give my guide's "rumor" the status of "fact." 
The guide who led me to the "Khieu Samphan's House" site seemed very matter-
of-fact in stating the identity of the location, perhaps unaware that there would have been 
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any question as to the certainty of the site. He offered second-hand corroboration of his 
claim (a bodyguard he knew), which was further supported by the son of one of the 
higher-ups that used to occupy the area. Furthermore, some informants have not been 
shy in expressing their own unease about the lack of accuracy afflicting some of the 
Ministry of Tourism efforts. One informant expressed some subtle, and some overt, 
criticism of the ministry, suggesting that its officers are ill-informed or at least 
proceeding without clear information. Another informant, who spent many years with Pol 
Pot, commented on the mis-positioning of the Khieu Samphan sign, saying, "When the 
Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism puts signs in the wrong places, people who 
know well about the places will laugh at them. I am afraid people will laugh, and I want 
to put the signs in the right places. The signs on the mountain are in the wrong places as 
well."194 From these comments and others, it has become clear that in the minds of some 
villagers, the Tourism Ministry and the provincial department are often viewed as outside 
forces, not emerging from the local expertise/experience of the district. 
Built in 1990, the remnants of Ta Mok's Middle House (lower) or Middle 
Warehouse—as the name of its surrounding village, Khlaing Kandal, indicates—has not 
achieved official designation (a blue sign) within the Tourism Ministry's historical-tourist 
area; more recently, it has been considered for inclusion, under the name "Ta Mok's 
Transport Depot" (kdnlaeng kaarthaan doekchornchounh mgJjmjtfisSriijnja).195 Informants 
indicated that originally Ta Mok lived at the middle house for two years, along with some 
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family members.196 After Ta Mok ceased residing there, the middle house was converted 
into a warehouse which stored many vehicles, including five Land Cruisers (three for Ta 
Mok, one for Pol Pot, and one for Khieu Samphan). Further inquiry discovered that even 
after its existence as a transport depot, the area was a performance space for irregularly-
scheduled theatrical performances that were subsequently re-played over the radio. In the 
aftermath of the Son Sen killing, the site was used as a resettlement camp to hold some 
100 pro-Pol Pot families. 
The theatrical use of the site for songs, skits, and radio indicates a well-developed 
cultural/arts component in operation by the Khmer Rouge after its 1979 overthrow.197 
Efforts by the ousted DK officials continued the use of airwaves as a means for 
propaganda and securing support. Informants involved in this piece of the cultural 
project report working under the supervision of Kheum Ngon, among whose duties were 
the managing of a section of the Department of Culture and Fine Arts.198 The 
Department of Culture coordinated artistic endeavors, which included the painting of the 
murals on the interior walls of Ta Mok's lakeside villa. Two primary artists—the teacher 
(Mr. Eng, who organized activities in Ta Mok's Sector 1003) and his student—were 
endowed with the responsibility of depicting the grandeurs of Khmer history for Ta Mok 
(and their comrades). In addition to villa augmentation, these two painters were involved 
in the creation of signs/placards, which were used 1) to educate people about the situation 
in Anlong Veng, and 2) to encourage soldiers at the front. 
From discussions with informants, the most significant cultural forms of post-
1979 Democratic Kampuchea were: 1) songs broadcast on the radio, whose content were 
essentially intended to bolster support (moral and military) for the Khmer Rouge in their 
battle against the Vietnamese, and 2) live theater which took the form of primarily 
dialogue-driven skits and plays. The primary vehicle for the transmission of post-
Democratic Kampuchea arts was a band of four radio trucks, which broadcasted in pairs 
at different shifts. (One of these trucks remains at the Region 4 Military Headquarters in 
Anlong Veng, although thoroughly damaged/ scavenged.) A certain mobility emerged 
for these performers, within Koh Kong province (in the early 1980s), through Pailin 
(1985 to 1994), and on to Anlong Veng (in 1994). There seems to have been around 
three to five people (who worked closely with Pol Pot) who were primarily responsible 
for the composition and transmission of these politico-cultural elements; all final 
approval for these works came directly from Pol Pot. One informant in particular had 
daily ongoing association with Pol Pot, as he was responsible for writing news reports (in 
addition to his activities as a performer). Although Pol Pot would not speak live on the 
radio, other figures were more actively involved in the broadcasts; these included Khieu 
Samphan, Mak Ben, and Chan Youran. Aside from speeches from these officials, the 
three daily transmissions included primarily songs and news/propaganda. My cultural 
informants offered a sampling a some of these war-time tunes, albeit in a hushed voice 
for fear that others might hear.199 The songs generally conveyed morals including 
prohibitions against drinking, stealing, gambling, and mistreating the people and 
encouragement to soldiers to live properly. 
@* @> @> 
His house built in 1988, Khieu Samphan (who had been the State Presidium from 
1975 to 1979, but lived mostly in Kampong Cham) had the support ofTaMok, who 
brought him to live nearby because it facilitated relationships with the outside. Khieu 
Samphan has four children (two sons and two daughters), and this house was used to 
hide him and his family. When he went with Ta Mok up the mountain, he had soldiers 
protect and look after the site and cultivate plants. 
Although there was dissension about which is the correct path to Khieu 
Samphan's house, there has been a general consensus that the Ministry of Tourism's blue 
indicator sign is within the vicinity of the site.200 In addition to concern about the 
signpost location, informants have also indicated that the name of the site is slightly 
inadequate. Although Khieu Samphan did live there for short periods, numerous 
residences in the environs housed many ambassadorial elites as well, including: Chan 
Youran (Mali, China, Pakistan), "Pon," Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn, Mak Ben (Yugoslavia), 
In Sopheap (Egypt), Kao Bunheng, Tep Khunnal, "Phan", and "Khorn." The purpose of 
the residence was to offer a refuge from onslaughts that might occur on the mountaintop 
homes, with one informant calling the site a "mobile house." This justification would 
support the short time period and irregular frequency of Khieu Samphan's residency at 
the site, as a number of informants indicated. Given that the structures began to be built 
toward the end of 1996, this site may have been a response to increased military 
campaigns by the government, following Ieng Sary's defection in Pailin (with his tens of 
thousands of troops). 
The site seems to have consisted of four or six residential structures (as well as 
some secondary structures like kitchens and outhouses) roughly aligned east to west. 
What remains of the houses are pieces of wood scattered in slightly overgrown 
clearings. Given the lack of structures or even much residuum, the site seems to 
foreground (the presence of) an absence. There are only people's memories to constitute 
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this "site" as an historical-tourist site. Otherwise (to most tourists without a local guide), 
the location might simply represent random paths through the forest with an occasional 
clearing. The uncertainty engendered by the absence of structures may be the source of 
the Ministry of Tourism's confusion in labeling. It is hard to understand how this far-
away "site" will draw tourists; perhaps it will have some historical significance for 
local/Khmer tourists. 
Its past significance for nearby inhabitants has contributed to its deconstructed 
historical stature. Looting is a typical issue for anthropologists/archaeologists, and it has 
a couple expressions in the context of Khmer Rouge tourist sites. While there is the 
typical confiscation by those who seek a profit for items of historical significance (i.e., 
antiquities), there is also the destruction of property for its composite materials. Both of 
these forms of "looting" occur in Anlong Veng, and they provoke a relatively singular 
attitude from informants. At Ta Mok's lakeside villa, the buildings are mostly barren 
inside; it is clear that much of what could be looted has been, including windows, doors, 
and pieces of the ceiling—perhaps another way in which objects are subject to struggle. 
The villa caretaker expressed some simmering hostility that lumped together those who 
criticize the Khmer Rouge (as being killers of the people) and those who have stolen 
nearly all the objects from the buildings. One of Ta Mok's drivers also concurred that the 
looting of the villa had subverted the project of exhibiting the original (and, therefore, 
interesting) contents of the house. At Khieu Samphan's house, the theme of "looting" 
emerged, and it is clear that the people who pillaged this site (perhaps only for its timber) 
are the reason no structures (any of the houses or various guard stations) remain. There is 
an implicit, sometimes explicit, judgment about those who have pillaged the historical 
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sites for their noteworthy objects: a general condemnation and frustration about the 
absence of these relics from their original (appropriate) resting place. 
Looting (the prevention thereof) also occupies one of the central duties of military 
and police personnel in Anlong Veng who are cooperating with the Ministry of Tourism. 
In fact, there seems to be a fair bit of (clandestine) monitoring of the tourist sites, even 
though most of the sites have already been stripped of their contents. A couple 
informants who work in this area have stated that their job is to protect all people who 
visit the sites, but also to keep safe all the objects that remain. The Ministry of Tourism 
has also stated its interest in recovering the objects (not materials) from the Khmer Rouge 
cadre's houses, focusing mainly on furniture that has been removed and presumably 
remains in the hands of local villagers. 
From May 1990, there was a pioneering group of 12 people who began 
construction with Thai and Khmer technicians and machines bought from Thailand— 
seven table saws, two generators, 100 Hino-brand drag chains—that altogether took 32 
workers. In 1993, the mill began sawing operations, but after six months, fighting had 
damaged 50 percent of the sawmill. In May, repairs were made to allow operations to 
recommence until March 1997. The size of the sawmill was 40 mx 72 m (counting the 
whole lumberyard, it is much larger than this). The sawmill processing capacity was 30 
m
3
 per day. Son Sen's body and those of his relatives were taken to this cremation site in 
the area of the sawmill. Nowadays, Anlong Veng villagers have divided up the land from 
this sawmill into individual properties and kept one place to build a pagoda (already 
built). One ofTa Mok's daughters has built a house in this area. 
The remnants of the concrete foundation and wooden pillars of Ta Mok's Sawmill 
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begin approximately 400 m east of the main road (about 150 m northeast of the Ministry 
of Tourism's blue sign), most easily accessed by the north fork of the cut-off. The 
newly-erected stone pagoda, Wat Srah Chhouk, stands quite close, perhaps ten meters, 
from the eastern edge of the foundation. (The older wooden pagoda sits about 20 m to 
the north of the remnants.) The site consists mainly of concrete passageways sunken in 
the earth, with the occasional stump of a wooden support pillar. The channels have now 
become overgrown with weeds and grass, and the sub-ground level areas are filled with 
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stagnant water. 
In its previous state, the mill and lumber yard extended nearly two hectares, 
stretching from the location of the Ministry of Tourism signpost to the pagoda and 200 m 
north to south. According to the former chief of operations, construction of the wood-
cutting facility began in April/May 1991 or 1992 and finished in 1993.205 Timber had 
been a trade that sustained the Khmer Rouge throughout its outlawed existence, 
particularly after China withdrew its explicit support for the movement. 
In the last years of Cambodia's civil war, which ended in 1998, both the 
Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government used logging to fund 
military campaigns and then used military campaigns as a pretext for more 
logging. Cambodia's leaders have since found it hard to kick the habit of 
treating the country's forests as a slush fund for political campaigns, 
personal enrichment and rewarding key clients.206 
According to the former chief of the sawmill, the lumber had been used for the 
people and soldiers; the wood went to build houses, the school, the bridge, the hospital, 
and the health clinic in front of the hospital. Contradicting claims that the timber industry 
in Anlong Veng and other places supported the Khmer Rouge through its defeat, the 
former chief claims that only a small amount of wood was sold to the Thais, and this 
lumber would have been hauled up the mountain and across the border. Logging was 
an (emerging) industry in Anlong Veng's peace-filled afterlife. Throughout the district, 
the traces of the trade, licit and illicit, were ever-present: the roads torn up by trucks with 
weighty wooded cargo; the clear-cut areas visible from atop the Dangrek Range; sitting 
on the shoulders of the mountain, one could always hear the sound of chainsaws, tearing 
down the tree-filled canopy beneath. 
Fighting erupted at two different times after the sawmill's construction. In the 
early part of the Khmer New Year (May/June) of 1994, government soldiers managed to 
capture Anlong Veng and hold it for two weeks, during which time they destroyed half 
the mill. The burned site was damaged again slightly in the fighting of 1995, when the 
government advanced but did not succeed in seizing the district. In 1998, the sawmill 
ceased being used, because the Khmer Rouge retreated up the mountain. The former mill 
supervisor asserts that all the machinery was in excellent condition at that time with a 
significant quantity of good wood, but the combat between the retreating forces and the 
government soldiers led to the site's destruction. The remaining usable lumber was 
claimed by the victors. 
The lumber yard is now mostly occupied by modest homes, among which lies the 
last resting place of the Son Sen family. One inhabitant at this grave site heard by word 
of mouth that the district chief was planning on taking the land—the plot, the yard, and 
house near it—to create a "Son Sen tourism area." These concerns echoed slightly 
through the views of those neighboring the grave site. Although the articulation of the 
issue was a bit confused, the status and control of the land (or, an as-yet-undesignated 
potential tourist site) seemed to be subject to a certain fluidity (mobility of ownership). 
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The land, once freely given by village authorities, might now be revoked by the same or 
higher-level authorities. Suspicions abound that the seizure of the land would be for the 
personal enrichment of district-level elites. More tragically, it seems the museum project 
might be used as an excuse for retaking tracts of land by the local government. These 
stories of possible land seizures in the environs of the lumber mill appeared to be the 
unfinished products of the village rumor mill, with only the slightest of ignitions. The 
ideas have been heard "from one person to another," but no one seems capable of naming 
an individual (or authority figure) who firmly indicated that land seizures would occur in 
the future. One informant traced the origin of the rumor to a visit to the area by chiefs of 
varying administrative levels within the district. The government visitors likely 
communicated the Ministry of Tourism's hope that it would be able to reconstruct all the 
sites in Anlong Veng.209 A local resident conveyed, 
This land before belonged to Ta Mok, and he put a sawmill here. After Ta 
Mok lost power, the government gave the land to the local authorities to 
give to the people. Some local people think that in the future the 
government will take the land to rebuild the sawmill again, because the 
government officials want the opinion of the general public abroad to 
understand that this was the real situation before, Under Ta Mok. Some 
people think the government will make a tomb on Son Sen's grave. 
People say that if the government needs this land, the government should 
pay compensation money to the people so they can move to another place. 
Because everything belonged to the Khmer Rouge before, the government 
wants to show foreigners all over the world that the Khmer Rouge were 
really in Cambodia. The information is unclear; we have only heard it. 
This whole land belonged to Ta Mok, and the whole land was a sawmill. 
Then the local authorities gave it out to the villagers. On the other hand, 
some authorities say the government may take the land in the future. But 
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if the government takes the land, they will do according to the 
government's idea (i.e., to re-make a sawmill)." 
The land in Srah Chhouk village that surrounds the Ta Mok Sawmill (and lumber 
yard) and Son Sen's grave was part of a land distribution effort under the direction of the 
former co-chiefs of the village. After their belated defections (spending the greater part 
of 1998 with Ta Mok in the Phu Noy Camp area in Thailand), these chiefs returned to the 
land on which they had formerly resided. Through official complaints to the commune 
and district chiefs, they eventually secured the land for themselves and for other villagers 
who were without property. Some 179 hectares were distributed (at not cost) to 131 
families, averaging over one hectare per household. When the land was given, there was 
no indication that the government would seek to reclaim the land. The only area that 
seemed difficult to transfer was the area around Son Sen's grave, because villagers 
refused to take it. Ultimately, the land was given to a couple of new people, who were 
instructed to tend to the grave site. The actual site of the sawmill (what now remains a 
series of water-filled trenches and foundations) was never disbursed. The new pagoda of 
Srah Chhouk village is now located right beside these ruins. 
One former village co-chief expressed extreme certainty in the villagers' right to 
their land: "Hun Sen said that people who used to live on the land would have the same 
land when they returned [from the mountain], and authorities would not be allowed to 
take the people's land." However, there was some discrepancy in how this respondent 
addressed possible development: if authorities want to develop, "they must compensate 
the villagers for their land," but also "they must adhere to the villagers' decision" about 
how the land is used. These not necessarily incompatible statements hint at a tension 
between government promises (perhaps emanating from Hun Sen personally) at the time 
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of reintegration and the always-present claim to "eminent domain" which may be 
exercised by the Ministry of Tourism at some point in the future, in the name of 
development through tourism. The tension which emerges out of this state of un-
resolution produces effects in district-, commune-, and village-level government as well 
as among the villagers who believe in the certainty of their land titles but also recognize 
the power of the authorities. 
Fears were not allayed, because it seemed the village chief had hinted at the 
possibility of the government taking back the land associated with the sawmill and the 
larger area which was its lumber yard. The dispute over the land of Ta Mok's wood 
processing site, and including Son Sen's grave, seems rooted in a change of local 
authorities. The previous village co-chiefs distributed the land out to people in need; the 
new village chief who took over in February 2002 is the figure that appeared to be 
promulgating the fears of eminent domain. This village chief recounted that he was 
approached by two Department of Tourism officials in May 2002 who asked him to look 
after the tourist areas in Anlong Veng, to keep them for the purposes of historical-
tourism. The officials did not explain what their purposes with the land would be, and 
they did not re-approach him after that initial meeting. The chief did not understand what 
the government representatives wanted to do with the former sawmill land, supposing 
that they might build a resort around Son Sen's grave. He seemed confident that 
something would be done with the land in the future, because it belonged to the Khmer 
Rouge—"the last area of the Khmer Rouge." He knew that the former chiefs distributed 
the land to villagers; however, he thought the residents do not have formal ownership and 
only live on the land temporarily, because he believed the government understands the 
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land to be in its possession. In his opinion, the sawmill site should be kept as an 
historical-tourist place, so that the nation and internationals can know this place belonged 
to the Khmer Rouge. Thus, he agrees with what he believes is the perspective of the 
government tourist officials, even though he had only one encounter with them and was 
not fully cognizant of their aims. 
The sawmill must certainly have been a significant site, not only for its sheer size 
but also for its importance to the local economy. However, the current village chief, who 
was also the former sawmill supervisor, likely prioritizes mis Khmer Rouge site in 
particular, because he was chief of its operations. This hypothesis invites validity given 
that although he was village chief, he did not seem to be guarding the villagers' interests 
(their livelihood, which is tied to the land), as the previous co-chiefs had done. Instead, 
he seemed committed to establishing and preserving the sawmill area, even if it meant 
relocating villagers who had now begun to eke out a living from this area. 
There are at least three inter-related tensions that are brought to the fore in this 
aspect of the museum project: inheritance (of land and land issues), eminent domain, and 
the effects of Ministry/Department of Tourism actions in local governance. The village 
chiefs land issue (villagers' claims vs. the government's tourism efforts) seemed to be 
inherited from the two former village chiefs. Perhaps guided by a different interpretation 
of the government's aims or unaware of them, these previous local leaders distributed the 
land to villagers. (On the villagers' side of the equation, the issue of property often boils 
down to a problem of documentation: of use, residence, inheritance, or ownership.) This 
scenario hints at the possibility that land in general is a problem of inheritance—the 
government "inheriting" the territorially-based memorialization imperatives from the 
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Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian government seems to have inherited the mobility of Ta 
Mok, the grounding patriarch who forms the central figure of the Anlong Veng museum, 
the "TaMok Museum."210 
The relation between memorialization and land ownership seems to emerge out of 
the reverberations of Ministry and Department of Tourism actions in local government 
and then, consequently, in village life. The probability of land seizure was likely the 
product of the village chiefs particular interpretation of the message he received (on one 
occasion) from the Department of Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng. The fact 
that preservation was not aggressively pursued since the possibility was mentioned in 
May 2002 suggests the enduring threat arising from: the chiefs understanding of the 
Ministry of Tourism's aims with regard to the reconstruction of sites; his respect for 
government authority; and his personal prioritization of the sawmill site.211 
This also points to how national objectives are interpreted and implemented 
locally, often hinting at a rural (periphery)/urban (capital) split that has long plagued 
Cambodian politics. In Hun Sen's 2001 circular, it is not clear that the exercise of 
eminent domain over all sites of historical import necessitates the seizure of villagers' 
land. The actions around the museum in relation to land ownership suggest that a radical 
(mis)translation occurs between what is said, or maybe even intended, within the capital 
of Phnom Penh, and how local leaders makes sense of those directives, or make those 
directives into "sense" (sens), according to the conditions of life in the countryside.212 
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The site of the Son Sen family grave site has undergone a number of 
transformations: rice fields, sawmill/lumber yard, cremation site, and home with the 
possibility of it re-becoming a "sawmill," reconstructed by the Ministry of Tourism for 
tourist visual consumption (i.e., not wood production). Although as yet to receive official 
blue-sign demarcation by the ministry, the grave is located within the larger area 
demarcated by Ta Mok's lumber yard), which is now a relatively populated area within 
the large village of Srah Chhouk.213 From first-hand accounts, the grave is said to 
contain ten bodies (although other news reports indicate 11 or 12), including Son Sen, 
Yun Yat (his wife), their children, as well as some extended and adopted family 
members.214 The cremation/burial site itself lies within the perimeter fence, in the front 
yard of a villager's house, the owner of which was given the land by local officials 
sometime after 1998. The inhabitants of the house tend to the grave, clearing weeds, 
lighting incense on holy days, and beautifying the mound with flowers; these actions are 
followed so as to ask for mercy and protection from the spirits of the dead.215 The village 
chief of Srah Chhouk provided the structure-free land to the husband; in exchange for 
back-pay owed him by his employer, the husband took wood which he used to build the 
simple home behind the cremation mound. "Nobody dared to take the land, because they 
were afraid," indicated many residents. When the recently-received resident came to live 
at the house, she was afraid of the spirits of the dead (khmaoch tgre). She lit incense and 
put it on the grave. Every holy day (thngai soel igMro), she follows this grave ritual to ask 
for mercy from the spirits of the dead, requesting that they not frighten her family but 
bring them happiness while they inhabit this land. In her account of these appeasement 
practices, she mentions others' supernatural encounters with the site. Some neighbors 
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told her they had seen (relatively small) fire flying from the grave, up and outward, and 
they claimed to have seen this fairly often; after a prayer ceremony, the fire ceased and 
did not return.216 
The story of Son Sen's demise is a thread that weaves together a large swatch of 
the Anlong Veng fabric, not without its knots and dangling remainders. The story of his 
presence and eventual exit on the escarpment connects with a number of sites: various 
houses, the sawmill, the platform at which Pol Pot was sentenced, the location of a radio 
truck, Ta Mok's homes on the mountain and below. The tale of Son Sen's murder was a 
sensitive piece of information to elicit. A close aide to Ta Mok claimed, "it is difficult to 
explain, because it is a secret story involving a personal conflict between individuals," 
while a neighbor to the gravesite said, that it "maybe a story of political problems." The 
term "politics" became a frequent enunciation in the course of interviews, particularly 
among former Khmer Rouge, but not necessarily limited to upper cadre. "Politics" 
(noryobay atantntij) would indicate a (impending) silence, a discursive marker that 
identified the broaching of a sensitive area of discussion. In this regard, the 
conversational warning sign operated as a catch-all term for any information that was 
either too sensitive or too complex to explain to the outsider. The realms of inquiry that 
invoked this signifier included: the actions of higher-level cadre, especially 
disagreements; how well one was acquainted with, or engaged in, the endeavors of Ta 
Mok or Pol Pot; explanations of why/how particular battles were fought; reasons for 
decisions on collective action; and in particular, events surrounding Son Sen's death. 
(Some respondents offered more nuanced answers that acknowledged a difference of 
opinion about upper-level cadre, but they still marked the area of discussion as "politics" 
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and therefore did not elaborate much further.) The reticence to discuss topics of a 
political nature—including information that exceeds the boundaries of ordinary political 
activity, such as the nature and manner in which decisions where carried out and what 
attitudes were conveyed or evoked by such decisions—seemed at odds with the Tourism 
Ministry's expressly-stated purpose to re-present the "political lifestyle" of the Khmer 
Rouge leaders while their movement spent its last days in Anlong Veng.217 
In the gaps of silences, a (composite) narrative could be gleaned from various 
sources—with attendant inaccuracies, inconsistencies, biases, and a general lack of 
coherence. Son Sen was the DK Minister of National Defense and also had santebal 
responsibilities (attested by documents from S-21 that bear his writing/notations).218 
After 1979, he represented the Khmer Rouge in the Supreme National Council during 
UNTAC, and he came to control Sector 1001, the area of the NADK's northern front in 
Preah Vihear and Stung Treng, east of Route 12.219 His execution occurred on the night 
of 10 June 1997.220 Informants identify the reason for the killing of Son Sen emanating 
from an "argument with Pol Pot." Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Ta Mok stayed in one area 
on the mountain (near Darm Chrey); Pol Pot stayed at his house at Kbal Tonsaong. Pol 
Pot had asked Son Sen and Nuon Chea to meet with him to do some work for the 
struggle; when they returned, Son Sen reported Pol Pot's plans to Ta Mok, with which Ta 
Mok disagreed. Pol Pot thought that Ta Mok wanted to co-operate with the Cambodian 
government, which enraged him and led him to order his commanders to kill Ta Mok, 
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Son Sen, and Nuon Chea. Ta Mok and Nuon Chea escaped Pol Pot's plans, but Son 
Sen and his family were killed.222 One long-time neighbor and acquaintance of Son Sen 
provided as detailed an account of the event as he could remember: 
The forces were 300 strong (the many soldiers that had protected the path 
to Pol Pot's house at Kbal Tonsaong), and nobody knew they were 
coming. They were commanded by Ta Roeun [Gen. So Saroeun] and Ta 
San [Gen. Nhem San], high commanders (originally from the 
Southwestern Zone) who received orders directly from Pol Pot. The 
soldiers reached my house first, woke me, and warned me, "When you 
hear something, stay calm and do not do anything. When you see the 
incident, do not fight back." The whole area was already surrounded as 
two cars, packed full of soldiers, drove toward the residences of Son Sen 
and Nuon Chea, one to each house. When the headlights focused on Son 
Sen's house, the shooting began. (After one car went to shoot at Son 
Sen's house, another car went to capture Nuon Chea, his wife, their 
daughter, two grandchildren (one boy and one girl), an older 
granddaughter, and their adopted daughter.) Two houses made up the Son 
Sen family residence, a house for the parents and a house for the children. 
When the soldiers arrived, they shot two people, Son Sen's son-in-law and 
his nephew. When Son Sen heard the shooting, he opened the door of his 
house, but his wife exited before him; the soldiers shot her and she fell to 
the floor. Son Sen was shot as he approached his wife. (That night Son 
Sen had a Chinese-made K-59 handgun and two clips of bullets on his 
waist, but he did not manage to shoot the attackers.) After shooting four 
people, Pol Pot's soldiers took another six members of Son Sen's family 
away to be killed, about one kilometer from their house, along the road to 
Kbal Tonsaong. These individual's were: Yun Yat's younger sister and 
niece; Son Sen and Yun Yat's daughter, niece, and nephew; and their 
adopted daughter. Pol Pot's forces withdrew toward Kbal Tonsaong, 
taking Son Sen's captured relatives. These relatives were not shot but 
beaten to death. Before being beaten, the women were undressed and 
some of them were burned. Ta Mok had left five days before the attack on 
Son Sen in order to stay at his lakeside house in Anlong Veng. Ta Mok, 
Son Sen, and Nuon Chea had plans to move down from the mountain, and 
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Ta Mok had already moved. Ta Mok was furious with Pol Pot, and he 
prepared his forces to fight back. Three forces were amassed: a group of 
300 soldiers advanced from the middle house on the mountain, and two 
units of 300 soldiers each, armed with regular weapons, ascended the 
mountain through the jungle directly to Kbal Tonsaong. The orders were 
given the night of the attack, and the two sides fought until 7 AM, when 
Pol Pot retreated from Kbal Tonsaong. Two days later, around 11 AM or 
noon, Ta Mok's large units, who had scaled the mountain through jungle, 
captured Pol Pot. 
Another informant, who became an impromptu undertaker, was living about one 
kilometer from Son Sen's residence on the night of the massacre. When Son Sen's 
family was killed, two bodies (Son Sen and Yun Yat) were immediately buried in the 
ground on the mountain; although more graves had been dug, the children and other 
relatives were yet to be interred. However, two days after the killing, Ta Mok asked that 
all the bodies be brought to Srah Chhouk and called the villagers to assemble at the 
sawmill. Ta Mok asked the gravedigger to deliver the bodies to the lumber yard to let 
people see the bodies, to say that Pol Pot ordered someone to kill Son Sen's family, and 
to make people angry with Pol Pot so that they would prosecute Pol Pot. Hundreds of 
people, from all the villagers around, came to see. Although no lumber was at the 
(present) grave site, the cremation site was surrounded on all sides by logs. Ta Mok 
commanded those assembled to prepare the grave and cremate the bodies, which all the 
villagers did together. After Son Sen was buried (originally), Ta Mok ordered all of his 
commanders to capture Pol Pot. At that time, Ta Mok's troops outnumbered those of Pol 
Pot; thus, Pol Pot's men retreated taking a radio truck along with him and broadcasting 
that Son Sen had betrayed the Khmer nation and people. Pol Pot was captured at Choam 
Pranong in Thailand, after which a corrective speech was broadcast by Khieu Samphan, 
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stating that Pol Pot had in fact betrayed the people. 
The sawmill operator understood why Ta Mok had put the grave in that location: 
"There was an argument within the Khmer Rouge, and Son Sen was killed. Ta Mok took 
the bodies there to show people that the killer is very savage, so that the people could 
remember. That was Ta Mok's purpose." He clearly wanted to use Pol Pot's murderous 
excess to his advantage, and thus selected a suitably public venue for Son Sen's 
cremation and final resting place. The motive for choosing the lumber yard seems based 
on securing the most viewing exposure of the event on a daily basis. 
Pol Pot's remains lie 1300 mfrom the Anlong Veng roundabout on the Dangrek 
Mountains. Pol Pot died on 15 April 1998 in a small house in which he was imprisoned, 
after Ta Mok sentenced him for killing Son Sen, about 100 mfrom his cremation site. 
Before Pol Pot died, he heard that they were going to deliver him to Thailand, after 
which he would be taken to the UN for legal prosecution. Upon hearing this, he let his 
wife dye his hair black in order to not let them recognize him in his plan to run away at 
night with his wife and daughter to Thailand in order to mix with Thai people. That 
night, 15 April 1998, his harsh punishment and his ill health caused his death. Of the 
people that looked after Pol Pot each day, Uncle Kov (living in Tuol Snuol Village) came 
to see his body and confirmed that Pol Pot was in fact dead and brought 2 blocks of ice 
from Thailand to put on the corpse to prevent its decomposition and injected a medicine. 
Then the family came to take Pol Pot's body to cremate 10 m in front of the house. 
Because the cremation was to occur in the area surrounding the house, Kov could not 
find anything but car tires to use for the pyre. After the cremation, Pol Pot's wife and 
daughter went to a camp at Phu Lay, Thailand, where they made consecrating merits 
once again in accordance with Khmer tradition. 
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Of the sites presented on Anlong Veng's tourist menu, Pol Pot's cremation site 
draws the largest recognition and outside focus. Journalists' accounts take the 
mythically-empowered grave as the centerpiece of reportage on the upcoming "Khmer 
Rouge theme park"—free marketing that extends beyond the audiences the Ministry of 
Tourism initially tapped. The site seems to foster the flourishing and embellishment of 
narratives, heaping legend onto the DK leader's newly lauded long home. People come 
to pray to his spirit, which, good or bad, is seen as powerful. Some Cambodians have 
made pilgrimages to the pyre in hopes of securing lucky lottery picks.224 Random ghost 
tales and historical conjecture swarm about the border among the more recent occupiers 
of the area. Some youth who went to draw water from a local pond reported seeing a 
ghost wandering about, very big, very black, and naked (except for underwear briefs) 
with lots of hair. Others have seen a ghost roam without a head and carrying a gun on its 
shoulders. The narrated reactions are likely indicative of new arrivals' responses to the 
mysteriousness and trepidation associated with Khmer Rouge sites. A young woman, 
originally from Pursat but residing at Nhoeun's former house at Choam Pass, somewhat 
disbelievingly stated, "The people who see the ghosts think maybe these are the ghosts of 
Khmer Rouge, because here was the front line of the Khmer Rouge. They're just 
speculating." She has never seen a ghost, but if she did, she would be too afraid to 
remain at the residence. Pol Pot's non-undead wandering also figures in features of 
fantasy. On 15 April 1998, Brother Number One passed away from a heart attack. 
However, stories abound about Pol Pot's possible persistent being. The usual rumor 
ponders the odd presence of hair dye at the leader's last abode, suggesting a disguised 
disappearance across the border, into Thai territory, and beyond. Although some believe 
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that the convenient timing of his passing suggests foul play, close family members 
describe rapidly declining health. 
While the grave site receives attention for the notoriety of the movement's 
deceased leader, the physical landscape shows the growing encroachment of private 
property and commerce, making plain the death of the CPK's purported economic 
agenda. The area around Pol Pot's cremation site has been drastically cleared. Through 
2004, the grave destination became inaccessible via the footpath that meandered through 
the landmines, which had figured so prominently in early visitor accounts. The former 
single-track route became increasingly occupied by border market sprawl; CMAC mine-
clearing and the accompanying tree-cutting from the main thoroughfare, hundreds of 
meters northwestward, hacked out a massive (and singular) access to Pol Pot's grave. 
Travelers arrive at the site via this very cleared area that once contained one of Ta Mok's 
common houses (now converted into a carport for oversized industrial vehicles)— 
CMAC's 10-plus-hectare ravine-shaped expanse of de-mined, clear-cut, de-vegetated 
land, which would had previously shrouded the western face of the funerary glade. Once 
a secluded ash pile in a small clearing, near a well, at the end of a mine-lined dirt path, 
the site of the cindery sap (wci) of Saloth Sar has been ob-scenely opened for view from 
the main road through Choam Pass by the vast clearing that was claiming the forest 
cover. Except for the increased accessibility and the lack of surrounding trees, Pol Pot's 
grave itself has undergone only minor changes: soda bottles planted around the pyric 
perimeter, a post-and-rail garde-fou, and a more robust, Thai-style spirit house (khtorm 
neaktaa fragntn). The detritus that marked the big man's last hut (khtorm neakthum 
SHHRG), while under house arrest, was moved uphill about three meters (and across the 
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footpath) from where it was previously. 
The entrepreneurial invasion of Pol Pot's residuum took hold in the wake of the 
2003 border opening. The sprawl of the market is one of the most significant and 
obvious transformations on the mountain. The stalls—which sell cigarettes, wood 
sculptures, toiletries, digital music and video, etc.—are interspersed with shack-style 
brothels (and these huts of ill-repute perhaps seduce and ensnare greater clientele than the 
depressing string of retailers). Economic intercourse has spread over the area where one 
was erected a house and kitchen belonging to Ta Mok's economics chief. The expanse 
appears so chaotic that some disorientation clouds the exact determination of the previous 
(non-designated) sites. Although growing in hope and hectarage, this commercial spirit 
certainly has not yet met with the strong hand of the law, which stipulates by edict: "It is 
absolutely prohibited to encroach on or subdivide land in an anarchic manner, or to 
undertake any form of construction in Anlong Veng that has an impact on this historic 
region without government permission, except for construction of housing for residents 
of the village and commune, in accordance with the Ministry of Land Management, 
Construction, and Urbanization."226 
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The gathering/or the sentencing of Pol Pot for the killings of Son Sen and his 
family included Kheum Ngon (chief of the court), Kao Bunheng, Tep Khunnal, Nov, and 
Seng (governor of Anlong Veng and its surrounding areas) as well as approximately 400 
people who arranged chairs for the court. Among those present was the foreign face of 
journalist Nate Thayer. At first, Pol Pot took the seat of honor in front of Kheum Ngon, 
who invited Pol Pot to vacate the seat of honor and sit to the side, after which the 
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sentencing of Pol Pot commenced. At that time, the people saw that Pol Pot had killed 
the Son Sen family with commanders Phan and Ryfrom Div 980. Then the people's court 
concluded the trial by sentencing Pol Pot and his side to life in prison starting from 1997. 
The site were Pol Pot was sentenced was a large wooden covered area that 
currently sits 100 m from the Cambodian border checkpoint. After the killing of Son Sen 
and Pol Pot's capture in Thailand, Ta Mok asked the villagers to come together on the 
mountain and loudly proclaim "Chayol Pol Pot betrays the nation!" and "Don't allow the 
people to follow Pol Pot's examples!" Pol Pot was not tied up; he sat in a chair with his 
head held low while the villagers shouted. After the boisterous sentencing ceremony, Ta 
Mok asked Khieu Samphan to make a radio speech explaining the situation. Pol Pot was 
sentenced to live alone with his family in a small hut (near what became his cremation 
site) without the right to speak or work. 
A much longer story describes the trial and how the leader of Democratic 
Kampuchea came to sit accused before his most loyal general and the populace of the 
Angkafs last stronghold. Bearing in mind the museum's significance as the 
infrastructure of war, the Khmer Rouge-government battles from 1989 to 1999 looked 
like an even more protracted version of the ill-executed (counter-)offenses during the Lon 
Nol regime. In the early 1990s, the PDK headquarters was moved from Malai to Phnom 
Chhat, under the command of So Hong (Pol Pot's nephew), who controlled Sector 102. 
After a surprise attack by government troops overran Phnom Chhat in August 1993, the 
headquarters was moved to the stronghold at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok had previously 
controlled the area and the lion's share of the NADK under the command of Pol Pot; with 
the abandonment of Phnom Chhat, political and military leadership meant control of the 
new headquarters' areas with Pol Pot.227 
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The government launched an ill-fated dry season offensive from January to April 
1994, which captured but quickly relinquished the strongholds of Anlong Veng 
(February) and Pailin (March/April). At the conclusion of the four-month operation, the 
PDK ended up with greater territory than it had controlled at the start.228 Both sides were 
seeking gains ahead of negotiations that took place in Pyongyang on 27 May (but yielded 
no substantive results, especially given the NADK's success). On 7 July 1994, the 
National Assembly passed the "Law Outlawing the Democratic Kampuchea Group" 
which, while banning the Khmer Rouge, also allowed King Sihanouk to grant pardons to 
surrendering leaders and prolonged the amnesty program (begun in 1993) for lower-level 
defectors. With the legislated attempt at splitting the PDK, Pol Pot and his leadership 
became increasingly isolated. In response to the anti-KR legislation, Khieu Samphan 
announced the PDK's formation of a "Provisional Government of National Union and 
National Salvation" (PGNUNS) with him as premier and defense minister.229 
In mid-1994, on Pol Pot's directive, the PDK sought to re-impose the strict social 
policies of the DK period, and foremost among these was a comprehensive ban on private 
property and a clampdown on trade.230 Rowley argues that international aid (principally 
from China) had softened the "self-reliant" ideology of the ousted DK; however, 
moderation was further fostered by social intercourse with the outside world. The 
cessation of that support meant a retrenchment and return to the strict policies of the 
past.231 In the afterlife of DK, the leadership's anti-Vietnamese rhetoric increasingly 
diverged from reality, especially given the neighbor's unilateral withdrawal of forces, one 
year ahead of schedule. As well, the socio-economic benefits (from gems, logging, and 
business ventures in Thailand) were unequally distributed, giving the impression of a 
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continued struggle that enriched an elite few. Perhaps 80 percent of the NADK had been 
recruited after 1979, largely through conscription at refugee camps.232 These younger 
cadre were less likely than their leaders to see the rationale behind unending war.233 The 
ousted DK leadership feared retribution and thus argued for continued struggle, while the 
youth could not reconcile the hardships of war and thus tended to favor peace and re-
234 
integration. 
Partly as a means for Pol Pot to re-assert control and partly in response to Ieng 
Sary's "loss" of $10 million, Son Sen in the west was dispatched to order the 
relinquishing of privately-held possessions (including much-needed items like 
motorbikes and other consumer goods), which only served to increase growing tension 
and distance between Pailin and Pol Pot's headquarters at Anlong Veng.235 The fall-out 
between Ieng Sary and the old guard (Pol Pot and Ta Mok) also emerged in the context of 
long-standing personal disputes which saw Ieng Sary's demotion in the early 1990s, a 
growing regional autonomy in the aftermath of the CGDK military break-up, and 
growing financial strain due to China's end of support andjjressure on Thailand to refrain 
from commerce with the outlawed organization. In July 1996, Pol Pot's delegation— 
Ta Mok, Son Sen, and Nuon Chea—met with Ieng Sary and Y Chhien in Phnom Malai; 
Ta Mok's rigid support and enforcement of Brother Number One's orders inflamed the 
situation, which helped precipitate revolts in the northwestern areas.237 
In August, Ieng Sary, Lt. Gen. Y Chhien (Division 415 at Pailin), and Gen. Sok 
Pheap (Division 450 at Malai) negotiated with the government while their forces 
continued to battle Ta Mok's soldiers.238 In November, the rebel faction allied with the 
government under an agreement that allowed them semi-autonomy (under Ieng Sary's 
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Democratic National Unity Movement). Ny Khon who commanded Front 250 (Sector 32 
at Ta Sdao) sided with his brother (Son Sen) and Ta Mok, but lost.239 He was defeated 
and captured along with another brother, Son Chhum, and Ta Mok's son-in-law, Meas 
Muth in October; the three joined the government on 18 December. The 1996 defection 
proved especially damaging to Pol Pot's organization. Given the areas' importance for 
gems and timber, the loss in the northwest was felt financially; in addition, an elite DK 
leader as well as 15,000 soldiers and civilians was a military and political blow. With the 
failure to maintain control over the areas, the 15 December return to Anlong Veng of Ta 
Mok, Son Sen, and Nuon Chea was met with their "house arrest" by Pol Pot. 
On Valentine's Day 1997,15 government officials seeking negotiations with 
elements within the Khmer Rouge (Long Tern and Kheum Ngon)—on the side the house-
arrested—were ambushed by forces allied with Pol Pot's faction. (Ten days later, Pol Pot 
called a meeting to announce new political and military leaders, replacing Ta Mok with 
Gen. So Saroeun as chief of staff and giving military command to Gen. Nhem San.) In 
spite of the earlier attack, negotiations with the government (FUNCINPEC) were 
resumed on 16 May 1997 with Tep Khunnal and Pech Bunreth negotiating on the Khmer 
Rouge's (Ta Mok's) behalf. On 1 June, Khieu Samphan took over negotiations and met 
with Prince Ranariddh, leader of FUNICNPEC; Nhiek Bun Chhay raised controversy 
when he publicly claimed to have made an agreement with Khieu Samphan.240 A 
reconciliation ceremony was planned for 5 July to occur at Preah Vihear Temple, where 
Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, and their 4,000-strong Anlong Veng faction would fuse with 
Gen. Nhiek Bun Chhay's forces (the RCAF, but along FUNCINPEC lines). 
In the meantime (just after midnight on 10 June 1997), Pol Pot ordered his 
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commanders to kill Son Sen and his family. Ta Mok counter-attacked; with Ta Mok's 
forces in hot pursuit, Pol Pot fled north toward Thailand with Khieu Samphan, Chan 
Youran, Mok Ben, Kao Bunheng, In Sopheap, and others along with some radio 
equipment; So Saroeun engaged Ta Mok's approaching units, but Pol Pot's fixer was 
captured. Others in Pol Pot's party were detained amidst the continuing pursuit; 
ultimately, Pol Pot's flee for the border dwindled to a small band of escorts: Khieu 
Samphan, Meas Son "Muon" (his wife), Mul (his daughter), and five protectors (one 
named Ngeth).241 The ailing Brother Number One, yoked in a hammock and saddled 
with an oxygen tank, was shouldered by bodyguards in his acromion escape through the 
Dangrek Range.242 Some US$5 million in cash had been secretly stashed while Pol Pot's 
heavies were burdened with lugging three other bags holding another US$3 million. Four 
of the five guards would betray the languishing leader, take the suitcased sums, and join 
RCAF units under Gen. Khann Savoeun.243 Ngeth was dispatched to Thailand with 
US$25,000 to seek out help; his capture led to the coordination of Pol Pot's apprehension 
in anhelation on 19 June. 
In addition to fleeing fratricidal foes, the early-June courting by Ranariddh of the 
Khmer Rouge sparked some skirmishes in Phnom Penh. A day after second-Prime 
Minster Hun Sen warned that FUNCINEPC was undermining the government, 
bodyguards of National Police Chief Hok Lundy exchanged gunfire with royalist party 
security in the capital. Just over a fortnight later, this would erupt into a full coup de 
force, as a weekend of battles would unseat Ranariddh as co-Prime Minister, lead to the 
killing of over 100 FUNCINPEC loyalists (including the co-chief of the national police, 
Ho Sok, who was shot within the Ministry of Interior compound, and other military 
leaders that were executed near Pochentong Airport), and the retreat of FUNCINPEC s 
military to its border stronghold at O Smach.244 
The 15 June 1997 broadcast on the Radio of the Provisional Government of 
National Union and National Salvation of Cambodia included a statement by the 
PGNUNS and National Solidarity Party from Anlong Veng: 
I. Treason by Pol Pot took place from the night of 9 June to 14 June 1997. 
II. This incident was resolved and normalcy was restored as of 14 June 
1997 by the force of great union and in the spirit of great responsibility for 
the destiny of the nation, the people, the ranks and the National Army as a 
whole who have been rallied around the Provisional Government of 
National Union and National Salvation [PGNUNS] and the National 
Solidarity Party [NSP] headed by His Excellency Khieu Samphan, prime 
minister of the PGNUNS and president of the NSP. 
III. The masses, the people and the National Army as a whole are cheerful 
and rejoicing because they have brought the treason of Pol Pot to an end. 
This treason has made it clear to the cadres, the combatants and the masses 
what was wrong and what was right, what was bad and what was good, 
who was wrong and who was right, and who was bad and who was good; 
and it helped to further strengthen solidarity and unity among the cadres, 
combatants, army, ranks, and people under the leadership of the PGNUNS 
and NSP with H.E. Khieu Samphan as prime minister and president. 
IV. The PGNUNS and NSP maintain their policy of uniting with all 
national forces in the struggle against a war of aggression and genocide of 
Communist Vietnam and its lackeys, the puppets with Hun Sen as the 
most active ringleader. The PGNUNS and NSP continue to uphold the 
stand of supporting the National United Front [NUF] with Prince Krom 
Preah Norodom Ranariddh as the chairman and the 14-point policy of the 
NUF. 
V. The PGNUNS and NSP appeal to all combatants, cadres, ranks and 
masses to continue uniting as a single body with the entire Cambodian 
nation and people in launching an offensive against the aggressive and 
genocidal Communist Vietnamese enemy and his lackeys, the puppets 
with Hun Sen as the most active ringleader in an increasingly vigorous and 
militant manner to attain the goal of ending the aggressive and genocidal 
war of Communist Vietnam and achieving genuine national reconciliation 
and genuine peace in an independent, peaceful, sovereign and neutral 
Cambodia with all of its territorial integrity intact.245 
On 25 July 1997, Pol Pot was tried by a "people's tribunal," at which he (and his 
commanders) faced the charge of murder for Son Sen and family, the detentions and 
attempted murders of Ta Mok and Nuon Chea, and the subversion of national 
reconciliation. A new Standing Committee was formed, composed of Ta Mok 
proteges—Nhorn, Kheum Ngon, Khem Tern, Nuon Nov—backed by Nuon Chea and 
with ultimate authority deriving from Ta Mok; the "intellectuals," who were seen to have 
favored Pol Pot, were sidelined.246 
In 1998, Ta Mok re-asserted strict control over the remnant movement, taking 
swift definitive action against free enterprise. However, there were reports that his 
grandiose military plans and growing paranoia about the ever-presence of enemies 
significantly undermined support from among his followers. Receiving some fore-
warning of a mutiny, Ta Mok gathered his loyalists and the movement's "intellectuals" 
and retreated from the Anlong Veng escarpment at Darm Chrey.247 Civilians were 
stationed at Mountain 808; Ta Mok and his forces were ensconced at Mountain 200. 
Revolts erupted on 23 March, and Ke Pauk defected to the government, taking with him 
Yim Phanna and Nuon Chroeun of Division 980.248 These defections found roots in the 
longstanding loyalty to Pol Pot (disrupted by the previous year's "people's tribunal"), 
221 
government enticements involving lucrative logging concessions and offers of cash, 
promises of semi-autonomy, as well as war weariness.249 
In early April 1998, Ta Mok and his army chief of staff Kheum Ngon were 
looking (pleading) to give over Pol Pot (to an international tribunal) in a last ditch effort 
to rescue their meager remnant forces, languishing in the disease- and mine-ridden jungle 
above Anlong Veng. Pol Pot died while in Ta Mok's custody on 15 April 1998. On 4 
May, Ta Mok ceded control of Mountain 200 and retreated to Kbal Tonsaong, while 
civilians at Mountain 808, numbering an astonishing 15,000 crossed into Thailand's 
Sisaket Province establishing two "refugee" camps (under the control of Ta Mok 
loyalists). On 11 June, the "intelligentsia" of the waning movement (Chan Youran, Mak 
Ben, Thiounn Thioeunn, In Sopheap, and Kao Bunheng) defected to the government. On 
4 December at Prassat Preah Vihear, a number of Ta Mok's military commanders 
defected—Khem Tem, Kheum Ngon, Nuon Nov, Meas Muth, and Im Phan—brought 
about by negotiations with Hun Sen that had been spearheaded by Kheum Ngon, Ta 
Mok's former army chief of staff.250 
On 25 December, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan defected to the government 
after assurances they would not be arrested; in fact, the two aging DK veterans were 
treated to a luxurious tour of the country from Sihanoukville to Siem Reap to Pailin. 
Commenting on the manner in which Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan should be 
received, three days later, Hun Sen said Cambodians "should dig a hole and bury the past 
and look ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate."251 Hun Sen's official statement on 
the defection (on 1 January 1999) emphasized the hopes of reintegration: "I have decided 
to welcome Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea to return to join in the national 
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reconciliation, reunification and to end the political and military organization of the 
Khmer Rouge."252 The two former KR elite were officially welcomed by Chea Sim at 
the CPP 7 January 20th anniversary celebration of Pol Pot's overthrow, in which the 
defection was noted as "a positive phase that brings a definitive end to the war, and 
strengthens peace and national unity in Cambodia." 
From late 1998 until March 1999, Ta Mok and his loyalists were camped just 
across the border at Nga-Saam Pass, shield by Thailand's military (Special Unit 838 as 
well as one infantry battalion).253 Ta Mok and his commanders were "invited" to a 6 
March 1999 meeting at Chhorng Sangum Pass (Thailand) at which they were detained, 
driven to Anlong Veng, and quickly whisked off by helicopter to Phnom Penh. Ta Mok, 
the last Khmer Rouge (often referred to by English-language journalists as "the 
butcher"), was initially charged with breaking the 1994 law that outlawed his 
organization.254 Special legislation was enacted to maintain his (indefinite) pre-trial 
detention of him (and former director of S-21, "Duch") beyond Cambodia's limit of six 
months; separate charges of "genocide" and "crimes against humanity" allowed him to be 
detained for additional three-year terms beyond the original legislation. Ta Mok died at 
the Preah Khet Mealea Military Hospital in Phnom Penh on 21 July 2006, while still in 
custody. 
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Ta Mok's mountaintop house was a resting place as well as a command center. 
Using the geographic conditions of a heavily forested mountain, Ta Mok installed heavy 
artillery and machine guns of various caliber in order to shoot at and attack government 
troops stationed anywhere in Anlong Veng District. There were two houses: one covered 
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with tile that had a place to store water jugs on a stone wall and another bigger house 
that had a pond. Among the various special plants and fruits that were cultivated were 
two champaka trees [tBHtfratii = Michelia champaca]. There was an eating area and a 
table for sitting and discussing work. One unfinished house in the area had only walls, 
made of 20-cm-thick concrete and topped with razor wire. This razor wire was 8 mm 
thick, and the other parts of the structure were fashioned from 2-cm-thick planks of 
samraong wood [uteritnti = Sterculia lychnophora]. From the mountaintop one can see 
across Anlong Veng District. 
A restaurant/guesthouse, sitting on Ta Mok's ledge (loy tutu), welcomes foreigners 
and Cambodians, the general public and official delegations. Over the years that I 
researched Anlong Veng, the establishment's proprietor, Mr. Ruon, continued to develop 
and upgrade his restaurant/guesthouse. The enterprise now has a series of six typical 
Cambodian elevated, thatch-covered seating areas {kdnhchoh ncm), which line the area 
near the cliff, as well as four cabins that constitute the "guesthouse." A larger common 
restaurant has been built further back from the escarpment's edge (and closer to Ruon's 
luxurious mountain abode). Gardens of flowers populate the area along with a spirit 
house {khtorm neaktaa frasiRtn) and numerous avian creatures—geese, pigeons, doves, 
myna birds, chickens (of multiple varieties), and three turkeys {moan barang tnatnhti) (or 
dindons, as Ruon liked to speak French to me). The sound of chainsaws and sights of 
greater clear-cutting are still evident from the overlook at Ruon's picnic area. 
Ruon arrived in Anlong Veng in the dry season of 1999, holding the rank of major 
and positioned as the deputy high commander of the RCAF's Region 4 Development 
Zone. His first stationing within the area was Ta Mok's middle house and its secondary 
structure near the cliff, "Ta Mok's headquarters for meetings of high commanders." This 
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middle house estate contained two houses, which Ruon claims had already been looted by 
soldiers and had been surrounded by mines. After four months of being stationed at 
the middle house, Ruon began to explore this area called the overhang (perngphnom 
trtag), and he was awed by its surrounding beauty. He made a small road, some 
foreigners came to visit, and these visitors gave him the idea to establish a guesthouse. 
After more ideas from foreigners, he started to build the restaurant; he and his daughter 
started offering food in 2001,256 Ruon started building the kitchen and the three 
bungalows (whose long roofs give the impression of jungle chalets), which started to 
attract mostly foreign customers. He received permission for these entrepreneurial 
endeavors from officials at the Department of Tourism, even before operating licenses 
had been instituted for the district.257 
Ruon's aims to shift his focus from historical-tourism to eco-tourism. He sensed 
that although many people are familiar with the Khmer Rouge, there is a greater demand 
for places of natural beauty (which also concurs with his own interest in the area). He 
has been a soldier for a long time, and he seeks a place of calm to enjoy and also to 
pursue a profitable business with the 11 family members that have come to assist him. 
He plans to make many small resorts in many places for people to come and play. He 
will make some small paths in the forest so people can see nature and Ta Mok's 
waterfall, 1 km away.258 In 2004, Ruon's restaurant received on average 20 Khmers per 
day and 10 to 15 Thais per day, a dramatic surge since the border opening. The 
guesthouse only gets Khmer guests once in a while, but about four to five foreigners per 
week stay there. 
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Pol Pot's house, in Kbal Tonsaong arid fortified by two walls, the bricks and 
arrangement of which were Thai, had a meeting place below as well as a place to keep 
supplies, money, and other various objects. The area of Pol Pot's house before was a 
place for Ta Mok to raise animals (cows) until he prepared the area as a residence for 
Pol Pot in 1992. 
Perched on the frontal lobe of Kbal Tonsaong, Pol Pot's mountain house is 
located about 7 km down the road from Ta Mok's cliff house. Built during 1992 and 
1993, the structure originally was composed of two above-ground floors and a basement, 
with a separate kitchen. The building was commissioned by Ta Mok while Pol Pot was 
with Ieng Sary in Malai, after which Brother Number One was invited to inhabit the 
house. In its present state (having been severely looted), the ruined residence barely 
indicates the existence of an upper floor. Almost all the walls are demolished, and light 
blue tiles persist as some of the only evidence of what the structure may have been like. 
The original retreat was erected by three construction workers, who had arrived in 
the Dangrek Range in 1988. These men, now in their early 50s, express a special 
relationship to their achievement. The sentiment can be traced in comments about the 
locale's present condition, in repeated statements that "if the houses were not looted, they 
would still be standing." (An implicit judgment regarding the acts of others (outsiders?) 
wanted to be conveyed.) Further, as one builder stated, "if they were not looted, the 
houses would gain money for the government to give to the district. Many tourists would 
come to see the houses." The awareness of tourism potential is perhaps their second 
concern with regard to the museum. When asked about their attitudes toward the project, 
another construction worker responded, "the museum is important because it is built to 
remind people about history and old things that the Khmer Rouge left. On the other 
hand, we have a border foundation between Thailand and Cambodia. We are afraid 
Thailand takes our land, so we build the museum and the house near the border." A third 
builder concurred, explaining that Ta Mok had asked them to measure the land between 
Thailand and Cambodia and to build the house near the landmark, because he was afraid 
the Thais would move the landmark further into Cambodia. 
Although the actual term "replica" (yoattho chamlang Introa)—literally, "object-
copy"—was not deployed by informants, their descriptions indicate that in situ, life-size 
reconstructions of the major sites constitute a key aspect within the overall vision of the 
Anlong Veng museum project.260 "Same as before" (dauchmun tteHs) is a more common 
colloquial expression of this emergent concept.261 The verisimilitude of these new 
reconstructions is largely dependent on the mental image in the minds of those who 
originally erected the buildings. The field of representation opens to numerous pressures 
and various perspectives on the relationship between originality and historical 
reconstruction. One of Ta Mok's drivers was articulate in explaining an obstacle to 
representing Anlong Veng history. He conveyed contemporaneous reflection on the 
desires of tourists (to see the current state of sites in Anlong Veng and the actual 
remnants of the old accomplishments), a commitment to authenticity (the old 
accomplishments themselves), and an acknowledgement of the practical demands of 
historical-tourist (re-)construction (construction of a "replica" by the original builders as 
if according to a picture). There was certainly an awareness that any replica is not 
exactly the same as an original. A son-in-law of Ta Mok commented: "Everything the 
government needs, the government should take.... People should not put false things in 
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the house; for instance, documents that came from Anlong Veng should not be changed 
or corrected. Anything we do not have, we should not make again. What we have, we 
should make the same, but not make any modifications." 
Another informant conveyed a complex understanding of the relationship between 
authenticity (i.e., unaltered objects)—which has been almost completely lost to 
destruction, looting, and scavenging—and re-presentation (i.e., making anew but exactly 
as before). Accordingly, the plan to rebuild sites seems framed in terms of an 
original/replica dialectic, which highlights competing pressures from attempts at 
historical accuracy and the drive to attract tourists; simultaneously, there appears to be 
tension between local and national agendas around the idea of "preserving" historical 
authenticity.262 
The essential goal of the ministry, with regard to remnants of structures that 
housed Khmer Rouge cadre, is the simulation of an originality with regard to structures 
(creating spaces) that have housed individuals of historical significance.263 "Re-
construction" in Cambodia is not new, as many of the temples in the country have been 
the product of similar (archaeological) efforts. However, in the case of Anlong Veng, the 
original builders are repeating the exact same (?!) construction work they were 
commissioned to do by other authorities roughly a decade before—claiming a precise 
repetition.264 There is therefore an assumed greater "legitimacy" or "accuracy" of the re-
presentation, because the builders are seen as capable of making the sites precisely the 
"same as before." 
The Ministry of Tourism is calling upon these three men to (re-)build on the 
foundations of ruins; this endeavor will expand to include the other sites to be (re-
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Constructed as they will have been (like before). Tourism officials have approached the 
men on two occasions to solicit their services in reconstituting Pol Pot's mountain house. 
In 2001, the district chief asked the men to venture to the ruined remnants to survey the 
site. Following the chiefs instructions, the men spent 30,000 riel each of their own 
money; over a year later, the district had not reimbursed them for their expedition 
expenses. The district chief told them when the houses are built, they will know the cost 
and then give the men all the money they are owed.265 The construction workers 
provided details to the district chief and agreed to build the house, because when the 
construction is completed they will receive payment. However, they expressed concern, 
because they did not know when restoration work will begin. In June 2002, Khemarak 
asked the three men to measure the dimensions of Pol Pot's house. In fact, they were 
asked to plan the reconstruction of six house sites in three areas on the mountain: the 
houses of Pol Pot, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Chan Youran. 
While they were encouraged by being contacted again regarding the tourism project, they 
harbored doubt on their future involvement.266 
There appear to be at least three notions of accuracy (sometime discussed as 
"truth") operating in and around the Anlong Veng project. First, there is a concern, 
principally expressed by local informants and echoed to some degree by tourism officials, 
about spatial correctness. The informed former Khmer Rouge residents made repeated 
statements arguing that mistakes committed by the Ministry and Department of Tourism 
demonstrated that these agencies should not be taken seriously. Another aspect to this 
nominalist issue is correct labeling of sites, for example attributing correct ownership or 
primary residence to the correct inhabitant.268 Addressing both of these dimensions 
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appears relatively straightforward, although it is somewhat complicated by the mobility 
over the course of two decades. Nonetheless, the concerns of Anlong Veng residents 
could be largely allayed by securing confirmation of site identifications with more 
informed locals, per the ministry's stated methodology.269 
It was common for informants (even relatively high-ranking figures) to defer to 
higher authorities when responding to inquiries, suggesting an invalidation of one's own 
opinions because of one's social position, but also simultaneously a paying of proper 
respect to those of higher status. In terms of content, this deference covered informants' 
attitudes, memories, and opinions about events as well as in the degree of their 
responsibility for actions and policies.270 A number of individuals made explicit 
deferential statements that the district chief knows the most/best about the history of 
Anlong Veng—as if obliging this figure to play primary informant would provide all the 
(relevant/legitimate) knowledge one could possibly want about the area's history. 
Others, particularly those officially involved with the Tourism Ministry's project, 
suggested three additional figures as bearers of historical knowledge. These 
individuals—a DK public works official, Ta Mok's secretary, and Ta Mok's adopted son 
(whose recognition stems at least in part from his active role in the Department of 
Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng)—posed locally sanctioned sources for 
historically accurate information (i.e., the "designated" historians). The stated credentials 
for their occupying this position of responsibility included: experiences, which were most 
relevant to the events and sites; outstanding memory capacities (mental acuity); 
continued study/reflection of the area's history; selection by higher officials in an attempt 
to consolidate a consistent history; and/or political orientation (i.e., pro-Ta Mok). 
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The construction of "history" from those in recognized positions entails some 
implications for how one understands "history" and its making and writing: history as 
negotiation as well as negotiated (re-)constructions of history. The first dimension of this 
dialectic involves understanding history as a perpetual process of struggle/negotiation/re-
configuration (a la Gramsci), whereby historical formations or conditions are the 
products of the antagonistic/agonistic playing out of actors' interests. In the case of 
Anlong Veng, the forces that made history—the Khmer Rouge and the Royal Cambodian 
Government primarily, but also international forces—are continuous with those involved 
in the process of this history's re-presentation in the form of a museum.272 The re-
construction of historical narrative-—as a consensus on facts among Anlong Veng 
villagers or as a museumification of a version of that history—parallels the operations 
that dominate the making of history, as various forces with differing perspectives and 
interests produce (textual) renditions of the past. However, while the authority of 
narrating the story of Anlong Veng was endowed to the most supreme local government 
official and a designated expert triumvirate, informants appeared quite capable and 
willing to share their knowledges and memories about particular sites.273 
A second notion of accuracy, the one broached by the task confronting the 
builders of Pol Pot's house, deals with resemblance. The ministry's conscripting the 
construction workers assumes that these individuals are the most capable in creating an 
accurate re-construction, replica, of the mountaintop abode, and thereby ensures a certain 
authenticity to the site. While the authentic and true are addressed in terms of correct 
historical accounts (Ministry of Tourism) and accurate identification of locations (many 
Anlong Veng residents), the (constructed nature of the) authenticity that the historical-
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tourist area seeks to provide—in situ and resembling reconstructions and replicas—is not 
overtly addressed by the tourism officials tasked with realizing the museum project. 
A former Khmer Rouge doctor conveyed a local's view of authenticity, which 
hinges on (the perception of) "original achievements," plainly stating: "So when the 
Oddar Meanchey tourism office rebuilds the museum and all the places, all the things 
they build will be new and not the original achievements of the Khmer Rouge. Then we 
will have no places left. How important is it? Because all the places will not be 
achievements of the Khmer Rouge; they will be achievements of tourism." His brief 
appraisal is insightful as it shows how the re-construction of sites is first a destruction of 
the original site, and second a creation (copy?) which does not have an inherent relation 
to the past/original achievement.274 This local Anlong Veng, former Khmer Rouge sense 
of "authenticity"—a relationship to sites with which current residents actually interacted 
(or still interact, such as the Ta Mok school and hospital)—can be contrasted with the 
Ministry of Tourism's notion of "accuracy" which operates as the legitimizing alibi of the 
museum project. Put differently, this comparison could be cast as the difference between 
an embodied, everyday relationship to a site ("real" or "authentic") and the abstract, 
rational(ized) determination of "accuracy" as it circulates in a discourse of truth and 
validity (providing the intellectual basis for the physical re-presentation of history). A 
local vision/relationship of "authenticity," as the doctor conveyed it—a native cherishing 
of what (actually) was before—seems in tension with another local perspective, based on 
the desire for money/development. While some informants are concerned about 
acknowledging the correct achievements of the Khmer Rouge, other seem ready to pimp 
this past (according to a variety of possible forms) on the promise of revenues from 
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A third area of "truth," which the Tourism Ministry frequented addresses in terms 
of accuracy, involves historical presentation. For the most part, the ministry pursues this 
true and accurate record in terms of correct historical information, specifically facts. This 
data (dates, places, events, personae) form the foundation for a historical narrative (i.e., 
the guide book), which is largely expressed as site-specific chronologies. Implicit in 
these mini-stories and explicitly in the training of tour guides is the inherent 
interpretation that governs the presentation of the past, a narrative that subtly demonizes 
Anlong Veng ' s ancien regime, even as commercial success provides the guarantee for 
this interpretation's circulation. 
N A T I O N A L N A R R A T I V E S 
Hun Sen ' s 2001 circular that initiates the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area 
project positions these latest (collection of) sites along a historical/historiographical 
continuum that also subsumes: the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes, the 
Choeung Ek Genocidal Center, and multiple memorial stupas that house remains of 
genocide victims. These recent endeavors can be placed alongside the (PRK) 
government 's efforts vis-a-vis Democratic Kampuchea more general ly—the formation of 
a "national narrat ive"—whose mechanisms involve museum efforts, annual holidays, and 
historical manifestations.2 7 5 Chandler ' s recent work argues that the Royal Cambodian 
Government ' s (specifically, Hun Sen 's) post-1993 approach to the D K period has been 
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"officially enforced amnesia," a turning away from its earlier emphasis on demohizing 
the Khmer Rouge.276 Offering a more variable reading, Williams argues that there has 
been a reversal from the policy of sustained hatred toward a policy of forgiveness and 
forgetting (1991-1994), national reconciliation (1996-1998), and memorialization (2001 
onward).277 The historical moments and monuments that underlie these readings are 
elaborated below. 
At the People's Revolutionary Tribunal convened at the Chaktomuk Theatre on 
15-19 August 1979, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were tried and condemned to death in 
abstentia on the basis of a month-old anti-genocide law, Decree Law No. 7.278 Minister 
of Propaganda, Keo Chanda, presided over the court; a former vice president of the DK 
People's Assembly, Mat Ly, acted as lead prosecutor. At the time, Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia was perceived as a violation of national sovereignty by the non-Soviet-aligned 
elements of the international community; the ostracism and isolation the new regime 
faced included: the denial of UN representation, in favor of the CGDK (led and 
represented by Khmer Rouge elite); withholding/cessation of aid; a trade embargo; and 
the military resuscitation of the CGDK factions.279 On the domestic political scene, the 
new regime's leaders had to differentiate themselves from the CPK and DK, from which 
many of them had fled as late as 1977. Furthermore, the administration needed to pursue 
social policies that would further garner legitimation for its (socialist, but not-DK) rule. 
The importance of the People's Revolutionary Tribunal to the regime is attested by the 
fact that the grand event was pursued in spite of a dramatic lack of resources.280 In this 
context, the political function of the tribunal was stated explicitly by the presiding judge 
on the eve of the trial: "Trying the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique for the crime of genocide 
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will on the one hand expose all the criminal acts that they have committed and mobilize 
the Kampuchean people more actively to defend and build up the people's power, and on 
the other hand show the peoples of the whole world the true face of the criminals who are 
posing as the representatives of the people of Kampuchea." 
Particularly interesting is the intellectual gymnastics that were performed to 
specifically attribute responsibility to Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and avoid mention of other 
DK leaders. Furthermore, their Marxist-Leninist affiliations—and, by extension, any 
connection to Vietnam—were discarded in favor of adjectival labels of "fascist" and 
"genocidal."283 By focusing exclusively on Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and their "clique" as 
those responsible, government policies left open the possibility of co-opting Khmer 
Rouge resistance fighters, including such senior leaders as Nuon Chea.284 This strategy 
was formalized in a circular that differentiated the culpability of leaders and those (lower-
level) cadre who acted under orders but who could repent and embrace the (PRK) 
revolution. As Gottesman notes, it becomes apparent that the greater crime was not 
DK-era offenses but continued resistance against the new regime. He further suggests 
that the trial was one of the first instances in which the new government would deploy 
"carefully constructed language" to distinguish its (communist) ideology from the 
("Maoist") ideology of Democratic Kampuchea.286 Heder has flatly stated that: "'Justice' 
was used crudely and straightforwardly as a political tool to craft a history acceptable to 
those in charge of overseeing its dissemination."287 Some specific policies and 
approaches of the PRK government, the KNUFNS, and the KPRP emerge from the 
tribunal: a differentiation of PRK communism from DK communism (conceived as 
"fascist method," "reactionary" policies, "Maoism") bolstered by a particular reading of 
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DK history; the limiting of responsibility to a small group of leaders (naming only two 
principals)288; an offer of clemency to remnant Khmer Rouge as a means of co-optation; 
the specific identification of Eastern Zone cadre as a distinct political body; the 
obfuscation/sanitization of the possible culpability of East Zone defectors holding posts 
in the PRK government; an all-inclusive "victim" status extended to survivors throughout 
society; the unification of opposing internal factions (Hanoi veterans and East Zone 
defectors) as well as surviving pre-revolutionary elite289; and a public enactment of 
justice (condemnation of genocide) seeking domestic justification/legitimacy for the 
Vietnamese-backed regime and the erosion of international support for the resistance 
factions that would become the CGDK.290 
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Two Vietnamese photojournalists stumbled upon an abandoned prison in January 
1979; this interrogation center had been evacuated in haste, leaving behind its last 
fourteen victims to die in its torture rooms. Just over a year after its discovery, the S-21 
security center would become the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime. S-21 
operated as the central office of DK's santebal, with numerous smaller prisons scattered 
about the country. Its uniqueness with regard to the CPK lies with its role in accounting 
for and documenting perceived traitorous networks, which the CPK leadership believed 
to be sabotaging the Kampuchean revolution—the purge (bos sdm 'aat ttsiaiMfrisi) of hidden 
enemies. Although S-21 prisoners were drawn from a variety of backgrounds, the 
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overwhelming target ofsantebaPs operation was those from within the movement 
thought to be betraying the revolution. 
Tuol Sleng Prison (S-21) 
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Tuol Slehg Prison (S-21). 
Source: Chandler, Voices from S-2J,p. 1 (photographs section). 
In the pre-revolutionary era, the structures that became S-21 composed the Tuol 
Svay Prey Secondary School and the Tuol Sleng Primary School (alongside to the 
west)/" After the CPK seizure of power, the classrooms of the high school's four three-
story buildings were used for detention, interrogation, torture, and the storage of vast 
documentation and many dossiers, which detailed the alleged sabotage committed by its 
inmates.292 Individuals brought into S-21 were not told where they were being taken. 
Immediately upon arrival, they would be photographed and shackled. Through 
interrogation sessions, inmates were made to recount their "life story" (brdvattiroup 
tjifmu); if this autobiographical "confession" did not elicit (anticipated) acts of sabotage, 
the respondent would be subjected to various types of torture and forced to revise their 
narrative. Consequently, the hundreds of thousands of pages of confessions bear 
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concoctions of conspiracies—many of which quite complicated and unbelievable—that 
involve CIA, KGB, and/or Vietnamese plots to overthrow Democratic Kampuchea. In 
scrutinizing prisoners' (false) confessions, Chandler describes each dossier's self-critical 
life story format as a uniquely Communist writing genre, particularly important in China 
and Vietnam.293 From confessions extracted under torture, the regime "exposed" 
traitorous networks (khsae kbdt tsjnjti) everywhere it looked.294 Prisoners were compelled 
to implicate their associates; these (false) accusations became the grounds for the culling, 
detention, interrogation, torture, and execution according to these strings of 
implication.295 The pathological logic governing the aw/o,$'-f/a:/e at S-21 becomes 
apparent: CPK suspicions (due to reflections on adverse conditions in the countryside or 
reactions to sporadic rebellions, or arising from leaders' personal vigilance) lead to the 
arrest of cadre already considered guilty; interrogators, themselves under threat from 
above to expose/produce traitorous activity (lest they be deemed traitors), extract 
"evidence" by means of torture; the confessions produce more enemies which thereby 
confirms the Party's suspicions; at the same time, the "smashing" (kamtech mss) and 
"discarding" {bah chaol ttnsraicu) of traitors attests to the (limited) success of the purge 
process.296 Of the approximately 14,000 men, women and children that entered S-21, 
only seven survived.297 After a satisfactory confession had been secured, prisoners were 
thrown away; some of the dead were buried in the surrounding areas (in the westside yard 
of the elementary school); with intensifying purges in 1977 and after, many of S-21' s 
inmates were transported 15 km from the capital, where they were killed and buried in 
mass graves. 
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The Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime {sarakmorntir aukrettkam 
bralaypuchsaas tuol sleng MIIH|I q^ SfifclprotijcujMiMS "stutrati") is poised on a hillock of 
strychnine {tuol sleng Qcutwa) in present-day Boeng Keng Kong III Ward, Chamkar Mon 
Quarter of the capital.298 The tourist destination, opened in July 1980, was the 
accomplishment of Mai Lam, a Vietnamese colonel and museum expert. He had 
assembled Ho Chi Minn City's Museum of American War Crimes, traveled to Poland's 
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum for research, and worked with East German museum 
specialists in the transformation of S-21 into Tuol Sleng.299 Commencement of the 
project was contemporaneous with the organization of the People's Revolutionary 
Tribunal and subject to many of the same objectives. "In turning S-21 into a museum of 
genocide, Mai lam wanted to arrange Cambodia's recent past to fit the requirements of 
the PRK and its Vietnamese mentors as well as the long-term needs, as he saw them, of 
the Cambodian people."300 
TUOL SLENG 
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In the past, the Museum "Tuol Sleng" was one of the high 
schools in the capital called "Tuol Svay Prey " High School. After 
April 17th, 1975, Pol Pot clique had transformed it into an office 
called "S-21" (Security 21) which was the biggest prison in 
Cambodia. It was surrounded with a double wall of corrugated 
irons which were surmounted by very thick barbed wires. The 
classrooms on the first and second stories were pierced and 
divided into single cells; whereas the ones on the third story were 
used for large detention. 
Many thousands of victims were imprisoned and exterminated 
with their wives and children (Peasants, workers, technicians, 
engineers, monks, ministers and some cadres in Pol Pot 
government, soldiers of all ranks, doctors, teachers, students, the 
Corps Diplomatique, foreigners, etc.). 
Right here, you will see a lot of evidences proving the atrocities 
of Pol Pot clique: cells, torture instruments, dossiers and 
documents, books of victims' names, victims' photos, their clothes 
and belongings.... 
We have found a few mass graves here and there around this 
prison especially the big ones in Chceung Ek village, Dang Kor 
district, Kandal province (about 15 km from Phnom Penh in the 
South—West) 
Source: Tuol Sleng Genocidal Center Guidebook, inside cover. 
Each building within the interrogation center compound offers a view of a 
different aspect ofsantebaVs functioning. The first-floor rooms of Building A exhibit 
metal bed frames and other implements used for torture; on the walls are blown-up 
photographs that show the state of each interrogation cell when it was discovered, many 
of which harbored blood-drenched corpses anchored to bed frames amidst pools of bodily 
fluids. To the still-visible blood stains on the orange-and-white tile floors are added the 
security regulations (in Khmer and English) that governed interrogations, posted just 
outside the interrogation rooms.301 The large rooms making up the first floor of Building 
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B are lined with photographs of hundreds of S-21's victims; more recently, these images 
have been arranged according to categories (women, foreigners, youth, etc.). The vast 
display of portraits is perhaps the most striking for visitors, and its display has circulated 
beyond Tuol Sleng's walls.302 The floors of Building C offer walk-in tours of various 
detention spaces, from the large classrooms where multitudes were ankle-shackled 
together to the brick-and-mortar solitary cells reserved for important cadre. Building D 
exhibits some remnant implements of torture, victims' possessions, pictures of S-21 staff, 
photographs of Phnom Penh in the 1970s, maps, as well as artwork depicting santebaVs 
methods. The last item in the gallery was a map of Cambodia composed of human skulls 
with the country's main water bodies (Tonle Sap and Mekong) dyed blood red; this map 
was dismantled in March 2002.303 
The Choeung Ek Genocidal Center (morchak morndorl brdlaypuchsaas cherng 
aek HfijHCintu tpnratiti&ri&ja tBtian), commonly called the "Killing Fields," complements Tuol 
Sleng the interrogation center. One of hundreds of sites that contain mass graves, 
Choeung Ek—the renownst {cherng aek tBtitm) of remembrance—was also converted into 
a memorial museum by the Vietnamese in 1980.304 Prior to becoming an ill-fitted resting 
ground for counter-revolutionary corpses and innocents, the area covered a fruit tree 
orchard and Chinese graveyard. Echoing the minimalism of Tuol Sleng, some 15 km 
away, the visitor walks among Choeung Ek's expanse of disinterred gravesites without 
much guidance beyond brief descriptions of the pits' former contents. A memorial 
"stupa" erected in 1988, houses hundreds of skulls and offers views of DK's victims. 
Farm implements (hammers, hoes, axes, saws)—the tools of bludgeoning—populate the 
memorial site's environs.305 
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At Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, visitors are presented with sites that suggest an 
unmediated encounter with the past. The environs are largely left to guests' exploration, 
with a minimal amount of guidance. Tuol Sleng is presented to the visitor as how the 
torture center was discovered in 1979. In so doing, it tends to efface its own curatorship; 
or, it designates that which stands "just as it was" (e.g., the interrogation rooms) and that 
which is being presented as it was (e.g., the enlargements of portraits correlated to inmate 
dossiers). Choeung Ek similarly seeks to present the mass graves "as they were," but 
most of the tracts have been excavated, so that the visitor can better "see" how they 
were—toward the "obscene." The windowed memorial "stupa" allows the visitor to look 
in on the victims (an assemblage of ossified remains), and the collections of implements 
and possessions underwrite the evidence of death. 
A variety of analyses indicate the obvious fact that the PRK government was 
attempting to shape the historical record with its (presumably-accurate-because-
undisturbed) representations of history at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek.307 It is clear that 
one of the overriding objectives, in the creation of Tuol Sleng especially, was the 
justification of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, an exhibition of the criminal acts of the 
Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique that warranted its overthrow by the KUFNS.308 PRK claims to 
legitimacy were rooted in exposing atrocities of the DK regime and arguing that the 
KUFNS had in fact saved Cambodia (and the Khmer race) from destruction by the evil 
Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. Simply, the greater the past suffering, the greater legitimacy 
endowed to the PRK. The locality of the museum (its truth of place) in concert with the 
photographic and textual "evidence" lend an authoritative character to the PRK's re-
presentation of DK horrors (and Vietnam's rescue).309 
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Ledgerwood treats Tuol Sleng as "the central site for construction of memories of 
Democratic Kampuchea," and she undertakes to analyze the correspondence between the 
"master narrative of the successor state" (PRK) and a "popular narrative" (largely 
coincident with Vickery's "Standard Total View").310 As a legitimation of the new PRK 
regime, the master narrative foregrounds Tuol Sleng in a way that positions the 
government as savior of a revolution that was stolen and perverted by the Pol Pot-Ieng 
Sary clique. The "monological historical explanation" remaps the revolutionary 
accomplishments in Cambodia, such that the PRK state is the re-alignment of the (good) 
communist movement that was derailed in 1975 by a clique of genocidal monsters: "the 
[April 1975] victory... was stolen by a small number of murderous criminals who killed 
true revolutionaries, many in this facility."311 The tripartite message that Ledgerwood 
locates in the State's publications emphasize: 1) Cambodians want to remember the 
clique's murderous acts so as to 2) disallow the Khmer Rouge's return, and 3) that there 
is an irresolvable anger/agony (chheur chap cmtrm)—"born of betrayal and frustration"— 
directed at "Pol Pot."312 With this message in mind, the analysis confronts Vickery's 
STV, not in terms of its content, but on the presumed sources of the narrative. Vickery 
claims that the STV largely originates with refugee accounts that are selected, circulated, 
and sensationalized by Western journalists and anti-Communist governments.313 
Ledgerwood argues that Vickery's idea of an extreme STV—"killing for the sake of 
genocide"—encapsulates the PRK/State narrative, the narrative of Tuol Sleng. Further, 
the museum offers an interpretive framework for "a shared perception of facts as 
remembered now by Khmer who experienced it."314 In sum, Ledgerwood's "telling" 
presents a government-initiated site of memory-interpretation based on and reinforcing an 
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extreme standard total view of the DK period. Furthermore, the victory script that posits 
the KUFNS as saviors of the Khmer race, emphasized in Tuol Sleng (as well as in the 
Days of Hate) draws significantly from the "good East" narrative that simultaneously 1) 
acknowledges a debt to the Vietnamese people while establishing independence from 
them, and 2) establishes the true (communist) patriots in contradistinction to the 
murderous clique that had attempted to pervert the revolution and to annihilate the Khmer 
race. The persistent and outlawed Khmer Rouge become the new "traitors" documented 
in S-21-become-Tuol Sleng315; the search for enemies extends toward Anlong Veng. 
In August 1983, the government declared May 20 as the "Day of Hatred for the 
genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan regime."316 The auspicious annual 
appointment with anger alluded to a meeting on 20 May 1975, at which Pol Pot and his 
cadre had put forth a policy (total agrarian collectivization) which entailed the 
differentiation of social classes, the elimination the ancien regime, and ensuing death 
from overwork/exhaustion. Deriving truth from location, the appropriate venues for 
the original activities were any place that had seen torture or killing during DK, including 
Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, and local "killing fields" sites as well as memorial stupas 
erected to preserve victims' remains. Victims of the Pol Pot clique were invited to share 
their stories of suffering and denounce the genocidal regime. Hughes' review of the early 
practices around this State-designated day indicates that the act of sharing memories was 
simultaneously combined with forward-looking action, revolutionary vigilance against 
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the continued threat of the Khmer Rouge.318 The Day of Hate was less about examining 
the individuated memories of victims and more directed to fostering and sustaining anger 
at Pol Pot's (and the CGDK's) continuing war against the Khmer people.319 Hughes also 
notes how the international target audience of the commemoration shifted over time, with 
messages tuned to Vietnam and the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s and broadening toward 
the UN in latter manifestations.320 Post-independence Cambodge exhibits a well-
established tradition of State-sponsored demonstrations of a political nature, and the Day 
of Hate iteration augments this practice by harnessing personal memory, experience, 
emotion, and vitriol to larger national and international aims. 
Although formal government promotion of the day ceased with the 1991 Paris 
Peace Accords, this suspension did not prevent some local municipalities from continuing 
to foster commemorative events. Latter-day celebrations of the day resumed attempts to 
meld personal reflection with political interests, albeit in a less-staged and more multi-
vocal manner. The Day of Hate was officially revived in 1999 in the context of 
discussions of an international tribunal for surviving DK leaders.321 With the bumpy 
take-off of the ECCC, the Day of Hate has seen a recent resurgence. Certain localities 
engage in Buddhist ceremonies as a means to honor victims of Democratic Kampuchea, 
others combine religious observance with spectacle. The 2008 ceremony at the Choeung 
Ek "Killing Fields" was marked by a re-enactment of Khmer Rouge violence. Phnom 
Penh Municipal Governor Kep Chuktema commented, "We have this ceremony to 
celebrate justice for the Cambodian people. And also highlight the [upcoming ECCC] 
trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders who have made this a devastating killing field."322 
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Day of Hate Re-Enactment 
Similar to the Day of Hate, the commemoration of 7 Makara, the national holiday— 
marking Victory over the Genocidal Regime Day, 7 January 1979 (tivea cheychumneah 
ler rorbdb brdlaypuchsaas BfiSffldastrojuuprifcantjfmMB)—experienced a period of 
remission.323 The holiday was reintroduced by a government circular in 1996, which was 
the first time Victory Day was to be celebrated following the post-UNTAC formation of a 
coalition government.324 From the CPP's perspective, the holiday celebrates the 
liberation of Cambodia from DK rule (with Vietnamese assistance); for its coalition 
partner FUNCINPEC, the date marked the invasion of Cambodia and its ten-year 
occupation by the Vietnamese.325 In protest of the holiday's re-commemoration, 12 
FUNCINPEC Parliamentarians expressed their opposition in a letter to King Sihanouk. 
Although subject to some controversy, but without the dramatic re-enactments or 
compelled performance of memory of May 20, Victory Day typically involves oratory 
occasions for leading CPP figures. Chea Sim, Party Secretary and President of the 
Senate, has taken the opportunity to recount the historical accomplishments of the 
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KUFNS, KPRP, PRK, and CPP with the support of the Vietnamese. His address on the 
25th anniversary of the Front's victory highlighted the "independence, peace, freedom, 
and prosperity" achieved by the liberation of Cambodia from DK rule as well as the 
government's further accomplishments in preventing a return of the genocidal Pol Pot 
regime. This speech also singles out those who opposed the celebration of 7 Makara 
as outlaws: "Such immoral attitude is only tantamount to legalizing the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime and at the same time constitutes an insult on the revival of our 
people."327 His 2008 speech marking the same event went further, accusing some 
"insane circles for taking themselves for the enemies of the 7 January victory and of the 
people's revival, seeking all possible means to overthrow the people's power with the 
aim of bringing back the genocide regime."328 The occasion for remembrance also 
provides the opportunity to identify traitors.329 
The narrative of the Party, as documented in official histories, provides greater 
detail on the interpretations of the past that underwrite the People's Revolutionary 
Tribunal, the Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek museums, and the official holidays sponsored 
by the PRK; it also provides a context for CPP motivations behind the drive to construct 
an historical-tourist area in Anlong Veng. 
Faced with the danger of extinction of the nation and loss of the country 
about to fall in the hands of the reactionary Beijing Chinese expansionists, 
in December 1978, a number of true Kampuchean communists gathered 
patriotic forces and created the Kampuchean United Front for National 
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Salvation, and incited the people to rise up and annihilate the genocidal 
regime. In response to the pressing (chant bach) wishes of the 
Kampuchean revolution, the Vietnamese people and army helped us 
truthfully in every way to fight for the historic victory of 7 January 1979, 
to destroy completely the regime of Pol Pot, to put an end to the danger of 
genocide, to liberate our country from the ferocious teeth of the Beijing 
Chinese expansionists, and to found the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea.330 
Thus is founded the victory script that legitimates the PRK government. Frings' 
examination asserts that KPRP historiography not only seeks to legitimate PRK rule, but 
also aims to establish a sense of independence and equality for Cambodia (specifically in 
its relation with Vietnam). In its first decade of rule, it also sought to present the KPRP 
as the proper inheritors of a Marxist-Leninist tradition, largely rooted in regional 
(Indochinoise) cooperation, a movement that had been hijacked by the (bad) communists 
under Pol Pot's leadership; that is, the KPRP sough to distinguish itself from Pol Pol's 
CPK while also re-asserting the Party's political lineage. The demonization of Pol Pot, 
his massacre of the Kampuchean people, was also framed in terms of expansionist aims, 
emanating from China.331 From 1979 onward, the Party—-through its various 
incarnations (KNUFNS, PRK, KPRP, CPP)—has consistently pointed to its role as savior 
of the Khmer people from annihilation. The PRK's history writing was initially 
constrained by the occupation of the country by Vietnamese troops. In order not to be 
seen as a puppet or client state of its assistive neighbor, Party history also needed to 
emphasize a degree of independence; however, given the massive support under-writing 
the PRK regime, any hostility toward its eastern neighbor was impossible.332 This 
tension was largely resolved by appeal to "militant solidarity" with the countries of the 
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old ICP as well as with states within the Soviet bloc. However, this idea also had to 
shift according the historical circumstances of the pre-1979 communist struggle. 
Divergences begin at the (re-)beginnings of the Party. Chandler and Frings 
contrast the torturous CPK battle over the Party's founding date to the PRK (re-)writing 
of Party history after the ousting of DK. The revised foundations of the CPK is brought 
to light in the Pol Potist CPK's 1976 shift from the 1951 origins of the KPRP to its 1960 
name change to the KWP. This was in tune with Pol Pot's desire to separate the CPK 
(and DK) from its period of Vietnamese/ICP linkages.334 Further, the ascendant faction 
within the CPK sought to physically eliminate counter visions of the Party's formation. 
Pol Pot had distanced the CPK from Vietnam politically (and historiographically) due to 
the neighboring communists' strategic subordination of the Cambodian struggle to the 
ends of the Vietnamese struggle. Pol Pot's early demand to pursue armed struggle—in 
line with his "imitation" of the (South) Vietnamese model—was discouraged, given 
Sihanouk's permissive attitude toward arms shipments to the Vietnamese across 
Cambodian territory and the strategic use of borderlands. Thus, the revisionist history 
that Pol Pot's CPK attempted to violently institute underscored Kampuchea's 
independent accomplishments against the expansionist aggression of the Vietnamese.335 
While the CPK imposed its re-naissance in 1976, the PRK re-tracing of its 
particular steps occurred a decade later.336 The 1986 KPRP Party History re-affirms the 
foundational split in the earlier KPRP, during the Second Congress held 28-30 
September 1960. "Pol Pot's entry into the Party Centre shook the composition of the 
Party; the opportunistic clique came to hold the important leadership positions; the 
authentic cadres and Party members were progressively discarded."337 Looking back, the 
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commencement of armed struggle by the CPK (unauthorized by the Vietnamese) 
becomes a silent period in the PRK historiography: events in the pre-1970 struggle go 
undiscussed, Party members disavow membership in the CPK during this time, actions 
and roles are minimized/obfuscated, etc. After the ascension of the US-backed Lon 
Nol regime, the story of Vietnamese support is re-inserted and framed in terms of a 
regional alliance fighting an imperialist power. 
Echoing the convergence of successor state victory narrative and STV (in 
Ledgerwood's analysis), Chandler states "Ironically, what people were told to think about 
DK in the 1980s and much of what was written about the Khmer Rouge under the PRK 
often coincided, in a pleasingly Manichean fashion, with what most people remembered 
later on, and with what was published about DK by expatriate survivors."339 In October 
1991, the KPRP became the CPP; Marxism-Leninism was eschewed, but Party and 
government officials remain the same. With the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army in 
1989, and especially the post-UNTAC integration of PRK/SoC, FUNCINPEC, and 
KPNLF factions, the government's struggle against the remnant Khmer Rouge in its 
various bases in the west and northwest projected independence, national unity, and socio 
-economic development. 
Begun in 1996, Hun Sen's "win-win policy" sought to achieve peace and national 
reconciliation without any losers, except for the select "hard-line chieftains" (which came 
to mean only Ta Mok).340 Code-named the "One Sen Plan" (phaenkaar muoy saen 
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stlsmKifi HHJ teas)—borrowing the singularity of the Prime Minister's moniker for its 
implementation—this policy worked toward national unity by using enticements that 
would increasingly chip away at the lingering Khmer Rouge resistance movement.341 In 
addition to amnesty, defectors would be guaranteed resettlement and equivalent posts in 
the government. Through military and politico-diplomatic means, Hun Sen sought to 
court these Khmer Rouge fighters into re-joining the national fold: "...to put an end to the 
Khmer Rouge we cannot use only military means, nor can we finish their political and 
military organizations by allowing them to come to Phnom Penh, by keeping them as a 
political counter balance, or by negotiating with them as a political and military 
organization. Therefore, the win-win solution or policy through the process of 
pacification in the remaining territory, is the only measure taken in accordance with law 
and morality to end these prolonged wars."342 News of the policy, especially as a post 
mortem account of victory, was used in a number of circumstances by CPP higher-ups. 
In describing his continued offensive against the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen counter-posed 
his "win-win policy" to the Khmer Rouge "iron erosion" strategy.343 In a preamble to 
discussing the CPP's accomplishments in overcoming conflict, President of the Council 
of Ministers Sok An outlined the policy's "five facets: 'divide, isolate, finish, integrate 
and develop' in which the Khmer Rouge political and military structure was ended, 
including by military assaults, but those Khmer Rouge who defected and surrendered 
were assured of their physical safety and survival, the right to work and to carry out their 
professions, and the security of their property."344 Addressing recent defectors, Hun Sen 
explained their actions as "not a surrender or a confession, but an obligation to be 
fulfilled by all Cambodian sons and daughters in joining efforts to put an end to the war 
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which the previous generations started."345 The strategy was also referenced in the re-
initiation of the Day of Hate.346 In terms of an historical narrative that incorporates the 
last bastion of Khmer Rouge resistance at Anlong Veng, the "win-win policy" points to 
the CPP's already accomplished rescue of the Khmer people from the genocidal clique as 
well as its further success in securing peace (again and again) in a manner that promotes 
unity and acceptance (re-integration) as well as reconstruction (employment and 
involvement in development). The Party that keeps giving peace, by tying together an 
ever-greater national unity.347 
On the occasion of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan defecting to the government 
in December 1998, Hun Sen stated: "We should dig a hole and bury the past and look 
ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate... if a wound does not hurt, you should not 
poke at it to make it bleed." Chandler notes how this quote indicates that the 
historiographic policies of the KPRP/CPP have moved from an emphasis on 
demonization to an enforced "collective amnesia"; the trajectory of this denouement 
proceeds from summoning history to its enterrement, to the diminishing significance of 
the Khmer Rouge past as a political issue ("devoid of interest" due largely to a changed 
geo-political context), to a forced forgetting as the most appropriate means toward socio-
economic development and national reconciliation.349 Although State-sponsored 
activities have diminished, the collective amnesia of which Chandler writes resides 
largely in this lingering absence of official observances, the lack of a history book in the 
Cambodian educational curriculum, and Hun Sen's "bury the past" message—a policy 
partially in force—which is now being complicated by the beginnings of a Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal. In the decade leading up the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of 
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Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea (the tribunal's official designation), Hun Sen and the CPP appeared to 
vacillate in their disinterest in pursuing legal prosecution.350 Certainly, it is too early to 
discern what the outcome and effects of the legal proceedings will be for historical 
concerns or national reconciliation, but the fact of their occurrence re-presents the 
problem of historical narrative.351 (Although it may be correct to ascribe an enforcement 
of collective amnesia to the aims of the CPP, circumstances still somewhat beyond the 
Party's control demand an historical accounting of sorts.) It is possible that the shift 
away from remembering the past for political purposes is best exemplified in the use of 
history for revenues from tourism.352 That is to say, the PRK's explicitly political 
approach to historiography in the 1980s—responding to international and domestic 
pressures, while also converging with popular memory at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek— 
is giving way to a post-win-win emphasis on socio-economic development that deploys 
historical sites for commercial benefit in the context of the country's fastest-growing 
industry. In sum, the successor state national narrative —written, re-written, performed, 
and monumentalized—appears to be yielding to the pimping of history for tourist 
revenue, still capitalizing on the control of historical narrative. A supplementary or 
modified historical narrative, even a post script, is still effected, particularly through 
these monuments that demand visitation. 
©>©>©> 
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The impetus for the Historical-Tourist Area of Anlong Veng began in 2001, and 
to this day, it remains an unfinished project. In spite (and partly because) of its partial 
character, the project provides indications of the historiographic tendencies of the CPP. 
Although Anlong Veng's designated sites date to 1989, the script that endows the district 
with importance is the (continued) demonization of the Pol Pot. The subject matter for 
the sites in the northern province of victory is primarily the resumed struggle of the 
outlawed Khmer Rouge against the internationally-recognized, independent, free, and 
democratic Cambodia; in this, it is the decline and dissolution of the organization that 
figures most prominently (the last residence, grave, and final sentencing site of Pol Pot). 
The sites provide the reminder of that earlier historical period (1975—1979) that occasions 
the need for remembering. There is a shift away from the memorialization effected by 
the mutually reinforcing successor state narrative and STV/popular narrative. The 
Anlong Veng "history" which resorts to demonizing—Pol Pot in his new/post-DK 
history, but still guilty in association with the past—appears more as officiated state 
history, but one that coincides with the expanding national unity achieved via win-win. 
The State-generated meaning endowed, tied (chomnang iam), to Anlong Veng locates the 
(former) local leaders as outlaws now domesticated and de-armed into harmlessness.353 
The new historical representation re-deploys the "genocidal monsters" script that is 
largely subsumed in the STV and performed at the 1979 tribunal and the genocidal tourist 
destinations. Demonization can be extended beyond the two-headed clique that 
dominates at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, although Anlong Veng's most significant 
leaders remain an antagonistic twosome (Pol Pot and Ta Mok). The harsh policies of the 
1970s are paralleled and reinforced by reference to the consistent (re-introduced) 
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extremism of Pol Pot's policies!—withdrawal from the peace process, repression, 
terrorizing villagers, and unending warfare—-and the implements of punishment for 
opposition (e.g., tiger cages). Some historical contextualization is necessary to ensure the 
profitability of the historical-tourist area. Although the inundation of State-sponsored 
demonization events and texts have diminished, Anlong Veng still floats at the latest end 
of the PRK-become-CPP continuum of national (perhaps becomes Party) narrative. It 
exhibits a reminder of achievements—peace, development, independence—delivered 
again and again by the CPP. In sum, the project implicates the Khmer Rouge past—two 
connected pasts, 1975-1979 and 1989-1999—but is primarily pursued in terms of tourist 
revenues, often with the alibis of pedagogy and posterity.354 
Certain themes and issues come to the fore in the Ministry and Department of 
Tourism's construction of the historical-tourist area, among these are the re-cognition of 
past crimes, the political life of Khmer Rouge leadership, an extension of Tuol Sleng and 
memory sites, the notion of truth in situ, the importance of replicas and representations 
"as is'V'as was," and pedagogy. The political thrust of the modified national narrative no 
longer appeals to the good communists of the East/KUFNS, although accomplishments 
and gifts to the people from the CPP are publicized.355 The good East narrative bolstered 
the historical narrative that dominated 1980s PRK historiography; the post-good East 
narrative—the selective (retroactive) privileging of the ex-DK factions that ascended to 
power with Vietnamese backing—is authenticated in the objects and sites (consumed by 
death) that the Tourism Ministry chooses to put on display. The "militant solidarity" of 
the 1980s does not need to be foregrounded, because Cambodia survives in spite of the 
outlawed Khmer Rouge's attempts to terrorize the independent (post-1979 Vietnamese 
withdrawal) and unified Cambodia. The earlier government historiography, especially in 
the Tuol Sleng presentation, was compelled to assert an independence from Vietnam; so 
too in Anlong Veng, this theme re-arises. With a diminished emphasis on socio-
economic issues in the PDK agenda, the political thought of Pol Pot's message came to 
exclusively capitalize on nationalist sentiments, with the threat of the historic enemy— 
the lowly Vietnamese (a-yuon mraa)—as its primary trope.356 The sites of Tuol Sleng, 
Choeung Ek, and Anlong Veng are involved in attempts to found a new (independent) 
sense of nation. 
As discussed above, the Tourism Ministry works in association with the Royal 
Academy of Cambodia and DC-Cam. This collaborative engagement seeks to produce 
an accurate history of the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng. As evidenced by Ros Ren's 
guiding draft, the content of this accurate narrative is predominantly factual information 
(dates and places). Through a series of interviews and cross-checkings, the ministry has 
achieved a reliable list of persona, locations, events, and their times of occurrence. This 
data is combined with the omni-present "genocidal monster" script to produce a rough 
historical interpretation of the significance of Anlong Veng. In this historically-
productive process of situating the Khmer Rouge's death, the Ministry of Tourism 
deploys a number of modes of truth. Foremost among these is an appeal to the truth of 
place. The Historical-Tourist Area of Anlong Veng is pursued as an in situ museum 
zone. The claim to original place is expressed in two ways, both of which play off a 
certain minimalism that pervades the sites. The district's significance for attracting 
tourists rests with the claim that history happened "here." This place is where the Khmer 
Rouge resided. This site is where Pol Pot was tried by his own organization. This house 
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is where Ta Mok and other leaders met and strategized the continued terrorization of the 
Cambodian people. This ash heap is where Brother Number One was cremated; in fact, 
this is all that remains of the leader. Leaving the history passed, the in situ nature of the 
project also claims legitimacy in terms of an "undisturbed" present: here and as it is 
(now). The remnant sites have not been adorned or changed in attempts to make the sites 
more amenable to tourists. The only augmentation are the blue signs that demarcate sites, 
setting them within the bounds of the historical-tourist area (and simultaneously outside 
the everyday). The non-participation of the ministry is attested by the remains' decay 
over/from time, the destructed ruins due to war, and the absences marked by looting.358 
Lastly, and building off the original, the ministry's plans include an appeal to truth based 
on (fabricated) resemblance (restoration/replica): here and as it was (then). Reflections 
on accuracy from ministry officials and locals seem to concur that the resemblance to the 
past—"just as it was before"—is an important piece to developing the tourist destination. 
It is likely that Anlong Veng in its finished manifestation will exhibit both these aspects 
of the in situ, the Ta Prohm model (left to nature and time) as well as the Angkor Wat 
model (rebuilt to better illustrate the past). 
The Tuol Sleng Museum hinges on an intersection of both forms of minimalism: 
the museum is undisturbed except for the accoutrements that help to better understand 
how it was before. S-21 is exhibited as z/"as is," providing grounds for authenticity ("I 
was there," "It happened right here," etc.); or rather, Tuol Sleng is presented as if 'the 
grounds had not been properly curated by a museum expert (Mai Lam). While Tuol 
Sleng the museum tends to efface or delimit its own curatorship, the lack of any museum 
expert/curator for the Anlong Veng project, in a way, reverses the issue. The Ministry of 
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Tourism drives the project in Oddar Meanchey, not the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, 
nor the Ministry of Information and Propaganda; and this suggests a different possible 
agenda than that dictated by the 1980s context of PRK historiography and 
museumification. Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, which were constructed/curated to bring 
legitimacy to the successor regime and erode the PRK's isolation, became successful 
genocide tourist sites. At the same time, the sites seemed to offer a way for Cambodians 
to situate their memories. Now, the hope for a new successful tourist destination assumes 
the curatorial effects of the past.360 Without a museumologist designing the outcome of 
Hun Sen's circular, the ministry's new KR destination replicates an in situ model already 
tried and tested in the country's genocide tourism repertoire. The minimalist character 
from the government's capital—Tuol Sleng's "strangely quotidian, un-monumental 
appearance" and the "relatively untouched nature of the memorials"—becomes repeated 
in the former stronghold of the Khmer Rouge.361 However, if the Ministry of Tourism 
hopes the Among Veng project can ride the coattails of Tuol Sleng's mode of 
representation, then it is the ministry that is seduced by the (government's own) "as is" 
claims to authenticity. As a corollary, even the replicas/renovations/reconstructions 
participate in this as is/as was before logic. 
The anti-architects of the Anlong Veng project—Ministry of Tourism officials 
along with Department of Tourism personnel—(re-)embrace the stark "realism" that was 
curated in(to) Tuol Sleng. Similar claims to truth (locality/m situ, 
reflection/reconstruction of the past as such, etc.) allow a seemingly unproblematic 
historical representation.362 Whereas the Tuol Sleng Museum's focus is almost entirely 
on the victims of DK, Anlong Veng dwells on its leaders. As the organization came to 
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increasingly rely solely on its xenophobic rhetoric, the minimalism enacted at Anlong 
Veng might divert attention from the role of the Vietnamese (seen as occupiers).364 
While the unintentional glamorization of the Khmer Rouge is an unlikely concern for the 
Ministry of Tourism, the 1990s' message of the outlawed organization vis-a-vis the 
"historic enemy"—-the erasure of a social policies focus toward exclusive reliance on 
nationalist war rhetoric—produces a tenuous situation for the inclusion of artifacts. 
Radio messages (condemning the Vietnamese puppet regime), signboards calling for war 
against the a-yuon, 1980s-era battle sites, and other monumental elements that 
foreground the war against the Vietnamese will need to be balanced out of the exhibits.365 
The organization's brutality (evidenced in graves and cages), its murderous calculations 
and strategizing (evidenced by meeting rooms and political halls), and its pernicious 
persistence (evidenced in leaders' residences and large architectural accomplishments) 
can be offered in the government's prosecution of history's representation. Given that 
the sites within the historical-tourist area gain increasing importance as they approach 
1999, the late history narrative—post-1989 withdrawal of Vietnamese soldiers-
facilitates the task of avoiding the sticky issue of a neighboring country's explicit military 
domination. 
Tuol Sleng is the centerpiece of the genocide-tourism offerings within Cambodia, 
with minor local memorial sites speckling the periphery outside the capital site. The 
Choeung Ek Killing Fields acts as proximate supplement, or simple complement, in the 
prisoner's path from interrogation to torture to killing. Anlong Veng, the after-thought, 
forms a temporal supplement, as such because of the Khmer Rouge's historical 
formations as well as the KPRP/CPP constitution of national narrative.366 Tuol Sleng as 
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constitutive of a national narrative that helps Cambodians explain the inexplicable finds 
its supplement in Anlong Veng, and one which necessarily changes the narrative's 
direction. That is, Anlong Veng supplants Tuol Sleng in the government's (re-writing of) 
history, while it is simultaneously an addition to that monumental effort.367 It is not the 
other (the former KR)—that Real/present that stands outside—that haunts the Anlong 
Veng project, but the other as constructed by the government: a need to account for the 
threat which is always supposed to be no longer threatening. The determination of the 
meaning of history that narrates the de-threatening of the movement concludes in the 
definitive end to the Khmer Rouge. The defecting dis-arming—a dis-membering that 
will become re-membering—is articulated in terms of life, breathing; specifically, the 
political life and the elites' habitations are re-contained in the situated museum's re-
representation. Breathing life into the historical locales (absences of past and future 
presents) for tourist consumption is organized around a guaranteed death, the last breath 
marked by the various remnants, debris, and traces and (future) replicas on display.368 
The specter of Pol Pot remains contained in the meaning-production of the historical-
tourist area. In addition, Anlong Veng the supplement foregrounds the museum-making 
(museumology) of the PRK, also re-calling into question the intersection of Tuol Sleng as 
museum and torture center.369 That history is re-membered and offered for consumption 
for various objectives comes to the fore in the Anlong Veng case, as evidenced by 
critiques of the project's commercialism. 
While there is a subtle, assumed, or partial story of the past for display at Anlong 
Veng (even in its not-yet-completed state), the organization and implementation of the 
project suggest that memorialization and historiography may not figure as the prominent 
260 
priorities pushing the project.371 In particular, the absence of a curator in defining and 
implementing the historical-tourist sites points to the overwhelming prioritization of 
development (conceived quite narrowly in terms of revenue). The primary role of the 
Ministry of Tourism, as opposed to other more memorial-driven institutions, in executing 
Hun Sen's edict emphasizes this point.372 Further, financing appears as the ever-present, 
overriding concern for those involved with the project, although accuracy of historical 
information also attracts significant attention. In the informal dissemination of the plans 
to Anlong Veng locals, an alibi of potentially lucrative enterprises guarantees the 
(anticipated) efficacy of the historical-tourist area. Indeed, informants were quite 
eager to welcome the near-future flow of tourists that would infuse cash into this remote 
hideaway. The view of tourism expressed by many residents echoes a standard view of 
tourism (an SVT?); they appear willing, even eager to participate in the commodification 
of culture that accompanies the tourist gaze. The influx of visitors will bring 
opportunities for profitable business ventures; if there are dangers to be considered, these 
are largely conceived as comfort (i.e., appropriate accommodations and "resort" 
activities) and safety (e.g., steering clear of landmines). 
The macabre and outre certainly offer marketable points for the (future) attraction 
of Anlong Veng. This coverage has been pursued largely in the anticipatory 
sensationalism of journalistic accounts, a recurrent theme in the free marketing supplied 
by reporting on a "KR theme park."374 The hyper-absurdity has already been laid bare 
and played out in the textual circulation even before the Ministry of Tourism finalizes 
decisions on the form/content of the museum. Treatments in the press of the plans for 
Anlong Veng also foreground the commercial aspect of the government's endeavors, 
which can also conjure ethical questions of dollarizing trauma and profiting from the 
past; the ethics debate has been ignited and largely already structured.375 As an 
economically-minded venture, Anlong Veng moves as one more vehicle like Tuol Sleng 
for the post-conflict re-integration of Cambodian society into the global order by means 
of foregrounding its conflict period.376 The reminder message of peace achieved by the 
CPP also suggests a control through (economic) reintegration of former Khmer Rouge. 
For Anlong Veng, the reconstruction begun in the wake of the win-win policy issues the 
historical record that repenters are called to live out in situ, further bolstered by promises 
of (tourist) development. 
The movement of this work has sought to evoke the personal intersecting the 
historical intersecting the ethnographic. Retracing the arrivals into the scene of research 
highlights the disciplinary kinship underlying the ethnographic project: homage, 
paleonymies, and already-unfolding historical movement, etc.377 The museum project 
that would convert the last Khmer Rouge stronghold into an historical-tourist area puts 
into play further intersecting trajectories. At Cambodia's national level (and principally 
for domestic purposes), there has been the need to re-iterate a victory narrative, that 
traces the achievements of the champions of the good East through: victims of Pol Pot's 
perversion of communist ideals, saviors of the Khmer race, defenders of Cambodian 
independence, guarantors of peace, and providers of socio-economic progress. The 
chapters marking this narrative's development include: the demonization of the 
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revolutionary ancien regime at the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, in a context of 
international isolation; Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek presenting an (unmediated) history 
for political purposes, following a Marxist-Leninist historiography and 
justifying/necessitating Vietnamese rescue and PRK (and, later, Hun Sen) rule; the 
performance/structuring of memory for national purposes in the Days of Hate; a singular, 
politically-crafted version of the country's communist past effected in the KPRP/CPP 
History; a win-win socio-economic strategy that entices/co-opts former opponents into a 
unitary nation; a "burying of the past" (i.e., enforced collective amnesia) that seeks to 
sublimate historical renderings into purely economic enterprises (and thereby obfuscate 
the question of the singularity/truth of the State's history). The consolidation and 
extension of this national narrative, which underwrites an empowered network, betrays 
academic determinations as performed in the good East narrative, the representation of 
atrocities by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique (at Tuol Sleng), the effected memories in the 
populace, the integration of the vanquished Khmer Rouge, the interpretative casting of 
outlawed experience (in Anlong Veng), and the production of a post-Democratic 
Kampuchea Pol Pot group for domestic and foreign consumption. 
The latest episode in this evolving story is inscribed on the environs of Anlong Veng, an 
in situ historical-tourist area that re-presents the last breath of the Khmer Rouge.378 
Clearly, the representational effects sought in this endeavor also demonstrate the interests 
of the government (most specifically the ruling CPP) in controlling the narrative of the 
DK past.379 The museumification in the province of northern victory fortifies the CPP's 
stronghold of (stranglehold on) History, the/its past. However, the impetus for pursuing 
such a project is also largely embedded in the prioritization of tourism in the country's 
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socio-economic development programme.380 The Cambodian government appears under 
pressure to harness its glorious past for national revenues, and the success of this 
development through tourism policy has met with some success. Anticipated gains have 
bolstered efforts to offer up sites of the country's non-glorious past. The initiative in 
Anlong Veng offers an opportunity for consolidating historiographic goals; it also 
presents revenue possibilities as the government tries to 1) diversify its tourist 
1 0 1 
destinations and 2) capitalize further on its already-successful genocide tourism. 
This most recent historical-tourism endeavor inherits the accomplishments of a 
national narrative (manifested through museums, trials, national holidays, Party history, 
and a restrained history curriculum) as well as existing venues that transform genocide 
into a consumable tourist product. At the same time, the earlier historical sites of 
genocide rememoration undergo their continued transformation. Tuol Sleng, which 
offered to the world a gruesome example of why the PRK should be recognizes as a 
legitimate government in 1980s Cambodia, also provides the national narrative that 
renders comprehensible (albeit in a manner that closely follows Vickery's STV) a past 
that remains largely inexplicable for the Cambodians who lived through it. More 
recently, the Museum of Genocidal Crimes has come to constitute the centerpiece of a 
dark tourism that harvests the country's traumatic past for profit.382 Choeung Ek follows 
a similar trajectory while also posing the possibility of the Cambodian government 
allowing its history of trauma to be managed and administered by (foreign) private 
firms.383 
In national terms, the project in Anlong Veng exhibits the same pressures as other 
moments in the post-DK construction of history: the continuing need to demonize Pol Pot 
through an STV-like history, reliant upon and extending the victory narrative of the good 
East cadre; the alluring promise of riches brought on by hordes of tourists; and the 
temptation to reap income from giving historical sites over to private control. The 
various national dynamics become refracted at the local level: 
• controversy in constructions of Cambodia's past exhibited in academic 
determinations of history as well as government projects (monuments, 
memorials, museums, tourist destination) and local re-tellings of 
experiences and memories 
• concern about the transmission of the past, and its forgetting 
• documenting the Truth—either through rigorous scientific work or local 
familiarity—potentially at odds with the Tourism Ministry's "blue tents 
and roast chicken" approach to historical tourism 
• an undefined notion of "museum" form (that echoes the minimalist 
realism of previous efforts) that contends with a disappearing, 
scavenged, and looted locale 
• contradictions/tensions in the impetus and organization of the tourism 
effort (Ta Mok vs. Hun Sen, DC-Cam vs. Ministry of Tourism, national 
ministry vs. provincial department, government vs. people, former 
Khmer Rouge vs. post-PRK affiliates, and the operational dissonance of 
Anlong Veng tour guides) 
• a related conflict of perspectives in which official history (Royal 
Cambodian Government, Tourism Ministry, DC-Cam academics) 
confront local knowledge (where memory manifests as the irrepressible 
excess of history) 
• a divergence in form/content further reflected in the ministry-vs.-local 
dynamic as well as Pol Pot vs. Ta Mok perspectives 
• a "true" and "accurate" restoration based on the idea of "as before" 
• the stated goal of pedagogical endowment increasingly subsumed by the 
stated goal of revenues 
Anlong Veng residents are drawn into the globalized (and globalizing) culture 
industry of tourism by the government's project. However, the activities within the 
district have participated in and exacerbated certain social tensions as well. The context 
in which the Tourism Ministry pursues its work has been subject to rapid social 
transformation: new wealth, logging, social ills, increased commerce, new people filling 
positions related to tourism (guesthouses, restaurants, transportation, etc.), greater 
development and better infrastructure, increased emigration, border opening, casino 
construction, and the increased frequency of foreigners. In the realm of corruption, the 
project encourages the already-present tendencies toward name-buying (where a concern 
for accuracy is not extended to identity in the organization of history-making), 
prioritization of personal gain, and patronage. The national consolidation of the Hun Sen 
network becomes mirrored at the local level with the newly-integrated leaders extending 
the patron-client relationships at sub-district levels, and with this, the individual benefit 
for those that partake of the museum endeavor. Related to this incorporating process is 
the Anlong Veng project's functioning as a means to legitimate the (character of) 
reintegration of former Khmer Rouge forces. The greater integration effected by "win-
win" policies brings (the signs of) development (following on Ta Mok's infrastructural 
gifts), a roundabout endowment and primary schooling as well as re-graded rural routes. 
However, Tourism Ministry movements also generate chaos, uncertainty, and 
potential for greater conflict in its museum environs. Land speculation runs rampant as a 
steady flow of cash-holding foreigners is anticipated. Meanwhile, the threat of eminent 
domain looms over certain zones within the historical-tourist area. The conflict within 
notion of accuracy persists in spite (because) of the ministry's unfinished project. The 
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determination of historical knowledge by the Tourism Ministry—by triangulation, 
double-confirmation, etc.—fosters a narrowing of sought information (dates, places, 
events, persons, etc.), toward the omission of interpretation. This instrumental scientism 
confronts a local episteme that values the knowledge of the highest authority over 
competing concerns of correctness, without any other why or wherefore (sans autre 
forme de proces)?u In the end, the government will have achieved a singular, stable, 
uni-vocal history/truth, circulated as accurate, correct, real, which relies on the 
demonization of criminally insane monsters and a celebration of peace-giving saviors, 
and achieves an ever-increasing incorporation of society's members through win-win 
reintegration efforts and promises of commercial success. 
"I will always lament its romantic past and sentimentalise the grand adventure of death 
we lived through in the midst of such ravishing beauty. Perhaps I am deceived by 
unworldly dreams. Perhaps I weave too many illusions about the past. But I don't 
believe it was just a romantic fantasy." 
EPILOGUE 
Route 67 to Anlong Veng from Siem Reap dramatically worsened between 2004 
and my last visit to the district in August 2005, perhaps on par with my earliest travails 
along the route. The road from Banteay Srei to Phum Srei Noy was essentially the same 
as ever.1 However, the Oddar Meanchey section of track (which was graded in January 
2003) seemed to have almost completely gone without maintenance.2 In many instances, 
the bridges were crumbling beyond their last leg; two or three had been completely 
replaced, but wood had been substituted for previous ironworks. The road through Prey 
S'aat became a muddy mess. New villages along the road still remained, but not much 
development, expansion, or improvement was obvious from 12 months previous. 
Anlong Veng economic environment expanded in length and width: businesses 
lined the street, starting from the lateral log bridge entering town all the way to the 
crossroads to O Smach/Samraong. A new gas station near the entrance bridge and a 
nearby concrete home mark the new limits of the town's core. The area and economy 
also broadened with the completion of the new New Market of Anlong Veng. This 
newest shopping venue offers a tall open-air commerce center with a concrete foundation 
and tin roof. The market peddles the same wares as the earlier new market—produce, 
meats, household items, clothing—although there is likely a larger portion of Thai goods 
available. A taxi depot has been designated in the market's large compound; however, 
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hired vehicles still line the main road through town across from the old "new market." At 
least three or four new guesthouses had been added (with Monorom, across the street 
from the hospital, reputed as the nicest/priciest). Numerous new restaurants had sprouted 
along the main thoroughfare. The wood business—cutting as well as carving and 
carpentry—remains Anlong Veng's primary industry. 
As a partial consequence, the condition of the town road has declined, marked by 
numerous sharp ruts and potholes. The road from the roundabout to Cherng Phnom had 
degenerated severely, obviously due to very large vehicles in conjunction with the 
monsoon weather.4 Massive ruts scarred the track nearly the entire distance from town to 
the mountain. The beaten path up the escarpment had similarly worsened. Much of the 
rocky terrain had been covered over with mud, making the ascent quite slick at various 
moments. It is all too apparent that large cargo trucks (carrying wood and perhaps other 
supplies) contributed to this decline. In 2004, a casino on the mountaintop was in the 
works. A large lot (approximately 4 ha), cast between Choam Pass and the Darm Chrey 
bluff, had been cleared of all vegetation, and cement pilings were installed.5 However, 
this gambling deal, which locals indicated was bankrolled by a brother of Defense 
Minister Tea Banh, folded after a controversy over its proximity to the border. The 
ambiguities of markers and a possible violation of territorial integrity led the Thai 
government to block transport of construction materials to the site.6 Instead, the high 
rollers have taken their dealings to higher plateaus. "A kilometre (half-a-mile) down the 
road from the grave, a different kind of attraction is being built: Cambodian defence 
minister Tea Banh's brother and tycoon Ly Yong Phat are throwing up a casino and hotel 
to attract Thais."7 Mountain 200, no longer the eroding site of a former munitions 
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factory, was being transformed in a newly-clear-cut chasm of casino cacophony. Two 
tower cranes peaked out above the jungle canopy.8 
The most dramatic visions of change on the mountain arose from the rampant 
cutting in various regions: Kbal Tonsaong, Darm Chrey, west of the border market, and 
Mountain 200. Some of this was meant to open areas for new building, while the felled 
flora certainly was fed into the timber business. Approaching the summit pass, de-
forestation efforts were apparent in the access path to the Pass 808 road, such that the 
military encampment, once hidden in the trees, became now visible from the main road. 
Across the road from this point, and on a peak, a new telephone network service tower 
(Mobitel/012) has been erected. 
The sprawl of the market offers additional evidence of mountaintop 
transformations. The stalls—which sell cigarettes, wood sculptures, toiletries, digital 
music and video, etc.—are interspersed with shack-style brothels (and these perhaps do 
much more business than the depressing string of retailers). Ironically (or appropriately), 
the market has occupied the area that contained the house, kitchen, and common house of 
Ta Mok's economic minister, Nuon Nov. The expanse appears so chaotic that some 
disorientation makes the exact determination of the previous sites difficult. The market 
on the south and west sides of the road (one stall deep) surrounds the area of Nhoeun's 
house and the previous structures, blocking the view into the area. A fire in the 2004 dry 
season destroyed some of this shallow market annex and damaged some of the 
languishing leftovers of questionable historical value. In spite of its burnt state, the 
charred leanings of Nhoeun's abode still offer a loading site for cut lumber.9 The area 
across the road to Darm Chrey from Nhoeun's house (formerly Kov's residence) has 
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been taken over by tourist police offices. The entire field in which the remains of Kov's 
house was located had been cleared and built upon. The road approaching the border and 
the government control offices appear unchanged in any major way. Similarly, Pol Pot's 
sentencing site remained a series of wood pillars, only with market stalls slightly 
encroaching on the site's fringes. All along the trail from Choam Pass to Darm Chrey, 
the Dangrek's escarpment had been parceled into property. Areas that were long fields of 
shrubs and semi-dense forest were broken into sections lined with wood fencing, metal 
linings, or barbed wire. Land speculation was well entrenched, while logging appeared to 
put idle hands to work. From Ta Mok's ledge, the cutting was quite obvious: if one could 
not see it with one's eyes, one could surely hear it in the constant buzz of chainsaws. 
The more remote area of Kbal Tonsaong was less affected by the rapid 
development afflicting the mountain's concentrated clusters nearer the border checkpoint. 
The road toward Pol Pot's principal precipice seemed very much unchanged, although 
numerous new sub-paths had been cut into the forest to allow for logging. The main road 
through the trees was slightly more eroded in sloped parts, but all the small bridges 
remained intact. Throughout the Kbal Tonsaong area, fewer soldiers appeared to be 
occupying/protecting. The brigade base was dismantled, leaving behind a singular 
residence near the encampment's former entry way. The "Guardhouse" (near the large 
pond) remains standing, still without any correction clarifying that it was a provisions 
office. The last remaining beams of wood at Ta Mok's pig house had fallen and/or been 
taken, leaving an obscured concrete foundation in tall grass. Access to Pol Pot's 
waterfall was discretely marked, but the path had become heavily overgrown (in spite of 
the CMAC certification that mines had been cleared). The compound of Pol Pot's house 
appeared relatively undisturbed, with an intact perimeter wall. Access to Khieu 
Samphan's office had been facilitated by the clearing of some vegetation. Pol Pot's 
residence, on the other hand, looked to have been abandoned to the vegetative forces of 
nature. The "swimming pool" was reduced to pockets of stagnant, algae-filled water. 
The lack of upkeep throughout the area and the absence of traffic leave the impression 
that neither tourists nor other visitors are making the long trip to the snout of Kbal 
Tonsaong. 
Finally, it remains unclear how the ongoing revision of the master plan—its latest 
draft produced in 2007—meshes with the publicly proclaimed pursuits of private 
protagonists. On the heels of privatization efforts at Choeung Ek and the ongoing 
capitalization of Angkor ticket sales by Sokimex, individual firms approach the Ministry 
of Tourism in hopes of laying claim to the last home of Cambodia's "Original Khmer" 
(khmaer darm tgi tlte) and the surrounding deathbed of its revolution.10 The dernier cri in 
re-touching the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area is heard in a proposal by Nhem 
En.11 This last protagonist posed as the photographer at S-21, who captured the dying 
moments of suspected traitors as the strings of victims entered DK's central security 
center. In the abyss {anlong nati) left by the Tourism Ministry, Nhem En is now taking 
shots at developing and framing the last breath of the Khmer Rouge movement, adding a 
new obscurantism to his camera. 
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After roughly three years, eights months, and 20 days in the 'Bodge, after many 
perfect moments, it was time for my departure, waving farewell like Spalding Gray 
driving away from a Killing Fields set. Left unfinished, encroached upon by business 
ventures, subsumed in commercialization, subject to historical revisionism and the re-
invention of memory, irrupting with hints of social tension, yielding to nature, time, and 
the vagaries of human behavior, the "museum" seems to become the fragmented partial 
tracings of the ethnographer through the field recorded as his/story. The multiple 
connections that become eclipsed by the (de)terminations—settings in time and place 
according to concrete foundations—of movement emerge in the diverse narratives that 
mark a long derive through the long ditch. 
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APPENDIX! 
Sites & Markers of Anlong Veng, Oddar Meanchey Province17 
Anions Veng Commune ufaalffltt 
1. Anlong Veng School (Ta Mok School) 
Hicinujs Hsatia 
2. Ta Mok Headquarters 
smsmfm sntjfi (tBlsiaiRHSinjMtiHgSiJa) 
3 . Anlong Veng Health Center 
(Ta Mok Hospital) 
Htmrawsffici uaatia c Hgnngj RIHR) 
4. Brick Kiln 
una HUCU sb Qjrtg 
5. Salt Warehouse 
tgia HUCU la gjtiti 
6. Chik Stream Bridge & Weir 
gsu an ma HiSn 
7. Ta Mok's House (lakeside) 
asmHfi<tniiua> 
8. Pol Pot's House (O Chik Lake) 
tjs tjtu tin (tslfjtiuUHtSm 
9. Ta Mok's Mine Production (O Chik Lake) 
mstitiratiHBts HIHR 
10. Kheum Ngon's House 
N 14° 13' 46-83", E 104° 05' 27-53" 
N 14° 13* 54-57", E 104° 05' 00-66" 
N 14° 14' 05-13", E 104° 04' 50-21" 
elev. 49 m 
N 14° 14.161', E 104° 04.783' 
elev. 47 m 
N 14° 14.299', E 104° 04.691' 
elev. 49 m 
N 14° 14' 12-98", E 104° 04' 44-56" 
elev. 48 m 
N 14° 14' 29-04", E 104° 04' 50-42" 
elev. 57 m 
300 m north of Ta Mok's house 
Trabaing Prey Commune iijffm'd'utu 
11. Ta Mok's Teuk Chum House 
tjs mm talrtSgriij 
12. "Pol Pot's Secret House" sign 
tjifiMttnti tjsMttiri utu cm 
13. Ta Mok's Middle Ware/House (Arts Group 
House, Ta Mok's Transportation Site) 
(jsfHunciftpti RiHfi (tis tsmHMtuj:. 
maafnjgiaBfitJfjia tn HR> 
14. Pol Pot's Secret House 
tiswaiti ucu cm 
N 14° 15.240', E 104° 04.850' 
elev. 55 m 
N 14° 16.109', E 104° 04.834' 
elev. 57 m 
N 14° 16.060", E 104° 04.709' 
elev. 61m 
17
 This comprehensive listing includes the names and locations of sites included in the Ministry of 
Tourism's Anlong Veng Hisorical-Tourist Area (in boldface) as well as many supplementary locales which 
have been omitted from the "museum" project. 
273 
Srah Chhouk Village 
15. "Ta Mok's Sawmill" sign 
gmutpnti inatifjtKin sn^n 
16. Ta Mok's Sawmill 
inacijiHinfin tnHn 
17. Ta Mok's House 
t j : KIHR aalsiariJtnnatjtftsrmtffi sntifi) 
18. Son Sen Family Grave 
tinans (fisaatisiMci) ma twa as MIBE™ 
Cherng Phnom Village 
19. "Khieu Samphan's House" sign 
glRMtHflH t j : t8jj Ht58 
20. Ta Mok's Arms Warehouse 
iHia|tnii tnan 
21. Khieu Samphans's House 
tj: 18JJ MtSB 
22. "Ta Mok's Warehouse" sign 
ttifiMlHnti inia fiiHR 
23. Ta Mok's Warehouse 
UJlti fflHfi 
24. Khmer Rouge Statues 
rastrmaiuna 
Mountian 200 
25. Mountain 200 road 
{Grrarotsjti « boo 
26. Munitions Factory 
tnatjiRpdltMi 
Pass 808 / Chrach 
27. Pass 808 road 
2 8. House East of Chrach 
29. Chrach Dam 
gsthaljtrm 
30. Chrach Housing Area 
BtSiJtriHtflBtiStt§B tSlpiB 
31. Chrach Arms Warehouse 
ujiasrifHtalttriB 
32. Ta Mok's Pass 808 Border House 
tj: mm: tairjsfi tfotf iBlfjf flstti 
fiUTMSCISfl 
B -U- B 
N 14° 18' 32-63", E 104° 04' 48-69" 
100 in west of sawmill 
(near a banyan tree) 
N 14° 18' 30-13", E 104° 04' 48-72" 
N 14° 18.546', E 104° 623' 
elev. 66 m 
on right side of road to Khieu Samphan's 
house 
N 14° 19.111', E 104° 02.642' 
elev. 71m 
N 14° 20.137', E 104° 04.783' 
N 14° 20.087', E 104° 04.800' 
elev. 85 m 
N 14° 20.236', E 104° 04.185' 
elev. 181 m 
• fitaoo 
N 14° 20.255', E 104° 03.659' 
elev. 246 m 
N 14° 19' 54-50", E 104° 03' 24-25" 
fgfi [ fori / ffflTJ 
N 14° 20.236', E 104° 03.390' 
elev. 287 m 
N 14° 20.710*, E 103° 58.923' 
elev. 391 m 
N 14° 20.985', E 103° 58.677' 
elev. 388 m 
N 14° 21.022', E 103° 58.617' 
elev. 383 m 
N 14° 21.216', E 103° 58.487' 
elev. 384 m 
N 14° 21.141', E 103° 58.608' 
elev. 387 m 
Choam Pass 
33. Ta Mok's Choam Pass Common House 
tJSIHtrUS RIHfi 
34. Nuon Nov's House 
tfsastsl 
35. Nuon Nov's Common House 
tjSJHgTta SS tSl 
36. Nuon Nov's Kitchen 
tistf Htits aa tai 
37. Pol Pot's Grave 
maatititsiH otu EIR 
38. Pol Pot's Last Hut 
SHHtiijmtBia U(U Clfi 
39. Pol Pot Sentencing Site 
msammffiM tjra tin 
40. Thai-Cambodian Border 
pfiaiti 
41. Nhoeun's House 
til ttfia 
42. Choam Pass Common House 2 
[Pol Pot Arms Warehouse?] 
43. Choeun Kov's House 
til tins ni 
Darm Chrev _^_____ 
44. Medicine Storage House 
tjs8ifiijijri8j 
45. Nuon Chea's House 
tisaafr 
46. "Son Sen's House" sign 
fifiHLHnutjs m ttua 
47. Son Sen's House 
tiS Aia IMS 
48. Son Sen's Children's House 
tisiaitas MB f MB 
49. Salt Warehouse 
50. Ta Mok Mango Orchard Guesthouse 
tjsMfimfi srron tBlBfnnaHMitu SniptSatti 
tis m f^t nnmrotra 
51. "Ta Mok's House" sign (Darm Chrey) 
ginftjipntitis snHfi 
N 14° 20.501', E 104° 03.483* 
elev. 324 m 
N 14° 20.536', E 104° 03.511* 
elev. 325 m 
N 14° 20.536', E 104° 03.533' 
elev. 329 m 
N 14° 20.535', E 104° 03.544' 
elev. 328 m 
N 14° 20.566', E 104° 03.468' 
elev. 322 m 
N 14° 20.556', E 104° 03.459' 
elev. 326 m 
N 14° 20.591', E 104° 03.643' 
elev. 334 m 
N 14° 20.667', E 104° 03.705' 
elev. 336 m 
N 14° 20.523', E 104° 03.661' 
elev. 335 m 
N 14° 20.498', E 104° 03.629' 
elev. 336 m 
N 14° 20.565', E 104° 03.673" 
elev. 336 m 
N 14° 20.733', E 104° 05.012' 
elev. 343 m 
N 14° 20.685', E 104° 05.038' 
elev. 334 m 
N 14° 20.669', E 104° 05.013' 
elev. 341 m 
N 14° 20.875', E 104° 05.082' 
elev. 361 m 
N 14° 20.852', E 104° 05.071' 
N 14° 20.798', E 104° 05.148' 
elev. 341 m 
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52. Ta Mok's (Middle) House 
tjUfflHfi 
53. Ta Mok Dayhouse 
tjjfiwia tnHn 
54. Provisions Storehouse 
maawmwjja 
55. Darm Chrey Restaurant/Guesthouse 
tfntjsmtJiatnig talmgatis tnHn 
56. "Ta Mok Waterfall" sign 
fitiMnintj gntrm RiHfi 
57. Ta Mok Waterfall 
9mnii RIOT 
58. Pol Pot Political School entry 
ifftgl tunnsitmtnm utu tin 
59. Pol Pot Political Hall Kitchen 
tjssGHmsl MtintBimtjim utu cm 
60. Pol Pot Political Hall Elite Guesthouse 
tSsjHgital Mtintmmtjira ucu nn 
61. Son Sen Relatives Killing Site 
mstifriimuficiriuiB jR&ni m ma 
62. O Kranhoung Old Radio Guardhouse 
HmitirmtJiwlgj Hi[nrnti 
63. New Radio Guardhouse 
HEflltDIHSlgj 
64. Radio Station road 
iMtffl wismfaj 
N 14° 20.779', E 104° 05.161' 
elev. 351 m 
N 14° 20.710', E l 04° 05.155' 
elev. 334 m 
N 14° 20.709', E 104° 05.206' 
elev. 343 m 
N 14° 20.763', E 104° 05.404' 
elev. 336 m 
N 14° 21.039', E 104° 05.470' 
elev. 355 m 
N 14° 21.066', E 104° 05.493' 
elev. 358 m 
N 14° 21.075', E 104° 05.868' 
elev. 369 m 
N 14° 21.184', E 104° 06.020' 
elev. 375 m 
N 14° 21.363', E 104° 06.177' 
elev. 390 m 
N 14° 21.380', E 104° 06.195' 
elev. 392 m 
Kbal Tonsaong fjpmgtBjiti 
65. 
66 
Kbal Tonsaong Guardhouse 
tntitmH njifiiQtana 
Kbal Tonsaong Secret Guardhouse 
tnatiiiHMinsi njirogtBjia 
67. 8 Pol Pot Guardhouses road 
68. "Second Guardhouse" 
[Economic Support Specialist House] 
lists gnSfim 
69. Pol Pot Holiday House 
tjSfiMlg UCU tlfi 
70. Pol Pot Holiday House Kitchen 
tisfGHtifgl tfstifiriB ura tin • 
71. Pol Pot's Nephew's House 
tfefiOT|t!ft) U(U (1?i 
72. Hong'sHouse 
tisuitt 
73. Ta Mok's Pig Barn 
srmutsrnnnifi 
N 14° 22.252', E 104° 07.165' 
elev. 376 m 
N 14° 22.197', E 104° 07.180' 
elev. 376 m 
N 14° 22.084', E 104° 07.175' 
elev. 366 m 
N 14° 22.012*, E 104° 07.141' 
elev. 374 m 
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74. Music Studio 
75. Radio Generator Facility 
76. 2 Radio Trucks 
77. Protection Wall 
78. Cassette Player House 
79. Radio Operator Houses 
80. Kbal Tonsaong Hospital 
HSEUwsmciryiEUBtajia 
81. Kao Bunheng's House 
tis tm osiuiti 
82. In Sopheap's House 
this Hsrtifnn 
83. Mak Ben's House 
tjsts Hti ras 
84. Thiounn Thioeunn's Children's House 
tjststJiis tnrmjmriBj tja ttj"fs 
85. Thiounn Thioeunn's House 
tjsts tnnrijmngj tja it^a 
86. "Khieu Samphan's House" sign 
tJlHMTJTItJ tjS t3j f (litis 
87. Khieu Samphan's House 
tjs tsjf aitis 
88. Khieu Samphan's Children's House 
tiststtas tsfi fjtis 
89. Khieu Samphan's Second Office 
[same as above?] 
rrfitintutagb tsjf wtia 
90. "Pol Pot Waterfall" sign 
tjinMtjnti Sntnii tjra tin 
91. Pol Pot waterfall 
9f1G1fi tjtU tlH 
92. Kbal Tonsaong Communications Center 
HgjHtuiEurmgifigtisji rjrinjBtajia 
93. Staff Houses from Communications Center 
tjsngrifri ci Htijunncumiffirigam 
94. Chan Youran's House 
tis BIS mns 
95. Khieu Samphan's Office 
mlontiiH) tsJJ wtia 
96. Pol Pot's House 
tiS UtU flH 
97. Pol Pot's Hideaway Hut 
SHtiniigs (tslsisatntitjs tinj no> 
98. Kbal Tonsaong School 
winntijs fipnjQtsjia 
N 14° 21.691', E 104" 07.134' 
elev. 367 m 
N 14° 21.658', E 104° 07.051' 
elev. 359 m 
N 14° 21.633', E 104° 07.226' 
elev. 363 m 
N 14° 21.556', E 104° 07.186' 
elev. 364 m 
N 14° 21.554', E 104° 07.186' 
elev. 362 m 
N 14° 21.540', E 104° 07.185' 
elev. 362 m 
N 14° 21.509', E 104° 07.178' 
elev. 362 m 
N 14° 21.509', E 104° 07.161' 
elev. 360 m 
N 14° 21.326', E 104° 07.176' 
elev. 339 m 
N 14° 21.346', E 104° 07.202' 
elev. 337 m 
N 14° 21' 20-07", E 104° 07' 11-36" 
N 14° 21.317', E 104° 07.189' 
elev. 342 m 
N 14° 21.312', E 104° 07.213' 
elev. 334 m 
N 14° 21.277', E 104° 07.293' 
elev. 348 m 
N 14° 21.281', E 104° 07.319' 
elev. 342 m 
N 14° 21.261', E 104° 07.272' 
elev. 340 m 
N 14° 21.229', E 104° 07.270' 
elev. 338 m 
N 14° 21.737', E 104° 07.280' 
elev. 366 m 
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APPENDIX 2 
Maps of Anlong Veng, Oddar Meanchey Province18 
Anlong Veng (South) 
Ta Mok's 
Lakeside Villa 
Anlong Veng 
Health Center 
1*K 4M 
Anlong Veng Primary School 
New Market of Anlong Veng 
1
 Numbers on these maps correspond to the list of sites in Appendix 1. 
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Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa 
Anlong Veng Village, Commune, District 
m OChikLake® 
Anlong Veng District I (South) 
Anlong Veng & Trabaing Prey Communes, Anlong Veng District 
to Samraong & 
OSmach 
I—I 
t o Dangrek Mountains 
_  Tuoljben^ Vijiage
 m 
" ~ KhW^YandafVillage] 
uQ 12 
13 
Khlaing Randal Vjllage 
TuolKanda! Village 
TuolKandal Village 
Aphiwath Village 
toTuol Sala 
Commune 
i p pev^oiment c&ntm, to Santepheap & 
HH Ekapheap Villages 
Trabaing Prey 
Primary School 
< Teuk Chum Village 
i n 
J9"!??'!?9 Pf?J? Commune _ 
Anlong Veng Commune 
- • • 7 
a . 
' • 
(6 
D4 as 
• • 3 
/ 
• • r-, 
2 S"3 
- • toTrabaing Pfassat 
to 
Siem Reap 
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Anlong Veng District II (North) 
Trabaing Prey Commune, Anlong Veng District 
todam&Mtn. 200 
to ! 
Tkeam «-
Romeas 
> tm 
H 
mk x& && 
^rah Chhouk Wljage 
TuolTbeng Village 
toTeukChup< 
Tupnbenpyi|lage_ _ 
KhFaingKandal Village 
N 
Chemg PhnomVilla^e 
SrahChhouk Village 
» 1 6 0 Srah Chhouk Pagoda 
• toTumnupLeu 
-» toTuolSala 
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Pol Pot's Secret House 
Khlaing Kandal Village, Trabaing Prey Commune, Anlong Veng District 
to Srah Chhouk 
• V Pol Pot's 
' '14®** Secret House 
M 
100 m 
'•. footpath 
N 
4> 
E313 
TafWok's Middle 
Warehouse 
to Anlong Veng 
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Dangrek Mountains Escarpment 
Border Crossing 
Mountain 200 
Pol Pot's Mountain House 
Khmer Rouge Statues 
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Choam Pass 
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Vcng District 
toCherngPhnom 
Darm Chrey 
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District 
285 
to 
Pass 
/u 
J**^.P 
Darm Chrey to Kbal Tonsaong 
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District 
1 h 
61 
100 rri 
to KUal Tonsaong 
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Kbal Tonsaong I (North) 
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District 
to Thailand 
<tf£**76 
to 
Kbal Tonsaong It 
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Kbal Tonsaong II (South) 
Dangrek Mountains, Anions Veng District 
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46
 Different scholars translate these two related terms somewhat differently. I have chosen to translate 
phoumipheak as "zone"; although somewhat inconsistent, I differentially interpret tdmbdn as "region" 
(when no substantial subdivisions were apparent, as denoted by three-digit numbers) and "sector" (when a 
multiplicity of single- or two-digit areas composes a larger zone). After reviewing the various terms and 
permutations for translating phoumipheak and tdmbdn, Vickery also acknowledges that the grounds for one 
rendering over another are essentially arbitrary (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p.331n5). 
47
 To be more precise, the April 1970 organization demarcated a North Zone consisting of Sector 31 
(Kampong Cham, north of the Mekong), Sector 32 (Kampong Thorn), Sector 35 (Siem Reap), Sector 36 
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(Oddar Meanchey), and Region 103 (Preah Vihear and the western part of Stung Treng). This large zone, 
filling a wedge formed by the country's two major rivers, was administered by secretary Koy Thuon, 
deputy secretary Chor Chhan (alias Sreng); its military was under the command of Ke Pauk (we Ke Vin) 
(Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 315-317). In 1975, a renumbering and slight modification 
created Region 106 (Siem Reap and Oddar Meanchey) under secretary Soth, Region 103, and Region 303 
(the areas from Sectors 31 and 32). Koy Thuon had been moved to Phnom Penh to assume his duties as 
Minister of Commerce. After the early 1977 purge, the North Zone was split in two: the new North Zone 
consisted of Sector 44 (formerly Region 106) and Region 103; a newly-created Central Zone consisted of 
Sector 41 (Kampong Cham, north of the Mekong), Sector 42 (southwestern piece of Kratie), and Sector 43 
(Kampong Thorn) (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 71, 73; Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 337-
340). The significance of this purge is elaborated in Chapter 2. 
48
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 71. 
49
 Vickery offers a scathing critique of the use and abuse of refugee camps ("Refugee Politics: The Khmer 
Camp System in Thailand," pp. 292-331). In this work, he goes beyond the humanitarian rhetoric that was 
circulated as support for the Cambodian refugee camp system and scrutinizes the political uses and 
economic benefits drawn from the perpetuation of that system. He provides some controversial, if well-
supported, assertions: the condition of the many Khmer "refugees" was on par with rural Thais (and other 
"Third World" people); the opening of Khao-I-Dang required the searching out of refugees to fill the new 
massive site; Cambodians entering the camps did not technically (according to international agreements 
and protocols) qualify as "refugees;" the refugee camp system acted as a magnet drawing people who could 
have otherwise stayed in Cambodia, a movement which helped de-stabilize the Cambodian economy; the 
bureaucratic and professional aspirations of some people in the volunteer agencies ("volags") encouraged 
the camp system to assume a more permanent character; the principal motivations for Khmer "refugees" 
were to re-establish relations with relatives abroad, conduct border trade, and/or join/organize a 
paramilitary group. One of Vickery's key points is to demonstrate how refugees had to be 
created/encouraged, suggesting that Thailand and the US aimed to use the refugee population against the 
Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh; he argues that essentially the large refugee problem was 
created for political reasons. 
50
 Vickery, "Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand," pp. 323-324. Prior to the June re-
organization the public face of the DK government had been seated at a mountain base at Pass 808 in the 
Dangrek Mountains above Anlong Veng (Kamm, Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land, pp. 178-183; 
Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare, pp. 413-420, hereafter referred to as The History of a 
Nightmare; Barber & Bou, "Tip-off allows Mok to fight on," pp. 1, 8). Although this area is not part of the 
Tourism Ministry's designated "historical-tourist area," Pass 808 is described in Chapter 3. 
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 In January 1980, the area commanders were: "So Hong at Kla'ngop, Sok Pheap at Malay; Nikan in 
Sampou Loun; Phi Phuon in Kamrieng; and Y Chhean in Pailin" (Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 
412); Son Sen took up the Eastern Front at Paet Um, Ke Pauk assumed control of the Northern Front in 
Kampong Thorn, and Ta Mok maintained authority of the Southwestern Front at Phnom Aural. By 1990, 
the area commands shifted such that (moving counter-clockwise from due north): Sector 1001 (Tonle Lpov, 
"the triangle") and Sector 1002 (Prassat Preah Vihear) were under Son Sen and Ke Pauk, with their 
divisions (105,612, 800, 801, 802,612, and 920); Sector 1003 (from Pass 808 to Chuprun) under Ta Mok 
(Divisions 417,607, 616,785,912, and 980); from Road 68 and Malai to Pailin, an area sometimes called 
"Pass 102" was under Ieng Sary; from Pailin to Koh Kong was under Pol Pot and Nuon Chea (compiled 
from interviews with: a former doctor at Ta Mok's Hospital, 8 September 2003; a former journalist under 
Pol Pot, 20 September 2003; Ke Pauk's son-in-law, 21 January 2004; Anlong Veng's former minister of 
economy and trade, 7 October 2005). Short offers a different take on this leadership structure for June 
1993, wherein the Northern Front is maintained by Ta Mok (at Anlong Veng) and Pol Pot (at Phnom 
Chhat) and the Southern Front is headed by Son Sen (at O Da, between Pailin and Malay) and Nuon Chea 
(at Samlaut); Son Sen's key subordinates were Y Chhean (in Pailin) and Sok Pheap (in Malay) (Short, The 
History of a Nightmare, pp. 431,436). 
52
 Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 429. 
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 Emphasis added. The word in this dedication used to convey the "gift" is somewhat odd. Rather than 
use the more typical word for gift (amnaoy mtutita), which derives by infixation from "to give" (aoy tmtu), 
or a more literary term like "endowment" (teaycheatean Bimtjffia), which echoes the Pali word for dowry 
(dayajja), the inscription employs a narrowly used word (chdmndng dai onniatfl), which refers to a wedding 
gift, the threads tied around the wrists of the bride and groom. The chosen verbiage derives from "to tie" 
{chdng tsia), suggesting the gift is a knot, link, or tying together. In fact, it might be fair to suggest that the 
string (khsae tsj) being tied/wedded to Anlong Veng (around its wrists) is Hun Sen's patronage network 
(khsae hun saen tsj uja twa). 
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 "The house itself sits on a spit of land in an eerie artificial lake dotted with the hulks of dead trees killed 
by the rising water. Residents say Ta Mok raised crocodiles in the lake, which he built in the early 1990's" 
(Crampton, "Rough road to a theme park," p. 2). 
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 As Second Prime Minister Hun Sen ousted First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in the July 1997 
coup deforce, FUNCINPEC elite found themselves under violent attack and being charged with making 
deals with the outlawed Khmer Rouge. While some of the FUNCINPEC cadre were assassinated at 
Pochentong Airport, behind the Royal palace, or within the Ministry of Interior compound (e.g., Minister 
Ho Sok), others retreated from the capital to the Thai border. Led by General Nhiek Bun Chhay, some 400 
soldiers fled but few found refuge at the familiar sanctuary of O Smach, a hilltop border town that had 
previously housed a refugee camp for FUNCINPEC s non-communist resistance through the 1980s. 
Allowed to breathe through the nose of Thai suzerainty during their second occupation of O Smach, 
FUNCINPEC leaders continued to court Khmer Rouge from Anlong Veng who could prove they had 
broken with the hardliners (Becker, "O Smach Journal; On Its Last Legs, the Saddest Cambodian Army"). 
The retreat to the O Smach enclave bears with it the legend of Nhiek Bun Chhay's run, a trek from Phnom 
Penh to the Thai border largely on foot. The lone protagonist, protected by a "magic vest"—a simple 
jacket whose pockets were filled with amulets and talismans—from which bullets would bounce, fought the 
elements including a bout of malaria and a 15-kg loss in body weight. The physical endurance was 
matched by his traits of character; he is said to have distributed 10,000 riel notes to his accompanying 
soldiers as they set out, so that if lost they would have "money to buy food and not rob from the villagers" 
(Chea & Lenaghan "General eludes dragnet," pp. 1,12) His own reticence toward superstition adds 
credence to the powers of the vest: "Before, I didn't believe in this magic thing, but now I believe that 
something was helping me" (Nhiek Bun Chhay, "Leaner Bun Chhay vows to fight on," p. 7). 
FUNCINPEC s military faction, or para—"the saddest Cambodian army" (Becker)—and the wearer of the 
magic vest occupied the hilltop enclave—the "only realdemocracy" in Cambodia (US Congressman Dana 
Rohrbacher)—from July 1997 through the July 1998 cease-fire, only to be re-integrated in the post-election 
coalition deal between Hun Sen's CPP and Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC in November 1998. 
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 The rice fields have been carved out of the forest—converting dense forest into what is typically called 
"garden" (chdmkaar nmi) or plantation (rice) farming—and many rice fields exist deeper into (and thus 
obfuscated by) the brush. 
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 The singletracks which cut through the shrubbery and trees of this district are mostly accessible by moto 
and oxcart; in the rainy season, oxcart and travel by foot are the most reliable means by which to navigate 
the thick mud into which the trails devolve. 
CHAPTER 2 
1
 Cambodia's geographical situation is one of the key themes that Chandler identifies in the country's 
history, playing a major factor in terms of foreign and domestic policy at numerous moments (Chandler, A 
History of Cambodia, p. 1 and chaps. 6,7). Noel suggests that concerns over expansionist neighbors 
dominated Cambodia's foreign policy under Sihanouk (Noel, Cambodia and Thailand). Kiernan notes the 
fear of becoming swallowed up following the example of the Champa kingdom, and he notes that 
"historical enmity" played into nationalist concerns of the CPK (Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean 
Communist Movement," p. 9; idem, How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 41-55). This fear of being devoured 
by neighboring countries continues to haunt Cambodian political discourse; Sihanouk's March 2005 
charges of bordering forces "nibbling away" at Cambodia underscore the concerns of territorial integrity 
(Sihanouk quoted in Mathews, "Border issues show how Sihanouk still in political fray," p. 14). 
Hood and Ablin document how geography encouraged various moments offending off extinction of the 
country, often by seeking the assistance of outside powers (Hood & Ablin, "The Path to Cambodia's 
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Present," pp. xv-xx). Tracing Cambodia's relationship to a Siamese society, Thion shows how a "galactic 
policy" (Tambiah's concept) has been repeatedly played out (most recently with the Thai military's control 
of the Khmer Rouge), with the Cambodian periphery replicating the Siamese center of the mandala, along 
with the paradoxes and contradictions of usurpations, rebellions, arid rivalries (Thion, "The Pattern of 
Cambodian Politics," p. 151; Tambiah, "The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in 
Southeast Asia," pp. 80-82,91-92). 
2
 Ccedes, The Making of South East Asia, pp. 198-201. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 113-116. 
This process of employing countervailing powers continued into Cambodia's modern relations with 
Thailand and Vietnam (Leifer, "Cambodia and Her Neighbors"). Thion argues that the most recurrent and 
distinctively Khmer pattern in politics (from ancient to present times) is factionalism, which he describes as 
a "modernized version of the old patronage system." (Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics," p. 163). 
In noting Cambodia's cultured differences from Western and Chinese politics, Thion emphasizes its abrupt 
and brutal changes, a certain lack of realism, quests to obtain honorary titles from the king, and 
individualistic (warlord) power contests. He further asserts that kinship solidarity has not been automatic 
and typically becomes a means to more power. Even the emergence of parliamentary democracy 
(supposedly based on principles) offered new opportunities for the pursuit of self-interest, nepotism, and 
corruption. 
3
 France's initial presence in Indochina appears more geared to 1) colonial competition with Britain who 
had complete control over India, and 2) Catholic concern about converts in Vietnam; in these respects, 
Cambodia was secondary to interests in its neighbor to the east. Interestingly, internal challenges to King 
Norodom's rule helped cement his embrace of French authority over Thai suzerainty. See Chandler's 
account of the establishment of the French Protectorate (A History of Cambodia, pp. 140-142). The 1897 
transfer of authority for collecting taxes, making decrees, and appointing officials to the resident-superieur 
combined with growing French disillusionment about Cambodian wealth, which meant ever-rising taxes 
would become a key element of colonial rule experienced by the majority of the Khmer people; this issue 
would become a motivating factor for sporadic peasant rebellions, in 1916 and 1924-1926 in particular 
(Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 153-159,167-169; idem, "The Assassination of Resident Bardez," 
which offers greater elaboration; and Osborne, "Peasant Politics in Cambodia"). Osborne suggests that 
early 20*-Century rural activism indicated widespread peasant resentment at the corvee system (prestations 
and requisitions), tax system, and corrupt administration as well as disorientation and incomprehension at 
the social changes that ensued following Norodom's death (Osborne, "Peasant Politics in Cambodia," pp. 
219-220,239-240). Like colonial rule in other countries, the Tricolor brought significant influence in 
shaping Cambodian institutions and bringing new institutions into existence. The production of 
"nationhood," as described by Chandler (A History of Cambodia, pp. 162-172), Edwards (The Cultivation 
of Nation), and Becker (When the War Was Over, chap. 2), emerged as a cultural enterprise, or process of 
"Cambodian self-awareness" (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, p. 163), that came to infuse all subsequent 
political discourse: the symbol of Angkor Wat (its re-discovery by the French), the establishment of the 
Buddhist Institute, political activism atLycee Sisowath, and the education and politicization of Cambodian 
intellectuals in Paris. The French re-discovery of Angkor and its endowment of a glorious past are of key 
importance (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, p. 163). In spite of the consistency of the icon of Angkor 
permeating the political imagery of every modern regime in Cambodia as well as its preeminence as the 
symbol of Khmer identity, Keyes notes the irony of such a shared privileging failing to prevent fratricide 
(which is some senses has been associated with differing interpretations of aspects of Angkorian 
civilization) (Keyes, "The Legacy of Angkor," pp. 57-59). Even still, Cambodia's more dramatic 
transformations in social life and politics would erupt in the latter part of the 20th Century. 
4
 Sihanouk's lineage was seen to appease competing branches (Sisowath and Norodom) of the royal family. 
He is the great-grandson of Norodom I, and his mother, Princess Kossamak, was a princess from the 
Sisowath side (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 166-167; Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince 
of Darkness, pp. 20-21). 
5
 On 9 November 1953, Sihanouk assumed the reins of the country from his former instructor from Saumar 
Cavalry School and commander of France's forces in Cambodia, General de Langlade (Osborne, 
"Independence King's greatest political achievement," p. 8). Sihanouk's rapid march to post-coloniality 
stole the wind from the sails of the anti-royalist independence struggles of Son Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer 
Issarak, absorbing nationalists into an emerging bureaucracy (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 184— 
190; Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, chap. 4; Summers "Democratic Kampuchea," pp. 413-414). 
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6
 Chandler provides a succinct summary of accomplishments that might encourage a view of at least the 
first decade of Cambodia's independent rule as a golden age: "Nearly everyone had enough to eat. Nearly 
all the farmers owned their own land. There was plenty of cultivable land in most of the country, and there 
were still opportunities for employment in the towns. Exports of primary products such as rice, rubber, and 
pepper earned foreign exchange sufficient for Cambodia's needs. Foreign aid from France, the United 
States, and the Sino-Soviet bloc provided hospitals, schools, a deep-water port, and a highway linking the 
capital to the coast. Salaries for the army and the costs of military equipment were paid by the United 
States. Health care and sanitation, still rudimentary by Western standards, improved dramatically. The 
incidence of malaria and infant mortality decreased. Hundreds of thousands of men and women who had 
been illiterate a decade before learned to read, thanks to government programs. Hundreds of thousands of 
their children and grand-children flocked into newly constructed schools. For the first time since 1945, the 
kingdom Was at peace" (Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 89). The capital city ofPhnom 
Penh in particular was envied by other regional leaders for its beautiful boulevards, parks, and intricate 
architecture. Counterpoising his wartime memories with his initial impressions of Cambodia, Swain 
(refracting some of the romanticized retrospective of an enthralled new arrival) offers evidence for such a 
vision of pre-war Phnom Penh: "Buddhist monks in saffron robes and shaven heads walking down avenues 
of blossom-scented trees; schoolgirls in white blouses and blue skirts pedalling past with dazzling smiles, 
offering garlands of jasmine to have their picture taken; lovers strolling in the evening along the placid 
river bank by the old Royal Palace; elephant rides in a park; tinkling bells coming from the shrine on top of 
the mound from which the city takes its name.... There was hardly any visible poverty. Life revolved 
around the family, Buddhist festivals, the rhythm of the seasons, as it had done since the time of Angkor, 
the pinnacle of Khmer civilisation. These Cambodians were not wily like their quicksilver Thai and 
Vietnamese neighbors, but pleasure-seeking, insouciant, with a childish faith in the ability of westerners to 
solve their problems" (Swain, River of Time, p. 13). 
7
 Heine-Geldern describes the worldview with a god-king (Devaraja) at the center and embodying the 
universe, including Cambodia's uniquely anatomical interpretation of the cosmology under King Sisowath 
(Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," pp. 21-22). Osborne examines 
how this cosmological vision held together an increasingly diverging society. He argues that a historical 
lack of strong and efficient administration from the (political) center fostered regional autonomy in terms of 
provincial leadership, but this was tempered by a worldview that posited the king as center of the universe 
and guarantor of its stability ("Regional Disunity in Cambodia," pp. 326-327). This echoes the replication 
of the center in periphery and cosmology in reality, which is constituent to Tambiah's "galactic polity" 
(Tambiah, "The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia," pp. 72, 80). 
8
 Etcheson calls it the "Magic Kingdom that never was" as he documents a series of social, political, and 
racial tensions underlying the apparent unity of the Sangkum {The Rise and Demise of Democratic 
Kampuchea, pp. 8-12). One example where social good seems to produce adverse social conditions was in 
the realm of education. Sihanouk devoted large sums to the Cambodian education system. Because 
education became the key to employment in the Cambodian state apparatus, the massive education 
emphasis in the 1950s resulted in the production of a class of credentialed semi-intellectuals who only 
tended to desire office work. The inability of the state to absorb the multitudes of graduates left them an 
expensive but unemployable resource as well as a political liability (Thion & Vickery, "Cambodia 1981: 
Background and Issues"). 
9
 The 1954 Geneva Accords stipulated that Cambodia hold national elections the following year. As Heder 
and others argue, post-Geneva Agreement circumstances dramatically weakened the Communist 
movements in both Cambodia and Vietnam—pre-election repression in the former and outright anti-
Communist hostilities in South Vietnam. However, the 1955 election period allowed Saloth Sar to 
infiltrate the Democrat Party and build alliances with individuals who were sympathetic to the Pracheachon 
Group (and also the covert communist movement) (Heder, Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese 
Model. Volume 1: Imitation and Independence, 1930-1975, pp. 37-43, hereafter cited as Imitation & 
Independence). The personalist rule of the Sangkum government is epitomized in the National Congress, a 
"Cambodian Pnyx" (as Pym calls it), where the ex-King-become-head-of-State would respond directly to 
issues raised by "his children"; Sihanouk "was a better rhetorician than almost all his fellow-politicians, 
and could make the Khmer demos eat out of his hand" (Pym, Mistapim in Cambodia, p. 66.). Noel notes 
that these bi-annual, open-air royal hearings functioned as a people's court of appeal and demonstrate how 
Sihanouk's demagogic control of politics by informal means (e.g., humiliation and ridicule at the Congress) 
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was (presented as) rule by popular consent (Noel, Cambodian Politics III: The Prince and the People, pp. 
2,10-13). 
10
 A less optimistic view of this time, pointing to deteriorating circumstances for the rural poor, might 
address hierarchical control through patronage networks, upward mobility for those who acquired foreign-
oriented skills, the predominance of rice farming on family-sized plots of land, widespread agrarian debt to 
usurers, and a growing (yet subordinate) administrative structure, which formed the pool of the modern 
Cambodian political elite (Vickery, "Cambodia (Kampuchea): History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future," 
pp. 40-44, hereafter cited as "History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future"). Vickery further states that: 
"Contrary to conventional wisdom, Cambodian rice agriculture, the largest economic sector, was poor with 
little prospect for improvement. Yields were among the lowest in the world, and could not be improved 
without considerable investment in fertilizers, irrigation and new techniques. Peasant incomes were not 
sufficient to permit them to invest in the improvements which might have increased rice yields, nor to 
attain a living standard, in terms of consumer goods, approximate to shopkeepers, mostly non-Khmer, or 
low-level bureaucrats, nearly all Khmer. Even with the large foreign aid programs, Cambodia still ran a 
large and throughout the 1950s and 1960s increasing trade deficit, and in the 1960s budget deficits, not for 
productive investment, but for elite consumption" (Vickery, "The Cambodian Economy: Where Has It 
Come from, Where Is It Going?" pp. 48-49). The adoption of foreign^oriented lifestyles on the part of 
Cambodian elites becomes a theme in Vickery's (and others') analysis of the economy and the 
revolutionary violence of the 1970s. Thion and Vickery analyze the historical development and 
perpetuation of a tripartite class system (peasants, officials, and royalty) with minimal social mobility and a 
lack of incentive or possibility for land/wealth accumulation, and reinforced by the Buddhist belief in merit. 
Portions of surplus produced by the peasantry typically went back into the country through the construction 
of pagodas and support of local artisans. The post-colonial socio-economic transformation encouraged 
wealth, squeezed from the peasantry, to be spent on luxury goods and foreign assets (rather than a 
reinvestment in the country) as officials took over French administrative positions as well as their 
consumption practices (Thion & Vickery, "Cambodia 1981: Background and Issues"). Vickery and Thion 
are not alone in pointing to extreme difference in socio-economic class and consumption patterns. As early 
as 1967, other scholars were demonstrating that foreign aid to Cambodia was allowing "expenditure well 
beyond the earned income of the country" (Leifer, The Search for Security, p. 16). The view of 
disenfranchised peasants exploited by the city had also been previewed by other leftist scholars early on. 
"Although these peasants produce food and the wealth of the country, they have always been divorced from 
political power. That power has traditionally remained above and beyond them—in the cities of Cambodia, 
where the country's elite reside, absorbing the peasant's products—and ruling in his name" (Frederick, 
"Cambodia: 'Operation Total Victory No. 43, '" p. 14). 
11
 Vickery, "History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future," pp. 42-44. 
12
 Vickery, in fact, describes the 1970 coup as an internal affair between two factions of the ruling class: 
Sihanouk's favored courtier-bureaucratic group and those wanting modern capitalist bourgeois democratic 
government ("History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future," p. 44). 
13
 Leifer, "The Failure of Political Institutionalization in Cambodia," pp. 125-140. Leifer argues that the 
Sangkum had been the key institution for the maintenance of the political system, operating as a coercive 
forum for urban elite political objectives. Meanwhile, a combination of traditional and charismatic 
authority secured support for Sihanouk among the country's large rural population. With a sense of 
foreboding, Leifer argues that Sihanouk's capacity to contain extreme conflict had overextended itself; the 
personalist leadership acted as a facade of stability over an underlying structural weakness, or simply, the 
lack of an institutionalized political system. (Drawing parallels to the weak state and personalist rule of 
Hun Sen might suggest a similar unraveling.) 
14
 "Henceforth in Khmer problems, both the remains of the monarchy and of Sihanoukism will no longer 
have the power to continue haunting us. The wheel of history spins forward, never retreating. Only two 
political forces confront each other: the free Khmer Republican regime and the force of the communists" 
(Ith Sarin, "Regrets of the Khmer Soul" in Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): 
Documents and Discussions, p. 54). Keyes shows how the coup disrupted the legitimacy of the tradition of 
kings, which was at the center of the Buddhist cosmological order (Keyes, "Communist Revolution and the 
Buddhist Past in Cambodia," p. 53-55). Traditionally, the monarchy was the sole source of unity holding 
together a fissiparous polity. According to Thion, the 1970 coup caused a gap between politics (in town) 
and kingship (among the peasantry), and Cambodia quickly returned to squabbling petty leaders and 
patron-client style relationships. He argues that modern concepts associated with "nationalism" had not 
permeated beyond the educated classes; thus, Cambodian politics remained largely tied to kingship as the 
source of legitimacy as well as guarantor of harmony between nature and the world—a role which none of 
Sihanouk's successors could assume or displace (Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics"). Smith 
examines a somewhat similar understanding of events among US Khmer immigrants. Two themes in the 
informants' interpretations of their traumatic pasts suggest an importance of: 1) Buddhist prophecy (put 
tumneay CIBBSIOJ), legends, and folktales, and 2) the Khmer Rouge occupying a place in a Khmer tradition of 
violence and mythical existence (Smith, Interpretive Accounts of the Khmer Rouge Years: Personal 
Experience in Cambodian Peasant World View). The legitimacy of the royal order, with a god-king at its 
apex, was seen to unravel with the ousting of Sihanouk. The coup is identified as a motivating factor for 
rural peasants to join the FUNK, because per Sihanouk's speech, aligning with the communists in the 
jungle was perceived as expressing support for the monarchy (Frieson, "Revolution and Rural Response in 
Cambodia, 1970-1975," pp. 35-37.) This was a frequent reasoning cited by my (former Khmer Rouge) 
informants in Anlong Veng to describe their joining the revolution (chaul badevoat tsrauBigs); however, it is 
possible that joining in defense of Lord Papa, rather than for a defeated ideology, may be a more appealing 
way to understand and relate their biographies in the present day. 
15
 Corfield's Khmers Stand Up! offers the most detailed account of the Lon Nol regime, as it devolved 
within the confines of the capital; at moments, the book gives what is literally a minute-by-minute account 
of events in Phnom Penh. With that acknowledged, the work's weakness is an almost complete lack of any 
account of activities and events in the countryside. At the time, Frederick asserted that the coup and 
Nixon's "Operation Total Victory No. 43" invasion (30 April 1970) only contributed to the existing 
tensions between city elite (wealthy and educated) and the rural overwhelming majority (poor and 
illiterate), and the rural disaffection could only increase support for the Khmer Rouge. Almost 
prophetically, she argues that Lon Nol's coup and the US invasion generated a situation in which a "middle 
path" (a la Sihanouk) or refuge through neutrality became no longer possible; the extremes would battle 
each other and Cambodia would be plunged into the Indochina conflict (Frederick, "Cambodia: 'Operation 
Total Victory No. 43,'" pp. 15-16). Even at the time, the brutality that was to befall Cambodia had been 
foreshadowed by some observers (Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): 
Documents and Discussions; idem, "The Unexpected Victory," pp. 28—31; Ith Sarin, Regrets of the Khmer 
Soul; Kirk, "Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?"). 
16
 Becker graphically describes the degree of corruption: "The army became the richest sector of society 
during the war, the one with direct access to millions of American aid dollars, and the most criminal. The 
generals were openly dissolute. They drank cognac and sodas before noon, built cement mansions, 
imported limousines, and opened Swiss bank accounts with money robbed from the United States and their 
own troops" (Becker, When the War was Over, p. 16). Shaw cross and Kiernan make some psychological 
generalizations about the effects of the US carpet-bombing of Cambodia, and these suggestions have been 
taken up in other interpretations (for example, Chomsky & Herman, After the Cataclysm, pp. 219-224, 
281-283). The Paris Peace Accords of 27 January 1973, which was to put an end to the Second Indochina 
War, in military terms allowed Cambodia to become "the only game in town," and America's B-52s 
focused their payloads on this singular battlefield (CIA Director William Colby quoted in Shawcross, 
Sideshow, p. 265). The "blind" aerial assaults surged to their most intense in 1973, before the US Congress 
finally halted Operation Arclight in August of that year. While some of the ordinance hit uninhabited areas 
such as the eastern jungles, significant tonnage also fell on more densely populated rural towns (e.g., the 
accidental strike on Neak Luong on 7 August 1973). Shawcross asserts that the bombings caused 
"irreversible psychological damage," which in turn contributed to the brutality of the CPK when it came to 
power (Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 298-299). Kiernan details some of the horrific effects within specific 
villages, at one point noting how the incomprehensible suffering wrought from above led to a paranoia 
wherein the most proximate potential "spy" might be accused of calling in the attacks (Kiernan, How Pol 
Pot Came to Power, pp. 349-355). Although logical and perhaps true, these would be difficult to prove in 
any significant way. Further, the psychological affects in and of themselves would not adequately explain 
the content or style of rule that would follow the cessation of the war. (However, psychological and 
infrastructural affects combined with a history of socio-economic deprivation and exploitation become the 
foundation for Vickery's argument regarding DK.) Rural villagers were presented with the choice of 
risking death in the war zone of the countryside—where republican FANK soldiers battled the Sihanouk-
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endorsed "Khmer Rouge," while US B-52s dropped bombs from above—or migrating to the city. As the 
war raged, nearly 2 million residents from the countryside opted for the latter and became urban refugees 
among Phnom Penh's usual population of 1 million (US Department of State, "Background Notes— 
Cambodia," Washington DC, 1987, p. 6). Numerous authors have pointed to the effects of the civil war on 
the revolutionary maquis; typically they identity the ways in which US bombing campaigns became a basis 
for FUNK recruitment (or a reason for fleeing toward the city) (Frieson, The Impact of Revolution on 
Cambodian Peasants: 1970-1975, p. 169; idem, "Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970-
1975," pp. 35-37; Hood & Ablin, "Path to Cambodia's Present," p. xxix; Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to 
Power, pp. 349-357; idem, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 16-25). They also point to how the bombing produced 
the opposite of their intended effect, making the CPK more resolute and perhaps more extreme (Kiernan, 
"Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement," pp. 280-284): the movement "dug in its heels" and 
"launched ferocious attacks" (Frieson, The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970-1975, p. 
168). Kiernan gives significant credit to Kissinger and Nixon for the CPK centralization of power (and 
elimination of moderates), contending that the US bombings of the Southwest in particular helped drive 
CPK factions to Pol Pot's "Centre" group (Kiernan, "Roots of Genocide: New Evidence on the US 
Bombardment of Cambodia," pp. 20-21). Supported by Ith Sarin's depiction of life in the liberated zones, 
Locard offers credence to the view that the revolutionaries' brutal and radical policies drove people in the 
countryside toward the capital (Ith Sarin, Regrets of the Khmer Soul; Locard, "Yes, indeed! Why did they 
kill (so Many)?" pp. 8-9). Kirk concurs by supplying reports from escapees from liberated areas (Kirk, 
"Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?" pp. 8-10). Chandler is keen to note how early "rumors" of 
strict and brutal rule in CPK-controlled areas were dismissed as anti-communist propaganda (Chandler, A 
History of Cambodia, p. 208). 
17
 "Phnom Penh remains apathetic, fatalistic and corrupt. Most of the expensive restaurants are open even 
though the children of the door are dying of starvation, and the rich have electricity while most of the rest 
of the city goes without" (Greenway, "5-year-old War leaves Cambodia Drained, Apathetic," Washington 
Post, 23 February 1975, quoted in Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, p. 214). A slightly fictionalized account 
also conveys the direness of the situation: '"Heavy fighting on all the main highways,' Keller [a journalist] 
intoned, at near dictation speed. 'Rocket attacks at night, plastics during the day, Lon Nol thinks he's god 
and the US Embassy has hot flushes supporting him, then trying to throw him out.' He gave statistics, 
ordnance, casualties, the scale of US aid. He named generals known to be selling arms to the Khmer 
Rouge, and generals who ran phantom armies in order to claim their troops' pay, and generals who did 
both. "The usual snafu. Bad guys are too weak to take the towns, good guys are too crapped out to take the 
countryside and nobody wants to fight except the Corns. Students ready to set fire to the place soon 
as they're no longer exempt from the war, food riots any day now, corruption like there was no tomorrow, 
no one can live on his salary, fortunes being made and the place is bleeding to death. Place is unreal and 
the [US] Embassy is a nut-house, more spooks than straight guys and they're all pretending they've got a 
secret. Want more?' 
'How long do you give it?' 
'A week. Ten years'" (John Le Carre, The Honourabe Schoolboy, p. 347, quoted in Corfield, Khmers Stand 
£//>/, p. 191). 
18
 Porter provides a brief but succinct history of the movement's development ("Vietnamese Communist 
Policy Towards Kampuchea 1930-1970"). Kiernan provides more detail on the break with Vietnam as 
well as the US bombing and the growing centralized control within the CPK (Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came 
to Power, chap. 8). Carney documents the means by which Vietnam helped develop the revolutionary 
administration in Cambodia (Carney, "The Unexpected Victory," pp. 22-26). A more complex 
understanding of how past involvement with the Vietnamese communists played out in terms of factions 
and policy comes from Heder (Imitation and Independence, discussed below, particularly in the context of 
a "good East" narrative). In brief, Vietnamese leaders had consistently sought an Indochinese Federation 
(allied with the Soviet bloc), but this priority shifted according to historical, geo-political circumstances. 
The earliest influences in Cambodia were in the establishment of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party 
in 1951 as an incipient communist movement. (Vietnam was consistently unimpressed with the 
development of objective conditions for revolution in Cambodia and Laos.) The 1954 Geneva Convention 
led Vietnam to cease its direct assistance of the KPRP. By the time Saloth Sar seized control of the 
movement, North Vietnam had already found a reliable regional ally in Sihanouk. As Sihanouk allowed 
Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, the Vietnamese strongly encouraged the Khmer communists to take a 
gradualist approach toward politics, which infuriated Saloth Sar and his colleagues. Vickery summarizes 
this relationship: "Vietnam's advice to the Cambodians seems to have been classic Marxist: Cambodia was 
not ready for its own Socialist revolution, should first cooperate in a Vietnamese victory, and then follow 
Vietnam to socialism" (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 285). By the time of the Lon Nol coup, the 
Khmer Rouge had had five years to develop hostilities toward Vietnam's policies; nonetheless, Vietnamese 
"support" continued for three years after the coup, as these tensions grew. 
19
 Shawcross (Sideshow) offers some of the most detailed information on the military struggles, particularly 
from the standpoint of the US government: Operation Breakfast and the Menu bombing campaigns (pp. 
15-35) as well as the Chenla-II offensive (pp. 202-205). 
20
 Lieutenant-Colonel Um Savuth is something of a minor legend from the Khmer Republic days. He 
'"was an astonishing personality, a thin, twisted man who walked with a long white cane, drove his jeep at 
terrifying speeds, and was nearly always drunk. Early in his military career he had, in a moment of high 
spirits, ordered a subordinate to place a cat on his head and then, from a considerable distance, shoot the 
animal off. The subordinate refused. Um Savuth insisted that it was a direct order. The man pulled the 
trigger and a part of Um Savuth's head was blown away. Ever since, half his body had been paralysed, and 
he had to drink quantities of beer and Scotch to kill his constant pain.' Donald Kirk recorded that 
Americans had assured him that Um Savuth was 'better drunk than most Cambodian officers sober'" 
(Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, p. 61; Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 202). 
21
 Becker charts Lon Nol's ascension before and within the coup, noting particularly how his obsession 
with the occult led to the military devastation of the Khmer Republic, especially the Chenla I and II 
offensives (Becker, When the War was Over, pp. 122-133). The Marshall's "strategic" approach to the 
crusade against the non-believers prioritized sites of Khmer-Mon glory and significance over points of 
military advantage. 
22
 A 48-day US airlift operation in the early months of 1975 only temporarily bolstered the capital which 
had been surrounded, cut off, and under siege by FUNK forces. Kirk notes that Lon Nol's FANK was 
incapable of successfully countering its enemy's onslaughts, a lack of effectiveness that was compounded 
by rampant corruption within the ranks, including ghost soldiers on payrolls and the sale of arms to the 
enemy, and buoyed only by US support (Kirk, "Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?," p. 11-12). 
(The Khmer Republic was further challenged by Phnom Penh's leftist student community who protested 
the regime's ineptitude and extreme corruption.) However, GRUNK's forces, the "Khmer Rouge," were 
similarly incapable of driving their enemy from the provincial centers or the capital. In this back-and-forth 
fighting, Kirk notes the development of an extreme ferocity in the Khmer Rouge's strategy and tactics, 
perhaps most exemplified in the 18 March 1974 capture, razing, and subsequent massacre of Oudong (pp. 
1-2). From all refugee accounts, the Khmer Rouge had embraced the use of terror tactics to subdue the 
populace under its control. In addition, denigration of Sihanouk within Khmer Rouge territory'seems to 
have begun in April 1973 (shortly after the Prince's tour of Ratanakiri) (pp. 14-15,17-18). Oddly, Kirk's 
1974 report frequently foreshadows the problems and atrocities to emerge in Democratic Kampuchea, for 
example in noting: the most inexperienced and illiterate cadre being placed in local leadership positions; 
the promised bloody purge of the ancien regime; and the dramatically increasing refugee population in the 
capital and in the surrounding areas of provincial centers. Kirk answers the report's titular inquiry by 
stating that the Khmer Rouge are both revolutionaries and terrorists, enforcing their determinant vision of 
radical change by a directed program of terror (p. 15). His conclusion offers what seems a balanced (rather 
than condemnatory) account of the movement's actions and endeavors. Largely driven by a range of 
frustrations as well as a determination for revolution, the movement's cadre "could not accomplish these 
aims as the peasant masses clung stubbornly to their time-honored ways" (p. 23). And lastly, the Khmer 
Rouge "longed for a total revolution by which they could reverse centuries of tradition, culminated by the 
period of neo-colonialism of Prince Sihanouk" (p. 23). 
3
 Becker characterizes Lon Nol's regime as "fascist," given its authoritarian and nationalist character, 
which also coupled with anti-Vietnamese xenophobia (traits she sees reflected in the CPK movement). She 
argues that the pro-Republic bourgeoisie found itself trapped between the communist guerrillas and Lon 
Nol's militaristic occult Buddhism; Lon Nol's view/treatment of the Vietnamese (both South and North) 
further complicated Cambodia's situation (vis-a-vis American support) (Becker, When the War was Over, 
pp. 121-130). Swain's unromantic vision of Phnom Penh descends into the particulars of the country's 
republican decline. "Everyone knew in their bones that Lon Nol had lost the war: the unscrupulous 
generals in their Mercedes; the cyclo-drivers carrying the wounded to hospital; the blind soldier-minstrels 
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wandering the streets; the legless cripples; the fortune-tellers; the women grappling with unaffordable Food 
prices; the shopkeepers; the soldiers; the bargirls. When lightning split the spire of the shrine on the top of 
the little Phnom hill [Wat Phnom], the fortune-tellers said it was a bad omen" (Swain, River of Time, p. 
104). He proceeds to descend further into the heartwrenching, and sometimes darkly absurd, tales of 
Phnom Penh's misery and demise: the end of shipping, the British diplomatic exodus, social life in dire 
circumstances, Khmer parents auctioning off their children for adoption, a besieged medical system 
completely incapable of treating the vast number of daily arriving wounded; and hopeful tales of recovery 
cut short by the fall of the city (pp. 104-113). 
24
 The figure for the population of the capital is the one most often cited (see for example, Ea, "Recent 
Population Trends in Kampuchea," pp. 4,13n2-3, which uses UN and US Bureau of Census figures; 
Banister & Johnson, "After the Nightmare," p. 107,136nl68-169; Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 48. 
The CIA's calculation was 4 million: "As the fighting intensified in the early months of 1975, more people 
crowded into the cities. By the time the Lon Nol regime fell in April 1975 the urban population probably 
was on the order of 4 million, more than half the total population" (CIA, "Kampuchea: A Demographic 
Catastrophe"). 
25
 Locard notes how the standard message—"Brother and sisters must leave Phnom Penh for a little while 
(for fear that the Americans are coming to bomb)"—was simply a form of deceit (Locard, Pol Pot's Little 
Red Book, pp. 128-129, my modification of his translation). Instead, he argues that the evacuation 
("ruralisation") was for security reasons (Locard, "State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) 
and Retribution (1979-2004)," p. 120). Etcheson offers a succinct list of the reasons underlying the 
decision to evacuate: 1) security against counter-revolutionary elements; 2) problems of health, sanitation, 
and food supply; 3) ideological belief in an agrarian revolutionary society; 4) consolidation of internal party 
power by Pol Pot; 5) fear of US bombing (Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, pp. 
144-145. Chandler's explanation of the decision to evacuate, which had been made three months prior, 
enumerates 1) a genuine lack of food in the capital, 2) difficulties of administering such a large population, 
3) concerns about security, and, most significantly, 4) a desire to demonstrate the countryside victory over 
the city (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 210-211). Similarly, Rousset stresses infrastructural 
disrepair and a dearth of provisions, in addition to the security argument put forth by Ieng Sary (Rousset, 
"Cambodia: Background to the Revolution," p. 517). Kiernan consults many first- and second-hand 
personal accounts (from interviews, books, etc.) to argue that the 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh was 
mainly a means of mass control and ethnic cleansing by the CPK Center (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 
39-64). He also argues that the differential manner in which the evacuation order was implemented 
demonstrates it was motivated by largely political concerns (Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean 
Communist Movement," pp. 50-51). 
26
 Ebihara, "A Cambodian Village under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979," p. 52; Vickery, Cambodia 1975-
1982, p. 87. 
27
 Heder offers a detailed list of the various labels that were attached to the two groups, and includes a 
reminder that this simplistic binary of "new" and "base" betrays the more complex class categories that 
were employed by the CPK (Heder, Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance, pp. 5-6). In his bountiful 
inventory, three particular categories received significant use, and typically illustrated an individual's status 
vis-a-vis becoming Party members (bdkuchorn untis): "full rights" (penh seth KIEJHB), "candidate" (triem 
ttfijH), and "depositee" {bdnnhar mm). 
28
 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 265. 
29
 As stated in chapter 1, CPK administration of the country was divided into seven geographic zones 
(phumipeak) and two special regions (dambari). The zones were subdivided into sectors (ddmban), which 
were referred to by number. Sectors and regions were divided according to pre-revolutionary 
administrative units: districts (srok), commune (khum), and village (phum). At each level, a three-person 
committee (secretary, deputy secretary, and member) governed. Ten to 15 village households constituted a 
group (krom), and conglomerations of villages formed cooperatives (sdhdkdr), which formed the 
productivist unit of the DK economy (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 71-73; Kiernan, The Pol Pot 
Regime, p. 167; Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, pp. 126-128). The variation 
across zones/sectors (and its importance) is discussed below. 
30
 Heder, Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance, p. 6. Vickery aptly summarizes: "In general living was 
best where evacuees were distributed among established peasant villages, and worst where evacuees were 
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settled on undeveloped land and forced to create and plant fields without either knowledge of how to carry 
out such work or adequate food supplies pending their first crop" (Vickery, "History, Tragedy, and 
Uncertain Future," p. 46). 
31
 The secrecy of the Party was maintained for a year and a half, while its leader, Saloth Sar, operated under 
the nom de guerre Pol Pot. (The moniker "Saloth Sar" is used throughout this text when discussing the 
individual's pre-DK life; otherwise, the revolutionary alias will be used.) Chandler describes the build and 
defend motive: '•''Building the country meant many things. It referred to increasing agricultural production 
and in particular the yields of rice. The process also involved building dams and irrigation works to permit 
double-cropping. Political education sessions also aimed at building new personalities that could serve the 
Revolutionary Organization.... Defending the country meant maintaining the offensive spirit which had 
defeated 'the American imperialists and Lon Nol'" (Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 256). 
Self-reliance and a national(ist) independence meant that Cambodia sought to harness it sovereignty and 
domestic capacities without assistance or guidance from outside (Jackson, "The Ideology of Total 
Revolution," pp. 39-49). 
32
 Becker describes the early phase of this "ultimate revolution" (1973 to January 1976) as war 
communism—drawing unacknowledged inspiration from Stalin's concept and Mao's Great Leap 
Forward—evidenced by authoritarian cooperatives, evacuations of urban centers, and reliance on increased 
hard work from the populace (which also resonated with visions of Jayavarman VII) (Becker, When the 
War Was Over, pp. 181-187). Chandler also entertains the idea of war communism to describe Pol Pot's 
1976 Four-Year Plan and its rapid implementation (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 214-215). 
Jackson notes how the haste for modernization was a key aspect of "total revolution" (Jackson, "The 
Ideology of Total Revolution," p. 65). The CPK expressed this velocity in its grand ambition: "The Super 
Great Leap Forward, this is a big leap beyond all reality" {morhaa lotphldh morhaa hah rumlorng 
HunttirmtJtKHtmumsisuti) (Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, p. 72). 
33
 The collectivized agricultural system through the 1970s functioned primarily around "mutual assistance 
groups," which were meant to develop into "high-level cooperatives" (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 
167-168). Dismal accounts plague the history of DK economic mismanagement (Chandler, The Tragedy 
of Cambodian History, pp. 258-262; Twining, "The Economy," pp. 125-132; Vickery, Cambodia 1975-
1982, pp. 163-169). 
34
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 286-287. Kiljunen offers a more somber view of administration: 
"Soldiers, village leaders and the cadres of the Communist Party were recruited from among the poorest of 
the peasantry: typically they were young, even small teenage boys. The fanaticism and intolerance of the 
young were thus exploited in building a new society. Supervision of the collective farms was in their hands 
and often also an absolute power which could lead to random executions for the merest show of 
insubordination" (Kiljunen, Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide, p. 17). The implications of differing 
views on (de/centralized) authority are discussed below. 
35
 Three metric tons/hectare was the CPK's stated goal ("Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety 
of Question," p. 3; idem, "Party's Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism," p. 54, Table 3). This tremendous 
increase in production capacity was meant to provide the resources to build socialism in all other spheres. 
"Strike, crush, and win absolutely the production goal of three tons per hectare!" (yaay sdmrok bok 
kdmtech sdaar sethkech muoy hektaa bei taon aoy baan dachkhaat! tvsmnmmonmnMBnn 
Hratflfitrrattrisfjjijisaissnfi!) (Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, p. 242). 
36
 The livelihood meetings were meant to cleanse the individual of non-revolutionary thought (Chandler, 
The Tragedy of Cambodian History, pp. 283-284). Ith Sarin, who lived in a liberated zone prior to the 
CPK victory, notes how the self-criticism sessions created a process that re-enforced the betterment of 
cadre and collective; without much judgment, he states that self-criticism was to follow five principles or 
themes: "manual activities; state of morale, feelings; instructions given by higher-ranking chiefs; personal 
position regarding policy and the Party; and revolutionary solidarity" (Ith Sarin, "Nine Months with the 
Maquis," p. 40). A note on translation: Locard uses the term svaytitien (ftjtHsmijs) for "self-criticism," 
which really means "criticism" (Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, p. 90); DC-Cam uses the term chiivatos 
(Siawja), which underscores the importance of one's outlook, perceptions, and ideology (DC-Cam, Two-in-
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One Democratic Kampuchea Glossary, pp. 14, 60); I am using the term as it appears in the Khmer version 
of Ith Sarin's Regrets of the Khmer Soul (Srdndh Prorleung Khmaer fyiHimspntifgt), p. 56. 
37
 Kiernan claims that Nestles condensed milk cans, which could hold roughly 250 g, were used to measure 
individual rations; pre-war rice consumption in Cambodia was 600 gper capita per diem (Kiernan, The Pol 
Pot Regime, pp. 163-164). 
38
 The deterioration of relations between DK and Vietnam are chronicled by Vickery: land and sea 
skirmishes after 1975; serious warfare diffused by 1976; markedly increased interest in disputed territorial 
areas followed by greater military attacks in 1977; a negotiated peace in mid-July 1977 that temporarily 
assuaged hostilities; renewed violence in December 1977 followed by full-scale war at the end of 1978 
(Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 202-210). Vickery suggests that "hyper-chauvinism" of Democratic 
Kampuchea policy 1) led the regime to readjust borders by force, and 2) may have been the basis for purges 
of Khmers thought to be pro-Vietnamese (p. 209). Becker examines deeply the relations (historical 
tensions) between Cambodia and her neighbor to the east. In so doing, she examines not only the divergent 
cultural influences of the countries over centuries, she also analyzes with keen insight the more recent 
networks of relations and interests of China and the USSR in shaping the nature of support or scorn 
between Cambodia and Vietnam. Focusing on the "boat people" as an expression of Southern Vietnamese 
(and ethnic Chinese) dissatisfaction, Becker locates China as the perceived culprit (and historic enemy) in 
Hanoi's revolutionary failures, thus positing an invasion of Cambodia as a legitimate attack against China 
(Becker, When the War Was Over, pp. 329-363). 
39
 At most, he describes the DK movement as "peasant armies led by'Marxist'petty bourgeois 
intellectuals" (Vickery, "The Cambodian Economy: Where Has It Come from, Where Is It Going?," p. 49). 
He also states, "In spite of ostensible allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, they followed policies contrary to 
all previous Marxist theory and practice. They held neither to Marx's view that communism would come 
through proletarian revolution and working class rule after capitalism had reached its highest level of 
development, nor Lenin's programme of vanguard intellectual-proletarian leadership in a largely peasant 
society, nor even Mao's of the peasantry as the leading revolutionary class, but supported by industrial 
development and a large, skilled urban working class. Nor did they adopt a Stalinist programme of forced 
primitive socialist accumulation from the peasantry to build an industrialized urban sector" (Vickery, 
"Notes on the Political Economy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)," pp. 438-439). Etcheson 
also notices the oddity of Vickery's "attempt to dissociate Pol Pot's organisation from the label, 
'communist' It is as if he does not want to sully the terms 'socialist' and 'communist' by associating them 
with Pol Pot's Kampuchean Communist Party" (Etcheson, "Reflections of Kampuchea," p. 978). 
40
 "Whatever else the conflict was, it was also, if not first of all, a war between town and countryside in 
which the town's battle was increasingly for the sole purpose of preserving its privileges while the rural 
areas suffered. The argument here, then, is that in 1975 Cambodia was divided into two numerically 
comparable camps, one of which had suffered immeasurably more than the other for five years, but 
nevertheless having won would dominate the other for the next four years, inflicting equal or greater 
damage on it, partly due to objective circumstances and partly out of revenge" (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-
1982, p. 39). 
41
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 280-283. Vickery's matrix of possibilities for revolution—a flow 
chart approach—takes two possible initial circumstances: anti-colonial struggle and domestic repression. 
The available strategies against the colonial power will boil down to bourgeois revolution or socialist 
revolution; a peaceful (bourgeois) move to independence may spur repression and lead to (peasant) 
revolution anyway. Kiernan's critique of Vickery's position admits that the CPK enjoyed widespread 
peasant support and peasants engaged in initiatives of their own (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 167); as 
for the Center being "pulled along" by the peasants (p. 164), Kiernan charges the Center's policies of social 
control (e.g., atomization) guarantees that the Party was increasingly leading (pp. 166-168). Kiernan's 
caveats are explicitly aimed at Frieson's differences with Vickery, largely informed by Scott's Weapons of 
the Weak; Frieson argues that peasant support was not widespread and that the secrecy of the Organization 
meant that peasants were engaging in survival strategies to confront turbulent times (Kiernan, The Pol Pot 
Regime, p. 166; Frieson, The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970-1975, p. 11). Frieson 
re-states this argument arguing that, in fact, a failure to bridge peasant politics to Party politics was largely 
DK's undoing (Frieson, "Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970-1975"). 
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42
 "The city, or at least its poorer strata, and indeed anyone trying to live honestly on a government salary, 
did begin to suffer from hunger at least by 1972—first because of inflation and then an outright lack of 
food; but anyone who would argue that it was thereby disadvantaged with respect to rural areas would then 
have to admit that the Communists, in spite of war losses and damages, were carrying out a very successful 
organization of agricultural production. Although certain journalistic accounts vividly describe the shelling 
of Phnom Penh, particularly during the last year of the war, those incidents, bad as they were for their 
victims, cannot compare with the artillery and air attacks on the countryside, some of which as early as 
1971 were clearly visible just across the river from Phnom Penh where they served as an amusing fireworks 
display for city people on an afternoon promenade or sipping drinks on their balcony. These were the 
people—spoiled, pretentious, contentious, status-conscious at worst, or at best simply soft, intriguing, 
addicted to city comforts and despising peasant life—who faced the Communist exodus order on 17 April 
1975. For them the mere fact of leaving an urban existence with its foreign orientation and unrealistic 
expectations to return to the land would have been a horror, and a horror compounded by their position on 
the receiving end of orders issued by illiterate peasants. On the whole they cared little or nothing for the 
problems of the "other half of their countrymen, and would have been quite content to have all the rural 
rebels bombed away by American planes. Even having seen the damage done to the country during the war 
they seemed to exclude it from their thoughts, almost never mentioned it unless asked, and then seemed 
astonished that anyone would take an interest in what happened in the rural areas before they arrived there 
in 1975. These are the people who, by nature of their circumstances, have been the main object of study for 
most post-1975 research on contemporary Cambodia, and also until late 1980 the main source of 
information about conditions inside the country. Even without conscious misinformation or exaggeration 
their portrayal of those five years could not help but be very one-sided; and the straight reporting of what 
they wish to say will inevitably give a distorted, sometimes even false, picture, of little use in 
understanding the revolutionary regime or for situating it properly within wider contemporary history" 
(Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 27-28). These statements seem to follow quite closely, Mao's 
proclamation (echoing Lenin), "Revolution is not a dinner party... A revolution is an insurrection, an act of 
violence by which one class overthrows another" (Mao, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant 
Movement in Hunan" (March 1927), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 28, quoted in Mao, Quotations from 
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, pp. 11-12). And in fact, the CPK version is quite similar: "Revolution's triumph 
over imperialism [badevoat chakrdpoat uBffiaotficifj] is not inviting guests to go dine... Revolution is 
seething rage at a class, striking and overthrowing a class" (Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, pp. 155-
156, my modification of Locard's translation). 
43
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. vii, 26-27. 
44
 His work emphasizes the implications of (near-)homogeneity, stating: 1) "Prerevolutionary Cambodia 
was 80 percent peasant, 80 percent Khmer, and 80 percent Buddhist," and 2) that ethnic minorities 
remained largely un-integrated within the country, and 3) cities were dominated by Chinese and 
Vietnamese (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 5). 
45
 Both Vickery and Heder have taken issue with the way in which race is used in Kiernan's accounts, 
although from slightly different angles. Vickery argues that a central policy to exterminate the Chams 
never existed (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 194-195; idem, "Comments on Cham Population 
Figures," pp. 31-33). Heder's argument suggests that the killing of ethnic minorities under DK is better 
understood in terms of the CPK's class categorization and resultant suspicions thereof (Heder, "Racism, 
Marxism, labelling, and genocide in Ben Kiernan's The Pol Pot regime," pp. 104-108, hereafter cited as 
"Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide"). The questions of centralizing authority and understandings 
of race versus class distinctions in DK practice are discussed below. 
46
 Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 343. In this context, he aligns the CPK not with the grand figures 
of Soviet and Chinese Communisms, but with "the sixteenth-century Englishman Thomas More, the 
Hebertists of the French Revolution, and the Utopian socialists of nineteenth-century Russia, whom Lenin 
had castigated as 'the carriers of a reactionary petty bourgeois ideology [promoting] stagnation and Asiatic 
backwardness.'" (Compare Lenin's words with Vickery's characterization of the CPK elite.) 
47
 With CPK/Pol Pot power consolidated, the "revolution without a model" proceeded toward the 
introduction of 1) ever larger cooperatives, and 2) communal eating, which resulted in greater social 
divisions and discontent—all this while the elite were afforded extreme luxury and other benefits of 
hypocrisy. Simultaneously, the CPK leadership squandered its natural and human resources by consistently 
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placing ideological position before practical benefit, for example: the ban on foraging in the face of 
starvation; the refusal to employ qualified technicians because their minds were not ideologically pure; and 
the complete repudiation of the past (and with it, its resources such as housing). In spite of this "irrational 
radicalism" (Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 349), the country saw progress in defense (China 
strengthening Cambodia's military capability) and irrigation. In spite of greater control over water as well 
as a bigger work force, cooperatives produced less than the regime believed. Short's explanation of this 
mystery is the lack of motivation on the part of the workers. Rural cadre hid the underproduction in their 
areas but were assessed levies based on the achieved quotas they did report. When food shortages became 
apparent, the CPK leadership decided that enemies within the ranks must be to blame. 
4
 The label comes from Kiernan {The Pol Pot Regime, p. 26), the characterization from Chandler (Brother 
Number One, p. 3). "Like Sihanouk's fashioning of Buddhist socialism or LOn Nol's entertaining ideas of 
Khmer-Mon hegemony, the CPK leadership choosing to wage revolution everywhere in Cambodia did not 
spring from a study of Cambodian social conditions or from consultation with others but from a conviction 
on the part of the CPK's leaders that a recognizably Communist revolution needed to be waged" (Chandler, 
The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 239). This echoes, in an awry fashion, Pol Pot's boasting that DK 
was "building socialism without a model." 
49
 Chandler, Brother Number One, p. 4. This is also the view held by Quinn who argues that Pol Pot was 
largely mimicking China's Great Leap Forward (morhaa lotphldh mmttuimtjis) and Cultural Revolution and 
using (Stalinist-style) terror and violence to achieve the Party's radical aims (Quinn, The Origins and 
Development of Radical Cambodian Communism). The works of other scholars have underscored elements 
of a Stalinist tendency within the CPK, noted especially in terms of the Parry's classifications and purges 
(Burgler, The Eyes of the Pineapple, pp. 260-269; Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic 
Kampuchea, pp. 45^7,164-169,192-193; Jackson, "Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge," pp. 248-
250). The regime's peasantism and privileging of "self-reliance" has led some scholars to (also) highlight 
Maoist tendencies (Burgler, The Eyes of the Pineapple, pp. 260-268; Ponchaud, "Social Change in the 
Vortex of Revolution," pp. 151-152; Quinn, "Explaining the Terror," especially pp. 228-231). In spite of 
these suggestive elements, Vickery still argues that "nationalism, populism, and peasantism really won out 
over communism" (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 309). However, Chandler explicitly notes how the 
historical interplay of Soviet and Chinese models are also refracted through DK. "After 1975, at least as far 
as ends and means were concerned, the revolution drew on Russian and Chinese experiences, moving 
smoothly from something resembling Soviet war communism (1919-21 in the UUSR, 1973-75 in 
Cambodia) to the collectivization (in 1976-77 in Cambodia) of the sort that had gripped the USSR after 
1927 and China after 1949—skipping over, as the Chinese had done, the relatively pragmatic, 
unrevolutionary model provided by the USSR's New Economic Policy in the early 1920s" (Chandler, The 
Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 245). Chandler also examines the Soviet show trials as well as Chinese 
and Vietnamese models of "re-education" in the context of DK's security apparatus {Voices from 5-27, pp. 
122-127,149-150). 
50
 Some of the continuities that have shaped the movement's overall character include: emphasis on and 
celebration of the country's glorious past, privileging of the Khmer "race," antagonism toward the 
hereditary enemy (Vietnam), and personalist rule (Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, pp. 237-
238). In terms of discontinuities, Chandler stresses: prioritization of social transformation and control, the 
dissolution of the market economy, revolutionary violence, and the imitation of foreign models (pp. 240-
246). Thion argues that the CPK's class analysis in the late 1960s was borrowed from Vietnam (Thion, 
"The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," pp. 22-23); Heder has devoted significant attention in elucidating 
imitation of Vietnamese models in the course of struggle (Heder, Imitation & Independence). 
51
 Heder has applied to the Pol Pot/Ta Mok/Duch leadership coalition the Marxist-Leninist label "ultra 
left," "its revolution was so extreme as to create feelings of either hatred for or disillusionment with the 
revolution, not only among its natural enemies, but ever-increasingly among its natural allies and friends" 
(Heder, "Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages," p. 18). 
52
 In fact, Heder's insight stresses the commitment to one particular model of revolution, which had been 
(mis-)applied to South Vietnam, even as the movement struggled to assert its independence from 
Vietnamese domination (Heder, Imitation & Independence). His recent book makes significant 
achievement in sorting out the ideological influences, their transmission, and realization in practice. He 
argues that the Cambodian Communists consistently (even dogmatically) sought to follow the 
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revolutionary model that Hanoi (mis-)applied to South Vietnam, even if this meant defying Hanoi. In this 
respect (and through discussions of Marxist ideology), Heder elucidates the nature and extent of Vietnam's 
"training" of the CPK. Heder also provides sound reasoning for differentiating the movement according to 
a non-Communist face (Sihanouk), the French-educated "Khmer Rouge" facade (Khieu Samphan, Hou 
Yuon, Hu Nim), and the real power in the CPK Standing Committee (Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, 
etc.). 
53
 Heder, "Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in Democratic Kampuchea Crimes: 
Cambodian Accountability in Comparative Perspective," hereafter cited as "Reassessing the Role of Senior 
Leaders." 
54
 "Democratic Kampuchea" is used to denote this entire period, even though the regime's title was not 
officially inaugurated until the promulgation of its Constitution in January 1976. 
55
 Lavoix approaches the scholarship on DK in terms of three "waves": 1) writers sorting out facts and 
factors, confronted by a dearth of information, 2) the rise of controversy as scholars (e.g., Vickery and 
Kiernan) stake positions based on a growing access to data, and 3) a shift toward systemic explanations, 
particularly those emphasizing processes associated with nationalism (Lavoix, "Cambodia"). 
For a critique of the early abuse of news from Kampuchea, see Vickery on Barron and Paul, on 
Ponchaud, and on Hildebrand and Porter (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 46^8,48-50,50-51, 
respectively). Kiernan offered one of the earliest defenses of the revolution against propagandist 
representations ("Cambodia in the News: 1975/76"), a view he would later revisit and significantly recant 
in 1979 ("Vietnam and the Governments and People of Kampuchea"). His 1976 essay asserts that refugee 
accounts of a "communist bloodbath" are overstated and reflect experiences peculiar to the Northwest 
region; in addition, Kiernan claims that there is no evidence to suggest the state of affairs were a result of 
centrally-organized government policy. In this critique of Australian press coverage of Cambodia, he 
directs attention to the composition of the refugee population (mostly former-city dwelling elites) and the 
motivations underlying their accounts. He asserts that the class position of urbanites combined with a lack 
of food is the logical basis for the April 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh. He further explores the unique 
socio-economic context of the Northwest as well as the lack of experienced cadre as the factors 
contributing to the disproportionately violent behavior; thus, he argues that stories from this region could 
not be generalized to the country as a whole. Kiernan notes the distortions and exaggerations of the press, 
citing the unfounded reports of exponential increases in refugees. He further cites the mass dissemination 
of photos that were widely accepted to be fake, and he also explains how some refugees participated in 
exaggerating atrocities, so as to persuade Thai border authorities to admit them. Taking the brief article as 
a whole, Kiernan borders on apologist for DK actions, but he also shows the mechanism by which 
newspapers sensationalize and overstate the situation, even if some of his claims (e.g., about returning 
Khmers) turned out to be false. Other early critiques can be found in Chomsky and Herman's analyses of 
reports from Time magazine, Simons (Washington Post correspondent), Newsweek magazine, Barron and 
Paul, Shawcross, Ponchaud, and Kamm (of The New York Times) (Chomsky & Herman, After the 
Cataclysm, pp. 163-207). Burgler begins his work with an inventory of oft-repeated hyperboles that 
appear in the media (Burgler, The Eyes of the Pineapple, pp. 1-2). Shawcross offers a summary of press 
representations and reactions to them in "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," pp. 238-243. The 
Barron and Paul account of Democratic Kampuchea (summarized in The Reader's Digest) sparked a 
combatative debate among leftist academics; as this exchange bled across multiple issues of the Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, see: Retboll, "Kampuchea and the Reader's Digest; Barnett, "Inter-
Communist Conflicts and Vietnam"; Summers, "In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would 
Shame and Honor Kampuchea Too Much"; and Kiernan, "Vietnam and the Governments and People of 
Kampuchea." Even in the waning years of the Cold War, versions of Cambodian history became the 
textual armament of geo-political forces, although this period exhibits greater alignment along Cold War 
ideological lines: US, UN, and China versus the USSR. 
57
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 40. Along these lines, the period of Democratic Kampuchea has been 
labeled using a host of descriptors, including the "killing fields regime," "auto-genocide," "the worst auto-
homeo-genocide in modern history," and "one of the 20th century's most brutal and radical regimes" 
(coined by Dith Pran; coined by Jean Lacouture; Gray, Swimming to Cambodia (film); Mydans, "Death of 
Pol Pot"). The typical journalistic characterization of the DK years sometimes emphasizes the personalist 
leadership of the regime and often highlights the forms of suffering experienced by most of the country's 
populace. "The radical Communist Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, during which time 
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1.7 million people were killed outright or died as a result of torture, disease, overwork and starvation" 
(Mydans, "Prosecutors Identify Suspects in Khmer Rouge Trial"). 
58
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 39. 
59
 Vietnamese propaganda circulated the term "Hell on Earth" (Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of 
Democratic Kampuchea, p. 216). Spalding Gray, whose 1987 monological account draws largely from 
Ponchaud and Shawcross, provides a formidable, if nuanced, example of the STV: 
"April 17,1975. Cambodia Year Zero. The Khmer Rouge marched in in their black pajamas. Lon 
Nol's army threw down their guns and raced to embrace them, thinking that the country would be reunited 
again. But the Khmer Rouge did not smile back. They took strategic positions in the town. Some of the 
kids, who grew up in the jungle and never saw cars before, jumped in and started ramming them into first 
gear and getting stuck in first gear, driving into walls and trees. And then the Khmer Rouge systematically 
began to empty the city of Phnom Penh. "Outl" they said. "Everyone Out, out, out!" "Into the fields," they 
say. "The Americans are going to bomb," they say. "There's no more food left." When the people ask 
who will provide for them, they say "Angkarl Angkar will provide. Angkar..." like some perverse Wizard 
of Oz, Kafkaesque thundercloud meant to rain down manna on the people in the fields. "And take nothing 
with you." You had to go into the fields with no possessions. 
"And then, if you couldn't walk or were in the hospital, they'd chuck you out the window— 
seventh-story, tenth-story—a kind of weird survival of the fittest. And then the killing began. 
Eyewitnesses said anyone that was educated was killed. Any civil servant was killed. Anyone carrying 
their own cooking pot was killed. People wearing glasses would be killed. The motto was: "Better to kill 
an innocent person than to leave an enemy alive." "But..." bmph. Dead, dead. 
"Kids were doing the killing, ten, eleven, twelve years old. They were too weak from their diet 
from barks and bugs and lizards and no more ammunition left, so they were trying to knock in skulls with 
these ax handles and hoe handles. But they were too weak to knock them in. So eyewitnesses said the kids 
were taking bets on how many whacks it would take to knock in a skull. And they were laughing. A lot of 
laughter going on, a lot of laughter. And eyewitnesses said if you pleaded for your life, they would laugh 
harder. If it was a woman pleading for her life, the kids would laugh even harder. And then they would 
take the half-dead bodies and drag them into American bomb craters, which acted as a kind of perfect 
shallow grave. 
"It was a kind of visitation of hell on earth. Who needs metaphors for hell? or poetry about hell? 
This actually happened, here, on this earth. Pregnant mothers disemboweled, eyes gouged out. Kids, 
children, torn apart like fresh bread in front of their mothers. And this went on for years until two million 
people were either systematically killed, or starved to death, by the same people. 
"And no one can really figure out how something like that could have happened. Certainly we 
could research that other Holocaust in Germany, because people speak a lot of German and read and write 
German, and Hitler's either dead or living in Argentina. But Cambodia is far, far away, and no one speaks 
enough Khmer, and Pol Pot is still alive and waiting up here on the Thai-Cambodian border, with 35,000 
troops supported by the Red Cross, by the United Nations, and by the United States of America. Because 
so many people would rather see him back in Cambodia with his nationalist coalition rather than the 
Vietnamese who are in there, and they came in in 1979. Some people, the British particularly, saying that it 
was a liberation. Others saying it was a xenophobic piece of cake, just biting off Cambodia to protect 
themselves from China. And I get very confused..." (Gray, Swimming to Cambodia (film), 52:45-55:55; 
Swimming to Cambodia (book), pp. 48-52, which differs slightly from the above). Within the description 
of horrors, Gray's monologue exhibits a procataleptic emphasis on accuracy ("really," "actually") and 
referenced sources ("eyewitnesses said..."), an emphasis mat is mirrored in the Tourism Ministry's 
historical-tourist project in Anlong Veng (developed further in the next chapter). 
60
 Vickery, "Democratic Kampuchea: Themes and Variations"; idem, "History, Tragedy, and Uncertain 
Future." 
61
 "Although there are plentiful reports of brutality against the population during 1975 and 1976, there are 
also a number of equally reliable reports of peasants not being badly treated and of peasant support for the 
revolutionary movement in that period'' (Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," 
p. 58). The fact of spatial variation can be at least partly drawn from the semi-autonomous zones, which 
were organized during the war with Lon Nol; one might also want to stress the historical antecedent of 
regional warlordism that dominated Cambodian politics for centuries. With regard to the best zones, 
Chandler states, "In general, the Northeast, East and Southwest had the largest number of experienced 
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cadre, the longest history of CPK indoctrination, and the greatest number of base people. These zones were 
thus relatively more benign, at least as far as newcomers were concerned, and for a time more reliable in 
the eyes of the CPK leadership" (The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 269). Kiernan gives some 
consideration to the Northeast Zone (Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, and Stung Treng Provinces), examining the 
CPK administration during the war and its consolidation of control (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 80-
86) as well as the CPK's attempted "revolutionary transformation" (Khmerization) of the region's hilltribe 
minorities (pp. 305-309). He concludes that generally the Northeast Zone, along with the Kratie Special 
Region 505 (up until the 1977 purge), was one of the best areas in which to live. 
62
 When the entire country is being transformed toward a slave state, the idea of favorable and unfavorable 
conditions seems relative. Vickery's distinction in this regard is helpful. He generally evaluates sectors 
based on reports of the numbers of executions and the quantity of food. (This stands in opposition to those 
accounts that might emphasize the difficulties for urban dwellers adjusting to agrarian labour, in which 
most sectors would be described as unfavorable.) For "good" areas, few killings (and only for typically 
criminal behavior) and adequate food might also be augmented by a "benign attitude of the cadres." He 
makes plain the possible correlation of factors that might foster better conditions: "Where food was 
plentiful, people could work better, disciplinary infractions were less frequent, and the cadres could afford 
to adopt a more tolerant attitude and treat breaches of regulations more lightly" (Vickery, "Themes and 
Variations," p. 110). For Vickery, "bad" situations exhibit two principal types. "First, there were the 
hitherto under-developed areas, often forested, into which 'new' people were dumped to clear and plant or 
build irrigation works, dependent on external supplies of rice. Usually there were shocking death tolls from 
hunger and illness, even where executions were few.... The second type of 'bad' area was where death 
from hunger might not have been a major problem, but where executions ran riot" (Vickery, "Themes and 
Variations," pp. 110-111). In an alternative manner, Kiernan's method for assessing conditions evaluates 
informant responses according to a rough rating scale: "not good" (at I'or miro), "tolerable" (kuorsdm 
RJMMH) or "all right" (kroanbar tjnsiu), "good" (I'or ra), and "not a problem" (at ei te HBHW) (Kiernan, Pol 
Pot Regime, p. 209; idem, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," pp. 140-141). Both 
approaches to assessment are dependent on a solid sample of informants—an adequately large number, 
representing various sectors within zones, and a corollary variety of class backgrounds—which often 
becomes the source of mutual criticism between scholars. 
63
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 93,105. The characterization of the Southwest Zone as origin of 
CPK power is one with which Kiernan agrees: "clan politics was solidifying into a baroque hierarchy of 
caste" (The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 169,186.). Vickery further notes that marrying off his daughters to rising 
political and military cadres assisted Ta Mok's expansion of his military power over most of the country 
(Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 106-107). Kiernan concurs with the description of familial power 
networks, but characterizes it as the Pol Pot family dominating the national level and "the Mok family 
dynasty at the Southwest Zone and region levels"; he further argues that kinship considerations 
supplemented categorization based on class background (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 186). 
64
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-82, pp. 93-94,97-98,105-106. 
65
 Ibid., p. 106. Kiernan's more detailed review of the sectors of the Southwest acknowledges a relative 
prosperity immediately following the war. His analysis also examines the hardships faced by those forcibly 
moved to the zone. Conditions deteriorated particularly in 1977 and afterwards; food quality and quantity 
diminished, and the rate of killings increased (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 168-204). Vickery also 
suggests that before 1977, killings had been few, restricted mainly to those associated with the Lon Nol 
regime (Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 97). 
66
 Vickery postulates that one factor that perhaps encouraged better treatment in sector 3 was the residence 
of Nuon Chea's mother (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 118). Kiernan confers with Vickery on 
conditions in Sector 3 (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 221). Broadly speaking, the degree of favorable 
variation rests largely on the lower-level cadre in the sector. 
67
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 108. The late imposition of control meant a lack of well-established 
cadre to oversee CPK revolutionary policies as well as an absence of cooperatives until April 1975. 
68
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 125. Vickery cites reports (principally Yathay) that argue, "In general 
those who worked well were on good terms with the cadres, and if work was done well there were no 
problems" (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 124). 
69
 The first "deportation" (April 1975) is the evacuation of Phnom Penh and the forced movement of the 
populace to the various regions in the countryside. The timing of the second deportation suggests that the 
evacuees provided (planting) labour in the Southwest but were deported prior to harvest, leaving the under-
populated Northwest to feed the new arrivals without a commensurate increase in its harvest. Kiernan 
gives much attention to the challenges that Zone leaders faced as 800,000 new people and "unclean" base 
people were deposited in the Northwest; he provides sector-specific descriptions of this migrating 
population (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 216-246). 
70
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 219-220. 
71
 Kiernan, "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia," p. 372 andpassim. Kiernan points to dramatic 
variation in levels of discipline, organization, political education, and commitment within the movement 
with particular attention given to the unique circumstances of the Northwest. In this early piece, Kiernan 
critiques the claims of both refugees and Democratic Kampuchea radio that the situation in Cambodia was 
uniform and centrally directed. As a corollary, claims regarding a "communist bloodbath" are argued to be 
relevant to the country's Northwest. In examining Democratic Kampuchea's lack of strong governmental 
control, Kiernan highlights a wartime breakdown of communication as well as a long history of a highly 
decentralized Cambodian state. Even as the revolutionaries gained territory, the organization was in a poor 
position to administer its expanded area. 
2
 Vickery provides the following patterns to describe the differential affect that the arrival of the Southwest 
cadre had on life in the Northwest Zone: "(1) in those places where the intellectual cadres of the Northwest 
had favored, or given soft jobs to, former urbanites of the Southwestern personnel removed the cadres, put 
the favored new people out to hard physical labor, and even killed some of them; (2) wherever there had 
been massive brutality against new people and severe hunger, the old cadres were removed and the 
conditions of the new people improved, although sometimes only temporarily if it proved impossible to 
increase food production—a major problem when, as from 1978, much food was being stockpiled; (3) 
where things had been going smoothly, as in most of damban 3, there was very little change, either among 
lower-ranking cadres or in the life of the evacuees" (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 128). 
73
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 243-245. 
74
 The series of purges carried out by the CPK is discussed below. 
75
 Vickery suggests the possibility that Chou Chet was put in control of the West Zone, with its 
insurmountable conditions, in order to set him up for failure and thereby provide an excuse to eliminate 
him and his network of support (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 129). 
76
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 129-131. 
77
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 416-423. 
78
 "If the Northwest were characterized by noticeable differences among dambans, the North shows few 
discernible damban-level features and very great variations in living conditions among even contiguous 
villages" (Vickery, "Themes and Variations," p. 123). Kiernan's evaluation of the North Zone is conducted 
primarily in terms of Ke Pauk's purge of Koy Thuon, his populating the administration with relatives, the 
rebellion at Chikreng (in Special Region 106), and power struggles within the CPK (Kiernan, The Pol Pot 
Regime, pp. 337-345). 
79
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 132-139. (With enough food or game resources, there was a greater 
chance of death by violence than starvation.) 
80
 Ibid., p. 134. "In areas where the new Communist administration was not well-established, village-level 
cadres made up of local peasants had a free hand to interpret policy guidelines as legitimation for the 
settling of scores" (Vickery, "Themes and Variations," p. 125). 
81
 Vickery, "Themes and Variations," pp. 123-124. 
*
2
 Ibid., p. 127. 
83
 This assessment is confirmed by Kiernan (The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 204-210), Chandler (The Tragedy of 
Cambodian History, p. 269), and, to a large degree, Heder (Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance, p. 7). 
84
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 141. Much has been made of the importance of this faction, 
sometimes called "liberationist" (rumddh iiths). Kiernan describes the differently clad Eastern troops that 
occupied parts of Phnom Penh in April 1975 as presenting a more tolerant approach in addition to its 
different appearance (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 41-43,65-68; idem, "Wild Chickens, Farm 
Chickens and Cormorants"). Similarly, Vickery cites reports of a more assistive character to the East Zone 
troops in the capture and evacuation of the capital in April 1975 (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 141). 
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Heder identifies a dissident faction within the CPK, largely composed of East Zone cadre, whose defensive 
military strategy vis-a-vis Vietnam and interest in domestic reform brought suspicion on them and 
ultimately led to their purge ("Khmer Rouge Opposition to Pol Pot: 'Pro-Vietnamese' or 'Pro-Chinese'?" 
in Heder, Reflections on Cambodian Political History: Backgrounder to Recent Developments). As is 
indicated below, the conception of a more moderate or lenient communist faction, which was brutally 
eliminated by the Pol Pot clique, forms the basis of narrative of "the Good East" informing PRK 
historiography. The origin and various referents of the liberationist label are complex. Quinn describes a 
division within FUNK during the war against Lon Nol, a CPK element he calls "Khmer Krahom" (red 
Khmer, Khmer Rouge) and a pro-Sihanouk element he calls "Khmer Rumdoah" (liberation Khmer) (Quinn, 
"Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970-1974," p. 6). 
As early as 1972, the Communist element began to rid the movement of any and all references to the old 
society, and Quinn documents internal fighting between the two factions in southwestern and eastern parts 
of the country, with the ultimate vanquishing of the Sihanoukists in 1974 (pp. 8-10). Kiernan repeats this 
analysis of factionalism and consolidation in his description of pre-triumph regional differences (Kiernan, 
How Pol Pot Came to Power, pp. 341-347). In retrospect, it might be clearer to distinguish between a 
hard-line dominant group and a more moderate faction, which may have seen a use for Sihanouk. Vickery 
pinpoints the confusion in Quinn's definitions, perhaps deriving from the fact that the aim of some units 
was only the removal of Lon Nol. However, Kiernan notes pre-1975 conflicts between the Khmer Krahom 
"blackshirts" (the Pol Pot-Ta Mok Party "Center") and the Khmer Rumdos "greenshirts" (Chhouk and Sao 
Pheum of the Eastern Zone), and he sees this division played out in zone-based policies under CPK rule 
(Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants"). The "Rumdo" in Etcheson's account 
continues Quinn's hazy depiction of CPK factions; Etcheson describes this group as "the followers of 
Norodom Sihanouk, and this group included a broad mix of democrats, republicans, and monarchists. 
Allied to the [Communist Party of China] center, they tended to be conciliatory to the Vietnamese. Based 
in the north, west, south, southwest, and east, this group was unique in that it had no independent military 
apparatus" (Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, pp. 164—165). It is interesting to 
note that Etcheson places Sao Pheum, secretary of the Eastern Zone, in the "Internationalists" faction, 
which he describes as pro-Vietnamese with democratic tendencies. 
85
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 141-142. 
86
 This lends credence to the claim that inexperience and a lack of prior grounding in regions and sectors 
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"History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future," pp. 47-49. 
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"Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," pp. 153-158; Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 210-
213. 
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 After the 1954 Geneva Conference, over 1,000 early communist/Issarak fighters went to Hanoi. Vickery 
traces a conflict back to a growing division within the party between Saloth Sar's faction and the veteran 
ICP-inspired cadre, whose "Khmer Hanoi" would be the object of purges as early as 1973 (Vickery, 
Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 210-217). 
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 When in power, Pol Pot deemed 1960 as the CPK's founding date (under the name of the Khmer 
Workers' Party), eliminating the 1951 First Congress and the fraternal ties with Vietnam that went along 
with it. Chandler very clearly draws out the implications of pursuing this change in the Party's founding 
(Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea"). 
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dynamism and self-confidence of French-educated intellectuals from well-off backgrounds" (Kiernan, 
"Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," pp. 153-154). 
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tnajMn); 3) "Hanoi Khmer" returnees, "wild chickens" (moan prey Hiatal) (Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm 
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Vietnamese" Communists during the 1970-75 war, demonstrating the military efforts deployed by the Pol 
Pot group in consolidating its rule of localities and zones (Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean 
Communist Movement," pp. 26-50). In particular, he documents the return of the Hanoi Khmer, only to be 
assigned menial tasks by Pol Pot's cadre before most of them were targeted for assassination; this policy of 
elimination while deriving from Pol Pot and carried out by the Party's security branch, Santebal (watiitu), 
occurred in the East Zone territory without Pheum's initiative or opposition (Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, 
Farm Chickens and Cormorants," p. 160). Certainly, the purge signalled to the East Zone faction and others 
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within the PRK government. 
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Khmer Rumdos are in control there" (The Pol Pot Regime, p. 205; "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and 
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execution, particularly as a means to weed out real enemies (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 146). 
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cadre in killings. Following Locard, he argues that a significant level of extrajudicial killings were 
occurring prior to 1978 (even though executions would dramatically increase with the purge of the zone), 
and "at least some authorities in So Phim's Eastern Zone were largely cooperating in a plan to liquidate 
many members of the class of Cambodians labeled as 'New People'" (Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 
106, referencing Locard's 1995 unpublished research paper "The Khmer Rouge Gulag: 17 April 1975-7 
January 1979"); Etcheson's point is to suggest that those escaped cadre, who returned to fight in the 
KUNFS, were likely complicit in the terror and killings in Democratic Kampuchea. 
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months, many of his military commanders, proteges, and former associates were purged" (Chandler, The 
Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 296). 
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in the East had pleaded with him to flee to Vietnam, but he refused. Pheum could not believe that the Pol 
Pot faction actually intended to eliminate him (or that the revolution would take such a turn). When 
summoned to meet with Ke Pauk, he sent a bodyguard to inquire regarding the reasons. The bodyguard did 
riot return, but another "invitation" arrived. Pheum sacrificed another bodyguard in his attempts to 
ascertain the intentions of the Party. A third summoning caused Pheum to send his nephew to discern the 
fate of the bodyguards. A fourth sacrifice, a representative from the Center who was posted in the East 
Zone Office, was dispatched to his death at Tuol Sleng. Ke Pauk moved his troops into the East Zone, and 
Pheum resolved to ascertain the Party's motives personally. On 3 June 1978, on the eastern shore of the 
Tonle Tauch in Peareang, watching the approaching troops traversing the river, Pheum finally accepted 
what the Party had in store for him; at that moment, he shot himself in the chest then the mouth (avoiding a 
tortured end at S-21). That night, his wife and children would be massacred as they made funerary 
preparations for the patriarch (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 399-400; idem, "Wild Chickens, Farm 
Chickens and Cormorants," p. 188-191). 
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 Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," p. 187. According to documents from Tuol 
Sleng, the dramatic surge in the first half of 1978 derived principally from the intake of personnel from the 
East (Boua, Kiernan & Barnett, "Bureaucracy of Death"). Chandler suggests that trucks full with prisoners 
were turned away at the S-21 gate and diverted directly to Choeung Ek (Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 
73). Locard correctly emphasizes the mental, rather than anatomical, interpretation of the "Vietnamese 
heads, Cambodian bodies" slogan (Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, pp. 179-181). Rather than an 
expression of ethnic targeting, this slogan suggests CPK purges sought to expunge a "way of thinking" that 
evidenced sympathy for or collaboration with the Vietnamese. Contra Kiernan, Heder offers an alternative 
metaphor, "Khmer political structures under Vietnamese leadership," recalling Saloth Sar's frustration 
during the struggle under Vietnamese tutelage (Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," pp. 
150). Further, he notes that the mere fact of pursuing a slower implementation of socialism appeared to the 
Party Center as "pro-Vietnamese" (p. 151). 
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 Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 74. Kiernan estimates the death toll for the East Zone (S-21 and village-
level executions as well as rural massacres) conservatively at 100,000 and probably around 250,000 dead 
(Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 404). 
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 Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," p. 197. Kiernan makes an odd note of the 
use of blue krama (traditional Cambodian scarves) to mark former East Zone people during this 
deportation, arguing a case for premeditation evidenced by the massive import of blue cloth from China 
(Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 405-411); others have suggested that this detail of DK control is not 
supported and that a wide variety of colors of krama were worn by CPK members, base people, and 
evacuees (Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," pp. 147-149). 
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 The move to seek support from a neighboring country, often repeated in Cambodian history, was framed 
again in terms of the survival of the Khmer race: "We have no mastery of the situation. We cannot solve 
the livelihood problems of our people. We have only to contact the Vietnamese again for the Kampuchean 
people to survive" (Heng Samrin, quoted in Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," 
pp. 194-195). 
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 The exact timing of the offensive seems to have been decided by the Vietnamese, who desired dry 
terrain as well awaiting rice harvest for its soldiers (Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p. 31). 
Chandler dates Vietnam's initial plans to overthrow DK to February 1978 (Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 
72), which suggests significant forethought. 
111
 Vickery underscores the added legitimacy that results from this association. The elite cadre of the East 
Zone having been almost totally purged, cadre that came to form the KUFNS came from the second-tier of 
fealty to the East Zone leaders. "[Second-echelon members of the old party veteran-Pracheachon 
tendency] represent party continuity from the earliest Cambodian Communist organizations, in that sense 
are more legitimate than Pol Pot, and that the cooperation with Vietnam is an old tradition to which they 
are heir" (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 216). Former East Zone cadre who filled the posts in the new 
PRK government included: Heng Samrin (Prime Minister), Chea Sim (Minister of Interior), Hun Sen 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs), Tea Sabun (Minister of Social Action), Ouch Bun Chhoeun (Minister of 
Justice), Sim Ka (Minister for the Inspection of State Affairs), Mat Ky (Deputy Minister of Agriculture), 
and Sin Song (Deputy Minister of the Interior) (Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and 
Cormorants," p. 198; Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and Society, pp. 73-74, 80-81). 
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 Note that the narrative is quite the opposite of the STV for the PRK that Vickery outlines {Cambodia 
1975-1982, pp. 39-40), which emphasizes Western/CGDK characterizations of the regime as an 
imperialist occupation or regional hegemonism by "the hooligans of the East" (as Deng Xiaoping labelled 
the Vietnamese), which sought the elimination of the Khmer race. 
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 Gottesman suggests that the "imagined history of revolutionary glory" was prefigured in Heng Samrin's 
speech in Snuol at the founding of the KUFNS: "The speech... in which he extolled the 'glorious victory of 
April 17,1975,' was an attempt to mythologize the revolution and to blame its implosion on the actions, 
taken 'a few days after liberation,' by 'the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang and their families.' The 
Vietnamese and the Cambodians who had taken refuge in Hanoi in 1954 were looking further back into 
Cambodia's revolutionary past, seeking to re-create a period when the two countries' communist 
movements were more united. They were also attempting to cover up current and historical Vietnamese 
domination" (Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p. 34). 
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 Frieson, "The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea," pp. 405-406. Similar to Vickery's 
endeavors, to read DK as non-Marxist, the PRK leadership has sought to invalidate CPK claims to being 
communist. As well, via its memorialization efforts (victor's history)—most notably, the Tuol Sleng 
Museum of Genocidal Crimes and the Choeung Ek "Killing Fields"—and juridical efforts (victor's 
justice)—the August 1979 People's Revolutionary Tribunal of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique—this 
leadership (i.e., the good communists) has accentuated the "genocidal" aspects of DK. It should be noted, 
as Schabas does, that in the PRK trial of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, "genocide" was not defined 
according to the 1948 Genocide Convention, but rather "an idiosyncratic definition that is substantially akin 
to the concept of crimes and humanity" (Schabas, "Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for 
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?," p. 37). 
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 Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," p. 118. For example, with regard to the evacuation, 
Kiernan argues that the East zone cadre were opposed to and delayed the carrying out of the order. 
However, Heder shows that there was no difference in the order issued for evacuation, but that a delay in its 
execution may have flowed from logistical issues, such when a cadre might have had an order confirmed 
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(e.g., a week later) (pp. 118-119). In addition, Heder points out that Kiernan constructs Sector 21 
Secretary Chan as a Pol Potist, such that the (good/real) East Zone cadre are exonerated of responsibility 
for Cham massacres. Further, Kiernan fails to mention that after the supposed Pol Potist took control of the 
sector, conditions improved (pp. 121-122). 
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 Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," p. 103. 
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 Ibid., pp. 124-127. 
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 Ibid., p. 133. Heder sees that tendency reflected in Kiernan's claim that the Party Centre sought to 
reclaim Kampuchea Krom ("Lower Cambodia," what is still southern Vietnam). Through wild 
conjecture—including misinterpretations of meetings and statements, improper attribution of responsibility, 
and mistranslation of a CPK document—Kiernan falsely asserts a DK policy to reconquer its ancient 
territory. He claims the minor border irritations, which grew into large-scale assaults in 1977, were 
motivated by the Southwest Zone cadre's irredentism; Heder's sources suggest cross-border animal theft 
was much to blame, covered by irredentist rhetoric (although adjustments in the land frontier became a 
factor in mid-1977). In various moves to shift responsibility for attacks off the East Zone, Kiernan 
backdates (by a year) the change in the Zone's power structure and leadership. Heder devotes intense 
scrutiny to Kiernan's false chronology, providing numerous references for the details of times, places, and 
people in the late 1977 onslaught. Ultimately, he asserts that evidence supports the idea that the attacks 
were "a gross overreaction to minor border problems" (p. 143) and even the aims of the major offensive 
were "to maintain the border as [the CPK leadership] argued it should be delineated" (p. 144). Heder's 
well-articulated version of events substantially invalidates Kiernan's notions of an irredentist Party policy. 
Further, Heder asserts that the counter-offensive from Vietnam overwhelmed the East Zone forces, which 
thereby raised the Organization's suspicions and precipitated the mid-1978 purges. In another explication 
of the purges, that encouraged the formation of the KUFNS, Heder provides a very detailed account of 
various factions (many individuals from which do not originate from East Zone leadership positions). The 
apparent united front is broken down into three main constituents: 1) Khmer Viet Minh or "veterans of the 
struggle" (neak tdsou chas gntiMtnM) who formed the core of the KUFNS; 2) "ex-'domestic' [knong brdtes 
gtittngw] Communists" who differed with Pol Pot/Ta Mok over strategies and tactics for dealing with the 
"acute enemy"; and 3) various non-Communists, including those who escaped to Vietnam and were treated 
as refugees, former supporters of FUNK, and non-FUNK bourgeois elements that threw in their lot with the 
Vietnamese (Heder, Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages, pp. 19-27). 
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'Heder, Imitation and Independence. 
120
 The peculiar element that crops up in this analysis is the over-commitment (expressed as a 
formulaicism) to a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary model that was "objectively" inappropriate to the 
context of the Cambodian Communists, suggesting that earlier scholarly interpretations misunderstood the 
nature of the divisions within the leadership. Heder delves deep into Marxist-Leninist, Stalinist, and 
Maoist ideological doctrine to clarify some of the influences and components within early Vietnamese-
dominated Cambodian Communism; such sustained scholarly analysis of the Marxist tradition with regard 
to the Cambodian revolution has long been needed. However, through his analysis of documents and 
statutes, Heder tends to neglect a social history which would indicate the impact of these early Communist 
endeavors or how widespread the movement was (beyond an urban Vietnamese and Chinese population in 
Phnom Penh? beyond the predominantly Vietnamese rubber industry workers in Kampong Cham?). While 
Heder emphasizes the (Vietnamese) training of leaders who were later to become important, he also gives 
the impression that "Cambodian" Communism was in fact Vietnamese Communists (and their military) 
advancing their vision, establishing some subordinate satellite organizations, and recruiting some lower 
(Cambodian) cadre to carry out their program. 
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 While the Vietnamese agents (Pham Van Ba and Nguyen Thanh Son) maintained direct contact and 
direction, influence from Vietnam started to decrease in 1957 as Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea began 
conducting research for their own Party Congress (Heder, Imitation and Independence, pp. 43-47). 
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 In terms of struggle, this ascendant faction (Tou Samouth, Nuon Chea, and Saloth Sar) continued to 
adhere to Vietnam's prescriptions of unarmed mass mobilization efforts until 1960. Heder is keen to 
itemize the dissent within the movement. Sao Pheum sought a resumption of armed struggle due to 
knowledge of the violent suppression of Communist activists in the East. Ieng Sary and other intellectuals 
favored political struggle independent of the Vietnamese and pushed for a national united front (including 
Sihanouk) against US imperialism. Sihanouk's inclusion of key leftists (Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and 
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Hu Nim) in the Sangkum government helped Nuon Chea and Saloth Sar obfuscate the nature of 
Cambodia's Communist movement as they researched and prepared for a Party Congress and a strategy of 
violent national people's democratic revolution. Heder illustrates how the Cambodian Communists sought 
to assimilate recommendations for South Vietnam (which in turn demonstrated Hanoi's assimilation of 
1940s Stalinist-Maoist re-thinking with regard to "national people's democratic revolution"); in so doing, 
the KWP was asserting an equal rather than subordinate comparison with Vietnam's struggle (Heder, 
Imitation and Independence, pp. 49-70). He acutely examines the KWP's 1960 Congress and its adoption 
of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and he exposes how the model for South Vietnam made even less sense for 
Cambodia's conditions. The country's social structure was radically misinterpreted likely because Saloth 
Sar and Nuon Chea were more interested in making revolution than in the actual details of Cambodian 
society. Nonetheless, the 1960 KWP Standing Committee pursued an initial strategy of political struggle 
which included armed self-defense and armed propaganda. Heder argues that the Party allowed Sihanouk 
to misread these French-educated intellectuals as being the leaders of what Sihanouk was calling the 
"Khmer Rouge," a move which allowed the Party to maintain its secrecy. While Saloth Sar and others 
would have become familiar with VWP documents (like the December 1963 "Resolution 9"), which 
encouraged armed struggle, such outright revolutionary violence was denied to the KWP leadership by 
Hanoi and Beijing. In September 1966, Saloth Sar became increasingly determined to break with 
Vietnamese and Chinese prescriptions and prepare for armed struggle. At its Party conference, the KWP 
pushed toward preparations for making a people's war, changed its name to the CPK (demonstrating an 
implicit belief in the superiority of the Cambodian struggle), and resolved to reject large-scale military and 
political intervention from the Vietnamese, as such assistance was perceived as VWP domination (pp. 71-
75). 
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 Heder, Imitation and Independence, pp. 128-132. He details a zone-by-zone assessment of armed 
struggle in 1968 and 1969, noting that for the most part the insurrection resulted in serious setbacks or near-
liquidation of Communist units; the key exceptions were Ta Mok's Southwest Zone and Saloth Sar's 
Northeast Zone. (In these descriptions, Heder does not forget to note the degree of brutality and destruction 
carried out by Lon Nol forces as well as the KWP's initial use of VWP-style terror in its people's war.) 
Heder documents Sihanouk's misunderstanding of the Cambodian Communist leadership and asserts that 
in fact while reliant on the Vietnamese presence and back-up, the leaders were in fact "Khmer Viet Minn" 
who however remained independent in decision-making from the Vietnamese and Chinese (pp. 133-146). 
Despite past disagreement about the armed struggle in Cambodia, once the long-awaited coup occurred, 
Vietnam and China praised the KWP for its 1968 decision. Ironically, Vietnamese agreement with the 
KWP regarding the coup and its increased support did not improve relations between the two movements; 
KWP leaders refused Vietnam's proposed "mixed commands" and assistance to establish local 
revolutionary state structures, but Vietnam pursued these ends regardless, (pp. 147-157). In late 1970, 
Saloth Sar decided to gradually seize control of the movement from Vietnam beginning with halting 
Vietnamese recruiting of Cambodian troops; this independence was formalized at the 1971 CPK Congress, 
even though Vietnamese military intervention would be required as late as August 1973. 
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 Heder, Imitation and Independence, p.166. The novelty of Heder's claim decreases as the time frame 
approaches 1975. While the pre-triumph form of struggle may have followed the Vietnamese people's war 
script, Heder fails to show how conditions in the early 1970s begin to explain the rationale of the policies 
adopted during Democratic Kampuchea. Exposition on events ends at 1973, suggesting the possibility of a 
break with the model in the 1974 to 1975 time frame, which would help explain the policies of the 
Democratic Kampuchea period. A hint of this development is offered in his analysis of how the CPK's 
radicalization of its policies after mid-1973 increasingly relied on coercion and violence (and thus 
demonstrates a lack of popularity for the CPK revolution). 
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 Chandler follows this bifurcated scheme—initial violence (April to June 1975) then subsequent 
purges—and further divides the latter phase: September 1975 to September 1976 and April 1977 to 
December 1978 (Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 45-49). Vickery examines the violence and killings in 
terms of two broader waves: 1975, aimed at officials from the Khmer Republic; 1977 onward, a widening 
purge of cadre from areas of production and distribution failures (Vickery, "History, Tragedy, and 
Uncertain Future," p. 47). Regardless of the specific timeframes adopted, what is key to note is that the 
successive purges gradually shifted the approach to "enemies." 
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 This schema parallels Thion's tripartite breakdown of DK victims: Lon Nol regime personnel, intra-
Party purges, and assertive killings (Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 166). Hawk also 
describes a "three-tier structure of murder" by the Pol Pot regime (Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination 
centre," p. 25). The base layer of the pyramid, labelled "conditions of life," includes exhaustion, starvation, 
and disease. The middle tier encompasses summary, extra-judicial executions or "massacres directed 
against disfavoured groups." The uppermost layer accounts for murder—arrest, interrogation, torture, and 
execution—by the Khmer Rouge regime's "nation-wide prison-execution system," the apex of which was 
S-21 (Tuol Sleng) where nearly 20,000 people were killed. 
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 Quinn, "The Pattern and Scope of Violence," pp. 180-207. Quinn's discussion of violence and, more 
specifically, terror, under Pol Pot traces out the patterns that the Cambodian regime shares with conceptions 
of totalitarian regimes. Quinn examines Arendt's idea (from Origins of Totalitarianism) that the initial 
phase of violence will focus on the recently vanquished, after which terror will intensify as the entire 
population becomes subjected (p. 179). He follows ideas from Friedrich and Brezinski (Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy) about how a sense of righteousness encourages this latter growth of terror (p. 
180). One of the problems that arises in Quinn's account of DK violence is his filling in areas of unknown 
with theoretical projections and examples from other historical moments (e.g., the "Four Olds," "new 
socialist man," etc.). Vickery has called this "reverse intellectual history" whereby the intellectual 
precursors are discredited by reference to atrocities attributed to DK (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 
ix). As well, though he draws on individuals' testimonies about social conditions, his essay certainly 
conveys the impression that these appear true throughout DK time and space. Further, all intention and 
authority is seen to derive from Pol Pot, ignoring how local cadre may have affected the implementation of 
policies. Finally, the realms within Quinn's scheme are not distinct categories; for example, evacuation 
(particularly of Phnom Penh) is often interpreted in terms of apolitical prophylactic means by which Pol 
Pot sought to weaken his rivals within the CPK. Additionally, "discretionary" or "assertive" killings 
(discussed below) are difficult to confine to one Quinn category. Nevertheless, Quinn's chapter on DK 
violence appears in many discussions of the atrocities committed by the "Khmer Rouge." 
128
 Locard, "State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and Retribution (1979-2004)," p. 124. 
Locard does not sequentialize the categories of enemies, suggesting instead that these four groups were 
targeted throughout the period. Although this may be true (as expressed though assertive killings), in terms 
of systematic killings (especially those that filled the cells of the security offices), most scholars suggest 
that the slaughter of the "enemies of the past" became more formal in 1975, after which the Party's killing 
machine turned on its own revolutionary cadre. 
129
 Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 41. He examines the rhetoric in Pol Pot speeches to explain the need to 
smash enemies (following Mao) and how enemies were defined (following Stalin and Mao). 
130
 "Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the 
revolution... To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the 
masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. To 
distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the 
various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution" (Mao, 
Quotations from Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung, pp. 12-13). 
131
 Echoing Stalin's "ulcer in a healthy body," the microbe metaphor comes from Pol Pot's 20 December 
1976 speech, "Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976" 
(pp. 183-184; the allusion to Stalin is highlighted by Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 361). Much of 
the report is a frank assessment of "key tasks," development goals such as water management, raising 
livestock, strategic crops, and agricultural productivity. Pol Pot calls for an intensification of class 
struggle—to "wage a deep, extensive socialist revolution" ("Report of Activities of the Party Center 
According to the General Political tasks of 1976," p. 184)—especially geared toward stopping the 
propagation of hidden enemies (p. 190). He prescribes verification of everyone through "life histories" 
(bravoattirup rafnm), a process that would build up the Party (pp. 203,208) as well as expose and smash 
"networks of enemies" (bdntaanh s 'trauv HiUTimMjn}) or "strings of traitors" (khsae kbdt tsjfjjfi) (pp. 184, 
210-211). Significantly, as Chandler notes, no criteria are provided for judging who is an "enemy," 
leading to his conclusion that such intentional ambiguity primarily served to allow the Party freedom of 
maneuver (Chandler, "A Revolution in Full Spate: Communist Party Policy in Democratic Kampuchea," 
pp. 177-178). The report is seen to offer an "elastic" notion of enemy (Heder, "Reassessing the Role of 
Senior Leaders"), which becomes significant in evaluating DK authority. 
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 Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 44. He is keen to note the quasi-medical rhetoric of Pol Pot's speeches 
on enemies and the metaphors of impurity (akin to Lon Nol's "non-believers" (thmil a§9j). 
133
 Heder differentiates these from the "obligatory killings" of the security system purge of enemies (Heder, 
"Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders," pp. 382-384); the implications of Heder's distinction are 
discussed below. In Thion's tripartite scheme, of the estimated 1 to 1.5 million deaths under DK, violent 
deaths can be divided into Lon Nol personnel (100,000 to 200,000), CPK purges (up to 200,000), and 
"assertive killings" (an unknown, but "massive," figure) (Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 
166). 
134
 These urban departure sites included Phnom Penh, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap, and 
Kampong Thorn. 
135
 Similar to Kiernan (The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 39-44,49-51,171-180,217-230,405^11), Chandler 
notes three waves of evacuation/deportation (Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p. 248). The 
first wave occurred immediately after the CPK takeover of Phnom Penh, and the capital's inhabitants were 
randomly transferred into the countryside along the national routes. The second wave, in 1976, was a 
relocation of peasants from the Southwest (and East) to the Northwest and Northeast. The third wave 
followed on the purge of the East Zone in 1978, when residents were deported from the East Zone in 
various directions. 
136
 Short, The History of Nightmare, pp. 320-322. 
137
 This echoes Vickery's description of the parameters of DK variation. 
138
 Becker, When the War Was Over, pp. 182-192. Chandler suggests the term may be applicable to the 
Four-Year Plan that was unveiled in 1977 (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, p. 215). Echoing Chandler's 
essay title, Locard describes the "revolution in full spate": "It included communal eating, collectivisation of 
all farm animals and implements, together with cooking utensils, and the setting up of special camps for 
children and work units for adolescents and young adults. People were submitted to concentration camp-
like daily routines with long hours of arduous work (agriculture in the rainy season, irrigation projects in 
the dry season), starvation diets, short hours of sleep and long nightly propaganda meetings. Religions 
(mainly Buddhism) were abolished, along with feasts, ceremonies such as traditional marriages, the usual 
calendar and all cultural activities. The Angkor substituted a revolutionary set of celebrations, with a rest 
day every ten days. Apart from literally working the people to death, the paramount obsession of the 
leadership was to hunt down the 'enemies of the revolution'; traitors and spies were said to stalk the 
country. A prison network was developed down to the district and often the commune levels, where the 
innocent citizenry were chained, tortured and executed in their hundreds of thousands" (Locard, "State 
Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and Retribution (1979-2004)," p. 123). As the 
revolutionary slogan went, "Through rapid development, our country must surpass the Angkor period" 
(Msaang cheat aoy baan choeunloeun lers sdmay dngkor nflrHJtjifiSjtnsTt^ SH a^iiSfiiMHtiiHgi) (Locard, Pol 
Pot's Little RedBook, p. 73). 
139
 Heder develops a solid explanation of Pol Pot's affinity for Ta Mok's Southwest Zone, as part of an 
attempt to consolidate real power bases beyond an already-accomplished official Party dominance (Heder, 
"Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages," pp. 7-14). 
140
 Kiljunen, Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide, p. 19. One of the means by which the Party/State (re-
)asserted its control was the July 1975 re-founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, where each 
zone committed its forces to the central committee. 
141
 Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 45. 
142
 Evidence of a directive can be traced to a 20 May 1975 conference at which Pol Pot made the point to 
"execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders" (Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 
p. 55). Kiernan marks the date of the halt to the killing as 28 May 1975, but he suggests that it was quickly 
countermanded ("Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," p. 51). 
143
 Chandler, A History of Cambodia, p. 213. During this period, the regime promulgated its Constitution. 
Chandler's early analysis of this document remarks on what would become major themes underwriting the 
regime's policies: a non-academic revolution with no precedent and emerging from the revolutionary 
aspirations of the people, with a stress on mass mobilization. He further notes the dominance of an 
inflexibility throughout the manifesto-style text as well as no mention of mechanisms to protect the 
Cambodian people (Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of 
Revolutionary Change"). It was during this period also that Democratic Kampuchea was officially founded 
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with Khieu Samphan as Head of State, Pol Pot as Prime Minister, Ieng Sary as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and Son Sen as Minister of National Defense. On 27 September 1976, Pol Pot was temporarily removed 
from power "for reasons of health," and some have argued that this change in power within the CPK was 
precipitated by events in China (Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, pp. 174-177; 
Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,' pp. 287-288; idem, "Conflict in the 
Kampuchean Communist Movement," pp. 56-57). As Deng Xiaoping rose to power in October 1976, 
China's leaders no longer wanted to maintain relations with a Hanoi that was seen as a Soviet client state. 
Although acknowledging a lack of evidence (and pondering Pol Pot's brief respite from power in October 
1975), Quinn proposes a hypothesis "based on the assumption of an extremely close link between China's 
leftists and Cambodia's leaders as evidenced by the similarities between some aspects of the Cultural 
Revolution and Cambodia's radical new socio-economic order and Pol's eulogy of Mao. Proponents of 
this theory note that Sihanouk's demise followed closely upon the death of Chou En-lai (reportedly the 
Prince's protector) and the ascendancy of the radicals. They now find it intriguing that Pol Pot's 
relinquishing of power comes so soon after Mao's death and the concomitant decline of the leftists" 
(Quinn, "Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and External Expansion," p. 47). Pol Pot's resumption to 
health was quickly followed by renewed and deepened efforts to eliminate infectious opponents. 
144
 Chandler, Brother Number One, pp. 114-122. In repeated instances, Chandler shows how the plan for 
1977-1980 slavishly mimicked endeavors in China. Becker aptly describes the economic policy of the 
time as a "criminal perversion of the self-sufficiency the Khmer Rouge claimed as the moral and economic 
genius of their revolution," and she proceeds to document an enslavement of the people, whose products 
were sold at reduced prices to China (Becker, When the War Was Over, p. 294). 
145
 The first "attempted coup" had occurred in July 1975, with a second in 16-18 September 1975. Pol Pot 
describes these assassination plots as emanating from Vietnamese spies (Democratic Kampuchea, Black 
Paper, p. 76). 
146
 Contra the Western scholars, Ieng Sary maintains that no bombing had occurred, contending that there 
had been an uprising instead (Short, The History of a Nightmare, pp. 354,598). A rebellion did in fact 
emerge in the Chikreng District of Siem Reap in March 1977; it seems that the rebellion was in part due to 
living conditions, partly to the removal of leaders, and partly to the encouragement from new leadership 
(who were subsequently purged) (Slocomb, "Chikreng Rebellion: Coup and Its Aftermath in Democratic 
Kampuchea"). A revolt would also break out in the East Zone, following the purge of its leaders. 
147
 In the DK lexicon, the word for "purge" (baos sdm 'aat ttnMMHiti) literally means "to sweep (and) clean." 
us «Yhe p0 j p o t gr0Up c o u id and would not accept failures and criticisms. The setbacks and failures that 
occurred were, therefore, blamed on those responsible for executing the policies, accusing them of treason" 
(Burgler, The Eyes of the Pineapple, p. 263). 
149
 The word for DK's security apparatus, Santebal (sdntibaal watiitu) was derived by combining security 
(santesok HBMS) [Pali: santi "peace" + sukha "health"] and police {norkorbaal Bmtnro) ["guardians of the 
city"]; in an awry manner, its etymology renders "keepers of the peace." 
150
 S-21 (nowadays, Tuol Sleng), formerly Tuol Svay Prey Secondary School during the Khmer Republic, 
is composed of four three-story concrete buildings, arranged in a "C" shape. The classrooms in these 
building were used to hold prisoners—mass detentions in some rooms and hastily-constructed brick-and-
mortar solitary imprisonment for more important captives—and some first-floor rooms were used for 
interrogation/torture. It maximum capacity at any one time was 1,000 to 1,500. This chief site worked in 
conjunction with security centers at the zone and sector levels as well as district-level "re-education" 
centers (morndorl kdsaang khluon HnnnjfiMHJsa), literally "self-building" centers (mandala). 
151
 The manual notes "doing politics" (thwer noryobay tfaHmtnca) and "imposing torture" {dak tearunkamm 
fiinaiitumH) as two interrogation techniques for exposing the enemy. Chandler notes that in the former, 
similar to Vietnam's "truy buc" (constant repetition), interrogators were given contradictory, confusing, or 
uncertain instructions on how to carry out their questioning (Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 114-115), 
which encouraged fear and suspicion within the security apparatus itself. 
152
 The registration numbers for S-21's victims were 200 in 1975,1622 in 1976, at least 6300 in 1977, and 
at least 5084 in 1978; some records are missing (Chandler, Brother Number One, p. 123; idem, Voices from 
S-21, pp. 35-36). The monthly figures correspond to zone purges, with higher entrants during the 
319 
February to April 1977 purges of the North and Northwest and during the April to June 1978 purge of the 
East. When the makeshift cemetery at S-21 ran out of space (in 1977), victims were taken 15 km away to 
Choeung Ek, the site today known in the tourist guides as the "Killing Fields." In an unusual manner, 
Short's description of S-21 attempts to relativize the significance of S-21 internationally (by reference to 
the French army in Algiers as well as many modern democratic states that have/had secret prisons) as well 
as historically (French antecedents of torture techniques in Cambodia in the early 1950s). He asserts that 
its uniqueness rests with the fact that rather than being an institutional aberration (as is typically the case in 
modern societies that enjoy certain freedoms), S-21 was "the pinnacle, the distillation, the reflection in 
concentrated form of the slave state which Pol had created" (Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 365). 
He further explains that S-21 's role derived from the approach to political conflict that emerges from the 
"Khmer mentality" of extreme/total violence (Short quoting Bunchan Mol) or "conquer-or-be-conquered" 
tradition in Khmer politics (citing Thun Saray). 
153
 Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 366. 
154
 Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination centre," p. 30 (emphasis added). Hawk traces ideological 
underpinnings of the CPK Centre to illuminate some criteria by which to judge who is an enemy, for 
example: differing views on Sihanouk, the relationship between the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
revolutions, and the correct path to socialism. Further, he asserts that zone secretaries had achieved 
significant autonomy during the war with Lon Nol, and these regional power bases (with their own 
ideological tendencies) harbored divergences from Pol Pot's Party Centre (pp. 28-30). Thus, S-21 offered 
the instrument by which the CPK elite extended and consolidated its control over the entire country and the 
whole revolutionary process, by "smashing" regressive factions. 
155
 Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination centre," p. 31. The institution's documentation exhibits a process that 
is "fantastical, bizarre, unimaginably senseless, even within its own twisted logic" (p. 28). Although "CIA" 
and "KGB" operate as generic signifiers for "enemy," it also is clear from the compilation of plots 
contained in the CPK's "Last Plan" that the prison's staff and officials took seriously that the CIA, KGB, 
and Vietnamese were colluding together against the revolution (Democratic Kampuchea, "The Last Plan," 
pp. 299-314). 
1 6
 Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 77-78. He suggests that the "exigencies of secrecy" (the need to keep 
S-21 hidden) led to nearly all entrants being killed; among those who knew about the facility, it was 
sometimes referred to as the "place to enter and not exit" (kdnlaeng chaul at chenh msiJtitiiHHrccji). Chandler 
also states that the ways prisoners were chosen, summoned, and collected remain unclear; even if guilty by 
association, each prisoner was forced to confess his own crimes as well as implicate his "string" of traitors. 
157
 Although the "Last Plan" charges that this consolidation of power in early 1977—eliminating a rival 
network whose vision of socialist transformation differed with the break-neck social leveling of Pol Pot's 
faction—proceeded on die grounds of these traitors building up CIA agents and "Vietnam annexationists" 
(Democratic Kampuchea, "The Last Plan," p. 300), it is also cast in terms of abolishing feudal and 
bourgeois remnants. Overt charges leveled against Koy Thuon focused less on his leniency or moderate 
revisionism, and more on his bourgeois indulgences and the abuse of power exercised to attain these. "The 
group of Koy Thuon in sector 304 created an atmosphere of pacifism, luxury and excitement entertained by 
arts, girls, reception and festivities; fostered house alignment and planting of banana trees along the streets; 
stimulate prestige, ranks and relation with the enemy" (p. 307). In fact, Ponchaud presents evidence to 
suggest that Koy Thuon, along with his zone deputy, his military commander, and numerous subordinates, 
had been conspiring for a coup as early as September 1976: "lis etaient en relation avec Chakrey, un chef 
militaire de Phnom Penh, et le coup d'Etat etait prevu pour le premier Janvier 1977. C'est Chakrey 
semble-t-il quidevait en prendre I'initiative a Phnom Penh, et une station radio installee a Oddar Mean 
Chhey devait appeler au soulevementgeneraf (Ponchaud, "Situation interne du Kampuchea Democratique 
dans 1977," p. 3). There is also a possibility that the initial suspicion of Koy Thuon was sparked by a 
personal squabble, jealousy over a love interest (Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 355). 
158
 Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 60-68. 
159
 Short, The History of a Nightmare, pp. 359,363. 
160/Z>W.,p.360. 
161
 Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 68. 
162
 Ibid., p. 75. Peasants had filled S-21's execution schedules, and lines of associations identified in 
confessions crept nearer to the Party Centre (e.g., Son Sen). Hawk offers a sobering, but perhaps ironic, 
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assessment by including the later reflections from Khmer Rouge leaders on deaths during their rule; Pol Pot 
(in 1981) and Khieu Samphan (in 1984) asserted that little or no mistakes were made with regard to spies 
and saboteurs, except that perhaps the Party had been too trusting or too slow in moving against enemies 
(Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination centre," p. 31). 
163
 This is the conclusion that Vickery draws in "Themes and Variations." 
164
 Short stresses DK's bloody border attacks, Vietnamese reprisals, both countries' geo-political situations 
(China vs. USSR), and China's attempts to oversee a negotiated solution. By their recourse to foreign 
powers, Short describes the process by which Vietnam and Cambodia's border conflict mushroomed into 
what had not yet been a "proxy war" between China, the US, and Cambodia on one side and the USSR and 
Vietnam on the other; it produced once again a situation in which "the paranoid miscalculations of 
[Cambodia's] leaders meant that its fate would be decided not by its own people but by outside powers" 
(Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 380). 
165
 Becker, When the War Was Over, pp. 291-293. The bankruptcy of these strategies led Ieng Sary to 
attempt to improve Democratic Kampuchea's image by inviting international journalist delegations to tour 
the country and increasing the food available to peasants (pp. 321-326). (During one such delegation, in 
which Becker participated, the British scholar Malcolm Caldwell was shot and killed.) Even with those 
(overdue) efforts, mass killing in the countryside and purges at S-21 continued, with the last being Vorn 
Vet's Ministry of Industry. Short also itemizes this 1978 easing of policies, a united front strategy that 
sought to initiate an opening up of Democratic Kampuchea within and abroad. He too notes that this 
increased tolerance and openness was largely simultaneous with the regime's most murderous purge (the 
East Zone), killing between 100,000 and 250,000 people. This "rotting from within" is the theme Short 
uses to explain the CPK's downfall and defeat by Vietnam (Short, The History of a Nightmare, pp. 382-
386). Kiljunen also weighs in on this final phase, late 1978 just before the Vietnamese invasion, arguing 
that the regime appears to have been on the verge of overcoming the material challenges to its economy 
and infrastructure (Kiljunen, Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide, p. 20). 
166
 Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, p. 119 (dngkaar thaayaang mech, trauv thwer yaang neung 
HamifiiraiaiHtj igJiftihataa). 
167
 This argument more closely follows a view of traditional Cambodian statecraft, which aligns more along 
the vectors of personal rivalries and patron-client loyalties. 
168
 Becker highlights problems caused by administration through semi-autonomous zones (notably Ta 
Mok's Southwest Zone and Sao Pheum's East Zone), which forced Pol Pot's first post-triumph task to be 
consolidating a base of support, digging deeper than the upper echelons of the CPK Centre (Becker, When 
the War Was Over, chap. 5). 
169
 Barnett, "Democratic Kampuchea: A Highly Centralized Dictatorship," pp. 212-229. Similarly, 
O'Kane asserts a "rudimentary totalitarian" character of the CPK revolution, which emphasizes the 
regime's total domination of the individual (O'Kane, "Cambodia in the Zero Years," pp. 735, 741-743.). 
Becker also examines the relevance to Cambodia of Arendt's assertion that a reign of terror is founded on 
the atomization of society, which is ultimately self-destructive. Using individuals' narratives to explicate 
key issues of the DK period, Becker's work similarly stresses: the ban on romantic involvement, a 
differential classification in the cooperatives, deportations, the Southwest's purge of the Northwest, 
unrealistic economic goals and inhuman social policies, a drive for "racial" purity, inexperience leading to 
terror, and the destruction of Buddhism (and other cultures) (Becker, When the War Was Over, particularly 
chap. 6). 
170
 Barnett's case for centralized authority, whose consolidation of power rested only on terror, is 
overstated. His argument, based on a supposed ubiquity of terror, makes very little reference to Cambodia 
(seeking instead to make his argument by analogy to Stalinist USSR). His essay remains more a position 
piece on the use of terror than a solid explication of the specifics of DK rule. The repeated caveats about 
regional differences, the lurking precariousness of the DK victory, and admissions of ongoing power 
struggles undermine the claim that central authority reigned throughout. 
171
 Numerous points in Kiernan's key work arise in which the (acknowledged) variation appears to 
contradict the author's claim about ever-increasing systematic and centralized control (Kiernan, The Pol 
Pot Regime, pp. 139-140,280-282,290-296,299-301,337-339,391-411,415^120). Thion has seized on 
this issue and has argued that the struggle for control was far from complete/stable—"the State never stood 
on its feet" (Thion, "The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," p. 28). In a dramatic break with other scholars, 
he argues that the leadership did not maintain central control over cooperatives or the national economy, 
state power, army, Party, and possibly even S-21. He provides a picture of a group riddled with political 
factions, resembling/re-enacting the regional warlordism of Cambodia's past, the komlang (kdmlang titnti) 
concept of linear loyalties: a hierarchical network of clients, subsumed under the rubric of "force" (pp. 12, 
28). 
172
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 15-16; idem, How Pol Pot Came to Power, particularly chaps. 6 and 
8. The overall argument running through this latter work is that because of various socio-political 
circumstances arid personal endeavors, the Pol Pot faction of the CPK was able to consolidate and 
centralize its hold on the organization. The text makes the "CPK Center" look quite coherent (even if there 
was intra-party struggle, mainly with the Hanoi Khmer/East Zone cadre), even as it accedes variation 
among pre-1975 zones. 
173
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 26 (emphasis added). Jackson similarly assesses the CPK's demise in 
stating: "Pol Pot's regime purged and repurged itself in a fratricidal search for ideological purity and 
internal security. In the end, striving for security at any price proved counter-productive; the government 
fundamentally alienated its people, frightened critical cadres into an alliance with Vietnam, and weakened 
the country to the point that it could offer little organized resistance when Democratic Kampuchea faced 
the third and conclusive invasion from Vietnam in late December 1978" (Jackson, "Introduction: The 
Khmer Rouge in Context," p. 3). 
174
 Locard, "Le Goulag Khmer Rouge 17 avril 1975 - 7 Janvier 1979," p. 129. "Le parti, I'Etat, 
I 'administration nefont qu 'un dans pays totalement militarise et oil regne la terreur. Une etroite 
oligarchic monopolise tout I'appareil d'Etat et controle toute I'economie: il ne resteplus le moindre 
secteur prive... niplus aucun chomeur" (p. 131). Beyond the idea of a total state, Locard's characterization 
focuses primarily on the centrally-Organized security system. 
175
 Heder & Tittemore, Seven Candidates for Prosecution, pp. 26-27. While the focus of the evidentiary 
brief remains with the policy against the ancien regime (in 1975) and the security apparatus (similar to 
Locard), Heder and Tittemore also note that the centralized authority extended into practices in the 
countryside: "Arrests and executions in rural areas were reported by lower-level officials to central 
authorities, and reveals that arrests and executions were discussed in meetings of military commanders. 
Accordingly, whereas policies of murder and torture could previously be inferred from the pattern of such 
crimes and were suggested by certain general official statements, the documentation we have reviewed 
confirms that many, if not all, of these crimes were committed as a matter of policy and that senior officials 
were knowingly involved in their development and implementation" (Heder & Tittemore, Seven 
Candidates for Prosecution, p. 10). Heder has subsequently critiqued his own formulation in this work, the 
model of top-down domination, for reasons discussed below (Heder, "Reassessing the Role of Senior 
Leaders"). 
176
 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 78. A focus on political violence (rather than authority over all 
policies) would necessarily make the case that the security system in operation during DK extended 
throughout the entire countryside and was solidly within the grasp of the faction who exercised direct 
control and, thereby, how security policies were implemented. By refining the claims about authority, this 
perspective can accommodate regional autonomy (fostered during the civil war) and variations in social 
conditions (not associated with systematic executions). Etcheson conceives of the victorious CPK in 1975 
as a "coalition of revolutionary groupings" (p. 88) from which a distinctive area, such as the East Zone, 
could emerge. 
177
 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 78. The "newness" of Etcheson's data and findings seem to date to 
the mid- to late 1990s. Although Etcheson states that previous hypotheses regarding the DK period (e.g., 
those of Vickery and Quinh) have been largely washed away by contemporary findings, his assertion does 
not relegate earlier efforts to the status of anachronistic placeholders for immature guesses of the past, on 
the rim of the dustbin of academic history. This is significant because some primary monographs on the 
DK period (Vickery's Cambodia 1975-1982, Kiernan's The Pol Pot Regime, and Chandler's Brother 
Number One) were either published or re-issued subsequent to the new data which Etcheson puts forth. 
Second editions of two of these works re-stake the authors' theses that DK represented a revolution guided 
by peasantist anger (Vickery) or that xenophobic totalitarian aspirations of a French-educated clique led to 
genocide (Kiernan). It would be foolish to assume these scholars are not aware of how the "recent data" 
might challenge their claims. (It may be that Kiernan's book was re-released in light of increased attention 
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on Cambodia due to an impending trial and that his version of events filled the void where an authoritative 
and comprehensive monograph on Democratic Kampuchea was absent.) Both works—Vickery's 1999 
imprint and Kiernan's 2002 edition—are re-issues without any significant changes made to the contents, 
details, or arguments of the earlier versions. In addressing the dynamics underlying Cambodian genocide, 
Kiernan states, "The phenomenon is notable for its explosive combination of totalitarian political ambition 
and a racialist project of ethnic purification... DK was the only communist regime systematically to 
disperse its minorities by force and to make punishable by death the use of minority and foreign 
languages.... Thus, racialist and ideological strands intertwined in a tapestry of tragedy" (Kiernan, The Pol 
Pot Regime (Second Edition), p. xiv), and again, "This clear-cut racial stereotype disguised as class 
discrimination served a policy of targeted ethnic repression" (p. xv). Vickery's newly imprinted 
introduction bluntly states that "no changes are required" of his original release (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-
1982, p. v), then it proceeds to 1) critique the foundations of those who opposed the substance of some of 
his earlier claims, and 2) explain the continued interest in his book. 
178
 The corner notations, of which Etcheson writes, which confirm the members and positions of the 
security committee seem to merely supplement knowledge of the hand-written marginal notes on 
confessions that have been identified as belonging to Son Sen, Nuon Chea, and Pol Pot. However, 
Etcheson asserts that the activities of Tuol Slerig were monitored on adaily basis. 
179
 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 83. Throughout the section on the security network in the 
provinces, the author makes repeated claims that future reviews of the findings will shore up the 
insufficiencies that plague his argument. 
180
 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, pp. 84-85. 
181
 Brown also picks up on this remainder. Although otherwise praising Etcheson's work, Brown charges 
that he leaves unanswered the question of whether the central authority was "strong enough to eliminate the 
possibility of local Khmer Rouge officials pursuing personal agendas and expanding the scope of killing" 
(Brown, "Review: After the Killing Fields"). Given the ambitious aims of Etcheson's collection, this 
lingering question constitutes a major lacuna. 
182
 Estimations of the Democratic Kampuchea death toll are addressed below. 
183
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Similarly, Kiernan's portrayals of DK's prioritization of irrigation and the Organization's tripartite division 
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census of Phnom Penh in February 1975, is put together with projections from Migozzi's 1968 estimates 
(Cambodge, p. 228) and some observations from Kirk ("The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or 
Terrorists?," p. 9). Similarly, the April 1975 national population (7.894 million, un-rounded) requires 
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from the uppermost extremes of estimations from Kiernan's "half," roughly 800,000 (The Pol Pot Regime, 
p. 456), and Sliwinski's 720,000 (Le Genocide Khmer Rouge, p. 79). 
Kiernan has made the charge that Vickery disregards the more reliable figure of 7.9 million for the 1975 
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Sliwinski, 310,000 (Le Genocide Khmer Rouge, p. 48); and Banister & Johnson, 275,000 ("After the 
325 
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 This is the conclusion to Vickery's analysis of the "human cost" (which Etcheson cites): "Given the lack 
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(Kiernan, "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia," p. 588). 
245
 "For example, in the 1999 mapping data for Banteay Meanchey, several mass graves in the vicinity of 
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by a Khmer Rouge hospital and two Khmer Rouge security centers at the same general location, it is not at 
all clear how one can be certain of the origin of the bodies in any mass grave in that immediate area. This 
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sampling from surveys, mapping, and cohort analysis), and although he proposes an approximate figure of 
2.18 million, he highlights the uncertainties, lacuna, and the ways he confronts these while also 
emphasizing that the number itself matters less than the acknowledgement that real people were the victims 
of the DK horror (Bruce Sharp, "Counting Hell"). 
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journalist accounts that neglect comparative evaluations which might look at similar mass killings (e.g., 
Indonesia) or social conditions in neighboring countries (Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 196-197). 
The level of suffering has been deployed in various arenas for economic, political, or social benefit. For 
example, refugee communities' perceptions of loss have played out in at least two directions. Immediately 
following the DK era, some refugees emphasized their traumatic experiences in order to secure assistance 
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mobilize their suffering and their experiences as victims, both in the homeland, the refugee camps and 
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for me!'" (Mortland, "Legacies of Genocide for Cambodians in the United States," p. 169.) There are also 
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credentials, Thion critiques the use of the term "survivor" as an appendage to signatories' names. "If 
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Colby, Pol Pot et ah the politics of 'Genocide'," p. 8). On the national stage, one might argue that the non-
Angkorian offerings for tourist consumption pimp suffering—a "moving spectacle"?—as a means to 
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effected by the denial; he casts his documentation efforts, the "truth," as a forceful remedy to the "evil" of 
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on Kiernan and the CGP mission ensued. Kiernan's examination of the Wall Street Journal charges is 
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 He contests Peou's pragmatism, which asserted that advocating prosecution within the political context 
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Peou as an apologist, so much as someone who is overwhelmingly focused on political context/strategy. In 
the thick of a discussion on genocide denying (Kiernan, "Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice," pp. 93 -
96), Kiernan lays charges against Heder (portrayed as a "colleague of Peou's"), which center on an 
apparent change of position between two working papers (from 1991 and 1996) that dealt with loyalty, 
differing visions, and varying support/backing within the CPK elite—principally, the commitments and 
culpability of Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. The contradiction that Kiernan supposes within Heder's 
writings involve perceived historical culpability in relation to the availability of documentary evidence to 
prove such guilt. 
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acknowledging that genocide occurred but blocking investigation of it. Kiernan charges Jeldres with 
attempting to suppress the findings of the CGP and cites Jeldres' affiliation with Chile's Pinochet regime, 
his siding with the KR during DK and in the CGDK (as was Sihanouk), and playing mouthpiece for Pol Pot 
(Kiernan, "Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice," pp. 97-98). Guilt by association (via character 
assassination) appears to be Kiernan's primary concern, as Jeldres' quotes simply imply a different 
perspective from the CGP rather than any sustained attempt at suppression. 
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 Kiernan, "Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice," p. 98. (It might be formidable to pretend that 
academics should not be used for politics and vice versa; all the same, it seems naive to fail to see that these 
endeavors are always to some extent ideologically imbued, a point Kiernan comes close to recognizing 
when he states, "both the creation of historical memory and its erasure depend upon contemporary politics 
as much as history itself (p. 103).) One position—attributed to Vickery, Chandler, and others—meets 
with Kiernan's respectful disagreement, which he calls a "technical denial of genocide": the atrocities 
under Democratic Kampuchea were murderous but do not constitute genocide as such. Thion is not 
included in this, "quite legitimate" if "incorrect" camp (p. 97), because Kiernan claims that Thion denies 
the idea of genocide (and cites Thion's Holocaust revisionism in an attempt to discredit his assertions about 
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 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
1948, Article II (emphasis added to highlight points that have sometimes been the focus of controversy 
with regard to the Cambodian case). The UN deemed that there was sufficient evidence for "requisite 
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intent" and "as such" to pursue investigations for a trial of genocide and to allow a court to decide the 
appropriateness of genocide (UN, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to 
General Assembly resolution 52/135, Article V, Section A. 1, paragraphs 63-65). As well, a 1995 study for 
the US State Department also confirmed: "We find prima facie culpability for acts against religious and 
ethnic groups, such as the Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese communities, and the Buddhist monkhood" 
(Abrams & Ratner, "Striving for Justice: Accountability and the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge," quoted in 
Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, pp. 54-55). However, legal scholar William Schabas disagrees, 
asserting that what is being described by "genocide" more closely fits the definition of "crimes against 
humanity" as they are articulated in Article VI of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Schabas, "Should 
Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?," p. 37; idem, 
"Cambodia: Was It Really Genocide?," pp. 472-475). His reading of the scope established by Article II of 
the Genocide Convention states that destruction of cultural institutions (i.e., Buddhism) and forced 
assimilation (i.e., of the Cham minority) do not conform to genocide's criteria; in fact, the US and Canada 
had specifically sought the exclusion of "cultural genocide" fearing its application to indigenous groups 
(Schabas, "Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?," p. 
39). Linton agrees with the position that Schabas puts forth, although she suggests that the scope laid out in 
the Genocide Convention may warrant modifications over time and welcome contributions to addressing 
this issue (Linton, "An Internationalized Domestic Tribunal?," p. 36). The need to address particularities is 
a recurrent theme in Linton's work, as her advocacy for a "truth commission" highlights the specific needs 
and context of "transitional justice" in Cambodia (Linton, "KR trials are vital, but won't solve everything," 
P-7)-57
 Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, p. 463. Kiernan argues that the Chinese were targeted as the "archetypal 
urban dwellers" and presumed not to be of poor origin; his region-by-region detailing argues against the 
idea of a "racial vendetta" even though Chinese deaths were disproportionately higher than the overall 
population (Kiernan, "Kampuchea's ethnic Chinese under Pol Pot: A Case of Systematic Social 
Discrimination," pp. 18,20-26). 
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 Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide." Interestingly, Kiernan introduces the Cham people by briefly 
recounting their history and ethnological migration, with a focus on religious elements. The formation and 
migration of the descendants of the Champa Empire into a minority population within Cambodia transpired 
principally in 1693 and again in the 1790s. Kiernan notes that most studies of the Cham population have 
misrepresented the group as the remnants of a disappearing people ("victims of history"), arguing (along 
with Ner) that the Cham community was increasing in numbers and cultural identity. In his political 
analysis of the Chams, two figures rise to prominence: 1) Colonel Les Kasem who headed a Cham battalion 
notorious for exterminating Khmer Rouge forces, and 2) Sos Man, who was an early ICP and CPK member 
who promoted communism among Cham communities. 
261
 Kiernan details the suffering of Chams in the East Zone—Sector 21/Krauchmar and Tbaung Khmum 
(Kampong Cham), Sector 22/Peareang (Prey Veng), Sector 24/Kampong Trabek (Prey Veng), and Sector 
23/Romeas Hek District (Svay Rieng)—and the common description in these testimonies are: the 
destruction of religion, introduction of communal eating, harsh work requirements, and dispersal of the 
community in the early years of Democratic Kampuchea. The last year, with the Southwest Zone's purge 
of the East Zone beginning in May 1978, is characterized by massacres. Kiernan's sector-by-sector 
account of the North/Central Zone—Sector 31/41 Chamcar Loeu District (Kampong Cham), Baray District 
(Kampong Thom), and remote areas of Preah Vihear Province (Sector 103)—depicts brutal repression of 
all "races," but particularly of "new people" (which, Kiernan claims, was often the category used for 
Chams, despite their base living) beginning in 1976. The account of the Southwest Zone—Koh Thom 
(Kandal), Treang District (Takeo), and Phnom Penh—shows strict regulations for all people, with harsher 
conditions and escalated killings occurring in 1978. The unique category of "deportee base people" for 
Chams seems to have been used only in Ta Mok's zone. The survey of the West and Northwest Zones 
depict a devout Cham community in Kampong Tralach District (Kampong Chhnang) in which the Khmer 
Rouge crackdown on Chams began in 1973, with each subsequent year bringing greater repression 
(Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide"). 
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262
 Vickery argues that Kiernan is "tinkering with the statistics in a tendentious manner in an attempt to 
prove the case for genocide in Democratic Kampuchea" (Vickery, "Comments on Cham Population 
Figures," p. 31); Vickery's calculations work out to around 30,000. Kiernan's rebuttal ("Genocide in 
Cambodia, 1975-79," pp. 35-37) begins by asserting that "genocide is not a matter of statistics" and whose 
more conceptual definition Vickery avoids. Re-justifying his calculations, Kiernan works in reverse 
attempting to show how Vickery consistently underestimates death tolls under Pol Pot. With an agreed 
1982 figure of 182,256 Chams, Kiernan's back extrapolation proceeds on a 3 percent per annum growth 
based on what he claims was "an historic baby boom" following the Democratic Kampuchea period (p. 36). 
Ner's 1936 base number (88,000), Ner's point that Chams were rapidly increasing in numbers, and 
supposedly following Migozzi closer than Vickery allow Kiernan to claim validity for his 1975 figure 
(250,000) and 1979 estimate (170,000). This raw drop (80,000) is added to the natural population growth 
(approximated at 10,000) to achieve Kiernan's death toll for the Chams at 90,000. Interestingly, Kiernan 
puts responsibility on the Pol Pot regime for 1) non-excessive but violent deaths (e.g., the cancer patient 
who is shot), and 2) additional deaths canceling out the low natural population growth rate. 
263
 Kiernan, "Orphans of Genocide," p. 33. 
264
 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 54. 
265
 The CPK security apparatus is one mechanism through which Cambodians were killed; however, other, 
non-systematic killings may constitute a larger share of the regime's victims. The idea of discretionary 
killings is addressed further below. In another venue, Etcheson uses the fate of the ethnic Vietnamese to 
advocate the applicability of "genocide" (Etcheson, "Nightmare of a History," p. 9). His example of the 
Vietnamese proves poor, given that the Lon Nol regime was predominantly responsible for deporting, 
executing, and thereby vastly reducing the number of Vietnamese {before 1975); Locard also picks up on 
Etcheson's poor choice of examples in his review of Short's new history (Locard, "Short's History of a 
Nightmare draws a Locard," p. 15). 
266
 Chandler, "Review: The Pol Pot Regime," p. 1064. 
267
 Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," p. 112. 
26iIbid., pp. 113-115. 
269Ibid.,p. 115. 
210
 Ibid., p. 146. 
271
 Hannum & Hawk, "The case against the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea"; 
Fein, Genocide: a sociological perspective. 
272
 On the issue of "auto-genocide" (and Kiernan's story of the blue krama), Heder sees a "more complex 
phenomenon" in which the logic of class struggle meant the elimination of all those who failed to live up to 
"Pol Pot's expectations of what a proletarianized people could achieve, how they should behave and what 
they should believe" (Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," p. 150). 
273
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 148-153; idem, "The debate to apportion blame," p. 7. 
274
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. 194. Although tenuous and admitting speculation, Vickery reasons 
that areas where Cham massacre did occur were 1) in the proximity of where Les Kasem's battalion had 
operated during the civil war, or 2) had higher concentrations of Cham bourgeoisie. Also, he argues that 
this minority group was not allowed to practice religion (as all Khmers were denied their religion). He 
remains skeptical of statements about the forced eating of pork, given the dismal supply of food in most 
parts of the country (pp. 194-195). 
275
 Chomsky and Herman, quoted in Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, p. vii. In fact, Vickery is more 
concerned with the genocide committed against the Vietnamese in the 1992-1993 period, when the DK 
leadership was pursuing a policy of targeting ethnic Vietnamese within Cambodia. 
276
 Locard, Pol Pot's Little Red Book, pp. 179-180. 
277
 Ibid., p. 303. Locard's study of slogans used throughout the DK period exhibits no examples aimed at 
Chams or Chinese. Anti-Vietnamese slogans abound—including the oft-repeated "Vietnamese head, 
Cambodian body'—but (along with Vickery) Locard argues the Vietnamese "had the good luck to be 
chased out of the country at the beginning of the regime." It is important to note that Locard (with 
Sliwinski's demographics and contra Short) recognizes a more difficult situation confronting Chams, even 
though the killing during DK is interpreted as politically motivated (Locard, "Short's History of a 
Nightmare draws a Locard," p. 9). The term "politicide" comes from Harff and Gurr; their six-point 
typology of genocides and politicides includes "revolutionary politicide," to which they assign the 
Kampuchean case: "mass murders of class or political enemies in the service of new revolutionary 
ideologies" (Harff& Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides," p. 360). The 
advantage of this category is its inclusion of discretionary/assertive killings, which occurred in the service 
of the revolution but largely outside the central security apparatus. However, the CPK purge of its own 
ranks, in the unceasing search for "enemies"—the best-documented violence of the DK period—would 
seem to conform to Harff and Gurr's "repressive politicide," because it specifically incorporates factions 
"engaged in some form of oppositional activity"—even if imaginary? 
278
 Locard, State Sponsored Crimes Against Humanity and "Genocide " in Cambodia, pp. 9-15. 
279
 Ibid., p. 5. He reminds his audience that "purity" in CPK rhetoric and analysis never referred to race or 
ethnicity, but focused on ideology (specifically, an independence from Vietnamese thought). 
280
 Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. U. 
281
 Ibid., p. 446 (emphasis added). Short's "Afterword" proclamations on genocide do not mention the 
Chams or other minority groups. The treatment of Cambodia's Muslim minority is given brief attention 
earlier. Short's position is that the suppression of "everything that had given colour and meaning to 
Cambodian life" was a policy of uniformity, not racism (p. 326). He further asserts that the killing of 
Chams may have been exacerbated by the group's historically-inherited increased reluctance to abandon 
their cultural specificity, which in turn generated or increased suspicion of Chams being anti-revolutionary 
(p. 327). Short even ventures to suggest that a certain amount of death can be expected to accompany any 
revolution (an abomination). 
282
 Short, The History of a Nightmare, p. 446. 
283
 Ibid., pp. 446-447. Short's examination of these political dimensions lends support to Thion's 
assertion: genocide as a political commodity. 
284
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. vi-vii. 
285
 Locard, State Sponsored Crimes Against Humanity and "Genocide " in Cambodia, pp. 2-4, referencing 
Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, p. 158. He further notes that the Soviet Union 
(and the Eastern bloc) was the country that ardently argued for the non-inclusion of "political" groups in 
the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
286
 Heder, "Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia," pp. 220-221. 
287
 Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 165-166. 
288
 Keng Vannsak receives a fair share of blame for Pol Pot's misguided Utopian vision of a Khmer 
democratic village state. The severity of Thion's tone is demonstrated in the following characterization: 
"Pol Pot, a much watered-down imitation of a faded Chinese copy of Uncle Joe, was and still is an 
unimaginative idealist, a forest monk, lost in dreams" (Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 
168). 
289
 Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," pp. 170-171. This is the source of Short's argument 
regarding uniformity rather than racism. 
29
 He offers relatively cynical remarks on the use of terms for their political value, when world powers' 
political actions and context are culpable. Following this sentiment, Thion advocates a trial of all those 
involved in the Cambodian catastrophe (US, China, Thailand, etc.). Although his vitriol cuts through the 
hypocrisies and paradoxes of addressing the deeds of murderous powers in the past and present, his wish 
for an accounting of all seems sadly unrealistic. However, it seems to be a shared sentiment; I witnessed a 
number of occasions (presentations, conferences, and informal discussions) where the culpability of the US 
in particular—for pre-1975 bombing and post-1979 CGDK support—was emphatically signaled by 
Cambodians as warranting legal redress. 
291
 Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 180. There has been considerable debate on how a trial 
would be received by Cambodians. Thion's assertions in this regard are rare. Some have speculated that 
legal proceedings against Khmer Rouge leaders might spike social unrest, ranging from civil war (e.g., 
former Khmer Rouge taking up arms in defense of their former leaders) to greater trauma (as Cambodians 
are called upon to re-visit a decades-old past from which they have moved on). Others, especially 
Etcheson, Jarvis, and DC-Cam, have stressed the reconciliation process, of which a tribunal is one key 
component. 
292
 Both Locard and Schabas pick up oh this inertia that confronts the effort to undo the terminological 
pairing of "Cambodian" and "genocide" (Locard, "Short's History of a Nightmare draws a Locard," p. 15; 
Schabas "Was it Really Genocide?" pp. 474-475), that it has "irrevocably entered our human rights 
nomenclature" (Schabas, "Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against 
Humanity?," p. 39). Schabas reasons that "genocide" is favored by many observers for 1) its weight as the 
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most serious crime against humanity and 2) the clear international legal obligations pertaining to cases of 
genocide (p. 36). 
CHAPTER 3 
1
 Although Cambodia can be said to possess de facto "advantages" for its economy—the world heritage site 
of Angkor Wat and a diverse complex of ancient Khmer temples (absolute advantages) as well as a long-
established tradition of rice production (a relative advantage, however non-intensive the use of the land 
may be)—the theory of "comparative advantage" seems largely a tool of economics deployed to 
retroactively legitimize, or naturalize, the export articles of developing. In fact, economies of the 
industrializing world seem to be largely a result of some historical givens ("advantages," in terms of the 
ease which they are produced) as well as the power relations among unequal trade partners, multinational 
domination, and relations of economic dependence foisted upon former colony states. It becomes clear that 
the "advantages" Cambodia has enjoyed have been frequently fostered by outside powers, whether a textile 
quota system or a re-discovery of a jungle-covered temple. 
2
 World Bank, 10 Years After the Crisis, p. 46, in reference to real GDP growth of 10.5 percent for 2006. A 
decade earlier, Cambodia's first rice surplus since the 1960s came to fruition (Sok, Chea & Sik, 
Cambodia's Economic Review 2001, p. I). 
3
 World Bank, 10 Years After the Crisis, p. 46. "The story of industrial and service sector growth in Phnom 
Penh and other urban areas to date appears to have tracked that of the East Asian miracle countries in their 
early stages of development. Because of the phenomenal growth in garment manufacturing, construction 
and tourism services, notably labor intensive sectors, in Cambodia's urban hubs, workers and especially the 
unskilled in the lower end of the distribution have benefited disproportionately. The country's general 
economic reform strategy, which includes globalization or opening up of the economy to trade and foreign 
direct investment, has transformed the livelihood opportunities of the urban population" (World Bank, 
Sharing Growth: Equity and Development in Cambodia, p. 51). 
4
 World Bank, Cambodia at the Crossroads, p. 29 
5
 The participants in the Eighth Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia in March 2006 included: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States, Asian Development Bank, European Commission, International Monetary 
Fund, United Nations Development System (UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, FAO, UNDP, and others), 
and the World Bank. Official observers included: China, India, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Poland, Russian Federation, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand.. 
6
 Sok, Chea & Sik, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001, p. 1. 
7
 A quota-free, duty-free trade agreement with the E.U. was negotiated in 2001 under its Everything But 
Arms system of preferences, which also encouraged growth in Cambodia's textile sector. However, the US 
has been the principal recipient of Cambodian garments, seizing 70 percent of the export market to the 
E.U.'s 25 percent in 2003 and 64 to 29 percent in 2004 (USAID, Measuring Competitiveness and Labor 
Productivity in Cambodia's Garment Industry, p. 12). 
8
 Sok, Chea & Sik, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001, p. 9. The (classification of) export quotas 
for Cambodian garment factories were laid out in a Ministry of Commerce ordinance (PNPRK360, dated 1 
February 1999). According to this ordinance, quotas from the US were granted to factories in operation in 
Cambodia; thus, during the November 1998 negotiations, Cambodia secured quotas for its 111 operating 
companies, which were employing some 72,000 workers. In 1999, there were suggestions from the 
opposition Sam Rainsy Party that corruption, fraud, and favoritism had plagued the granting and 
management of the quotas while social factors of production had been ignored (for example, see SRP 
Members of Parliament's question to the government, dated 3 May 1999.) 
9
 USAID, Measuring Competitiveness and Labor Productivity in Cambodia's Garment Industry, pp. 3—4. 
10
 One general strategy to head off an impending loss, which has already been adopted, is a re-branding of 
Cambodia that promotes the fair social conditions of the country's production, emphasizing labor 
standards, workers' rights, and working conditions. 
11
 In 1999, Cambodia's garment exports were worth US$553 million (50 percent of the country's total 
exports), of which 88 percent went to the US; in 2000, their worth was US$985 million (70 percent of 
exports), with 76 percent going to the US (Sok, Chea & Sik, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001, 
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pp. 49-50). As 136,000 of the 160,000 workers in the garment industry in 2000 were women principally 
from the countryside (p. 57), some social observations about the impact of this urbanization tendency 
among young women should be acknowledged. The key insight is that rural girls tended to remain at home 
with the family, following the schedule and demands of household and farm work, until they were married. 
This paradigm stands is stark contrast to the work demands and hours involved in the garment industry. 
While work life becomes increasingly regimented and work becomes longer, female factory workers are 
also experiencing new forms of social freedoms. 
12
 Coe et al., Cambodia: Rebuilding for a Challenging Future, p. 8. 
13
 Each of these grouping exhibits differing pressures that direct their unfolding as successful tourist 
destinations. The prestige of ancient grandeur is presided over by the post-colonial state. Enduring natural 
beauty is subject to the opposing demands of national resource extraction and "resort" tourism. Modern 
trauma representations are directed the government ministries (significantly guided by the CPP) in 
association with historically-concerned institutions (DC-Cam) and to a certain extent the presentations of 
foreigners. 
14
 Angkor Wat was designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in December 1992. Ticket sales for the 
Angkor park are administered by Sokimex, the politically-connected petroleum company that sustains an 
ever diversifying business portfolio. (A one-day ticket costs $20. Admission is free to Cambodian 
nationals; in order to avoid ticket collection, guards at the various sites inquire as to a national's homeland, 
seeking aspects of confirmation in the respondent's speech. A Cambodian passport or other identification 
can be demanded as an ultimate resort.) As the country's largest company, Sokimex has been the recipient 
of contracts from the government often in suspicious circumstances (e.g., gas imports, the monopoly of the 
supply of medicines, and the furnishing of military and police uniforms) (O'Connell & Yin, "All that 
glitters seems to be... Sokimex," pp. 8-9). The company secured the management of ticket sales through 
discrete discussions with government officials in April 1999; the price for this concession was an annual 
flat fee of US$1 million. Total ticket sales for 1999 was US$3.8 million (Vong & Marcher, "Sokimex and 
Government revisit Angkor deal," p. 3). The August 2005 renegotiation of the deal at an inter-ministerial 
meeting, absent of competitive bidding, reaffirmed Sokimex's concession but on terms more favorable to 
the government. If gross sales are less than US$3 million, then the government receives 50 percent of the 
revenues; if sales exceed US$7 million, then the government's share is 70 percent. The government 
portion is intended to support Apsara Authority, which oversees conservation but remains heavily 
subsidized by foreign funding (Kanmwerayotin, "Show Us The Money"). 
15
 In this list, one might also include the foreigner-oriented Butterfly Garden (Siem Reap) or the Snake 
House (Kompong Som), although these are mainly establishments that augment their food offering with 
bestial novelty. In conversations with informants in Oddar Meanchey, any water body became the topic of 
potential development for tourism/resort purposes, including Ta Mok's lake, the narrow waterfall at Ta 
Mok's cliffhouse, and the jungle-embedded reservoir in Trabaing Tauv Commune. Essentially, this meant 
cleaning the site of UXO or natural debris, constructing open-air huts where food would be available, and 
advertising. The word for "resort" (from the Sanskrit/Pali ramantya) emphasizes a pleasant and attractive 
site. The term "eco-tourism" and its conceptual implications (wildlife preservation and conservation,) have 
only recently been applied to some of these sites. A notable exception is Ratanakiri's Yeak Laom Lake, 
managed by the Forestry Department, which uses the environs as a means to educate visitors about native 
flora and fauna (as well as providing a deep swimming hole). Tours of the Prek Toal Bird Sanctuary in the 
Tonle Sap also more closely conform to the philosophical impetus of "eco-tourism," as relating to an 
ecology. In terms of language, Cambodians refer to "nature tourism" {teschdr thoamm 'cheat 
igMtnnfiotftiisi)—"tourism" from Sanskrit/Pali desa- place, region + -carana walking about; "nature" from 
Pali dhamma- + -jati, which might be rendered "all things born (jati) of the natural order of things 
(dhamma)"—rather than the more closely equivalent "eco-" (bdrihthaan mwia), from Sanskrit, paristhana 
surrounding, residence (akin to Greek oiko-). 
16
 A plethora of restaurants, bakeries, and retail shops which employ disenfranchised youth, training them 
in various vocations, could also be added to this list. 
17
 The casino/look-out station at Bokor Mountain (Kampot) and the colonial-era villa ruins (Kep) allow the 
opportunity to wander about and see, but no historical explanation is provided, beyond the (textual) 
guidance the visitor brings. These southwestern sites combine visions of (the remnants of) upper-class life 
under the Union Indochinoise as well as the actions of the CPK: Bokor, once a casino and hotel for the 
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French elite later became a base from which military units could launch attacks; Kep's seaside villas were 
partially demolished by CPK forces, it is said, to send a message about luxury lifestyles. 
18
 Taiwanese businessman Victor Chao's Marksmen Club was established beyond Pochentong Airport in 
1997, as a visitors' venue alternative to tourist attractions like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek that "depress 
people" (Dupont, '"War Disney': Cambodian tourism hits its mark?," p. 16). It added a newer facility with 
newer toys near the existent Kambol firing range operated by the government. 
19
 Shenon, "Khmer Rouge Threaten Cambodian Tourism." The apparent reasoning behind the attacks 
suggests that the outlawed Khmer Rouge were seeking to disrupt all investment in the country so as to 
undermine the largely credible Royal Cambodian Government that had come to power through UN-
sponsored elections in 1993. In this context, "Khmer Rouge" is used to denote the ousted CPK regime that 
regrouped via the refugee camps, participated in the Paris Peace Accords, ultimately withdrew from 
UNTAC, continued isolated attacks, and were banned in 1994, even though the organization operated under 
a number of different auspices: Democratic Kampuchea, Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(which included Son Sann's KPNLF and Sihanouk's Mouvement de Liberation Nationale du 
KampuchealArmee Nationale Sihanoukienne/FUNCWPEC), and the post-1982 Party (or, Partie) of 
Democratic Kampuchea as well as its military arm, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea. While 
this blurs the individuated identities the organization has assumed, it is consistent with the way the RCG 
cites the group in its planning and documentation. 
20
 Although Hun Sen's direct responsibility has not been formally pursued, information provided by a US 
casualty of the attack, Ron Abney, and gleaned from the confidential FBI investigative report, indicate that 
members of Hun Sen's Bodyguard Unit #2 (2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment), specifically Gen. Hing Bun 
Heang, planned the attack and harbored the escaping assailants (including, Kong Samreth, code-named 
Brazil) (Garella & Pape, A Tragedy of No Importance, chap. 9; Doran, Report to the U.S. Senate 
Investigation on Grenade Attack). 
21
 While it does not completely explain or excuse the violence, art examination of the details of the events 
suggest that the deaths of these foreigners resulted during attempts to traverse Khmer Rouge-held territory. 
The three backpackers (Australian, Briton, French) had managed to board a train bound for Kampong Som 
(Sihanoukville), at a time when foreigners were forbidden to ride the train for security reasons. The three 
travelers were taken to the Khmer Rouge base at Phnom Voar, where they were killed under Pol Pot's 
orders, two months into ransom negotiations. Trials spanning 1999 to 2006 eventually found three Khmer 
Rouge officers responsible: Gen. Nuon Paet who ordered the attacks, his superior Gen. Sam Bith, and Col. 
Chhouk Rin who led the troops in the ambush of the train. An excellent presentation on these events, 
characters, court proceedings, and politico-legal implications for Cambodia's judiciary can be found in 
John Hall, "In the Shadow of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal." The convoy to the Citadel of Women, 30 km 
from Siem Reap town, rambled out when the area was still off-limits to visitors; after the attack, it was 
determined that the shooters were "bandits" with Khmer Rouge backgrounds. (This was the security 
situation problem as I traveled through the country three years later: although the Khmer Rouge had small 
pockets of support, the real threat of "bandits"—former (Khmer Rouge) soldiers still toting their guns— 
pervaded the Cambodian countryside.) Although the story of the Howes killing took two years to surface, 
it appears that he was initially instructed to leave to seek ransom for his de-mining crew, but his refusal (an 
act of solidarity with his co-workers) meant that the team was released and Howes was executed. Scotland 
Yard determined that those responsible for Howes execution were: Ta Mok, Gen. Kheum Ngon, Col. Kong, 
and members of Kheum Ngon's bodyguard unit (Rim, Lim, and San) (Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away 
With Genocide?, p. 115). 
22
 An unqualified segment of arrivals to Cambodia seem driven at least in part by a sense of adventure 
tourism (the leftovers of war tourism), which takes advantage of a lack of infrastructure and potential 
instability. Cambodia's listing in the first edition of Pelton's quasi-guide book, The World's Most 
Dangerous Places, may encourage this sentiment to seek out adrenaline rushes among the country's 
hazards. Other textual portrayals of the untamed destination in the mid-1990s narrate tales of extreme 
adventure and sex tourism, for example, Gilboa's Off the Rails in Phnom Penh: Into the Dark Heart of 
Guns, Girls, and Ganja and, quite differently, Vollman's lesser-known Butterfly Stories. A more recent 
work by UN workers, Emergency Sex (and Other Desperate Measures), depicts dangers, dedication, and 
drunken dealings during the UNTAC period, albeit not in a tourist-guide style. 
23
 Royal Cambodian Government, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010, p. 56. Consequent to 
the rampant commercialization of all aspects of cultural life brought on by the tourist gaze, Cambodia has 
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been plagued by some of the more severe social ills associated with tourism and worsened by its weak state 
and dilapidated infrastructure. A 1999 survey of travel agents showed that 21.7 percent of tourists to 
Cambodia came for sex, and an unknown fraction of them came for child sex; it is argued that Thailand's 
and the Philippines' success in their anti-pedophilia measures has led to new, poorer destinations, like 
Cambodia, to be sought (Nuon, Yit & Gray, Children's Work, Adults' Play, p. 36). Chea Huot, a CDRI 
researcher, offered similar numbers for 2000, citing the success of anti-sex trade legislation in neighboring 
countries as a causal factor (Straits Times, "Sex draws nearly a quarter of tourists to Cambodia"). 
24
 Royal Cambodian Government, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010, p. 57. 
25
 A lull afflicted Cambodia's tourist growth from July 1997 (political instability manifested in factional 
fighting) until after the 1998 elections, further fueled by the regional economic woes. Years after the "open 
skies" policy was formalized, it opened up direct flights servicing Siem Reap Airport to regional airlines 
arriving from Taipei, Hong Kong, Kuala Lampur, Singapore, Jakarta, Vientiane, as well as cities in 
Thailand and Vietnam. The "open skies" approach to encourage tourism had been pursued in 1968 when 
China assisted in the construction of the Siem Reap airport; however, political turmoil in 1970 effected an 
abrupt halt to the tourist blossoming (Sok, Chea & Sik, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001, p. 69). 
The US$18 million upgrade to the Siem Reap Airport was unveiled in August 2006. 
26
 Perhaps the most significant casualty was Royal Air Cambodge, which had long enjoyed a de facto 
monopoly on domestic commercial air travel; the airline ceased all its operations in October 2001. 
27
 In 2001, the average duration of a stay direct to Siem Reap was 3 days and to Phnom Penh 5 days; only 
12 percent of Siem Reap's visitors continued on to the capital (Sok & Sarthi, Cambodia's Annual 
Economic Review 2002, p. 22). 
28
 In 2000, arrival by air to Siem Reap tripled, flights arrivals grew by only 14 percent, and the total number 
of foreign tourists increased by 32 percent; because of the shorter stays (among direct-to-Siem Reap 
visitors), income from tourism increased by 24 percent, compared to a 40 percent increase the year 
previous (Sok, Chea & Sik, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001, p. 7). 
29
 Thong Khon, deputy festival organizer, helped oversee the US$500,000 budget, which was originally 
priced at US$1.7 million. King Sihanouk opposed this use of the country's national icon. 
30
 Tourists have expressed disappointment in the quality of accommodations, vehicles, and the knowledge 
of guides in this developing country (Sok, Chea & Sik, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001, p. 76). 
The Carreras,/ete brought together: 150 dancers, 32,000 flowers, 20 life-size ice carvings, four elephants, 
and 70 chefs. 
31ADB, Technical Assistance Consultant's Report, p. 19. (The ADB has been a key actor in coordinating 
the various efforts and specialties of these different frameworks and organizations.) Tourism is one of the 
five key areas of cooperation spelled out in ACMECS' Bagan Declaration of 12 November 2003. The 
Emerald Triangle's Pakse Declaration of 2 August 2003 more specifically spells out the commitments by 
which cooperation will be effected between Cambodia (Preah Vihear and Oddar Meanchey), Thailand 
(Ubon Ratchathani and Sisaket), and Laos (Champasak and Salavanh), including infrastructural 
improvements, human resources, facilitated border crossings, and joint promotion of investment. MGC has 
specialized its working groups such that Thailand leads in tourism, Cambodia in culture, India in education, 
etc. 
32
 The name derives from the Suwannaphumi Peninsula (sovannaphum MfrumS), "golden region," which 
was the ancient toponym of mainland (insular) Southeast Asia. 
33
 Also at this meeting, Sereyvuth expressed his desires for a Tourism Development Zone, a cultural theme 
park for recreating history. 
34
 This was the formulation in the November 2000 implementation of the agreement. The initial accord put 
forth two package tours, the "Khmer Cultural Tourism Route," with the following trajectories: 1) 
Bangkok-Aranyaprathet/Poipet-Siem Reap, and 2) Bangkok-Trat/Koh Kong-Kampong Som-Phnom 
Penh-Siem Reap-Aranyaprathet/Poipet-Bangkok. 
35
 The six countries are Cambodia, China (Yunnan), Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
36
 Hing & Tuot, "Pro-Poor Tourism," p. 34. Post-1993 government economic reforms allowed for the 
quick absorption of FDI, generating dramatic growth in garments and tourism (Chea & Sok, "Integrating 
Cambodia's Economy into the World," p. 54). 
37
 World Bank, Cambodia at the Crossroads, p. 29. Tourism is the major contributor to growth in the 
services sector and second only to the garment industry in boosting economic growth (Royal Cambodian 
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Government, National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010, p. 56). CDRI, using its own data combined 
with that received from government ministries, offers slightly lower totals for tourist arrivals than the 
official numbers from the Tourism Ministry—323,000 in 1998; 412,000 in 1999; 515,000 in 2000; and 
662,000 in 2001—but still acknowledges a 30 percent increase in arrivals from 2000 to 2001 (Sok & Sarthi, 
Annual Economic Review 2002, pp.21-22). 
38
 Hing & Tuot, "Pro-Poor Tourism," p. 33. Analysts from CDRI, Economic Institute of Cambodia, and 
World Bank all suggest caution when evaluating domestic tourism numbers, as the figures are difficult to 
count with certainty and definitions vary. The World Bank defines a Cambodian tourist as a person who 
travels more than 10 miles and spends money during the trip (World Bank, Halving Poverty by 2015?, p. 
69). 
39
 Chea & Keat, Statement at the Joint Annual Discussion, p. 5. 
40
 The ADB has consistently argued that the Cambodian economy needs to move away from its dependence 
on garments and tourism for economic growth (ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2006, pp. 192,195; 
idem, Asian Development Outlook 2007, pp. 202,205; idem, Asian Development Outlook 2008, pp. 195, 
197-198). 
41 
The overall effect on GDP was softened by an agricultural rebound that year (IMF, Cambodia: 2004 
Article IV Consultation, pp. 9-10). 
42
 Sok & Sarthi, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2002, p. 22. Ballard notes that up to 70 percent of 
the income generated by tourism leaves the country (The Impact of the Tourism Industry in Siem Reap on 
the People Who Live in Angkor Park, pp. 2,19-20). 
43
 A senior government official cited in Kanmwerayotin, "Show Us The Money." As the industry and 
country develop, greater "spin-off benefits" would fall on the Cambodians. It is important to observe that 
the growth in tourism (as well as garments) has been less determined by government policies and 
management and more a result of favorable happenstance. As the World Bank notes, "weak formal 
institutions and excessive, unclear and overlapping regulations impose very high costs (formal and 
informal) on households and firms attempting to do business in Cambodia" (World Bank, Halving Poverty 
by 2015?, p. 57). What the bank does not analyze is the ways in which politically/socially well-cOnnected 
firms can more easily navigate the economic landscape than (foreign) firms that require formal and 
transparent market mechanisms in order to compete. Thus, Cambodia's patronage system works as a buffer 
(or rebuff) to the foreign companies who are typically more capable of rapidly deploying and maintaining 
services on a major scale. The World Bank approaches this issue in terms of "good governance," endemic 
corruption, and the persistence of a post-conflict state apparatus or "'perverse' forms of social capital," 
rather than the re-assertion or endurance of pre-war social relations (World Bank, Halving Poverty by 
2015?, chap. 7, particularly pp. 131-139,141-147,148-151). Thus, a weak state is analyzed in terms of 
its difficulty in creating a favorable investment climate with legal guarantees that promote efficiency and 
accountability. 
44
 Hing & Tuot, "Pro-Poor Tourism: Siem Reap Case Study," p. 36. Tourism created 5,000 jobs in 2001, 
growing to 65,000 total (Sok & Sarthi, Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2002, pp. 35-36). "The 
argument against tourism as far as social capital is concerned is that tourism exploits freely and profits from 
the output of social capital but seems to reciprocate poorly" (Mingsam, "Tourism: Blessings for all?," p. 
4
 Hing & Tuot, "Pro-Poor Tourism," p. 36. "As is well-documented, garment manufacturing and tourism 
services are concentrated in urban areas, and both sectors, driving Cambodia's growth in the last decade, 
are intensive in unskilled labor" (World Bank, Sharing growth: equity and development in Cambodia, p. 
49). It is important to highlight that although Angkor Wat has been the primary engine of the country's 
tourism draw, its home province of Siem Reap ranked the third poorest in the country in 2004 (World 
Bank, Halving Poverty by 2015?" p. 2). 
46
 Ballard, "Linking Tourism to Poverty Reduction," p. 87. This is further confirmed by the Economic 
Institute of Cambodia study for the World Bank on communes surrounding Siem Reap town (World Bank, 
Halving Poverty by 2015?," p. 71). 
47
 CDRI reports demonstrate how social relations mediate participation in the labour market. One tells how 
a relative's job at a large hotel became a gateway for other family members (whose village was connected 
to town via good roads) to assume various jobs at the hotel (Hing & Tuot, "Pro-Poor Tourism," p. 53). 
Conversely, another shows how information on disreputable construction firms (e.g., which failed to pay its 
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employees as work neared completion) circulates among job-seekers (Ballard, "Linking Tourism to Poverty 
Reduction," pp. 87-88). Ballard stresses proximity as well as social networks, which he describes as a 
means to navigate bribes and middlemen that lead to jobs {The Impact of the Tourism Industry in Siem 
Reap on the People Who Live in Angkor Park, pp. 8-9). 
48
 Ballard, "Linking Tourism to Poverty Reduction," pp. 90-92. "The failure of Siem Reap's fanners to 
meet the hotels' and restaurants' demand for food has fairly prosaic, production-side problems; small land 
holdings, and often poor soil, a lack of water control infrastructure, and difficulties getting produce to the 
town in good condition have all made it hard for local farmers to compete with cheaper imports from 
Thailand and Viet Nam" (World Bank, Halving Poverty by 20157? p. 71). 
49
 Although it has not been directly stated as such, the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area fits well with 
the pro-poor tourism development program that seeks to strengthen linkages between historic tourist 
attractions and their rural communities (ADB, The Greater Mekong Subregion Tourism Sector Strategy, p. 
44). Further, the Anlong Veng project bolters and participates in the diversification of Cambodian tourism 
as a modern historic site as well as a midway point on the path to Prassat Preah Vihear. The transfer of 
skills is perhaps largely limited to the training of tour guides by the Department of Tourism's Working 
Group on Anlong Veng. Agricultural linkages were perhaps most secure when the remote location was 
dependent on local and provincial produce; the border opening in November 2003 creates the opportunity 
for more visitors and greater consumption/trade of Cambodian goods, but it also allows the budding 
tourism project to become underwritten by foreign goods and services, as has been the case in Siem Reap. 
50
 In my own travels in 1998 (to Ratanakiri via Kratie and Stung Treng), our convoy came across an 
abandoned NGO vehicle full of supplies; locals said the driver, a Khmer, had been abducted by bandits 
within an hour of our arrival on the scene. 
51
 The NGOs, Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC) and European 
Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (EU ASAC), have been the 
prominent actors in reducing the surplus of weaponry. The organizations estimate the number of 
outstanding weapons in an area, assess the area's development needs, and make commitments to fulfilling 
these needs based on the number of weapons surrendered. Dispossessed weapons are amassed in grand 
incineration events, known as "flames of peace." JSAC's first collection ceremony in Anlong Veng was 
held on 12 June 2003. 
52
 Oum & Sok, Cambodia Economic Watch, p. 13 (emphasis added). 
53
 Two other related sites, which have served the tourist, educational, and remembrance goals, are omitted 
in this directive to preserve, and these are the already-well-established Toul Sleng Museum of Genocidal 
Crime and the Choeung Ek Killing Fields. 
54
 "The curriculum on Khmer Rouge history provided by the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
Ministry of Education... was a political tool designed to mainly justify the Vietnamese presence in 
Cambodia. Children from grade one and up were taught via textbooks to hate and fear the Khmer Rouge" 
(Dy, Genocide Education in a Global Context, pp. 12-13). 
55
 Minister of Information Khieu Kanharith has asserted that the removal of instruction on the Pol Pot years 
was effected following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords; he claims it was the international community's 
distaste for the use of the term genocide that prompted the government to cease instruction on the Khmer 
Rouge (Prak & Wasson, "KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum," p. 2). 
56
 Unmacht, "Unveiling a dark chapter in Cambodia's past," p. 13; Pin, "Prime Minister Orders Recall of 
Textbooks," p. 15; Prak & Wasson, "KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum," pp. 1-2. The 
chapter's content was based largely on the personal experiences of the six members of the Ministry of 
Education's committee tasked with addressing the DK period, members who considered themselves to be 
"living documents" not in need of much source material. (A previous textbook from 2000 to 2001, 
covering the 1953-1998 period, gave scant attention to the Khmer Rouge; as well, the CPP victory in 1998 
was included, but FUNCINPEC's victory in the UNTAC-sponsored election was not, provoking charges of 
bias from the royalists.) 
57
 Woodsome, "Schools Get Book on KR," p. 1. The book recounts the memories of a girl (age five to 
eight) during DK: the gradual break-up of her family, the execution of her father (a major in Lon Nol's 
army), and the harsh conditions of life in a child labour camp. 
58
 Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport, Minutes of the Meeting on the Review of the Draft of 
"A History of Democratic Kampuchea"; Kinetz, "In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the Khmer 
Rouge," p. A14; Kinetz & Yun, "Textbook on KR Spotlights Cambodia's History Wars," pp. 1-2. DC-
Cam had anticipated this review by the government, even four years before, when the work first 
commenced. Much of the debate about the presentation of this period in history has focused on interpretive 
bias, fears of propagandizing, as well as implied culpability (for the ex-CPK members who are the 
country's current leaders). In order not to offend political sensibilities and stir controversy, Khamboly's 
descriptions take great pains to state facts using neutral language. For example, rather than claiming the 
Vietnamese "liberated" or "invaded" Cambodia in 1979, he simply states that they "fought their way into" 
the country and "helped to create a new regime in Phnom Penh" (Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea 
(1975-1979), p. 2; Kinetz & Yun, "Textbook on KR Spotlights Cambodia's History Wars," pp. 2, 61). In 
the ministry's review of Dy's work, participants critiqued the 11-chapter work for: exceeding the 1975— 
1979 time frame (e.g., describing the development of CPK thought out of ICP anti-colonial struggle); not 
waiting the "60 years" that is required for a fact to become history; the mention of individual names; the 
excessive length of the account; possible affects on a nascent climate of peace; preponderance of author's 
opinion; the style not being in accordance with a pedagogical methodology; and the 
inconsistency/differences on statistics (e.g., the toll). 
59
 Museum and memorial sites gain increased importance in this absence, especially for imparting a 
national narrative (discussed below). 
60
 The thoughts of a leader of a local rights group told in Kinetz, "In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the 
Khmer Rouge," p. A14. 
61
 Chhang Youk quoted in Prak & Wasson, "KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum," p. 2. 
62
 Etcheson's treatment of this new phenomenon follows a distinction between knowing about the past and 
believing it: while children are very aware of the stories, events, and figures from the DK period, they 
simply do not believe that it happened (Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 2). 
63
 "This preservation-for-education practice sees remains, objects and sites—'primary' artifacts—as 
capable of instructing and unifying the society around knowledge of what has come before" (Hughes, 
Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia, p. 271). 
64
 The high command at the Ministry of National Defense divides the country's army into five military 
regions and a number of autonomous infantry brigades. Region 4 is headquartered in Siem Reap; it 
includes Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey, and Preah Vihear Provinces. 
65
 Anlong Veng is saturated with various military groupings, most of which are subdivisions within, or 
reporting to, RCAF Region 4. Other specialty forces, such as the gendarmerie, also operate in the area. 
The complex military arrangement in Anlong Veng is addressed below. 
66
 These databases are accessible on line from Yale University's CGP website: www.yale.edu/cgp. 
67
 Cook describes this effort as the "attempt to capture and record, using all extant sources of information, 
the full scope of an episode of state violence aimed at destroying a particular group" ("Documenting 
Genocide: Lessons from Cambodia for Rwanda," p. 225). There appears to be a teleo logical vision 
underlying the "complete account of genocide"—in a single data structure and using "the best of 
ethnographic, historical, and forensic research methods"—that suggests proper documentation and 
understanding will lead to the prevention of genocide (p. 234). The scientist imaginary of Harff and Gurr 
seeks to gather "systematic information on the universe of episodes" of genocide/politicide in order to 
"develop convincing multivariate theories of the phenomena" (Harff & Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of 
Genocides and Politicides," p. 360). 
68
 The Ministry of Tourism holds a copy of the 174-page transcript of these interviews in Khmer. 
69
 Youk has made two trips to Anlong Veng, in January and August of 2002. One of the problems he has 
had is that the sites are too close on the map; he has asked some local experts to enlarge the map. At die 
time, he was needed to work out some small linguistic issues in the translation and transliteration of Khmer 
names of sites into English. 
70
 Youk maintained correspondence with Thong Khon through Ros Ren, Undersecretary of State at the 
Ministry of Tourism (who worked at the Ministry of Culture during the 1980s). Ros Ren is very involved 
with the information garnered from DC-Cam and the circular issued by Hun Sen. 
71
 Another, perhaps more cynical, view might argue that the memorialization of Anlong Veng is simply an 
alibi for the extraction of resources (material or ideological). I examine different aspects of this perspective 
below, specifically with regard to the opportunities opened up by the project as well as its potential for 
constituting a different form of Khmer Rouge "trial." 
72
 Youk has had some less than satisfying interactions with government officials seeking to represent 
Cambodia's war legacy for tourists. DC-Cam was contacted by the War Museum in Siem Reap, because 
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the center had discovered a big gun in Mondulkiri, left there since 1962. Youk's organization instructed 
the museum that it would have to study the object, not just put the object in the museum. DC-Cam ended 
up doing the study for them (see Chuong, "Reminders from the Bombing at Dak Dam"). He has also 
shared openly this criticism of the Tourism Ministry and Minister Veng Sereyvuth (letters to the editor of 
the Cambodia Daily). 
73
 Among mid-level government officials affiliated with the Anlong Veng project, it seems that the priority 
of accuracy in the representation of Khmer Rouge political life in Anlong Veng may be a reaction to or 
correction of the "distortions" of history that dominated the Democratic Kampuchea period. Whatever one 
wants to claim about history as simulation, the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were engaged in 
successive historical (re-)constructions according to a political program and driven primarily by interests of 
expedience and mass control. Thus, it is a fairly simple observation that those involved in the re-
representation of the Khmer Rouge, being aware of and/or having endured its distortions, would be quite 
interested in presenting a history that is corroborated by evidence, facts, and the like. This concern may 
also guide the actions/ thoughts (not necessarily consciously) of former Khmer Rouge soldiers living in 
Anlong Veng. (However, I also wonder if the rigorous methods for the accurate representation of history 
might also derive from, or be an extension of, a residual Marxist-Leninist revolutionary praxis: a correct 
assessment of situations that is tested in the realm of practice, a methodology that seems to be in operation 
in information-gathering in the district.) The director of DC-Cam has noted the government's cowardice in 
approaching those with the most reliable (and thus "accurate") knowledge—the living Khmer Rouge cadre: 
Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan—instead relying on the "vague memories" of villagers that had only 
peripheral involvement with the historical sites. Late in my fieldwork stay, I attempted to interview Ta 
Mok. Captured in 1999, the one-legged general was imprisoned at a military base in the Boeng Keng Kong 
Quarter of Phnom Penh. His jailed residence was in fact only four or five blocks from my flat on the south 
side of Tuol Sleng. I had completed a significant amount of preparation, including much photographic 
material for Ta Mok's review, which touched on earlier methodological inspirations. However, the attempt 
was short-lived, (knowingly) in vain, and ultimately unsuccessful. Rather than seek approval from above, 
which I felt would be futile and also draw too much attention to the issue of privileged informants and 
freely-floating foreigners, I chose to greet the gatekeeper. I approached the checkpoint at the entryway 
where I was flagged by a guard. I asked about Ta Mok's confinement at this location and how one might 
go about gaining access. The guard refused to acknowledge anyone's whereabouts and suggested that I 
remove myself from the premises. Further questions made him more uncomfortable, but certainly not 
hostile; following theater of the absurd non sequitur dramatics, it became apparent that we were (not) in 
dialogue over access that could (not) be granted to a person/place that could (not) be confirmed. 
Concluding our interlocutionary non-encounter (a la Ionesco's La Cantatrice Chaitve), the dutiful sentry 
refused to accept any materials that might go to any unconfirmed inmate who may or may not be within the 
confines of the military base, and we each returned to our normalized routines. 
74
 Departing the capital too long after sunrise to make a well-lit journey, I was caught motorcycling through 
the sandy national route in the dark. Ruts, now invisible, and a smudge-dusted and bug-blotted visor 
complicated my involvement with apparitions emerging from the blackness—pedestrians and bicyclists. 
Slower speeds and last-minute swerving to miss these wandering locals were the constant reminders to 
always depart the capital earlier. Bugs, attracted by the headlight and finding their way into my eyes, and 
large cargo carriers (not affected by my headlight) added to my self-imposed travel punishment and my 
own amazement at how I arrive safely at my Cambodian destinations. I took the opportunity to ruminate 
on every possible fear that my neurotic intellect could conjure: getting robbed by bandits, breaking down in 
the dark, riding off the road (which almost-happened frequently), getting run over, running over someone, 
animal attack... the list grew longer and more pathetic as my mind was allowed to wander. I arrived in 
Siem Reap filthy and exhausted, a scene that would be repeated numerous times throughout my research 
efforts. I sought rest with my friend Dara at his restaurant. Having been well looked after by Khmers 
during my travels through their country in the past, I was comforted by seeing a familiar face after a 
harrowing evening expedition. Conversing with Dara about his personal and work life afforded a glimpse 
into the feel of tourist development in the environs of Cambodia's primary draw. Dara tells me that the 
business at his eatery has decreased even though national statistics on visitors to Siem Reap show a 
dramatic increase; he knows of at least four restaurants that recently had to close. He believes that food 
establishments have been hit hard because more and more guesthouses are offering breakfast and lunch 
included with a room; accommodation taxes are based on occupancy, but restaurants are taxed at a set rate, 
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which had doubled in the previous year. My input consisted mainly of a suggestion to form an association 
of restaurant and business owners to collectively address the shared concerns of entrepreneurs trying to 
profit from the country's resurgence of tourism. 
Khemarak had hoped for us to meet some former Khmer Rouge in Siem Reap before we headed to 
Anlong Veng. After a two-day delay and numerous phone calls back and forth, the meeting did not 
materialize, and I was basically left with two days to spend amongst the tourists. I wasted no time in 
contracting a stomach intruder, giardia, which seems to happen with a certain regularity with my bodily 
immersion in Cambodia. While the medication (metronidazole) is readily available at all the small 
pharmacies and the treatment is fairly simple, one contraindication, alcohol, can be difficult to explain to 
your Khmer hosts. 
About 60 km before Anlong Veng, the moto and I got up close and personal with the red groundcover. 
Believing the beaten track to have bravely bore the passage of heavier traffic, my mighty speed manifested 
a minor error. After traversing a bridge, the moto veered into deep loose laterite that would not allow any 
quick maneuvers and ultimately threw me to the ground. My corporeal arrival in Anlong Veng was marred 
by a bloody scrape down my arm and cuts on my hands. A minor injury, but avoiding infection became a 
priority after earlier incidents. (My two previous extended stays in Cambodia had concluded with moto-
inflicted injuries that got infected: a slow motion head-on collision at the intersection of two boulevards in 
Phnom Penh cut open the top of my foot, and a sudden stop on loose rock on the road to Battambang ended 
in an incision in my thigh; both gouges progressed to infection.) 
77
 The significance of October 23 refers to the date of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, that 
officially ended the civil war between the Vietnamese-backed government (PRK) and the exiled forces of 
Son Sann's republican KPNLF, Sihanouk's royalist FUNCINPEC, and the strongest faction, the ousted 
DK. 
78
 The saga about "Chhony" and "Khemarak" not being familiar to those being questioned, was another 
testament to how little used are proper names. I had heard stories from Khmers that they have gone their 
whole lives not knowing the name of someone with whom they have spent significant time, because the 
person was always called "uncle" (pou a or om H) or "older sibling" (bang ufc). Often, in lieu of the proper 
moniker, only a nickname is known. However, the exception tends to be people in positions of authority; 
logically, the helpful neighbors knew the name of the assistant district chief, but I wrote off the kids' 
(feigned?) non-understanding as suspicion of the foreigner or simply poor pronunciation on my part. In the 
end, Dom Chhony's residence would be where I cast my lot for my many stays in the field. Khemarak also 
stayed at October 23, as his regular residence lay 100 km away in the provincial capital of Samraong. He 
made irregular visits to Anlong Veng, and his (impending) presence provided the opportunity to replay the 
name game. Since his given appellation was unknown to most, I came to know about him as Lauk Thak 
(roughly translated as Mr. Chubby), or people would simply describe him as the heavyset Chinese-looking 
guy. And while most people called me Lauk Thy (tnnn S from GHMJ or SHE), i.e., Mr. T (the American 
popular icon being unfamiliar to my acquaintances), Khemarak preferred the two-syllable abbreviation of 
my name: (maussy HMJ), auditorially falling between "mousey" (like a rodent) and Maussy (like someone 
interested in gift exchange). 
79
 Like many scientific neologisms, the Khmer word follows a similar etymological derivation to the 
English compound: ai = nara (Sanskrit, Pali) = man, person, comparable to anthropos (Greek); ItiVfoji = 
vijja/vidya (Pali/Sanskrit) = knowledge, science comparable to logos, word, thought, science. 
(Anthropology, alternately spelled Bifinjjjj, draws from the Sanskrit sastra, knowledge, science, education.) 
The Khmer word is so unusual the topic received added attention whenever it would arise in my Khmer 
lessons, in the US and Cambodia. I stayed clear of even more technical (recondite, academic) terminology 
that would draw on even lesser-known Pali and Sanskrit elements: for example, ethnography 
(cheatpontosastr tfinngMi|iji),ya/i (Sanskrit, Pali) birth + bandha (Sanskrit, Pali) bond, connection + sastra 
(Sanskrit). Because "anthropology" was so rarely understood, I would explain that my studies were similar 
to sociology (sdngkumvichea M^HJIJI), archaeology (boraanvortovichea untuiffflgi), or history (brdvoattisastr 
tufgMijM). 
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At the time of my arrival in Anlong Veng, the town had four establishments that could be properly 
labeled as restaurants (phochneathaan tmt3sragia), while lesser eateries {haangbay tmtitnm) also populated 
the main drag, and small food stalls filled the perimeter of the market. Numerous snack and drink stands 
also cropped up along the roads leading in/out and through town. The number of business establishments 
grew over time and space, the restaurants growing the town toward the mountain and the provincial capital. 
Upon my arrival, the restaurants proper included: Mohaleap ("Great Fortune"), Thour Thea ("Well-off," 
but also the compounded names of the owners' two daughters), Chumnor Tracheak ("Cool Breeze"), and 
Dara Raksmey ("Starlight"). 
81
 Given the use of food consumption as a venue for project updates, this guest was treated to a number of 
specialty dishes only available in the country's hinterland, including stew of black soft-shelled tortoise 
(Trionyx ornatus/Amyda cartilaginea) (sdmld kdntheay MHtimtu), stir-fried monitor lizard (Varanus 
nebulosus) (chaa trdkuot SJIIHRH), and raw chevrotain (Tragulus pygmaeus) venison salad (phlea sach 
chhlous giMiBunM). 
82
 Sophorn's relationship to Ta Mok might be more accurately described as "fostering" (chinhchoem %ma) 
since his being raised and supported (as the Khmer term indicates) did not afford him a kin relationship. 
(Adoption, in a strict sense, would entitle one to inheritance of property, name, etc.) However, given the 
high status of his birthparents, his position as a son "raised by Ta Mok" may have been more a case of his 
parents lending their son to a leader who they liked and respected. Ebihara's discussion of the forms of 
extended family and the various ways children are "adopted," or come to live in a household, confirms this 
possibility (Ebihara, Svay, pp. 136-137n2). Her work identifies: formal (legal) and informal (socially 
recognized) adoptions; "guardianship," where more or less permanent residence in the home does not carry 
the status of adoptee; "lending"/"borrowing" between families, when a child is sent to live with an affluent 
kinsman for a time but maintains ties with the parents; and "amiable unions" (thoa HH)—"a fictive kin 
relationship" (sometimes translated as "god-" parent)—that arise from a shared sense of closeness, which 
can result from a variety of circumstances (e.g., a friend in an unfamiliar setting that helps one navigate the 
surroundings, one's best friend's parents, etc.) but do not follow the residence patterns associated with 
adoption (pp. 177-180). Sophorn is certainly aware that claiming to be the adopted son of Ta Mok carries 
a certain currency, which he has obviously used to his advantage in the Tourism Department as well as 
among tourists and other visitors. 
831 had hoped to interview Sophorn's father, but during the years I was there, Sophorn always said that his 
father wanted to remain private. I wondered if Sophorn might have felt the threat of being upstaged by his 
more famous and more accomplished progenitor. 
84
 Corfield and Summers mention four sons of Ta Mok, all of which became CPK members in Takeo 
Province, but they do not mention their fates {Historical Dictionary of Cambodia, p. 408); this account 
perhaps confuses the fact that Ta Mok was the eldest of four sons, and his younger brothers occupied 
ranking positions within the CPK at the district and commune levels. My informants, including two of Ta 
Mok's daughters, do not mention any sons. The account of Mok's sister, Ung Poun, states that Ta Mok had 
four daughters with his wife, Uk Khoem (Sann Kalyann, "I only want justice," p. 7). Meas Muth (Khe 
Muth) was a prominent figure in Tramkok District during DK and headed Sector 1003 with Ta Mok in the 
Dangrek Mountains after 1989; he currently holds the rank of general in the RCAF, having defected in 
December 1998. He is considered a candidate for prosecution (as Meah Mut), because of his knowledge 
and involvement in purges of CPK members (Tittemore & Heder, Seven Candidates for Prosecution, pp. 
99-113). 
85
 Of the memories he shared, he recalls many people having been killed under orders from Ta Mok. 
Sophorn knew some of the executing soldiers but not all of the victims. Ta Mok had believed there were 
traitors (tSafijfl) working with Hun Sen. Sophorn states that many traitors were killed, and he specifically 
remembered one incident where five monks were killed. In 1994, he saw the monks in a car on the way to 
Prey Kuoy tpi ROJ—a place he described as a "killing field," (on the north side of the road to Trabaing 
Prassat District)—and he heard the gunshots. He was aware that this information was sensitive, and that 
some people did not want to tell newspapers about the killings because they are scared. DC-Cam believes 
a "killing field" site containing 3,000 bodies, dating from 1993 to 1997, sits 6 km from Anlong Veng town 
(Rowley, Second Life, Second Death, p. 214). 
86
 Kevin's English capacity was partially self taught and partially grew out of his own determination and 
diligence. His earliest translation work occurred with his embrace of Christianity, when a pastor hired him 
to help translate sermons to potential converts in Kampong Chhnang. 
87
 The use of the term "new people" (neak thmei gnS) is deliberate, to highlight a "re-occupation" of Khmer 
Rouge territory by the non-Communist urban-oriented folk of which the Khmer Rouge had attempted to rid 
the country (or harshly assimilate) in the 1970s. 
88
 My Khmer was sufficient enough that I could understand when the question was misunderstood; I tried 
not to push the issue too much—asking the same question over and over again—as keeping things light-
hearted seemed the Cambodian priority. Typically, I Would ask a question in Khmer, and Kevin would 
rephrase with some grammatical "corrections" for the informant. Often, it seemed that only word order 
was being re-arranged, a modification Mme. Bora suspiciously described as the change necessary to 
transform my urbane (Phnom Penh) language into rural (uneducated) speech. 
89
 This was certainly the case in his establishment of an office as well as design of entry tickets; it also 
became apparent how those residing in Anlong Veng and involved in the project must/do wait for the 
mysterious figure to appear before proceeding. 
90
 Individuals at the district level are involved with any and all ministerial endeavors in the area by 
definition. I had developed a list of simple questions that I would use as a springboard into further 
investigation of the lives, stories, and worldviews of my informants. The informant sample of district, 
commune, and military was composed almost exclusively of former Khmer Rouge soldiers who migrated 
to Anlong Veng as they were fighting the government. (This very systematic approach to the informant 
sample deviated widely from the experimental methodological concerns I had proposed in "Following 
in/of/as Para-Sites.") With the defections and reintegration process, the government doled out local 
governmental positions based on rank within Ta Mok's hierarchy; thus, the higher an individual was in the 
DK army or political structure, the higher the official is today. After the openness of conversations with 
Sophorn earlier, I was a bit surprised by the guarded answers provided during my first interview with an 
assistant district chief. After scant biographical information, I was asked my purpose for wanting to know. 
I informed the respondent that I wanted to know a bit about the people I was interviewing, but that he was 
not obligated to answer all my questions. At that point, he asked that there be no more questions about his 
life. Although I had thought that this would become a recurrent problem, informants' suspicion of my 
purpose was quite rare and principally confined to the offspring of Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan. 
91
 After the initial stint in Anlong Veng, Khemarak took me on tour: to witness market activity 
(smuggling), towering casinos, and karaoke in the border town of O Smach; to consume specialty jungle 
feasts involving water fowl and red ants; to join in a rain dance at Prum Keul Temple in drought-plagued 
Chong Kal District; to take in the official and unofficial tourist happenings in Oddar Meanchey's provincial 
capital of Samraong. 
92
 A couple bridges on this fine route were still under construction in 2002. 
93
 The entrance to Anlong Veng via Route 67 was changed toward the end of conflict in 1999. The road 
had previously cut east on the northern outskirt of Prey S'aat, run past the old airstrip, and joined the 
district closer to Thlat Commune. A dilapidated 100-meter bridge has rendered the old access unsuitable in 
all but the driest of months. 
94
 The claim to resolving the initial land disputes was confirmed by many informants of various socio-
economic strata: for the most part, returnees either received the land they had worked prior to fleeing, they 
were given new (equivalent) land, or they were compelled to purchase their land back. However, new land 
concerns began to erupt during my stay. In addition to property speculation, which soared with the 
November 2003 opening of the border at Choam Pass, the Tourism Ministry's museum plans fomented 
land security worries (see below, the guided narrative around Ta Mok's sawmill and the Son Sen family 
grave). 
95
 These are the same "monuments" that mark Ta Mok's history in the area; that is, the sites cited as 
manifestation of development were also the accomplishments that constitute the DK rebirth to victory 
narrative. 
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 The social priorities reverberate in the names of the post-1999 founded communities: Development 
(kphivoat HHISJJS), Peace (Sdntepheap Msmn), Unity (Aekdpheap Onmn) Villages. 
97
 The common translation of this word is "heart," as the seat of emotion. However, the term (from 
Sanskrit/Pali citta) actually conveys a wide range of meanings, including: feeling, emotion; will; intention; 
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thought, opinion, mind. It is the root in character traits such as generous (chett I'or Sfifg), honest/reliable 
(chett trdng SfUfttJ), dispassionate {chett dach Sfiflis), two-faced (chettpiir Bgfit), and malevolent (chett aa-
krdk GBHitfiti). It also forms the basis for psychology (chett-sastr BgMijft)), philosophy of art (chett-vichea 
GgJtfi), and moral conscience (moneaksikaar kaangplauv chett HSMmisiatjfBfj). 
98
 The multiplicity of potential "museums" arose with various informants: Ta Mok's ancient artifact 
museum, the district chiefs tourism effort, and the Ministry/Department of Tourism's historical-tourist 
area (itself a subject of multiple reflections). This refraction of the museum idea is discussed below. 
99
 Importantly, the chief of Anlong Veng Commune had received formal notice from the governor's office 
that an historical museum was being planned, but he remained unaware of which sites would be included, 
who would implement it, how it would impact the commune, or what measures he might take to be 
involved. 
100
 In reality, the Dangrek Mountains areas—Choam Pass, Darm Chrey, Kbal Tonsaong—are secured by 
two RCAF companies (see below), and thus the benefits of this chiefs communal administration do not 
apply. 
This leader reported that in Thlat Commune there are no places concerning important things during the 
Khmer Rouge period, but it had a very small, ancient temple, which was a place for devoted Buddhists to 
go meditate and achieve a pure heart. However, it is now broken down with stones scattered about. Thlat 
is also home to the pagoda that houses Ke Pauk's remains. 
102
 The commune chief had claimed to have been contacted in May 2002 by a representative from the US 
Army, who expected US$5 million to be allocated for the completion of the dam and repair of the road. 
With management from the provincial governor and the Department of Water Resources, he was interested 
in helping to build lakeside dayhouses for tourists as well as providing boats for waterplay in the reservoir. 
103
 One manifestation of this presence is the groups of personnel—ciwies-clad or in partial uniform, armed 
with K-59 handguns or sometimes AK-47s, and engaged in heavy drinking—who populate the local eating 
establishments, roadside snack shacks, and karaoke clubs from dusk to late night. 
104
 RCAF Region 4 is one of the country's five military regions (phoumipheak JjSfiifi), which are 
geographically arranged and report to the Ministry of National Defense. Military Region 4 covers four 
provinces: Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, and Preah Vihear. It has three subordinate 
groups. First, there are four sub-provincial military operations, one for each province (and named 
accordingly); the Oddar Meanchey sub-provincial operation is located in Samraong, under the command of 
Mok Sovann. Second, Region 4 oversees three brigades: 41 (Samraong), 42 (Phnom Kulen), and 43 
(Lumtong). Third, the military region oversees three regiments that are stationed along the Thai-
Cambodian border from O Smach to Preah Vihear: 401 (Preah Vihear), 402 (O Smach), and 403 (O Ongrey 
in Trabaing Tauv Commune). At the Anlong Veng base, the commanders in charge are (in order of chain 
of command): Col. Heom Sean, Front Region High Commander; Col. Ho Kruy, Deputy Front Region High 
Commander; Brig. Gen. Yim Peum (former Khmer Rouge), High Commander of Brigade 43. 
105
 In order to tour two specific areas along the escarpment, I required the permission from this lieutenant 
colonel. Mountain 200, the site of a munitions factory and marked with a Tourism Ministry sign, was 
closed to all unauthorized traffic; given its official standing in the museum and its clear standing inside 
Cambodian territory, its shuttering (to those without proper papers) likely arose from the dramatic clearing 
efforts—the uprooting of all trees and vegetative matter—along the path leading to the factory foundations. 
The second site, Pass 808, required military approval and escort because the mountain paths that led to this 
undesignated historical area traversed territory where the border was not yet cleared demarcated/agreed; 
without a guide, an unfamiliar traveler could very easily end up deep in Thailand's Sisaket Province 
without knowing it. 
106
 Division 2 is one of seven military divisions (kdngporl thom natitUG) which are functionally arranged and 
report directly to the Ministry of National Defense. Divisions should be composed of 8,000 to 10,000 
troops, with each division divided into three functional battalions (artillery, tanks, and anti-aircraft); these 
should include three platoons per battalion, numbering 100 to 120 people each. The historical issue of 
whether Cambodia's adequately fills its rank designations with the requisite number of troops, especially in 
the war between government forces and those of the Khmer Rouge, has been addressed by a number of 
analysts (Carney, "The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance in Cambodia," pp. 189-190, 
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201-202; Peschoux, Les «Nouveau» Khmers Rouges Enquete (1979-1990), pp. 84-88,120-122,126-130). 
My informant in Anlong Veng confirmed that what numbers should constitute larger military units may not 
concur with the actual status of forces, echoing Peschoux's suggestion that "iV ne s 'agit la que d'effectlfs 
theoriques. 11 est douteux en effet qu 'aucune des grandes divisions [kdngporl thorn natituii] de I 'ANKD 
[NADK] atteigne reellement 10 700 hommes" (Peschoux, p. 121). 
107
 The security hierarchy is geographically enumerated along the south side of the road (from west to east): 
Anlong Veng Police Headquarters (provincial and district, general and tourist), District Office (across the 
street from the houses of the district chief and two of his assistants), RCAF Region 4 District Headquarters, 
and the Gendarmerie District Headquarters. (This last site sits across the road from the radio 
communication center, ICOM "TO 50," which was the government's operation command post for the final 
offensive against Ta Mok's forces in 1999.) This helm of district authority is concentrated just east of the 
town's endowed roundabout. 
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 The descending chain of police command follows: Gen. Hok Lundy, the notorious National Police 
Commissioner at the Ministry of Interior; the provincial police chief (in Samraong); Maj. Pov Ri, deputy 
director of provincial police, in charge at Anlong Veng; and Cpt. Roeun in charge of the district police 
precinct. The organization of forces, particularly the police, seems redundant, exposing a microcosm of the 
larger bureaucratic state apparatus that dominates Cambodian political and administrative spheres. In terms 
of police, at least at the outset of my research during peacetime, it seemed difficult to imagine that local 
affairs would require such a large pool of personnel. 
109
 Patrol and protection of/in Choam Pass, Damn Chrey, and Kbal Tonsaong is provided by the 150 to 200 
soldiers who compose Company 2, under the command of "La," and Company 5, under the command of 
"Rith." The military liaison with the Anlong Veng Working Group works regularly with the soldiers in 
these two companies, making frequent trips the mountain to manage their standard of living, salary, 
weapons, and the border. 
110
 Numerous examples can be cited: the Tonle Bati riverside in Takeo, the Teuk Chou rapids in Kampot, 
the mountain base at Oudong outside Phnom Penh, and the seafront at Kep. 
1111 remained in the country from January 2002 through October 2005, spending extended stays in Anlong 
Veng as well as monitoring developments there from Phnom Penh. 
112
 It is also clear that climate plays a role, although no one would cite this quotidian influence. With its 
weather pattern—something on par with Houston, but impacting a more spartan infrastructure—I 
immediately learned how torrential downpours, lasting from three to ten hours, hindered conducting 
fieldwork as well as almost all commercial activity and ministerial agendas. Roads become (temporarily) 
impassable and people simply remain in whatever location at which they were caught when the storm 
began. The monsoon season will pose a perennial problem to sustained tourist development. 
113
 Falby, "Anlong Veng: future KR Disneyland," p. 16. 
1141 harbored the perception that long absent accomplishments would materialize in a sudden manner. 
Having seen plans and projects languish previously in various parts of the country, I had witnessed break-
neck paces achieved, once a final decision had been made. 
115
 These silky {sautr tqjp) recitations at tourist sites weave threads (sautr; Sanskrit: sutra) that form a 
historical fabric, enveloping the visitor. 
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 My own (tourist) concern was how incredibly drunk this man was one afternoon, when I passed by on 
my way back from Pol Pot's grave. Half-dressed and shouting with rifle in hand, he explained to me and 
my visiting cousin that we required his permission to visit the historical sites (even though no one had been 
present when we had entered). It was unclear what he wanted us to do, now that we had broken his version 
of the rules. After about ten minutes of ranting, happenstance came to the rescue: the restaurant owner and 
military officer from Ta Mok's cliffhouse pulled up on his moto and quickly silenced the guard and ushered 
us on our way. For my own part, I was not exceptionally concerned, knowing that I had become a familiar 
face in the district and living with the family of an assistant chief who frequently looked after my well-
being. Indeed, I was a bit incredulous at how upset the drunk guard had become. However, I pondered the 
implications for residents' anticipated tourist influx, and I related these concerns to a receptive Khemarak. 
In the land of smiling Khmers, even former Khmer Rouge, visitors would be turned off by tourist 
guardianship such as I had witnessed. 
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 One of the tasks that the Ministry of Tourism (and DC-Cam) accomplished was interviewing a number 
of former Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng, garnering some biographical data and information on the 
historical sites. The interviews were sent to DC-Cam for verification and editing, and the corrected 174-
page transcript (in Khmer) resides with the ministry. I have also probed informants for biographical data. 
In the midst of an interview with one commune chief, he spontaneously offered to write down his 
"autobiography" for me. (This came in the context of giving differing impressions of Ta Mok's and Pol 
Pot's characters and actions.) The offer and the format it would take warrants notice, as "autobiography" is 
a well-established genre in Cambodia. Developing out of the Marxist-Leninist (Stalinist) tradition of "self-
criticism," this format was employed by the CPK at large group meetings as well as in the "confessions" 
acquired at S-21. The function of life stories, as a means of garnering information, shifts through various 
contexts: for purges (exposing traitors), for museum (explicating the truth), for research (evoking the 
ethnographic). 
118
 Business owners appeared interested in following the law, likely for their own protection from 
(exploitative) authorities. It is hard to know whether the licensing program was a response to a local 
concern or a high-level decision that presumed local concern and was consequently well-received. The 
licenses also operate within an established Khmer interest in credentials and documents to (officially) 
sanction their status and activities. 
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 This is on top of a district business tax of 10,000 riel per month per restaurant/guesthouse owner, which 
goes to support the district's administrative work. 
120
 This alignment is rough primarily because of the confusion around the location of Pol Pot's Secret 
House (see the guided narrative below). In addition, a number of sites that are included in the zonal listings 
are/were not part of the original sites established by the Ministry of Tourism (e.g., Khmer Rouge statues, 
Ta Mok's Mango Field, and the two radio sites). Among these are locations that are merely designations 
(some disputed) that lack any indication of historical presence, let alone a signpost. Obviously, the zone 
lists for ticketing omit some sites that have already been marked with indicators (e.g., Anlong Veng Health 
Center, Mine Factory at Mountain 200, Pol Pot's waterfall). 
121
 The idea of a foreigner {bdrortes HIIBM) typically refers to Western visitors ("French," barang tiihti), but 
can also include north Asian tourists. Especially in Anlong Veng, Thai visitors are tallied separate from the 
barang and other bdrortes. 
122
 An earlier draft of what would become the guide book, dated 25 July 2002, circulated between the 
Tourism Ministry and DC-Cam. This document forms the basis for the guided narratives below. 
123
 There is a bit of divergence of perspective on what constitutes a "museum" in Anlong Veng. Some 
folks believe the 30 or so sites (that is, the whole district) is the historical tourist area, while others believe 
that Ta Mok's lakeside residence and possibly Pol Pot's mountain house will be places that reflect a more 
traditional understanding of a curiosity cabinet housing artifacts and narratives. Although these views are 
not mutually exclusive, they did indicate a lack of consensus. 
124
 The individuals in the district appeared very interested in hawking their Khmer Rouge history so as to 
reap the economic benefits of an influx of (probably mostly Thai) tourists, on their way to Angkor Wat or 
Preah Vihear. I would venture to guess that the development of these historical tourist sites also functioned 
as a means to get Anlong Veng's border crossing to be officially opened; this would lead to even more 
lucrative benefits: "smuggling" goods into Cambodia for local (elite) consumption as well as allowing the 
Thai companies to plunder the district's timber resources (as the Thais have done with the gem resources in 
Pailin)—Cambodia exhibits a peculiar consistency in squandering its natural resources and allowing 
foreign forces to easily extract what assets the country possesses. 
125
 The lack of agreement in the works of foreign scholars on Cambodian history—Chandler, Vickery, 
Kiernan, Heder, Etcheson—attests to a similar difficulty in addressing larger periods of the Khmer Rouge 
past. 
126
 On a more practical level, even those who seem to agree on events often possessed different accounts of 
dates and times. This proved to be the case with those who are socially designated as the holders of 
historical knowledge. (The Ministry of Tourism also conducted approximately 30 interviews in 2002, 
which included some of these "designated" informants; it is unclear whether the information they garnered 
was consistent enough to produce the "accurate" account of Anlong Veng history the government sought.) 
127
 There was certainly no lack of "data" or "knowledge" to be remembered or conveyed about Anlong 
Veng; in fact, there was an overabundance of information, which appears internally conflicting and often 
subject to the political/personal goals of those relaying memories and/or those seeking to put these stories 
into a history (for public consumption). In terms of a tourist agenda, a combination of differences emerged 
in aims and perspectives. The indeterminacy of what actually would constitutes a/the "museum" underlay 
the source of variation in opinion about how the tourist endeavor will be implemented and subsequently 
benefit the local inhabitants. When money for the project becomes available to the ministry, a clear 
definition of how the sites are supposed to function as tourist destinations may be worked out. 
128
 The lack of formal involvement of commune-level officials was evidenced in their hazy visions of what 
the museum might constitute (a haziness that may have also been the product of the national government's 
lack of a clearly-defined plan). However, most local leaders and villagers recognized that Ta Mok's 
lakeside would be the central draw for tourists. 
129
 With regards to the museum structure, Khemarak ruminated that "the plan of the government is to 
follow the old style of the house and the situation there. Maybe they will make a wax statue, like the 
activity of Ta Mok working during the Pol Pot time [like at the Cambodian Cultural Village in Siem Reap]. 
They will repair and rebuild the old buildings, in the whole area, anywhere that is broken down." 
130
 The 2007 Royal Decree on the arrangement of the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area listed only 14 
places for the project (some of which included multiple sites). 
131
 Road conditions and seasonal weather largely dictated the accessibility of historical sites. Ta Mok's 
house on the lake was a facile excursion even during a monsoon; unlike almost all the other sites, the house 
provided shelter from storms. Expeditions up the escarpment (to visit Pol Pot's grave, Ta Mok's 
cliffhouse, or Pol Pot's mountain retreat) were significantly complicated by rain and road damage from 
heavy (weighty) traffic. The ascent from Cherng Phnom Village to the border crossing at Choam Pass 
could be a precarious trip in the wet season, as the rising track was composed of slick mud, jutting 
boulders, and deep tire-dug ruts, 
132
 The Thlat Commune Chief had suggested a variety of objects to display in a Khmer Rouge museum: 
mines, old Khmer Rouge weapon materials/arms, bamboo punji sticks, proverbs the Khmer Rouge used to 
tell people, other Khmer Rouge documents, Democratic Kampuchea money. The proverbs were usually 
against the Vietnamese enemy and about leadership strategy (yuthasas doeknoam mgNiTwSfiSi) and how to 
make war (e.g. "follow up, discuss, [then] take action"). In general, responses I received demonstrated an 
unrestricted creativity in the minds of (potential) participants. Someone in a position of power, who has 
some strict ideas about content, will perform the castratory act that will establish meaning out of this 
excessive jouissance—a clear vision shall emerge. 
133
 These items had yet to be gathered together, let alone out on display. The "tigers cages" were in three 
different villages spread across the district. The photographs were kept at the Ministry of Tourism office, 
and Thong Khon personally secured the videocassette. 
134
 A man who had managed documents for Ta Mok had freely shown me his photo collection in 2002. A 
year later, he was offering viewings of this same gallery to tourists for US$5. 
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 Chhang Youk, "Letter. Memory Exploitation," p. 1. 
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 The informant believed that this was only a partial list of what Ta Mok had intended to commemorate. 
Ta Mok's possession of ancient artifacts had been indicated as early as 1994; reports from the successful 
siege of Anlong Veng by RCAF forces include stories of capture of numerous antiquities (e.g., ^"'-century 
Angkorian lintels) that ensconced various parapets around Ta Mok's estates (Dodd, "High life of hated Ta 
Mok is laid bare," p. 9). 
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 Vickery's understanding of the post-DK years suggests little change in the movement even through its 
waning days at Anlong Veng. In his comments on the 1997 sentencing of Pol Pot, he says: "Peasantism 
and nationalism are still the KR themes, as they always were, and now they claim to be for liberal 
democracy and the free market... Their policies were always in principle pro-peasant, yet they severely 
damaged peasant livelihood. Now, with a small population dependent on them, and vast wealth from 
timber sales over the years, it is easy to subsidize their way into popularity among those peasants.... So far, 
their free market activity has meant stealing the national forests and selling them across the border, and if 
this is what Cambodia has to hope from them, the country might just as well stick with its current rulers. As 
for their commitment to liberal democracy, I think we may fairly disbelieve.... As for nationalism, that 
means aggravated hatred of Vietnam, which was probably the single most destructive element of DK 
policies, and the motive for most of the officially sanctioned executions" (Vickery, "A non-standard view 
of the 'coup,'" p. 11). Some of Kiernan's work has claimed that nationalist concerns overshadowed 
revolutionary goals among a Pol Pot faction, which eventually gained control of the movement; however, 
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there are a number of problems with the substance and structure of his argument, notably the ways in which 
a preoccupation with making a case for genocide crowds out other analytical factors. 
A difference in leadership style/strategy is apparent at least as early as the DK army's arrival in Anlong 
Veng (as my research suggested), if not before (as other historical texts demonstrate). Ironically, the 
demand for "accuracy" in representation will likely omit the persistent differences/contestations in points of 
view—"the museum as the spectacle's petrification of history." 
139
 Huy, "Anlong Veng Residents Believed Ta Mok did not Commit Crimes," p. 28. 
140
 The tension between the two administrative levels helps explain the district chiefs late-onset non-
cooperation with my research, especially if he identified me (as another outsider) with the Ministry of 
Tourism. The issue of whose museum and authority has most recently shifted back to memorialization 
efforts taken on by former Khmer Rouge, as Nhem Em, the S-21 photographer and a present resident of 
Anlong Veng, has stated his personal interest in creating a multi-media museum in the former stronghold. 
141
 As early as 1998, the government was conscious of the "artifact" status that Pol Pot possessions might 
carry, and it was aware that ancient antiquities might be in the Khmer Rouge's hold. To this end, the 
government deployed armed soldiers to guard the objects and sites. Clearly, some harvesting must have 
occurred, as relics, both ancient and modern, have arrived at their placepropre (appropriate; own/ed). 
142
 When he received the job, Rong Samlaut [not his real name] was promised he would be given a salary. 
When one's name is entered in the government list, the job becomes a legal position; often, the new-hire 
pays the interviewer to have the appointment registered. Rong Samlaut believed that he did not have to pay 
to get his name on the list, because he had been hired on his merits—even if one of those is being the son of 
a high commander. One of the two other tourism "employees" with whom he worked, similarly abandoned 
the work to seek gainful employment elsewhere. 
143
 From my conversations with the two individuals named Rong Samlaut, it is clear that the impostor had 
purchased the name a few months prior to the real Rong Samlaut deciding to leave his position. 
144
 In casual situations, the use of someone's proper name is concerned rude. Thus, most interactions with 
"Rong Samlaut" operate under whatever nickname by which he is called. 
145
 The local patronage network, itself a somewhat competitive milieu, is the medium or face that 
filters/absorbs (the desire for) the infusion of capital that comes with tourist development. The 
"pervasiveness of patronage" and hierarchy in Cambodian social relations constitutes one of Chandler's 
four recurring historical themes (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 2, 104-108,259n22), even as he 
acknowledges that the nature of these relations has changed over time (p. 19). Certainly, a more 
comprehensive study of Cambodian patron-client relations, specifically with regard to new (tourism) 
development endeavors is warranted, developing beyond the work begun by CDRI (Ballard, Annual 
Development Review 2006-07, pp. 190-197). Further work might tie together the "strings" (khsae tsj) of 
clients bound to a patron {me re), or "spine" (khndng §a), relations that dominate Cambodia's social 
organization and increasingly direct its political arena; additional research might also weave in 
investigations of the ideas of "corruption" and "nepotism" that have dominated (Western-oriented) 
critiques of authority at all social strata in the capital and the countryside. However, it is beyond the scope 
of this work to adequately address this vast topic. With that acknowledged, it is important to recognize 
some contemporary efforts that analyze the changing nature of patronage in Cambodia, its role in rural 
decision-making, and its inter-imbrication with the political realm. Ledgerwood and Vijghen, arguing 
against views of post-conflict atomism or a return to a pre-revolutionary state, suggest modifications to the 
classic model of patron-client relations; their work suggests an approach that addresses relations as being: 
flexible, under negotiation, rather than permanent; including, rather than in contrast to, kin relations; 
drastically unbalanced in regards to the protection/benefits provided to the client; and reflecting a 
decreased influence of Buddhism (Ledgerwood & Vijghen, "Decision-Making in Rural Khmer Villages"). 
Similarly, Marston adapts the dyadic relationship in discussing the inscription of social inequality in 
modern Cambodian hierarchical relations (Marston, Cambodia 1991-94, chap. 4). Hughes also argues for a 
modification of the traditional model of patronage (from Scott) in Southeast Asian cases, and describes the 
new character of these post-colonial and post-socialist relations (e.g., the concentration around state 
bureaucratic institutions) (Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, pp. 60-67, 70-77). 
She also examines the way in which the "strongman" figure of Hun Sen plays out through networks of 
support and how this organization of power shapes ideas about correctness versus effectiveness in 
Cambodian politics (Hughes, "'Dare to Say, Dare to Do,'" pp. 138-145). In her treatment of the specific 
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practice of gift-giving in the Cambodian political context, she asserts a more complex interplay of 
obligation and coercion, beyond the simple notion of enlisting support through material reward (Hughes, 
"The Politics of Gifts"). Un examines that ways in which the CPP has used the apparatuses of the State-
democratic institutions (particularly elections)—to deepen and extend its patron-client relations; his critique 
of the political facade asserts that the CPP's patronage strategies do not foster "genuine popular political 
participation" while they simultaneously encourage the spread of corruption (Un, "Patronage Politics and 
Hybrid Democracy"). In fact, he echoes Hughes claim that the state bureaucracy becomes "networks of 
obligation and flows of resources between officials" (Un, p. 227; Hughes, '"Dare to Say, Dare to Do,'" p. 
127). These reflections on the political aspects of new forms of patron-client relations would be benefited 
by an examination of the economic entrenchment of Hun Sen's network (for example, Heder, "Hun Sen's 
Consolidation"). Burgler, following Thion, has examined the importance of how patronage lines 
superceded political association as a basis for the wide scope of the CPK's purges: "The individual's 
political choice centres on questions of personal loyalty more than on an identification with the political 
line. Conflicts within the top leadership about general policy, ideology, the exercise of power and other 
such issues that seem purely political at that level, lose more and more of their political character and 
become more and more a question of loyalty as they descend down to the lowest echelons" (Burgler, The 
Eyes of the Pineapple, p. 124). In tracing out the nepotism of the DK years, one could highlight the 
positioning of familial folk in the DK administration and CPK hierarchy: Khieu Ponnary (Pol Pot's wife) 
who was head of DK's Women's Association; Khieu Thirith (Ieng Sary's wife) Minister of Social Action; 
Yun Yat (Son Sen's wife), Minister of Culture, Education, and Learning; Pol Pot's nephews and nieces at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ieng Sary's daughter who headed Calmette Hospital; and his niece who did 
English translation work at Radio Phnom Penh. A fuller analysis might establish a consistent social pattern 
across political regimes. 
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 On the night of 9 September 2003, the traffic of large vehicles could be heard rumbling by the October 
23 Guesthouse, perhaps coming from the direction of Trabaing Prassat. On the morning of 10 September 
2003 on the way to Cherng Phnom Village, I encountered eight or ten empty large trucks that appeared to 
be returning from on top of the mountain. These suspicions were confirmed when a business operator on 
the escarpment related (complained) that the road to the mountaintop had been badly damaged by the 
trucks, to the extent that even he (a daily traveler to and from the mountain) had a minor moto accident 
along the road. 
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 A foreigner involved in purchasing materials conveyed that merawan timber (Hopea odarata) (koki RRI) 
was selling for US$62 per cubic meter in Anlong Veng, while the same wood would sell for US$300 in 
Siem Reap town. He noted that processed and used wood were assessed differently than the fresh timber 
that was legally forbidden from crossing provincial lines. 
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 The expected arrival date of service from both network towers had been the subject of locals' ongoing 
varying estimations, with some saying "one week more" and others saying "one month"; similar guesses 
were ventured over a six-month period. While delays persisted for whatever reasons, the town's two radio 
communications centers remained the only means of contacting outside areas (besides travel by road) until 
late 2003. 
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 The CamShin tower was the first to be erected, and it resides next door (to the west) of the district 
chiefs house. The Mobitel tower is south of the newest market and on the east side of the main road 
(almost directly across the street from Mohaleap Restaurant/Guesthouse). 
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 At that time, power was supplied from 6 AM until 11 PM with two short outage periods, one in the late 
morning and one in the early evening/late afternoon. 
151
 Some shops in town offered the local purified product at 1500r for a six-pack of one-liter bottles. 
Nationally, prices for water were re-settling to 2000r after the bottling shortage following the Thai riots 
(January 2003) had been overcome. Prices for water in Anlong Veng had typically hovered around 2000r 
with some variation (2500r to 1800r) from store to store. Although the low price may have been enabled 
by a local supplier, most shops still tended to sell water from O Smach or even Samraong. 
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 Although residents perceived this new power as cheap (relative to times immediately preceding), the 
price for electricity in Anlong Veng (similar to other rural areas) was more than threefold that charged in 
Phnom Penh. 
153
 When the family at the October 23 Guesthouse acquired a television and VCD player/video game unit, 
the new gear seemed to eclipse time otherwise spent chatting with neighbors. 
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 Even as the crossing is an international border, Thais were only allowed to enter Oddar Meanchey 
Province (not Cambodia as a whole), and Khmers were only allowed to enter Sisaket Province (with passes 
issued on their respective sides). 
155
 The most intense day was the border opening when hundreds of pick-up trucks raced between the 
mountain pass and the town, stirring up a red haze of dust that lasted all day and into the evening. 
156
 The market spans both sides of the road, south to the old site of Nhoeun's house and north just beyond 
where Nov's kitchen stands in disrepair. With the greater number of resident sellers at Choam Pass also 
came an increase in the quantity of trash in the area, heaped and strewn in areas not used for selling, but 
still an unavoidable eyesore. Some of the historical sites valued for tourism potential are cordoned by long 
piles of market rubbish—an exiting (non-Trotsky ist) minority confined to a trash heap of history. 
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 A reciprocal Thai market for Khmer consumers was set up on the other side, but later reports indicated 
this plaza's existence was short-lived. 
1581 became involved in documenting some of these ills in 1999, especially the pernicious spread of 
HIV/AIDS in border areas, where a perceived lawlessness is fostered and reinforced (Wood, "Site 
Assessment Study Koh Kong, Cambodia"). Growing political attention has been given to the socio-
economic degradation that occurs with the dominance of casino enterprises at the border. (By law, 
Cambodians are not allowed entry to casinos; the venues are established on the border to provide gambling 
opportunities to visitors from Thailand, where casinos are outlawed.) In 2002, opposition members of the 
Cambodian National Assembly questioned the government regarding "the increasing crime associated with 
the thriving drug production, drug trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering industries, which 
are led by the mafia behind the facade of casinos" (Sam Rainsy Party, "Mafia and Money Extortion in 
Poipet"). This illicit activity that flourishes in the border areas, especially Poipet, and its effects on 
Cambodian governance have received international scrutiny (US Department of State, International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report—2003, vols. 1 and 2; Lintner, "Betting on The Border," pp. 53-54). 
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 One specific case, which drew my attention to the issue, was the arrest of a skirmish of youth, which 
included the son of the owners of a well-established restaurant. The kids were detained at the Gendarmerie 
base near the Anlong Veng primary school. The restaurant owner expressed her wish that they keep her 
son locked up, because his behavior had gotten out of control, he had started spending a lot of time with 
these delinquent juveniles, and more incidents were erupting. This level of parental resignation—certainly 
absent from any previous conversations—followed only five months after the border opened; a general 
sense of fear/crime was related by numerous acquaintances in that same period of social re-adjustment to 
outside influences. 
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 Precedent for new roads enabling fresh roadside enterprises for elites was established with the Prime 
Minister's 1999 directive to re-route the entry to Anlong Veng, abandoning the airstrip and founding the 
new market. 
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 Three bridges in Prey S'aat became unusable. Other bridges, which had not yet collapsed, showed 
significant signs of stress; large ruts became larger; formerly smooth sections of road grew new potholes. 
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 Even more noteworthy was the phenomenon of limited parking. So few cars had roamed the district in 
the past that the small areas in front of local eateries or guesthouses had remained spaciously open. With 
the post-peace, post-border opening, post-development vehicular inundation, the accommodation of 
patrons' transports became a daily issue. 
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 These were: the ICOM near the UNICEF office; CamShin (Oil) tower; Mobitel (012) tower; and the 
newest phone service addition, Samart (016). Along with these accomplishments in the realm of 
telecommunications, Anlong Veng offered a cable TV service, its office located on the south side of town 
(not far from a new clinic). In spite of these improvements, a connection to the internet from the former 
KR stronghold remained elusive through my departure in 2005. 
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 Like many business initiatives in Anlong Veng, the new "new market" was embroiled in some 
controversy. It seemed that the district chief had been attempting to arrange a re-vamping of Anlong 
Veng's old market, near the junction of the road to Samraong/O Smach. A number of business owners 
followed this indication, and some new shops and restaurants began to populated the area around the 
junction. However, some form of mass appeal to elite authorities in Phnom Penh allowed the newest 
market to be built in the area south of the district office. (This move marks a decreasing capacity on the 
part of the district chief to impose his will on Anlong Veng developments and, therefore, an inability to 
reap the profits from those impositions as well. Local residents have become more willing to make clear 
some of the chief s efforts and how they have not worked.) 
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 The influx may congeal with the Ministry of Tourism's plans for the area as it tends to "dilute" the 
previously dense population of former Khmer Rouge, a process CPK elite would have interpreted as 
microbes infecting their base. The takeover by economically-oriented "new people" marks a definitive end 
of the revolution. 
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 For example, a commune chief with whom I had frequent interactions, had built a beautiful large new 
home made of high quality wood; this new house sits perhaps five meters back from his former meager 
abode. As well, a former aide to Ta Mok, and already the owner of a stately residence, began construction 
of a rather unique-looking second house near Arpiwhat Village. The guesthouses that are owned by 
assistant district chiefs, continued with upgrades and additions. The "Prodigal Son" guesthouse added a 
second structure of hotel-like units; next door at the October 23 Guesthouse, construction an additional 
building was following suit (at an estimated cost of around US$30,000). 
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 Given that an overwhelming majority of residents in the district (and all but one of my informants, the 
chief of a rather remote commune) originate from other provinces, the "coming to Anlong Veng" narrative 
is a common story, and it often involves a multiplicity of arrivals. Most of my informants were Khmer 
Rouge soldiers, so typically they first "came with the Democratic Kampuchea Army"; others have came to 
the district following the 1999 peace in hopes of business opportunities, and their migration tales offer 
differing motivations and storylines. In conversations with most informants, "struggle"—in the form of 
war (and urban evacuations), military/social reintegration, (inter/nationally-sponsored) "development," and 
looting—seemed to recurrently invoke the theme of (re-)"arrivals." The expression of this 
mobility/circulation manifested as: soldiers' inter-provincial immigrations, ending in Anlong Veng (when 
Ta Mok called the forces together); the successive retreats and advances of the Democratic Kampuchea 
Army and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces from the Dangrek Mountains to the district proper and back 
again; cross-border movement of the outlawed organization to/from Thailand (perhaps in tandem with 
military advances/retreats or commercial stimuli); shifting, multiplying, and re-constructing residences; 
driving cars and road repair (the infrastructure of circulation); a growing influx of "new people" seeking 
business opportunities and NGOs seeking development; and the visitation of foreigners—journalists and 
tourists (and social researchers)—to sites within the district. This theme and these phenomena should be 
put in contrast to the Ministry of Tourism's historical tourist endeavors which (attempt to) fix a 
determination, preservation, and even re-construction of sites/stability (for the purposes of consumption), 
with a consequent elimination of indeterminacy and change. (The very notion of a site exposes some 
assumptions about the possible stability of objects of re-presentation.) Further description of how this 
theme arises is provided in the site-specific guided narratives (below), as each site exhibits the differing 
historical pressures and forces that shape its location, structural remnants, and characteristic traces. 
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 The inchoate prior—largely discarded by the ministry but also very unclear to the resident informants— 
is the chaos out of which lines are drawn, sites are recognized, concepts established, the History is 
composed, and "historical-tourist" areas are designated. 
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 In conversations with villagers, it has become clear that many locations throughout Anlong Veng district 
exist under two names, attesting to the mobility and paleonymy of the district's internal divisions. When 
the Khmer Rouge moved down from the mountain, beginning in 1989, they demarcated areas to arrange 
villages according to the unit forces that stayed with the village; each village may have taken on a 
subsequent designation which may describe a physical characteristic (e.g., Tuol Tbeng, Tuol Kandal) or an 
abstract concept (e.g., Ekapheap, Aphivath). Sometimes, the military unit number remains the predominant 
reference for a village (such as Village 105). Unraveling the former hierarchy seems intertwined with the 
geographical mapping of the area. I was able to decipher a number of these duplicitous villages: Divisions 
920 and 800 formed Tuol Sala; 920 also encompasses O Thorn, O Chik, O Beng, and Chrak villages; 980 
became a village on the way to Thlat commune; 105/Thnal Kaing; 507/Phteak Chram. Interestingly, Srah 
Chhouk, a large village that was intended to become its own commune under Ta Mok, did not have a 
division number associated with it; it was a place of factory (sawmill) workers, medical staff, engine 
mechanics, and carpenters, and it was referred to as the "Ministry." Adding to the challenge of mapping 
out these sites, a couple informants have described areas on the mountain which were formerly inhabited by 
Khmer Rouge (e.g. Teuk Keo, under the previous control of Division 785) but which have now simply 
been taken over by the jungle. Further, it seems that villages and communes have moved and taken their 
names along with them. Thus, informants talked about areas where Lumtong and Trabaing Tauv 
communes as well as O Chunehean/Yeang Kang Cherng Village used to be. 
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 The manager of Ta Mok's warehouse reasoned: "This place is a characteristic of war. All the places 
where the Khmer Rouge built—the warehouse or the houses for public leaders or the sawmill—all these 
things the Khmer Rouge used for fighting the government. If the Khmer Rouge did not build these, they 
could not fight the government. To make war on each side, they must have people living in the base and 
also have soldiers stationed at the front. The people at the bases have to work hard, farm rice, and do 
everything to support the soldiers, and they need leaders to guide them in making war. For example, if we 
have fish and no salt, the fish goes bad. But if we have salt, we have fish. Salt can be like the leaders, and 
the people at the base are like the fish. People cannot make war without their leaders, so all the signs which 
are put everywhere in Anlong Veng District are very important, because people want to see how the Khmer 
Rouge made war with the government. People can see the last base of the Khmer Rouge, and the other 
bases of the Khmer Rouge are not different from the last one." 
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 Recall that Cambodia can be seen as the victim of outside forces under perpetual threat of extinction. 
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 This suggests an arbitrary character of the ministry's founding of History on concrete remains. 
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 Pass 808, also referred to as Chrach or Ba Traveng, was the (public) Khmer Rouge headquarters from 
1981 to 1985, before most of this staff moved to the Thai side of Choam Pass. A small handful of 
informants have memories of this area, and my own tour of the border-hugging former encampment in 
2002 uncovered only faint residues of a prior command center. Kamm and Short (developing Kamm's 
description) indicate that "Base 808" was a public seat of the ousted DK government from 1980 until June 
1982 (Kamm, Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land, pp. 177-183; Short, The History of a Nightmare, 
pp. 413-414,420); thousands of Khmer Rouge civilians, detached from Ta Mok's retreat in April 1998, 
took refuge at the lapsed base (Barber & Bou, "Anlong Veng death rattle," p. 8). 
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 A history of borders—1955 diplomatic relations, Brevie line, etc.—edges up to the assertion that 
Cambodia has been a victim of its geographical placement/outside forces. 
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 This movement evokes some socio-historical tendencies: 1) patron-client relations, nepotism, and 
networks as a cultural constant in Cambodia for 1500 years, and 2) parallel regionalism in the pre-1975 
"Communist" movement, FUNK. 
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 The tellings about movement to, from, and within Anlong Veng suggests a rear base as "residence" for 
divisions fighting in other provinces. 
177
 "Instability" becomes an obstacle to development as seen by tourist officials as well as Khmer Rouge 
when reflecting on their past. 
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 Ultimately (what is), the fragments of the sites themselves form ellipses: remnants (and a denied, but 
perhaps recreated, wholeness); unanswered questions about sites (un-specificity), "enduring unknowns"; 
ongoing transformation (looting/de-construction, logging, touristicization (guesthouse/restaurant), natural 
decay ("jungle"), parcelization 
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 Even within the emphasis on commercialization a number of alternatives come to mind: from the blue 
tents and roasted chicken to Tuol Sleng-style sobriety to Williamsburg, Virginia (a hyperconformity to the 
past). 
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 The italicized paragraphs that begin each section are my translations of Ros Ren's site summaries which 
will form the basis for the Anlong Veng guidebook. The summaries were drafted in a letter that circulated 
between the Ministry of Tourism and DC-Cam, dated 25 July 2002. These sections are intended to 
textually mimic the guided explorations of Anlong Veng's history: an explanation of the mountaintop sites 
with the aid of a journalist who daily worked with Pol Pot; a tour of Pass 808 and the Mountain 200 mine 
production factory with one of Ta Mok's former drivers; a trip to Son Sen's house and other key residences 
on the mountain with a man who lived with the former Defense Minister; and a guided venture to Ta Mok's 
Warehouse with a local villager who had guarded the forest-hidden site. The descriptions synthesize 
fieldwork, Tourism Ministry research, DC-Cam addenda, and news clippings to provide a view of the 
histories and uses of the sites in Anlong Veng as well as to express a wide range of issues that arise at these 
destinations. A more complete listing of the names and locations of sites—those officially included as well 
as supplementary loci—can be found in Appendix 1. Maps of the areas are laid out in Appendix 2. 
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 It is widely established that the Khmer Rouge sent cadre abroad (to China), for training and education, 
but it is also known that certain education efforts were undertaken within the country as well. A first-hand 
testimony by a French woman, Laurence Picq, Au-dela du ciel, explains how the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (the "Bl" office, in her case), under the direction of Ieng Sary, was involved in the education of 
young cadre in Phnom Penh throughout the entire period of Khmer Rouge rule. One of my informants, 
who spoke openly about his education during that period, further showed how this experience is what 
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enabled his personal associations and connections with higher-ups within the Khmer Rouge. He arrived in 
the capital in 1975, and Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary asked him to study languages (at a site to the west of the 
Railway Station, near the current Council of Ministers office, near the statue of two deer). Nuon Chea's 
three children (two daughters and a son) also studied there. In the first year, there were more than 300 
students asked to study: 50 studied English, 50 studied Chinese, 25 studied Vietnamese, and others studied 
a variety of other languages. (In 1977, Vietnamese instruction was ceased, and more students were 
encouraged to study Thai, French, and Spanish.) The school was run by Mr. Veun and Mrs. An Sai. Mr. 
Veun was a department chief at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of adolescents while they were 
studying. Mrs. An Sai was the wife of the DK Ambassador to Thailand as well as a department chief in the 
ministry; she collected together the documents used for instruction. Mr. Sohong is identified as vice 
director of the ministry, under Ieng Sary. Along with a number of other students, my informant's 
roundabout arrival in Anlong Veng (via Svay Sisophon, then Malai, and through Chreik Village in 
Thailand) was overseen and organized by Mr. Sohong. This story demonstrates (again) that Democratic 
Kampuchea attempted to educate people; however, it seems this education (e.g., language instruction) was 
reserved for a select few. It also seems clear that once educated, Democratic Kampuchea officials deemed 
those students to be assets of sorts that should be preserved. Thus, Mr. Sohong taking the students to the 
Dangrek Mountains seems consistent v/ith Angkor's agenda of conserving its intellectual capital. 
Furthermore, the schooling of elites' offspring suggests not only a degree of privilege afforded to a 
particular echelon, but it also demonstrates a reproductive (or symbiotic) relationship between rulers, 
education, and the regeneration of authority figures. 
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 Every Thursday, teachers were asked to gather at the wooden school for training in pedagogy and 
mathematics. One informant, who used to teach at the wooden school, said that he taught grade 5 as well 
as geography, geometry, history, natural sciences, and mathematics. Thai was the only foreign language 
allowed to be taught. He obtained documents from Thailand and from the Cambodian government; from 
these two sources, he composed lessons for the teachers. In the subject of history, students were taught 
about the history of Vietnamese soldiers invading Cambodia; in geography, students were taught from the 
same material used by the Cambodian government. History books could not be prepared by the teachers 
themselves; they were received from the Khmer Rouge leaders through the superintendent of schools. 
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 There are parallels in how regimes prioritize the control of history. First, it was not until recently that 
the government in Phnom Penh allowed history books which covered the 1970 to 1979 period of 
Cambodian history, mainly because the determination of the presentation was an extremely controversial 
exercise. Second, the Ministry of Tourism is attempting to determine and establish/present the history of 
the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng. 
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 Over the course of my research, it became apparent that former Khmer Rouge with greater education 
were more forthcoming with the political reasons explaining how they came to joined the Khmer Rouge. A 
couple informants could trace their involvement back to student groups in which they participated or to the 
intellectual reasoning behind their support for the Khmer Rouge. The key ideas underlying these political 
explanations are: 1) a change was required in order to help Cambodian society, and 2) the fact that the 
Khmer Rouge demonstrated a concern for the poor. Like the population in general, the bulk of my 
informants are minimally educated peasants, and their primary stated reason for joining the revolutionary 
forces emanated from the Sihanouk's March 1970 post-coup instructions to the "children" of his kingdom. 
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 An odd mimesis of Williamsburg is opened up in the everyday. 
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 Although structures may conventionally thought to be stable or stationary, these objects (places) were 
perhaps equally subject to struggle as their inhabitants. In fact, recurrent liberations of the Anlong Veng 
territory made (re-)constructions of the houses possible. The mobility of the structures—from both struggle 
(war) and looting—suggests an "arrival" of sites themselves. Although the various buildings on the 
property owe their provisional existences to the area's history of conflict, Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa figures 
as a cornerstone of the Ministry of Tourism's museum (stabilization) effort. 
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 It is clear that Ta Mok had at least three principal residences at various times through his stay in Anlong 
Veng. Initial research indicates that some of these were constructed at the same time, and they were clearly 
understood in relation to one another. The three largely acknowledged residences include: the cliff house 
residence (the middle house at Darm Chrey), the "middle house" (in Khlaing Kandal), and the lakeside 
villa. Family members indicated a fourth residence of the leader, which was also near the lake in Teuk 
Chum village, a few kilometers away from the villa. The Teuk Chum lakeside residence was described as 
the "real house" of Ta Mok, as the lakeside villa was intended to be given over to the villagers as a 
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museum. However, Ta Mok spent more time at the villa than at this secondary lakeside residence. Almost 
every piece of wood from the Teuk Chum site seemed to have been scavenged, leaving the area overgrown. 
Even the former guardhouse and bodyguard residence associated with the house are empty sites. Not 
surprisingly, this site has not been granted historical-tourist recognition by the Ministry of Tourism. (A 
short distance from this site, close to the main road, is a dilapidated hut, which is said to have been a 
warehouse that stored uniforms.) 
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 A boat trip on Lake O Chik makes possible an up-close familiarity with the locations that were of 
former importance (before occupation of the territory by government forces and before the construction of 
the dam). Pol Pol's riverside residence, built in 1992, was formerly situated on the banks of O Chik (Dig 
Stream). The house, along with many others, was burned down in 1993 by Ta Mok's soldiers as the 
government army approached. As the dam was built in the following years, the burnt remains are presently 
under water. (Despite its relative absence, the site is demarcated on a Ministry of Tourism map of the 
historical tourist area.) The house had been built of wood and stone, and given that the lake/reservoir is 
quite shallow, one might be able to walk on the partially-submerged foundational remains of the structure. 
Above-water clearings in the lotus plants and other freshwater shrubbery are the only indications of a 
trajectory that would parallel the route of a road (to the residence) below the surface. The submerged sites 
in the lake suggest how objects/sites are subjected to struggle (war—advancing and retreating armies) and 
human labour/intervention (the impact of the dam), in similar ways to how local (mobile) populations have 
been effected. Although the structures are basically invisible, the boat tour of O Chik offers some potential 
interest for tourists, providing excellent views of the town and other historical sites (e.g., the hospital, 
lakeside villa, etc.). A ten-minute canoe ride from the lakeside villa brings the visitor to the only above-
water structural remains. It appears as a concrete closet, and it was likely part of the tallest building in the 
immediate area. The structure was explained to be a vault (although there is disagreement among 
informants), a building to hold the money of Democratic Kampuchea (examples of which informants have 
shown me). This debilitated site was somehow involved in the organization's regulation of local commerce 
and trade. (While Thai baht were used for the purchase of goods from Pailin, DK money was used for 
goods that had been acquired from Thailand and then (re-)sold in Anlong Veng. It is clear that the 
circulation of this money was tightly controlled, with cadre expecting surpluses to be kept in the vault.) In 
1993, the Khmer Rouge elite had plans to stop the circulation of Democratic Kampuchea script; they had 
intended to gather up all the bills and keep them in this vault. It would be ironic that, given the reports of 
how Democratic Kampuchea sought to abolish money (in the 1970s), the only (above-water) standing 
testament of the presence/existence of DK residence in the man-made (Khmer Rouge-made) lake is the 
trace of a place to store currency, both DK bills and Thai baht. Huy Sophorn chronicles this post-1979 
clash of cash (Huy Sophorn, "A Pure Society is One without Money," p. 25). 
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 In fact, my "initial" tour of the site seems to have followed the confusion that claims the Tourism 
Ministry's blue signs for Khieu Samphan's House and Pol Pot's Secret House are switched. Some reliable 
informants indicated that the indicator sign for the site called "Pol Pot's Secret House" is in the correct 
location. (It may be that my "previous" visit to the site simply ended at a random clearing in the woods.) 
The (newly-discovered) site lies 4.1 km north of the central Anlong Veng roundabout. The sign on the 
west side of the road correctly marks the path which proceeds through Khlaing Kandal village. Along the 
route (about 250 km west of the road) resides "Ta Mok's Middle House" (lower) on the south side of the 
road. Pol Pot's Secret House can be accessed by a foot path (or "short-cut" as my guide referred to it) 
which breaks off the primary path 50 m west of the broken dam (built in 1997, perhaps two weeks before 
Son Sen was killed), continues almost invisibly through rice fields and forest, and arrives at the southeast 
edge of the site. A road also proceeds to the site and travels along its west side; however, this road was 
built after integration, suggesting that the footpath short-cut may have been the primary means of access. 
(The road to the site proceeds west off the main road, past the middle house, and following the detour that 
links the two pieces of road separated by the broken dam. Shortly after the dam, the road splits; in order to 
arrive at the south entrance to the site, one must follow the north fork and proceed north by northwest.) 
Around the house was built a sconce (perhaps 1 to 2 m high and 1.5 m wide), square in shape with each 
side measuring 50 to 70 m, which even in its current state, would obscure any internal structures from 
vision. One wooden house was built in the compound; concrete was about to be laid when the war flared 
up. The site has one bomb shelter, two entrance/exit gates (one near the northwest corner and one on the 
south side), two ponds inside, and one large pond outside (to the northwest, visible from the entrance 
point). 
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 Two possible events may have sparked this fear. Hun Sen's move to outlaw the Khmer Rouge may 
have generated some panic when the implications of the ban became fully understood in Anlong Veng. 
Ieng Sary's defection may have also led Anlong Veng elites to believe that the RCAF would be able to 
more fully concentrate its forces on the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold. 
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 Like some Khmer males, he seems to play at being a "big man," and it appeared that he would attempt 
to use his experience living with Ta Mok as a means of asserting his personal importance. The possibility 
that his memory might be inaccurate in a few instances may constitute a loss of face or a challenge to his 
self-confidence. 
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 This insistence led us to visit what he was calling "Khieu Samphan's House" (in Khlaing Kandal), 
which was essentially a non-site not very far from the (actual) site of Pol Pot's secret house. 
193
 The rumor, however, was consistent, as there was no presence of a counter-rumor throughout the village 
suggesting a different demarcation or identification. 
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 His idea that the sign was "misplaced" derived not from it being switched with another site. Khieu 
Samphan's House lies 3 km from the main road, and two turn-offs can lead to this destination. The 
informant's charge was that the sign was 1) too far from the actual site, and 2) at the trailhead for the longer 
route to get there. 
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 The site is located 150 m west of the main road on the south side of the path that would proceed on 
toward "Pol Pot's Secret House" (sometimes confusingly called "Khieu Samphan's House"). What 
remains is a long water basin that is so hole-shot that it can no longer hold any liquid volume. Adjoining 
this long remnant is a large square concrete expanse. A wooden house on stilts has been constructed next 
to the concrete slab. According to the residents, the middle house had originally been constructed from 
wood and brick, but invading government soldiers looted the house in order to build a military camp and 
left one wall remaining. That final wall has subsequently collapsed. The nearby elevated residence was 
built more recently on the site, next to the large cement foundation; the owner went off to fight in the war, 
and government soldiers arrived and took control of the new wooden residence. The current owner 
indicates that the military had the intention of selling the property, but in 1998 she persuaded a high 
commander to give it to her and her daughter, simply because she is poor. It is curious to see a site of 
historical significance such as Ta Mok's middle house and performance arena (although not yet designated 
by the ministry) to be given away to an impoverished woman and her daughter; the story seemed somewhat 
unbelievable, but perhaps it is a striking example of Khmer compassion and generosity. (This transfer of 
ownership stands in contrasts to the issue of land claims in the area surrounding Son Sen's grave, discussed 
below.) 
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 Ta Mok seems to have built houses in sets of three. On the mountain, there are a house-become-
warehouse located near the current border checkpoint office, the vegetative void of a "middle house" that 
bordered a mango field, and a cliffhouse whose foundations in Darm Chrey have become a restaurant and 
guesthouse in peacetime. (According to some conflicting details, the "middle house on the mountain," 
built in 1994, refers to two houses in the same area on the mountain and these housed eight or nine men and 
their families. When Son Sen arrived on the mountain in the 1996/1997 dry season, this house became the 
residence for him and his family; Nuon Chea took up residence in the other house quite close to Son Sen's 
place. These were the homes that were attacked by Pol Pot's henchmen in 1997, in an attempt to 
exterminate Son Sen, his family, and possibly others.) Many informants reasoned that the "middle house" 
(whether the mango orchard house or the cliffhouse) received its name because it lay between Choam Pass 
and Kbal Tonsaong. In the flatland area below, Ta Mok had a "middle house" (lower) in Khlaing Kandal, 
which informants claimed, received its name from being between the Darm Chrey cliffhouse and the 
residence on the O Chik). Completing the trio in the flatlands are the lakeside villa, which consisted of a 
varying number of structures over time (the most significant being the meeting hall), and a lesser-
known/lesser-recognized residence in Teuk Chum Village, which was also quite close to the lake. 
Supplementally (and adding confusion only in terms of tourism demarcations), there was also & materiel 
warehouse (khleang bdrikkhaasoek uJitimmMfr) in Cherng Phnom Village—a large structure surrounded by 
some smaller guard houses, all obscured by a tropical canopy subject to contemporary encroachment— 
which the Ministry of Tourism has placarded "Ta Mok's Warehouse" a separate destination from the 
Middle Warehouse ruins. 
197
 An earlier phase is discernible in the development of a DK politico-cultural apparatus. The initial 
endeavors were journalistic, taking the form of newspapers (Revolutionary Flag and National Liberation 
Front)—under editors Touch Ren (alias Kren) and Chou Chet (alias Sy)—and radio (Voice of Democratic 
Kampuchea). Touch Ren was a member of the Southwest Zone Standing Committee, later worked with Hu 
Nim at the Ministry of Information, and now lives in Paris; Chou Chet was CPK Secretary of the Western 
Zone until he was purged by the Organization in March 1978. After DK's ousting, Touch Ren controlled 
the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports and the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts (by some accounts, 
these are combined into one ministry). Through these ministerial posts, he trained select students and 
maintained the radio station. In 1980, a group of 46 students (43 males and three females) were selected 
from all over to live near Pol Pot at Phnom Kravanh (in Koh Kong Province). Touch Ren took charge of 
training these young cadres. From my informants' perspectives, the intention of the organization's elite 
was to draw off the specialties of these students and assign them to appropriate departments in the 
formation of a new government. In 1982, Pol Pot sent 20 students to study different subjects in China for 
six months (essentially, different aspects of radio broadcasting). Out of these domestic and foreign 
trainings emerged a number of people who were later to provide the cultural material and technical 
expertise for the transmissions over Voice of Democratic Kampuchea. 
198
 Kheum Ngon figures in a prominent narrative among the Anlong Veng locals. Popular local belief 
states that Kheum Ngon is a primary reason the Khmer Rouge were ultimately defeated in Anlong Veng. 
As the story goes, he fell sick and was sent to a hospital in Thailand. From there, he established 
communication with Hun Sen, providing information that enabled the government army to seize Anlong 
Veng. After the peace, he became a brigadier general in Phnom Penh; throughout the early 2000s, his 
lakeside estate in Anlong Veng was rarely graced with his presence. In November 2007, he was charged 
with the abduction and killing of British de-miner Christopher Howes. The mini-narrative of his betrayal 
stands in contrast to popular views of Ta Mok as a local hero. 
199
 "My Oxcart" was about Democratic Kampuchea making people grow rice and not allowing them to join 
the Vietnamese army and the Hun Sen army (KUFNS). "The Landscape of Kravanh Mountain" (in Pursat) 
praises the beauty of nature and the moment of struggle. "Legend Song" addresses a Vietnamese story 
about a high commander sent to fight in Cambodia. The song attempts to disgrace the legend, because the 
protagonist seeks to take Cambodia. "Get Up Brothers and Sisters and Join Against the Vietnamese 
Army," a rather upbeat song, encourages "para" troops (KPNLF and the Sihanoukist army) and the DK 
army to join together. My informant said there were thousands of songs that he sang for the Khmer Rouge 
radio. "Soldier's Precepts," written in 1996, is specifically about Anlong Veng culture. 
200
 The sign stands in Srah Chhouk Village, about 250 m north of the market area (and cut-off to the 
pagoda). Many informants have indicated that the sign should be moved north 800 m to Cherng Phnom, 
just north of the village's southern boundary marker. My access to this site suggests that the change would 
make for a more direct approach to the area, although villagers have indicated that the two roads merge 
about 2.5 km down the path. Proceeding along this northerly path (from Cherng Phnom), approximately 
3.45 km from the main road lies the turn-off (north) for Khieu Samphan's house. (Continuing 
straight/west, instead of turning, leads to Thkeam Romeas Village; the road, which the Khmer Rouge built, 
used to extend to O Smach but is now broken.) 
201
 In terms of layout, the houses seem to have been constructed in pairs. The easternmost house is in an 
area of high grass on the north side of the road with remnants of wood marking its location. The most 
recognizable feature in the remains are two small stakes sticking up just above the grass. This house seems 
to have had a kitchen attached to it. Further west lies another residence, and it remains a patch of grass 
with bits of wood. Significantly, toward the southeast corner of this second house, lies a well which is now 
overgrown with bushes; the wood pieces lining the top edges of the well are still visible through the 
shrubbery. The path entering the area forks just beyond the first two houses, composing what appears to 
have been driveways for the western houses. Only a few pieces of wood are present at the clearing of the 
third house; however, there are a number of very aged and rusty food containers. These included tomato 
(paste) cans, canned milk, anchovy tin, and a ketchup bottle, all of which seemed to be of Thai origin. To 
the north of this third structure lies another well, and to the northwest of the well is an outhouse (a hole in 
the ground with planks of wood, which one informant claimed was built by and for the bodyguards of the 
area). The fourth house is the hardest to discern in terms of structural traces. My guide explained that 
some villagers cleared the area for rice farming and in the process burned some of the wood that made the 
westernmost residence. The houses resided on the edge of what is now a large clearing (perhaps a product 
of the villagers' recent efforts), which affords a view of the mountain. 
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For a contemporary archaeological example in a Cambodian context, see Dougald O'Reilly's work 
recovering bangles, beads, and epaulettes a late prehistoric cemetery in Banteay Meanchey (Lon Nara, 
"Phum Snay ruined, other sites in danger," p. 5). After the looting of this Northwestern site, O'Reilly went 
on to found Heritage Watch, an NGO that seeks to reduce artifacts smuggling through government policy 
and education. 
203
 Local inhabitants are not the only people mildly concerned about artifacts. The ex-pat claimant of Pol 
Pot's toilet seat expressed nervousness about the possession of the commodious curio, especially given 
statements by the government about historical artifacts; Pol's pot was removed from its place of 
prominence at Siem Reap's Ivy Bar (Gee, "Travelers Attracted by Khmer Rouge Sites and Souvenirs," p. 
17). 
204
 The building appears to have been quite large, extending 30-40 m north to south and another 30 m east 
to west. The channels may have been areas for the large saw blades or access passages to the machinery 
above. In the cement foundations, there are three Khmer inscriptions. The first is almost certainly 
incorrect (off by one decade); it reads "16.6.84" followed by some unclear Khmer script (perhaps a name, 
Ahn). The second inscription, located one or two meters south of the first, reads "Solidarity Group Srah 
Chhouk Commune Sawmill 28.6.94." The third inscription, right beside the second, reads "United to build 
the sawmill are the national force and our national force 28.6.94." The markings (excepting the first) 
indicate that the foundations were laid in June 1994, shedding doubt on the accuracy of one informant's 
account. 
205
 During the construction, a group of 30 Thais assisted 32 Khmers; the Khmers did the construction, and 
the Thai engineers did the mechanical/engine parts. The long construction time is accounted for by the fact 
that the sawmill had seven engines used for cutting wood and two additional machines for planing and 
leveling. The mill's typical daily capacity was 30 cubic meters of wood. Usually, a staff of 30 laborers 
worked the site, with an additional 20 to 30 brought in when greater work was required. 
206
 Global Witness, Cambodia's Family Trees, p.12. Global Witness had been a tenacious monitor of the 
illegal logging business in Cambodia through the 1990s, producing detailed reports exposing the areas and 
individuals involved (Global Witness, Logs of War, pp. 17-22; idem, Thai-Khmer Rouge Links and the 
Illegal Trade in Cambodia's Timber, which provides details on cross-border timber trade via specific 
Khmer Rouge border encampments). For its sin of perseverance, it was appointed to become the 
government watchdog for the country's forestry sector in 1999; for over-achieving in that official capacity, 
the organization was dismissed as forestry monitor in 2003. 
207
 The sale of timber to the Thais was a recurrent issue in the post-UNTAC period, as the international 
community understood the significant revenues the Khmer Rouge continued to secure from harvesting 
wood. Logging and gem-mining generated US$100-150 million for the organization (Fawthrop & Jarvis, 
Getting Away With Genocide?, p. 105); Global Witness suggests that in 1995 timber alone netted the 
Khmer Rouge US$10-20 million per month (Global Witness, Logs of War, p. 18). Fawthrop also 
inventories Ta Mok's Thai business deals through the Khukan Aroonsawat Group, which included a 
logging company, gas station, and restaurant. Fawthrop's point is to demonstrate the complicity and 
involvement of Thai military officials and businessmen in sustaining the Khmer Rouge while it lingered in 
Anlong Veng (Fawthrop, "Ta Mok: A guerilla with a taste for business," p. 6). The UN enacted sanctions 
on Thailand in the early 1990s forbidding the country from conducting cross-border timber deals (with the 
Khmer Rouge), and there were times when logs rotted in Anlong Veng as the Thais abided; the US 1997 
Foreign Operations Act further increased pressure on the Thais as it threatened cessation of military aid to 
countries that engaged in trade with the Khmer Rouge (Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 133). 
208
 The most flagrant logging adventure that this impromptu "local witness" observed occurred shortly after 
Global Witness was removed from its position (for being too good at its oversight). Soon after the more 
lenient, elite-friendly Societe Generate de Surveillance (SGS) took over, the nighttime convoy through 
Anlong Veng occurred. Trees were harvested from the mountaintop along the border with Thailand and 
transported down the rocky precipice and the district's main drag, making a left turn at the roundabout to 
lumber by the district chiefs house and on to a secret border crossing near Tumnup Daich in Trabaing 
Prassat District. 
209
 The immediate realization of this vision was quite unrealistic given the state of the museum's 
organization and funding. 
2,0
 With a trajectory that originates in Takeo, arrives in the Dangrek Mountains, crosses borders, produces 
various residences and moves between, the mobile Ta Mok is progenitor and condition of possibility for 
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"Anlong Veng" as museum. Inheritance implies not only a benefitting from previous efforts but also 
something owed to the past—initiation of a debt/gift requiring a counter-gift?—and perhaps this museum is 
the Ministry of Tourism's return. 
211
 The possibility of the government taking villagers' land for the purposes of a museum (or a "resort") is 
disturbing, particularly for the instability it would likely produce in the lives of those who have only 
recently come to know a certain stability since 1998. Further, the grounds for making such a claim to the 
land border on the preposterous. Every place in Anlong Veng belonged to the Khmer Rouge, and it is no 
secret that they occupied the area. It would be conceivable, if absurd, to cordon off the entire district and 
relocate the entire historical population (while erecting blue indicator signs stating "Khmer Rouge villagers 
lived here"). Land ownership, mobility/transformation of sites, and the administration of village life in 
relation to the demarcation of an "historical-tourist" area warrant greater development, explanation, and 
discussion, specifically in terms of the events of "defection" and "reintegration." (The plans and 
procedures for this process were certainly clearly expounded at the time.) 
2121 would risk re-asserting some of the social divisions that plagued the Lon Nol period (and Sangkum 
Reastr Niyum) in claiming that central dictates from the urban core become divergently implemented in the 
Cambodian countryside. (This may align with the accounts of Vickery and others who interpret the 
Democratic Kampuchea regime as regionally and temporally variant according to the local leaders' 
implementation of interpreted policy.) 
213
 The destination is roughly 300 m east of the main road (on the south fork), which proceeds along the 
road that goes through Srah Chhouk and continues on to Tumnup Leu. 
214
 The most complete list provided by my informants named: Son Sen MS trus, Yun Yat ma tirm, Lim (5H 
(Son Sen's son-in-law; Mon's husband), Pai u (Son Sen's nephew), Thea tn (Yun Yat's younger sister), 
Mean raja (Thea's daughter), Mon HS (Son Sen's daughter), Nang nnitj (Mon's daughter), Vichekaltjm 
(Mon's son), and Rim"JH (Son Sen's adopted daughter). 
215
 The lady of the house, a Kampong Cham native, had only recently relocated to Anlong Veng in order to 
be with her husband, who had been doing woodwork in the area since around 1998. 
216
 Fire emanating from a grave suggests the presence of a radiant phantom (preay irntu), who are believed 
to travel by night and cause illness. These spirits usually emerge from trees, and they are noticed by blue 
flames above or in the leaves of the trees. They are born from people who have died, and thus they are 
usually identified by names (e.g., the Son Sen phantom). These spirits of the dead are differentiated from 
tutelary/ancestral spirits (neak taa gntn). Although also borne of the deceased (and thus named), ancestral 
spirits typically inhabit stones, (banyan) trees, or forests, and they occupy a higher position than preay in 
the folk religion pantheon. Ancestral spirits can be asked for protection by making offerings of food; they 
can also punish wrongdoers who trespass in their area of residence. 
217
 Mme. Bora related the popular understanding that doing politics is tantamount to having accidents. Cast 
in a larger historical understanding, it seems reasonable to equate political struggles with "accidents" 
(kruahthnak ttfnsgifi), a not-so-subtle euphemism; one might attribute much of the suffering of the 
Cambodian people to the political aspirations of the King, Lon Nol and company, and the revolutionaries 
of Democratic Kampuchea. The brief example of the March 1997 grenade attack on a Sam Rainsy 
demonstration—accidents that befell some attending a parked presentation—underscores the point in more 
contemporary terms, as do the continued assassinations of local political activists in the countryside 
(particularly in periods leading up to elections). 
218
 Historians suggest that Son Sen had come under suspicion by his own organization, but that his purge 
was deferred by the hostilities with and ultimate invasion by Vietnam (Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 74-
75; Heder, Pol Pot at Bay, pp. 10-12). 
219
 Some informants described the area as the existing district of Trabaing Prassat (the neighboring district 
to the east of Anlong Veng); some located the area of operations as "the triangle," highlighting the 
polygonal joining of Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos (near Choam Khsan); others simply referred to Tonle 
Lpov (tonle rorpov 9ta ittrl) (a site within the sector, on the border with Laos) to hint at Son Sen's area of 
control. The confusion may emerge from the subsumption of Ke Pauk's Sector 1002 (west of Route 12) 
into Sector 1003; the entire northern front was re-designated Sector 1005 under Ta Mok's command in 
May 1992. Son Sen's control offerees was ceased in February 1992 (Heder, Pol Pot at Bay, p. 204); 
although some accounts suggest he was "reinstated after 'confessing' his mistakes" (Barber, "KR succumbs 
to hidden rivalries," p. 4). 
220
 For informants, the exact date was of little concern and agreement (some claimed April 10, 1997 and 
others placed it in mid-May), in contradistinction from Pol Pot's publicly-pinpointed passing on 15 April 
1998. 
221
 Some speculation emerged that the savagery of killing of the entire family, although following the DK-
era purge modus operandi, may have been the ultimate resolution of a personal feud between the executing 
commander, So Saroeun, and the deceased (Thet & Piore, "The Final Chapter"); however, Pol Pot admitted 
to Nate Thayer that he had in fact ordered the massacre: "You know for the other people, the babies, the 
young ones, I did not order them to be killed. For Son Sen and his family, yes. I feel sorry for that. That 
was a mistake that occurred when we put our plan into practice. I feel sorry" (Thayer, "Day of 
Reckoning," p. 15). While suspicion of Son Sen's negotiating with the government was the immediate 
target (as indicated by Khieu Samphan's VoDK radio charges of conspiring with the Vietnamese and their 
puppet), the issue of intimate knowledge of the security operations of the CPK (especially at S-21) while in 
power would certainly provide and additional concern. 
22
 A reconstruction of the political context and turning alliances is presented in the guided narrative of Pol 
Pot's sentencing site below. 
223
 This also seems true of the sentencing event of Pol Pot which is described as more of a public 
hazing/shaming than a trial or prosecution. 
224
 Falby, "Anlong Veng: future KR Disneyland," p. 16; Thet, "In Anlong Veng, Prayers for Pol Pot's 
Return," pp. 1, 17. 
225
 There are ideas that Pol Pot's natural death may have been helped along by others' agency, like Ta 
Mok's withholding of oxygen (Thet & Piore, "Final Chapter"). Given that Ta Mok was defending against 
revolts and was forced to flee to the escarpment, the priority of maintaining Pol Pot's livelihood was likely 
diminished, save for the potential value of bargaining chip number one in a peace negotiation. The low 
value of life is demonstrated in the execution of So Saroeun and two other Pol Pot accomplices (who 
lacked any bargaining benefits) on 26 March 1998. 
226
 Royal Cambodian Government, "Circular on Preservation of remains of the victims of the genocide 
committed during the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1978), and the preparation of Anlong Veng 
to become a region for historical tourism." "'The Ministry [of Tourism] wants to find out why the size of 
the land around Pol Pot's cremation size [sic] is getting small—from seven hectares to only 0.7 hectares 
today,' [planning officer] Long Von said [Oddar Meanchey Governor] Pich Sokhin met with tourism 
and land management officials... to determine how to reclaim land illegally claimed by villagers near the 
cremation site. 'We would like to inform people that this area is protected for a historical site illustrating 
the end of Pol Pot's life,' Tourism Ministry Secretary of State Thong Khon said" (Kimsong, "Firms Eyeing 
Pol Pot Site as Tourist Draw," p. 2). 
227
 During various periods of CPK/PDK rule, personal differences were often diffused through the 
regionalized authority; the consolidation of control at Anlong Veng increasingly denied the geographical 
diffusion of personal tension between Pol Pot and Ta Mok. 
228
 The success in the northwest was so great that the advancing NADK was only stopped on the outskirts 
of Battambang City. 
229
 The Khmer Rouge's 10 July 1994 re-creation under the PGNUNS name was composed of the following 
leaders: Khieu Samphan as Prime Minister and Minister of the National Army; Chan Youran (former 
ambassador to China) as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Defense 
of the National Culture, Literature and Customs; Mak Ben as Minister of Rural Areas, Agriculture and 
Water Conservancy; In Sopheap as Minister of Immigration (dealing with problems of Vietnamese 
immigrants in Cambodia); Kao Bunheng as Minister of Labour and the Situation in Phnom Penh and other 
cities; Pich Cheang (another former ambassador to China) as Deputy Minister of the National Army; and 
Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn as special adviser to the Prime Minister on the People's Health and Sanitation 
(Brown & Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 256; Thayer, "Split formalized as KR declare 
'govt,'" p. 11). The "intellectuals" at Kbal Tonsaong—particularly Khieu Samphan, Chan Youran, Tep 
Khunnal, and Mak Ben—could provide legitimacy to the Khmer Rouge, because they were more 
acceptable to the Cambodian populace, "the last sliver of legitimacy the KR could claim to have as a 
political movement rather than just a bunch of bandits and killers" (Barber & Bou, "Dangling by a thread," 
p.7). 
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230
 As foreign support had dwindled in the early 1990s, PDK cadre increasingly engaged in trade, which in 
turn exposed the guerrillas to the world of peace and freedom (Ashley, "The End," p. 23). 
231
 Rowley, Second Life, Second Death, pp. 213-214. 
232
 Ibid., pp. 208,222-223. 
233
 The manager of one of Ta Mok's warehouses indicates the conflicted loyalties felt by some as the strict 
policies were newly instated: "At that time [1983], I asked myself: why do I work hard for Angkar? 
Because the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. As well, the Khmer Rouge elites did not educate the people 
badly; they always encouraged people to work hard for the country and to think about the nation. This was 
the political idea of the unit. In politics on the international stage, the United Nations also supported the 
Khmer Rouge movement, and the United States closed its eyes and asked the Thais to support the Khmer 
Rouge. This is what the top leaders told us as well as what we heard on the radio. We each had our 
understanding. We listened to Voice of America. Sometimes a group of people listened to VoA and 
understood differently. I also wondered: the Khmer Rouge are communists and the Thais are democrats, so 
why does Thailand support the Khmer Rouge? And now we still wonder why. They supported the Khmer 
Rouge for what? As I said before, the United States also knew this, but they closed their eyes.... After the 
accords, everyone realized that they had freedom to go to their own country, and everyone understood the 
war should be ended. I still lived with the transport unit along the border, and during the 1993 elections 
there was still fighting.... I did not tell you about the story of my hard life. From 1976 to 1982,1 lived in 
the forest and did not have rice and only ate roots in the forest. I had a bit of an easy life in Thailand when 
I was in charge of the warehouse. When along the border, there was a lot of fighting, and I was often on 
the move. When in Thailand, my heart was okay, but my body was difficult, because I had to carry bags of 
rice all the time. I told you before; I have been cheated by politicians. Angkar told me if we liberated the 
country, the poor people would be rich. But the whole time until now, I still have the same position, and I 
am still poor. When I was with the Khmer Rouge, I was very sad, because Angkar did not have many kinds 
of ministries (like the Ministry of Tourism or the Ministry of Agriculture). They did not have a market or 
allow people to make business or go places. If Angkar would have let me live like I do now, I would have 
been happy, because I can meet NGOs and tourists. During the Khmer Rouge, I never met any foreigners; 
therefore, it was not progressive. Now it is okay; we have foreign friends, the Ministry of Tourism, and 
many ministries. This is my own understanding." 
234
 Rowley, Second Life, Second Death, pp. 211,220. 
235
 Thet & Piore, "The Final Chapter." 
236
 Thayer, "KR hardliners - down but not out," pp. 4-5. China had officially ended its support of the 
Khmer Rouge in 1991. This had the effect of dramatically diminishing Ieng Sary's role, which had already 
aroused suspicion and anger, because China had insisted that Ieng Sary be the key individual to distribute 
all arms and cash issuing from the Middle Kingdom. 
237
 Gen. Kheum Ngon told Nate Thayer in 1997 the same story that was repeated almost verbatim by my 
informants five to six years later: "In July 1996, Pol Pot sent Ta Mok to western Cambodia to settle the 
problems within our organization in that area. But once Ta Mok arrived in that area it was too late... The 
people rejected Pol Pot already and they rose up against him because the people cannot support Pol Pot's 
policy" (Thayer, "Brother enemy No. 1," p. 8). 
238
 Troop strength estimates for the defecting divisions indicate 1,500 troops and 13,000 "civilians" from 
Division 415 and 900 troops and 8,500 "civilians" from Division 450; Khmer Rouge civilians were 
noncombatant personnel who, however, participated in the struggle as transport and supplies support 
(Watkin, "KR forces may be slashed in half," p. 3). (Khmer Rouge leaders in Thmar Puok district, Banteay 
Meanchey—Divisions 519 (under Prum Sue) and 518—began seeking to defect as Ieng Sary's side battled 
TaMok.) 
239
 Ny Khon's troops—including Divisions 320, 705,948, 531—totaled a mere 1,000 troops (Watkin, "KR 
forces may be slashed in half," p. 3). 
240
 Nhiek Bun Chhay's statement included a provision that would allow Pol Pot, Ta Mok, and Son Sen to 
flee to Laos. 
241A convoy carrying Chan Youran, Mak Ben, Thiounn Thioeunn, Tep Khunnal, Pech Bunreth, and Kao 
Bunheng was captured on 16 June 1997. 
242The sharing of responsibility as well a 
word (chuoy rek ttotin); the yoke, from which the mountains nominally break forth, is borne in a similar 
s helping to carry on one's shoulder are conveyed in one Khmer 
pole (ddngrek tfaliti). The weight of this historical figure, history itself, bears (responsibility) down on 
these people and this place—"this very moment" to be recuperated into the totality of an historical thought 
that will determine its truth. 
243
 Shortly thereafter, Gen. Khann Savoeun was forced to flee to the FUNCINPEC refuge at O Smach. The 
money was said to have been turned over to Nhiek Bun Chhay, who denies any knowledge of its existence. 
244
 The term "coup" to describe the fighting of 5-6 July 1997, largely embraced by journalists, was 
challenged by Hun Sen as well as some academic observers; distinctions between a coup d'etat and coup de 
force have also been used in attempts to properly situate the "events" in political science conceptualization. 
The post-electoral negotiations of 1993 had rendered a diarchic government, wherein all ministerial 
positions were duplicated, one for each party (FUNCINPEC and CPP). Roberts points to international 
meddling confronting Cambodia's political culture as underwriting the 1997 context. He asserts that the 
enforced power-sharing wrought by the Paris Peace Accords as largely incompatible with the operation of 
Cambodian politics, "characterized by deeply entrenched personality-dominated closed political cultures 
with extended power bases" (Roberts, "Meddling while Phnom Penh Burned," p. 22). When the Phnom 
Penh fighting erupted, then-second-Prime Minister Hun Sen declared he was (legally) protecting the 
government from sabotage by Ranariddh who was making deals with the outlawed Khmer Rouge and 
illegally importing weapons to that cause. Hun Sen's own attempts to integrate the Khmer Rouge might be 
viewed as a means to undermine the ailing movement's capacity, while Ranariddh's efforts can be 
construed as a means to militarily bolster one political party (FUNCINPEC) operating within the country 
(Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, pp. 141-142). In order to formalize his argument 
regarding a non-coup, Hun Sen compelled FUNCINPEC remnants in Phnom Penh to offer a replacement 
for the wanted Ranariddh; Ung Huot became first-Prime Minster in August. It would take international 
negotiations and a royal pardon for Ranariddh to be allowed to return to his country and compete in the 
1998 parliamentary elections. 
245
 Phnom Penh Post, "KR radio turns on Pol Pot," p. 4. 
246
 Ashley, "KR Papers show rebels still living the past," p. 9. 
247
 The individuals who joined Ta Mok's 22 March move included: Khieu Samphan, Chan Youran, Tep 
Khunnal, Nuon Chea, and the arrested Pol Pot. 
248
 On 21 March, two divisions about 30 km from Anlong Veng revolted; on 24 March, another division 
mutinied; and on 29 March, one more. 
249
 Thayer, "Nowhere to Hide," p. 12; Barber & Bou, "Tip-off allows Mok to fight on," p. 8. 
250
 Thet & Piore, "The Final Chapter." Meas Muth and Im Phan, who had defected to the government in 
Pailin in 1996, rejoined the military struggle against Hun Sen in the aftermath of the CPP-FUNCINPEC 
fighting of July 1997. 
25
 Mydans, "Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge," p. Al . Hun Sen's big hole and 
clean slate comments followed on Khieu Samphan's suggestions to "let bygones by bygones." 
252
 Hun Sen's defense of his welcoming Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea is telling: "Without peace, justice 
cannot be found. I have said in the past, we should not talk about how to cook the fish while it is still in the 
water—first you need to catch the fish.... Compare the way I received Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea and 
the way others have received them in the past. I received these people as they surrendered to the 
government, to live a life as normal citizens. From 1979 to 1994, others received Khieu Samphan as head 
of state and even provided him with escort cars when he went with Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to speak in New 
York at the UN. They were received as equals with other heads of state. Before the 1993 elections, when I 
met Khieu Samphan at the royal palace, I carried with me the Genocide Convention of 1948. I read the 
articles of the Genocide Convention to Khieu Samphan and told him: you have to be arrested. Then, 
nobody did anything to Khieu Samphan! In fact, I was ordered by UNTAC [United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia] to provide them with better security. The ones who supported the Khmer Rouge in 
the past should be courageous enough to state the facts. As for a trial [of people responsible for genocide 
and war crimes]—we take it as a fait accompli. In my 1997 letter [to the UN requesting a trial] I only 
referred to 1975-1979. My position is: if they decide to stage such a trial, they can go ahead. I have given 
no guarantees that anyone is exempt from trial. In a trial we need to lay all the cards on the table. We 
cannot hide anything. We have to ask who helped the Khmer Rouge to survive. Even [former Singapore 
prime minister] Lee Kwan Yew cannot escape justice. He pressured Prince Sihanouk to establish the 
tripartite government [in alliance with the KR] on the border. Those who supported the KR and helped the 
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KR should be concerned, including those who had good relations in the last two years, which led to the 
[1997] fighting. If we talk about justice, everyone must have justice" (Jarvis, "PM Hun Sen: 'First you 
need to catch the fish,'" p. 3). 
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 Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?, p. 132. Ta Mok had initially been detained by the 
Thai military on 4 December 1998 along with Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan (Thayer, "End of Story?," p. 
23). The lack of amnesty for the lone standing leader made further struggle necessary if futile. It is likely 
that Hun Sen's long-standing desire to allow the leaders to "disappear" may have enabled Ta Mok's 
persistence (see Adams, "Justice for Khmer Rouge crimes is there for the taking," p. 8). 
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 "For the record, when fancy becomes fact: Scholars say that Ta Mok's nickname 'The Butcher' was 
made up by journalists, probably in the 1980s. So all the reams of news copy of late which read 'known as 
the Butcher' is basically stuff just pulled out of some other reporter's story. Most Khmers have never heard 
of it, except from Western news stories. In his home district in Takeo, he's still known as Achar Mok. As 
one scholar told the Post, 'In Khmer, you can either be a "mass murderer" or a "man who cuts meat." You 
can't be both.' If any expat reporters took the time to go out and ask a Cambodian they might find out, but 
that would require work. Then again, why ruin a good headline?" {Phnom Penh Post, "The Gecko," p. 12). 
I interviewed the butcher of Anlong Veng, who was able to shyly provide insights into the infrastructural 
underbelly of the town. If the slaughterhouse is any indication, 2003 represented a year of increasing 
regulation for Anlong Veng, as part of the government's organizational consolidation. The takeover of 
local enterprises (formerly managed by local police and soldiers) by increasingly higher levels of 
government—Agricultural Department's managing of meat processing, the regulation of (electrical) power 
generation by provincial authorities, the licensing of businesses by the Department of Tourism, etc.—signal 
the material socio-political transformation of Anlong Veng as it becomes properly re-integrated into the 
national fold. A former Khmer Rouge originally from Kampong Cham, the abattoir operator took on meat 
vending in the absence of other work in Anlong Veng's post-war shambles. His butchery processes at least 
ten pigs and typically one cow each night. "It is difficult to talk about how to kill the animals. You have to 
come and watch at 4 A.M. We have our own method for killing cows." Describing the process, he states 
that he "puts a big rope around the neck of the cow, ties one end to a pole and the other end to another pole, 
and pulls it taut. The small rope on the nose is pulled to the ground. If a cow is mean, I tie a rope around 
the cow's waist, pull it toward another pole, and make it fall down. Then I tie its feet, the front together 
and the back together. Finally, I hit the cow on the back of the head with an ax. Cows are easier to 
slaughter than pigs. Pigs have to be hit five times with an ax and still may not die, but cows only have to 
be hit once. Some cows take a long time to die; I hit them with an ax, and they bleed from the eyes and 
mouth. For pigs, I stab them in the neck first, then I hit them on the head. I have to hit it on the head, 
because the pig is still alive and does not die quickly from bleeding. When I have slaughtered the animals 
already, the owners come to pick up the meat themselves." Although Cambodia is an overwhelmingly 
Buddhist society, the butcher says there is no real social stigma associated with doing his work; he believes 
some people may be afraid to talk to him, because he is a pig and cow killer. He flatly states that he is 
afraid to kill humans. "Humans are not easily killed, unless they are tied. We can kill humans with poison. 
Humans are not easily killed, because usually they are not fastened and tend to put up a fight." 
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 The RCAF had stationed 42 soldiers on the mountain with duties divided between two divisions, with 
unit groupings all along the escarpment: Division 23 took responsibility for the area from Ta Turn to the 
middle house; from the middle house to the boundary with Preah Vihear Province (at Preah Bralay) was 
under the control of Division 24. 
256Ruon repeatedly emphasizes that the restaurant/guesthouse was from foreigners' ideas and suggestions. 
This repeated claim seems to have a few points of importance. First, quite simply, Ruon is quite outgoing 
towards foreigners, to such an extent that I imagine he spent a long time in the company of internationals. 
He seems to want to extend some solidarity to (Western) foreigners, evidenced by his continued gesture of 
speaking French with me (even as he knows that I am American). His French is quite good and he seems 
to maintain correspondence with a group of acquaintances abroad. Second, if the ideas come from 
foreigners, then it should attract foreigners, which is one of the stated interests of the Ministry of Tourism. 
Thus (third), any question of whether this development of the site should have occurred finds credence in 
the fact that foreigners want this kind of tourist/visitor offering. 
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 Before 2003, all the guesthouses and restaurants did not have official government permission to operate. 
All were controlled by the police. Before tourism officials came to do research for making a tourism area, 
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police were the local authorities. The tourism officials came in 2000; Ruon took them up the mountain to 
stay with him and show them some places. His purpose was to persuade them to protect all the places in 
order for them to become a historical-tourism area. He claims that the plans that the Department of 
Tourism is presently following originally came from him. He drew up those plans in 2000 for the 
department, and he has maintained a close relationship with the tourism officials for along time, "since we 
had only an old market and no new market." 
258
 It is hard to know the source of Ruon's ideas and aspirations for eco-tourism in Anlong Veng, but he 
certainly harbors some very specific images about how this might be realized (e.g., paths to waterfalls, 
paths for allowing night observation of wildlife, etc.). On the one hand, these new ideas about nature 
resorts may be extensions of local tourism destinations in Thailand—the water bodies, shores, and natural 
environs—that populate the countryside and are clearly demarcated by government-erected signs. On the 
other hand, some of Ruon's specific imaginings may have been garnered from the National Geographic or 
Discovery channels on television, both of which are quite popular with Khmers. The idea of creating little 
mini-resorts for "people to come play" seems a bit contrived (and may not cater well to foreigners), but 
maybe this is what works in neighboring Thailand (or other parts of Cambodia). It is hard to imagine this 
"eco-tourism" as not being just another oversold idea on the development-though-tourism bandwagon. 
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 The construction workers indicated that Ta Mok had intentionally constructed a number of residences on 
the mountain near the border landmarks in order to secure land claims against the Thais (a view confirmed 
by the caretaker of the lakeside villa). A key example of this approach is Ta Mok's house/bunker on the 
Thai border at Pass 808 in Chrach/Ba Traveng. (Note that these statements underscore the view of Ta Mok 
as a local, if not national, hero.) It was curious that the border issue arose in discussing the museum's 
importance. On the one hand, territorial encroachment (by both Thailand and, more significantly, Vietnam) 
is a recurrent theme in the contemporary Cambodian political discourse (and it forms much of the stated 
basis for the strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment that is so common through the country). At the same time, 
demands about territorial integrity seem somewhat out of place, given that in practice the Khmer Rouge 
was receiving crucial support through and from Thai forces across a very permeable border. However, a 
clearly demarcated border allows for a clearly demarcated refuge/sanctuary, Thailand; so, the idea of a 
border could be used to the Khmer Rouge's advantage as well. Certainly, in hindsight, it is more amenable 
for former Khmer Rouge to recall a clear border of national integrity, which simultaneously understates the 
role of a secondary historic enemy in abetting their movement while simultaneously playing up the heroic 
role of their leaders in defending the motherland. 
260
 Unlike a reply or folding back (Latin replicare), the primary root derives from Pali vatthu (Sanskrit 
vastu) for "ground" and also object, thing, property, field, site, subject, substance. The Khmer ending 
denotes "to copy, to recopy, to transcribe"; by infixation, it is also carries over "to ferry, to cross" 
(chdmldng BHti < chhldng at)), which bears idiomatic relation to giving birth {chhldng tornle SSQJS). 
261
 Some informants used different variations of this phrase: "exactly like before" (dauchknea piimun 
tjGtptiHB), "do the same as before [in the beginning]" (thver tarn dauch piidarm tSffifltsriiSH), etc. 
262
 One might draw parallels between this reconstruction effort and the debates around Ta Prohm in relation 
to the other temples in Siem Reap. 
263
 These claims to authenticity/origin (of reproduction) only betray the bankruptcy of the projects of "the 
authentic" and "the original." 
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 As if, rather than the Ecole francaise d"Extreme-Orient reconstructing the "bronze tower" Baphuon with 
its reclining Buddha, the 1 l^-century subjects of Udayadityavarman II were brought to piece together the 
scattered shards. 
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 The lack of repayment appears to be a possible means by which to conscript further labour from the 
construction workers; that is, if they want to be paid for previous work, they will have to finish the work. 
266
 After my first interview with the three construction workers, they requested my assistance in securing 
their position as re-constructors of Pol Pot's house with the Ministry of Tourism. I explained what 
individuals at the ministry and Khemarak had explained to me: that the names of the three construction 
workers were known and already chosen for the job. 
267
 See the section above on proper signage around Khieu Samphan's house and Pol Pot's secret house. 
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 Again, "Khieu Samphan's House" is at stake, because the seven houses that populated this area housed a 
number of upper echelons, mostly ambassadors, from the movement. 
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 The district chief made this plain when he was asked about the historical aspect of the ministry's project: 
"With regards to the museum, nobody can talk untruly. For example, Ta Mok's house has a bedroom; the 
bedroom has a bed and a chair; the house has a big lock; so nobody can say that Ta Mok was a small man 
and had nowhere to sleep. Ta Mok's house happened truly. A second example is Pol Pot's house: no one 
can talk untruly, because Pol Pot had his own house to sleep in, a place to work, and a storeroom to keep 
his materials; nobody can say anything besides this. For myself, what belongs to Ta Mok and Pol Pot, I can 
tell you; other things that do not belong to Ta Mok or Pol Pot cannot go into the museum." Subsequent 
comments demonstrated a strong concern for objects (being returned), and the power of objects and sites in 
securing the truth of Ta Mok's and Pol Pot's histories. Other local leaders have emphasized the evidential 
nature of documents and artifacts. The Trabaing Prey Commune Chief expressed three ideas for the 
museum project which highlight this concern: "First, they should prepare historical documents. Second, 
they should ask people to take responsibility in the museum. Third, they should preserve old evidence of 
the past so that people can see—evidence like what people have done and the changes in society from time 
to time." 
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 An aspect of this issue can be traced to the cultural priority of demonstrating appropriate respect, but the 
added complication of a possible war crimes trial may also lead informants to seek out increased 
unaccountability for anything they have done (whether those actions are perceived to be illegal or not). 
Deference to authority combines with denials of responsibility. While motivations and intentions are not 
necessarily of interest here, it is clear that, in giving information on Anlong Veng's history, concerns of 
self-preservation/self-defense against a possible onslaught of legal proceedings shape the character of the 
information communicated. 
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 In these discursive moves, informants equated authority with (legitimate) knowledge/familiarity: 
because the district chief is the highest official, he therefore knows the stories most clearly. My first 
interview with the district chief indicated that he was more in tune with his possible inability to remember 
stories than villagers might give him credit, whether that potential forgetting was genuine or strategic. 
272
 My own ethnographic data-gathering was subject to the same forces and interests that continue to shape 
the Cambodian political scene. Thus, although amassing information on personal and collective memories 
and attitudes on re-constructions of Khmer history, the research tended to reproduce an obvious refraction 
of the country's contemporary politics, a system/process of negotiation. One of the key issues to emerge 
was: the complexity of struggle in the making (and subsequent re-presentation) of history becoming 
overshadowed by the attempts to secure a stable understanding of Anlong Veng's past. Whether as an 
account from the highest (former Khmer Rouge) official or as a rigorously-researched then re-constructed 
museum, the need for security/stability in understanding eclipses notions of a negotiated history, 
complexity, multivocality, and perspectivalism. The hesitations and ellipses faced in encounters with 
former Khmer Rouge—informants who "may not remember" or who do not want to talk about "politics," 
silences operating to cover complexities—betray the efforts of a government-sponsored intellectual 
apparatus that requires a stable, yet politically-interested, re-presentation of the Cambodian past. 
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 This produced the seemingly-odd situation whereby informants gave information about when and who, 
but they would not venture to explain how and why this data might figure in a larger story, leaving that 
dimension to those with the clearest/highest capacity for memory. 
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 This vision is somewhat complicated by the fact that the majority of sites have already decayed due to 
nature or have been thoroughly looted into oblivion, often by the locals who had an "original"/"authentic" 
relation to the sites. 
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 Ledgerwood's work develops Anderson's idea of a national "biography" in situating Tuol Sleng's role 
in a PRK national narrative (Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 204-206; Ledgerwood, "Cambodian 
Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes"). She asserts that the state narrative of genocide and death 
forms the "biography" of Cambodia, with Tuol Sleng serving as a centerpiece. Anderson contrasts the 
personal biography of parental begetting down time to one's death with the national narrative that work up 
time toward some telos; this inversion of narrative temporality is marked by deaths (assassinations, war, 
holocausts, etc.) that are taken up and "remembered/forgotten as 'our own'" (p. 206). In Ledgerwood's 
analysis, the remembering of deaths (at Tuol Sleng) proceeds according to the successor state's 
revolutionary progression; but the story of these deaths is also remembered as "our own" by mutual 
reinforcement with a popular narrative (very much in line with Vickery's STV). The project in Anlong 
Veng may be viewed in similar conceptual terms, but according to differing pressures of temporal, spatial, 
political, and historical contexts and purposes. These divergences are traced below. 
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 Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 356. For the moment, I would like to leave open the status 
of Chandler's claim, especially given that the policy "remainspartially in force" (p. 357, emphasis added), 
evidenced by the "third," "even more macabre" Khmer Rouge tourist site, Anlong Veng (pp. 356,361, 
Chandler referencing Wood, "Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge"). As the historical-tourist area 
project in Anlong Veng is left to languish, the disinterest, forgetting, and burying of the past may be the 
actual and intended ends of this (unfinished) museum. This partiality in the history of Anlong Veng offers 
the possibility of "demonisation" (post-1979 policy) and amnesia (post-1993 policy) simultaneously. 
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 Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," pp. 249-250. 
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 The charge of "genocide" was broadly conceived, including practices that ranged from torture and 
killing of ethnic minorities to destruction of the economy and forced labour (People's Revolutionary 
Council of Kampuchea, Decree Law No. 1, Article 1); the broad scope of the crime has been frequently 
remarked (Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?, pp. 42,45-46; Gottesman, Cambodia After 
the Khmer Rouge, p. 62; Heder, "Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia," pp. 190-191). 
279
 Fawthrop and Jarvis map the international community's "sympathy for the devil" approach to the 
Kampuchean crisis (Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?, pp. 52-69). Other authors offer 
particularly scathing critiques of the use of the refugee issue in these endeavors to punish the PRK 
government and its Vietnamese backers (Reynell, Political Pawns; Vickery, "Refugee Politics: The Khmer 
Camp System in Thailand"). 
280 »j^e resources with which the PRK was built up were pitifully few. Pol Pot 's terror had decimated the 
ranks of Cambodia's initially small class of educated and professionally skilled people, and many of those 
that survived took advantage of the chaos that followed the Vietnamese invasion to flee the country. But it 
was not jus a shortage of suitable people—almost everything was lacking. Even in February 1980, when 
there was a clearly functioning administration, it had to do without almost all the usual paraphernalia of 
modern bureaucracy. There were pens and paper, but they were not easy to come by. There were no 
telephones, and hardly any typewriters" (Evans & Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War, pp. 160-161). The 
conditions led arriving participants "to wonder why anyone was bothering to hold a criminal trial, when so 
much needed to be done to restore normal life" (John Quigley quoted in Gottesman, Cambodia After the 
Khmer Rouge, p. 64). A Ministry of Justice had yet to be formed; thus, the tribunal was conducted by the 
Ministry of Propaganda. In the case of Anlong Veng, it is telling to note that an improved socio-economic 
situation for the government has not meant the rapid development of the historical-tourist destination. 
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 Keo Chanda, "Press Conference," 1.01 bis, p. 49. 
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 Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?, p. 42; Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 
'Adapt' it to a New Political Context," pp. 836-837; Chandler, "Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer 
Rouge?," pp. 71-72. "For Vietnam and the new PRK state in 1979, [personalizing DK's record with the 
name Pol Pot] was simply the easiest way to quickly assure the demonization of their enemies; for other 
Cambodians it was a way to avoid examination and self-criticism of their own society; for concerned 
western regimes it was a way to escape from their own responsibility in the destruction of Cambodia; and 
for academic specialists, at least in English-speaking milieus, concentration on personalities rather than 
social and economic structures was an ingrained habit in their work. Thus both among the Cambodian 
population and western observers 'Pol Potism' as an aberration of one evil man, or at most a small coterie, 
replaced 'Democratic Kampuchea,' which should have been viewed as an unfortunate episode in 
Cambodia's integration into the modern world requiring close study and explanation in its totality" 
(Vickery, " A non-standard view of the 'coup,'" p. 11). 
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 A defense lawyer described his clients as "criminally insane monsters" (Stevens, "Closing Argument," 
3.03a, p. 507). 
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 "Vietnam had disseminated the notion of a 'Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique' since mid-1978, at a time when it 
believed other Standing Committee members might be sympathetic to overthrowing Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. 
Although one of them, Sao Pheum, Secretary of the Party's East Zone, had committed suicide in June after 
his Zone was subjected to a massive purge, the Vietnamese apparently placed hopes on at least two others, 
Party Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea and Standing Committee Candidate member Son Sen, who was 
currently Democratic Kampuchea Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of National Defense and had overseen 
matters of internal security" (Heder, "Victors' Genocide in Cambodia," p. 11). 
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 "Circular on Punishment for Those Who Committed Offenses Against the People During the Pol Pot-
Ieng Sary Regime," outlined in Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, pp. 61-62. 
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Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p. 60. Gottesman argues that this move was intended to 
spare the PRK's Marxism-Leninism from the "taint of genocidal associations" (p. 61). A different 
historiographical approach, that pursued by Vickery, would be to argue that DK was not communist or 
Marxist, but manifested a peasantist rebellion; this more theoretically-involved argument appears outside 
the realm of possibilities for the Party establishing the foundations of its "true" communism in the same 
political apparatuses that produced the KPRP/KWP/CPK. 
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 Heder, "Victors' Genocide in Cambodia," p. 11. One might enlarge the statement to include multiple 
forms of representation, operating under the rubric of justice, memorialization, museumification, tourism, 
etc. (e.g., "Historical-tourism was used crudely and straightforwardly as a political tool..."). 
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 Khieu Samphan was appended to the dyadic clique in public denouncements, following his ascent to 
vice president of the CGDK. 
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 Whatever tensions may have permeated the KUFNS, the PRK Government, and the Cambodian 
Communist Party/KPRP, it is clear that the political actors had learned from DK's mistakes and taken to 
overcoming, or at least glossing over, these internal divisions. "Cambodia's previous revolutionary 
experience was that the reactionary clique of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary constantly divided cadres and made them 
commit offenses against each other, even killing each other, which led to the defeat of the revolution. This 
is the painful and pitiful lesson of the Cambodian revolution" (Resolution, [Cambodian Communist] Party 
Central Committee (Doc. 8-71), quoted in Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p. 69). 
290
 The tribunal's guilty verdict, presented to the UN Secretary-General, specifically identified China's 
(continuing) role in support of the Khmer Rouge. Gottesman gives significant attention to the internal 
Party politics that crafted the tribunal proceedings and its judgment. His analysis uncovers a tension 
between KPRP Hanoi veterans and Eastern Zone defectors, demonstrating the former's distrust of the 
latter's loyalty and experience. Of particular concern was the presence of former DK cadre in the new 
administration and Party offices, who have "blood debts" (culpability) (Gottesman, Cambodia After the 
Khmer Rouge, pp. 66-69). Heder similarly points to the trial judgment as a "compromise position" among 
the Parry's internal factions, which brought to light the crimes of DK but cast greater shadows on 
culpability: "Like its Tokyo predecessor, it served the purposes of official history by demonizing those 
whom it had been decided should take the blame for what had happened while sanitizing or glossing over 
the record of those who were victors or the victors' allies. It was an attempt, first, to codify an official view 
of the history of DK's crimes and opposition to the regime, and second, to solidify relations among the 
various elements that comprised the new political order" (Heder, "Victors' Genocide in Cambodia," p. 11). 
291
 Prior to the Khmer Republic, the secondary school was named Ponhea Yat High School. The secondary 
school structures are what constitute the Tuol Sleng Museum; the site of the primary school has now been 
converted into housing. 
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 Current museum literature indicates that, initially, all the classrooms were converted into prisons, while 
interrogations were conducted in the houses in the surrounding area. However, due to the frequent 
occurrence of rape of female inmates, prison director Kang Kek lev ("Duch") moved interrogations into the 
S-21 compound (Royal Cambodian Government, "Genocide Museum Tuol Sleng," p. 2). 
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 Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 88-90. He also highlights a few similarities with pre-revolutionary 
Cambodian police reports (e.g., proces verbale). More significantly, this work notes how the self-critical 
autobiographies were broadly collected and intended to purify cadre and reinforce solidarity while 
displaying the CPK's empathy and vigilance. In deciphering some meaning in the confessions, Chandler 
repeats Heder's key insight that "CIA" and "KGB" came to operate as generic terms (metonymies) for 
"enemy"; further, he draws parallels to the Soviet experience whereby affiliating prisoners with foreign 
intelligence agencies suggested the prisoner was "non-Khmer" (pp. 93-94). Chandler's survey also shows 
how the hidden enemies dujour (e.g., Vietnamese in 1978) became objectified fantasies in confessions. 
Further, he demonstrates how ordinary past errors/offenses (e.g., breaking an instrument) were retroactively 
elevated to treason, as evidenced by the prisoner's arrest (p. 103). Future-oriented plots, the confession's 
"Plans" section, are logically discounted as "the least revealing and probably the most consistently 
concocted portions" (p. 105). In exploring the psychological aspects to the tortured confessions, Chandler 
argues that prisoners' confessions can be viewed as "objectified fantasies" for the interrogator's need for 
"truth" and a sense of eliminating the enemy (Chandler, "S-21, the Wheel of History, and the Pathology of 
Terror in Democratic Kampuchea," p. 18). (Although this article entertains a Freudian interpretation of the 
prison, with caveats, that interpretation is ultimately discarded.) In this investigation, Chandler conveys 
provocative ideas on Khmer Rouge historiography—serving as regalia of the regime, celebrating and 
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legitimating its actions; a process of uncovering/peeling away to get at truth (hidden history); use of self-
critical autobiography (format and content conforming to the Party's needs and understandings of history); 
and the ongoing construction of Party history, evidenced in the serial destruction of Party enemies—which 
open up the possibility for some interesting historiographic comparison across regimes (and I would argue 
specifically, the current administration's re-construction of history at Anlong Veng as a 
substitute/supplement for a trial). 
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 "Tuol Sleng's director Duch was a model of efficiency in keeping the confessions flowing to the party 
leaders, confessions that served the function of confirming Pol Pot's delusion that all economic setbacks 
could be blamed on enemies and treacherous moles sabotaging the glorious revolution. The confessions 
varied from a few pages to several hundred in the case of important cadres deemed to be prime enemies of 
the state and traitors to the revolution. By contrast with the general incompetence of most aspects of the 
regime, S21 was a showcase of efficiency with, in its own terms, a striking rate of productivity in the 
manufacture of confessions and corpses" (Tom Fawthrop, "The Secrets of S21," p. 80). 
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 Chandler and others are right to highlight the Kafkaesque (Josef K.) nature of S-21 practices: "they had 
not been accused because they were guilty; they were guilty because they had been accused" (Chandler, 
Voices from S-21, p. 77). 
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 The nature of the purges, especially of the East Zone in April to June 1978, is discussed in Chapter 2. 
297
 The actual number may be quite higher, as children were not typically included in the prisoner lists. 
One survivor was the inmate Vann Nath, whose artistic skills saved him from execution; he was put to use 
producing busts and images of DK's Brother Number One. Vann Nath's post-DK work—graphic painting 
of torture techniques and suffering at S-21—hangs on the walls of the museum's exhibition hall, Building 
D. 
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 The poisonous tree (Strychnos nux-vomica) is remarked upon in the museum's literature: "In English the 
word 'Tuol Sleng'" is recognized as the location where the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime, more 
commonly known as the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, set up a prison to detain individuals accused of 
opposing Angkor. However, in the Khmer language, the word 'Tuol Sleng' connotes a terrible meaning in 
itself. It is perhaps only a strange coincidence that the KR regime used this specific location as a prison. 
According to the Khmer dictionary published by the Khmer Buddhist Institute in 1967, the word 'Tuol' is a 
noun. It means the ground that is higher in level than that around it. The word 'Sleng'1 can be a noun and 
also an adjective. When the word 'Sleng' functions as an adjective, it means, 'supplying guilt' {del aoy tos) 
or 'bearing poison' (del noam aoy mean toas) or 'enemy of disease' (del chea sat-trov ning rok). As a 
noun, 'Sleng1 means the two kinds of indigenous Khmer poisonous trees. The first kind is 'Sleng Thorn" or 
'Big Sleng" that has a big trunk, leaves and fruit. The second type is 'Sleng Vour' or 'Sleng Vine' which is 
shaped almost like a vine with small fruit. They are both poisonous. Therefore, from the above translation 
we can see that Tuol Sleng literally means a poisonous hill or a place on a mound to keep those who bear or 
supply guilt [toward Angkar]" (Royal Cambodian Government, Genocide Museum Tuol Sleng (Former 
Khmer Rouge S-21 Prison) [brochure], first two paragraphs, p. 1 of 6; transliterations, italics, and brackets 
in original). Etymological priorities dominate the opening paragraphs of this new guidebook where the 
original introduction (below) addressed prison structure, victim population composition, torture 
implements, and killing sites. 
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 Chandler, Voices from S-21, pp. 4-6; Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," pp. 181-182; 
Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," p. 248. "Although Mai Lam remained in Cambodia until 1988, working 
at Tuol Sleng much of the time, he concealed his 'specialist-consultant' role from outsiders, creating the 
impression that the initiatives for the museum and its design had come from the Cambodian victims rather 
than from the Vietnamese—an impression that he was eager to correct in his interviews in the 1990s" 
(Chandler, Voices from S-21, p. 6). The story of the KUFNS victory over DK (and halting the atrocities at 
S-21) shows some parallels to the Soviet socialist savior ceasing the suffering and death at the Eastern 
European concentration camps; while it is clear that Mai Lam sought to harness some of the 
representational methods of Holocaust memorials (e.g., stockpiles of victims' clothes) to the depictions at 
Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, it is also clear that the Cambodian case does not correspond to the same 
framework. As Chandler's study of S-21 makes quite clear, while concentration camps acted as labour 
pools and extermination centers, Tuol Sleng answered to more quasi-legal endeavors: "those in S-21 were 
treated almost as if they were subject to a judicial system and their confessions were to provide evidence 
for a court of law" (p. 7). The evidentiary nature is further confirmed by visits to the "crime scene" of Tuol 
Sleng during the People's Revolutionary Tribunal (Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p. 64). 
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It should be noted that although Tuol Sleng did not open until July 1980, as early as March 1979 tours of 
the site were allowed by the government, as it made its case for the legitimacy of the Vietnamese-backed 
PRK to the international community. During its first week of officially being open (from 13 July 1980) 
Tuol Sleng attracted 32,000 visitors (Ledgerwood, "Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes," 
p. 88). Visitations during the 1980s were principally locals and nationals from socialist countries; in 
addition, the government compelled visiting journalists to play witness to Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek; the 
audience broadened to include more Western nationals following UNTAC. 
300
 Chandler, Voices from 5-27, p. 5. Chandler's work offers some of the most valuable reflections on S-
21, examining the structure, staffing, practices, and philosophical issues raised by S-21. One of the earliest 
accounts of the atrocities at S-21 appeared in 1980, and it sketched the horrors of the center while also 
conveying the immediate shock of S-21 's discovery (Boua, Kiernan & Barnett, "The Bureaucracy of 
Death"). 
301
 During Democratic Kampuchea, the regulations were etched on the small blackboards in each 
interrogation (class)room; a more official reprinting of the contemporary display added French. The 
security regulations iyinay sdntibaanaaasaxsita) are listed as follows: 
1. You must answer accordingly to my questions. Don't turn them away. 
2. Don't try to hide the facts by making pretexts this and that. You are strictly prohibited 
to contest me. 
3. Do not be a fool for you are a chap who dares to thwart the revolution. 
4. You must immediately answer my question without wasting time to reflect. 
5. Do not tell me either about your immoralities or the essence of the revolution. 
6. While getting lashes or electrification you must not cry at all. 
7. Do nothing, sit still and wait for my orders. If there is no order, keep quiet. When I ask 
you to do something, you must do it right away without protesting. 
8. Don't make pretexts about Kampuchea Krom in order to hide your jaw of traitor. 
9. If you don't follow all the above rules, you shall get many lashes of electric wire. 
10. If you disobey any point of my regulations you shall get either ten lashes or five 
shocks of electric discharge. 
302
 The walls of photographed faces is one of the iconic images that is immediately associated with the 
museum and, frequently, with the history its portends to represent. Beyond the bounds of domestic 
(tourism) goals, the photographic archive from S-21 was used in a 1993 art/capacity-building project— 
Photo Archive Group—led by photojournalists Douglas Niven and Christopher Riley, which took 21 
portraits from the interrogation center on international tour as "Facing Death: Photographs from S21: 
1975-1979." On portraiture and exhibition with regard to Tuol Sleng, see Hughes, "The Abject Artifacts 
of Memory"; French, "Exhibiting Terror"; Leistner & Wood, "Hanging the Past"; and Williams, 
"Witnessing Genocide." 
303
 Ledgerwood notes that Ministry of Information literature pointed out that skulls in the map were 
recovered from "killing fields" in each of Cambodia's provinces (Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol 
Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes," p. 91). In spite of this soft nationalist appeal, the map and the 
exhibition of human remains in general have been a point of contention for Cambodians. In the lead-up to 
the discontinuation of the map's use, King Sihanouk commented that the artwork amounted to a second 
persecution of the dead. Deviating from Khmer Buddhist customs, the lack of cremation for these victims 
as well as their continued public display dis-allow the souls of these dead to rest. Hughes offers a 
thoughtful analysis of this issue in her work on remains displayed at the Choeung Ek Memorial (Hughes, 
Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia, pp. 275-277). Her work underscores how the 
representation of remains at Choeung Ek assumes a legal character, the remains posing as evidence of DK's 
atrocities (pp. 270-272). 
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 Choeung Ek has 129 mass graves, most of which have been excavated. Some observers have noted that 
soil saturation due to heavy rains can still unearth some remnant bones and fragments. 
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 On the creation and design of the Choeung Ek Memorial "stupa," see Hughes, Memory and Sovereignty 
in Post-1979 Cambodia, pp. 273-277. Management of the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center was sold to a 
Japanese firm, JC Royal, in 2005. The English-language press in Cambodia has offered numerous 
occasions for adverse reactions to the privatization moves (Kuch, "Japanese Firm to Manage Choueng [sic] 
Ek"; Kuch, "Official Linked to Choeung Ek Tourism Deal"; Kimsong, "Firms Eyeing Pol Pot Site as 
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Tourist Draw"; Lodish & Prak, "Japanese Lease Results in Better Roads Leading to Choeung Ek"; Kinetz 
& Kuch, "Progress Questioned 3 Years After KR Site Lease"). 
306
 Writing on a similar experience within memorialized concentration camp sites, Young states: "Nothing 
but airy time seems to mediate between the visitor and past realities, which are not merely re-presented by 
these artifacts but present in them. As literal fragments and remnants of events, these artifacts of 
catastrophe collapse the distinction between themselves and what they invoke. Claiming the authority of 
unreconstructed realities, the memorial camps invite us not only to mistake their reality for the actual death 
camps' reality but also to confuse an implicit, monumentalized vision for unmediated history" (Young, 
Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust, p. 174). 
307 „^ t J U Q J gjeng) o n e walks a c r o s s bloodstained tiles to the metal bedframes where suspects were found 
shackled and bloodied. To the extent that the museum's curators offer any interpretation, it's meant to 
shock.... Such images help the current government, led by heavy-handed former communist Hun Sen, to 
remind Cambodians that it is a more benign presence than the Khmer Rouge. (What government isn't?)" 
(Ramos, "Benefits of Cambodia's Tourism Boom Unclear," p. 2, rhetorical parenthetical in original). 
"Shock" may be a more common reaction attributed to the foreign visitor, as the site offers a means for 
Cambodians to mediate and re-member their own memories and sense of profound loss. Even if heavy-
handed reminders are not the message ("more benign"?), it is clear that the museum subtly shapes the 
historical and personal understandings of a variety of its visitors. 
308 «Tne Museum's photographs and artefacts recount the horrors of S-21 (and, by extension, of 
Democratic Kampuchea) so forcefully that Vietnam's incursion appears as a humanitarian intervention, 
providing the salvation of the Cambodian people from further suffering under Pol Pot" (Hughes, 
"Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes, Phnom Penh, Cambodia," p. 
178). Drawing a clear line of continuity from the People's Revolutionary Tribunal and the establishment of 
Tuol Sleng, Williams states, "Mai Lam sought to distinguish between legitimate communism practiced by 
the Vietnamese and perverted, even 'fascist,' DK communism" (Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," p. 248). 
309
 Drawing off Sara Colm's interview with Mai Lam, Ledgerwood relates that the museum was pursued as 
"evidence" against the DK regime by the curators. Williams points to the (minimalist) exhibition of photos 
and remains as offering commemoration but not encouraging "any kind of reconciliation with the past"; he 
suggests that the preservation of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek is "a reminder of the need for action" 
(Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," p. 247), suggesting that the sites' witnessing by visitors underscores an 
absence of justice. This may be a response principally experienced by foreign visitors. From the PRK/CPP 
perspective, the State's "memorial" sites may well be a needed action already accomplished, an effected 
historical consciousness, produced in the national narrative which Ledgerwood explicates (and in a 
mutually reinforcing relationship with the memories of Cambodians). 
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 Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes," p. 82. 
311
 Ibid., pp. 90-91. Ledgerwood cites Watson's use of Kilgman's term (p. 90; Watson, "Memory, History, 
and Opposition under State Socialism," p. 2; Kligman, "Reclaiming the Public," p. 395). Kligman is 
addressing the (re-)birth of civil society and different interpretations made possible only after the December 
1989 fall of Ceausescu, emphasizing the totalizing tendencies of the previous regime. Watson's point, 
however, is to identify ongoing oppositions—"unofficial pasts"—concurrent with the dominant historical 
representations. Ledgerwood argues that this antagonism between enforced, totalizing history and 
"unsanctioned remembrances" (Watson), typical of socialist states, is reconfigured in the Tuol Sleng 
narrative. (The re-establishment of the Party's past in official histories is mapped out by Frings, 
"Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context"; a discussion of these 
historiographic efforts follows below.) 
312
 Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes," p. 91. This "rage born of 
agony" (kdmhoeng chheur chap RtfianStrra) was harnessed in the May 20 Day of Rage commemorations, 
discussed below. 
313
 Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, pp. 30-38. A fuller description of the Vickery's "standard total view" 
is provided in Chapter 2. 
314
 Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes," p. 93. Contrary to Thion's 
claim that PRK propaganda has hampered people's ability to build retrospective understandings (Thion, 
"Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 183), Ledgerwood argues that the PRK state narrative (although 
one of multiple explanations) is one of the most powerful and encompassing "tellings." Rather than 
368 
offering "new" memories for Cambodians to remember (as Watson identifies in Soviet bloc states and 
China), the Tuol Sleng historical narrative offers away to explain the inexplicable suffering that 
Cambodians experienced. "The metanarrative of the PRK state, of criminals committing genocide ousted 
by patriotic revolutionaries, framed and provided an explanation for seemingly incomprehensible events" 
(p. 93). 
315
 Ledgerwood notes this ironic twist, and points out the rhetoric of a 1995 Hun Sen speech that describes 
a "nest of terrorists" and "worms that destroy the society" faintly echoing Pol Pot's language regarding 
"hidden enemies burrowing from within" (Ledgerwood, "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of 
Genocidal Crimes," pp. 95,97n30; Ker, "Hun Sen: the 'worms' that must die," p. 3). 
316
 The national remembrance holiday, typically referred to as the Day of Hate {tivea chdng kdmhoeng 
gfisatiuiii), can also be rendered Day of Anger or Day of Rage. The connecting term {chdng sa) derives 
from "to tie," and can yield the opposing ideas of "to establishment friendship" {chdng metrei BtitHifi) as 
well as "to not forgive someone's mistake" {chdng tos fflnffini) or "to bear/hold a grudge" {chdng kumnum 
BURa). "Holding" and "maintaining" the anger are the senses favored by Chandler and Fawthrop and Jarvis, 
respectively (Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 362; Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With 
Genocide?, p. 74), although these connotations would be more readily reflected in the Khmer roots "hold" 
{kan ma), "look after" {reaksaa ityi), and "keep" {tuk qti). 
317
 Little evidence for this supposed 1975 meeting suggests that the chosen date echoes 20 May 1973, when 
the CPK openly broke with Vietnam (Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New 
Political Context," p. 834; Hughes, "Remembering May 20," p. 40). Others claim that 20 May 1976 bears 
the significance as the day that the implementation of the radical collectivization program was initiated 
(Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 362; Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?, p. 
74). 
318
 Hughes, "Remembering May 20," p. 41. She also notes that events included conciliatory statements 
with regard to the Khmer people's debt to the Vietnamese. Emphasizing political manipulation, Williams 
argues, "Hate Day was arguably designed not so much to begin healing the emotional wounds of survivors 
as to sustain an implacable hatred of the KR, which in turn helped secure allegiance to the government's 
war with the still-formidable KR forces" (Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," p. 249). Similarly, in 
discussing the PRK's 1983 Research Committee on Pol Pot's Genocidal Regime (which produced the 
official DK death toll of 3.3 million), Etcheson entertains the possibility that the research project along with 
other state-sponsored activities—such as the Day of Hate ceremonies—fostered "a trope for the socially 
and politically acceptable Cambodian genocide survivor story," a trope disposed toward the generation of a 
"national myth" (Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, p. 215n4). 
319
 The CGDK had been formed the year before the Day of Hate was founded. 
0
 She cites the composition and presentation of petitions to international governing bodies emerging out 
of Day of Hate activities, specifically condemning international support of the CGDK/PDK or calling for a 
trial of DK leaders (Hughes, "Remembering May 20," p. 42). 
321
 Hughes, Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia, p. 283. Various appropriations of the day 
have been attempted. In 1999, the Sam Rainsy Party sought to rescue the commemoration from an endless 
cycle of violence (anger and revenge) by establishing May 22 as an annual Day of Forgiveness, 
incorporating Buddhist rituals and ceremonies (Sam Rainsy Party statement, "SRP Calls For Day of 
Forgiveness"); the new date marked the 1996 assassination of a steering committee member of Sam 
Rainsy's (Khmer Nation) Party. Fawthrop and Jarvis note that the "Day of Maintaining Rage" was 
officially re-named to "Day of Remembrance" in 2001 (Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?, 
p. 74). 
322
 Eang, '"Never Again' Is Message at Day of Hate Event," p. 2. 
323
 "Vietnamese soldiers entered the Cambodian capital on the morning of January 7, their jeeps roaring 
down the city's deserted avenues. At noon, radio broadcasts announced that the Front had liberated Phnom 
Penh. By evening hundreds of Cambodian soldiers—Khmers who had fled the Khmer Rouge and taken 
refuge in southern Vietnam—arrived. Housed in Phnom Penh's airport, they joined Vietnamese troops in 
scouting the empty streets and buildings for lingering Khmer Rouge soldiers, engaging the few they found 
in rounds of gunfire. Over the next few days, pronouncements poured forth on behalf of the Cambodian 
leadership" (Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p. 11). 
First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen 
(CPP) both signed the 5 January 1996 circular. 
325
 "By remembering January 7, we do not forget the assistance of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the 
Vietnamese soldiers and people who sacrificed their lives to rescue the Cambodian people. We express our 
gratitude to Vietnam [for] that time, in order to show that the truth remains the truth" (Hun Sen speech on 4 
January 1996 quoted in Ker, "Funcinpec MPs rally against Jan 7 holiday," p. 1). In his 7 January 1996 
inauguration of Hun Sen Park in Phnbm Penh, Hun Sen re-iterated, "Today is the day that saved us from 
Pol Pot's genocide, the day that gave us the second birth... had it not been for January 7 [1979], there 
wouldn't have been the Paris Peace agreement, nor UNTAC in Cambodia and everything we have today" 
(P. 3). 
Chea Sim, "Speech on 25 anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime." 
327
 Ibid. 
328
 Chea Sim, "Speech marking the 29th anniversary of the victory of 7 January." 
329
 Similar moves were expressed on official occasions during Democratic Kampuchea. In his September 
1977 speech delivered at Phnom Penh's Olympic Stadium, "Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea," Pol Pot combined triumphant forward-looking rhetoric with warnings to 
enemies (Chandler, A History of Cambodia, pp. 221-222). 
330
 The KPRP's 1982 Party History quoted in Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New 
Political Context," p. 845. 
331
 This influence was referred to as "an ideology of extreme chauvinism" (cheatniyum chdng'iet-chdng'dl 
huos haet tfinamHBtajfititisiitnfiJtuifi) (Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political 
Context," p. 840). In 1991, as Chinese support for the PDK was ceasing, this language diminished, and 
subsequent overt references to China were absent (p. 836nl06). 
332
 In fact, following Decree Law No. 2 enacted in 1980, "betraying the revolution" included distributing 
anti-Vietnamese propaganda, thereby splitting the political field into traitors and those who support the 
PRK (Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, pp. 77-78). 
333
 Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context," pp. 811, 826, 836, 
845-846. 
334
 Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea." Chandler's post script notes the (temporally) 
close revisionisms marked by the CPK's self-dissolution in December 1981 and the PRK rulers' June 1982 
establishment of the KPRP's founding date as 28 June 1951 (not 19 February nor 30 September). "The 
party's birthday is still a moveable feast, and its other anniversaries depend on the needs of the regime in 
power in Phnom Penh. Plus ga change, plus c 'est la meme chose" (p. 300). 
335
 See DK's Black Paper for some of the more severe renderings of these xenophobic and irredentist 
politics. One might (re-)state this conclusion for the KPRP: thus, the revisionist history that Hun Sen's 
PRK attempted to sometimes violently institute underscored Kampuchea's independent accomplishments 
against the expansionist aggression of the Chinese. 
336
 In PRK historiography, the legitimate Party congresses were held in 1951,1960,1979,1981, and 1985; 
the 19 February 1951 Second Congress of the ICP is seen to have given birth to the KPRP, although the 
PRK's preferred date is 28 June (due to the chronological demands between Party and Armed Forces). 
Over-writing its own formation, the CPK history as enforced by Pol Pot sets the First Congress in 1960, 
with subsequent gatherings in 1966,1975, and 1978 (Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it 
to a New Political Context," pp. 809-810, 817-819, 823-826). 
337
 Quoted by Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context," p. 829. At 
the same time, she notes that PRK revisionism marks the beginning of Pol Pot's reign as 17 April 1975 
(CPK liberation of Phnom Penh), in spite of the fact that "the Pol Potists deviationist policies" had taken 
hold in the countryside two years previous, while the Vietnamese were still actively supporting the 
Cambodian communists (pp. 833-834). 
338
 Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context," pp. 840-842. 
339
 Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 358. He aptly summarizes the effect of PRK 
historiography in terms of responsibility: "Unsurprisingly perhaps, no one in the PRK era publicly raised 
issues of individual or collective responsibility for what had taken place under DK. No one suggested that 
Marxism-Leninism as practiced in Vietnam and in a diluted form in the PRK might be as unsuitable (or as 
indigestible) for most Cambodians as its 'Maoist' form had been under the Khmer Rouge. No one 
370 
remembered that the Khmer Rouge movement, until the early 1970s, had benefited from extensive 
Vietnamese assistance and had attracted thousands of willing disciples. Finally no one dared to suggest 
that officials of the PRK who had served, in many cases, contentedly under DK should be held accountable 
for anything they had done in those years. Throughout the 1980s, thousands of men and women who had 
committed crimes against their fellow Khmer between April 1975 and January 1979 resumed their pre-
revolutionary lives and in many cases were rewarded with administrative positions. Although former 
Khmer Rouge cadre lived all over the country, often alongside their victims, they were nowhere to be 
found. 'The Pol Pot time' was evil, but the men and women who had administered DK, except for a 
phantasmagoric 'genocidal clique' had disappeared. In other words, a hole had been dug, and parts of the 
past had been buried" (p. 363). 
340 ])jfferent government officials mark the commencement of this strategy at different times. Khieu 
Kannarith stated the policy had been followed from 1987; Sok An suggests the mid-1990s; and Hun Sen 
has variously indicated 1996 to 1998. By 1998, the policy had extended a "warm welcome" to any Khmer 
Rouge, save Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan (Fontaine, "Hun Sen suspicious of KR trial 
motives," p. 3). On the "warm welcome" and leniency toward repentant defectors from December 1978 
onward, see Gottesman (Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, pp. 9,75,225-226,353-354) who quotes Heng 
Samrin, President of the KUFNS: "The Front intended 'to warmly welcome, and create favorable 
conditions for, officers and soldiers, as well as public servants, in the administration of the reactionary 
regime to rally with the people and fight back against the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang to save the motherland 
and their own families... To practice leniency toward those who sincerely repent. To give appropriate 
rewards to those who had performed feats of arms in service of the revolution'" (p. 9). The foundation for 
offering amnesty in return for defection (repentance and a demonstration of new loyalty) was already laid 
in this 1978 speech, codified in the 1994 law to outlaw the Khmer Rouge, and re-confirmed in the 1979 
tribunal, which charged by name only Pol Pot and Ieng Sary for the crime of genocide. Heder stresses that 
the post-7 January 1979 "warm welcome" represents a turnabout from the stricter political line that offered 
a narrow window of opportunity for the reactionary cadre, fighting the KUFNS and Vietnam, to join the 
"pure patriotic revolutionaries" (Heder, "A fluid policy trail on how to treat 'ex-DK,'" pp. 10-11). 
3
 ' The singularity of the codename could also point to a multiplicity, "one hundred thousand" (muoy saen 
HtutMB) plans; however, Hun Sen claimed the policy in his own name. Some comparisons might be drawn 
between Hun Sen's "win-win" focus on national reconciliation and unity, and bringing all sides into the 
fold (albeit unequally), and the approach underlying Sihanouk's personalist Sangkum "party" that similarly 
sought to reign/rein in conflict and opposition under the royal samdech's direction. 
342
 Hun Sen, "Escerpts [sic] of Samdech Hun Sen's Speech to a Grand Peace Meeting," p. 1. 
343 «Thjs ;s n o t a matter of rust destroying iron, it is of iron wiping out rust" (Hun Sen quoted in Fontaine, 
"Hun Sen suspicious of KR trial motives," p. 3). 
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 Sok An, The Rule of Law and The Legacy of Conflict, p. 3. 
345
 Hun Sen, "Escerpts [sic] of Samdech Hun Sen's Speech to a Grand Peace Meeting," p. 1). 
346
 The success of the strategy in uniting and reconciling the nation arose in a speech at the re-initiation of 
the Day of Hate at Choeung Ek in 1999 (Mydans, "A Word to the Dead," p. A4). 
347
 See Chapter 1 (note 53) for a description of how Hun Sen's endowments (chdmndng dai tSantitfl) are tied 
to recipients. 
348
 Hun Sen quoted in New York Times, cited with Khmer equivalent by Shipler, "Twenty Five Years Later, 
from the Shadows of Truth," English p. 40, Khmer 49:«ttatinnnSmtarrl mJHfitiimnj ttfitiJMHtiisnstal MHJRJIQIQ® 
ttfimthfiBHSinj af HHtimimglaSti... rtiMstadtalHacm ntumciHtnti IjpnituriH i» The hole to which Hun Sen refers is not 
the long hole (dnluang m$) of Anlong Veng, but the large pits/graves (rorndav itturl) of the kind that 
populate the "killing fields" at Choeung Ek. 
349
 Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 356. 
350
 Many observers sensed a persistent disinterest mixed with a healthy dose of leading on the United 
Nations. The process began with the government's request for UN assistance in 1997; in 2001, legislation 
was passed which enabled the founding of court, but the ECCC was not formally established until early 
2006. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this work to retrace the unfolding of these newest efforts to 
bring the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea to international or hybrid "justice." Works that focus on 
Cambodia's culture of impunity and the possibilities for the Khmer Rouge tribunal include: Etcheson, After 
the Killing Fields, particularly chaps. 8-10; Fawthrop & Jarvis, Getting Away With Genocide?; and Heder, 
"Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia." 
351
 Chandler is correct to asses the situation as follows: "Whether the tribunal will produce closure, re-open 
a range of traumatic recollections or sink without a trace remains to be seen but with a budget of almost 
U.S. $60 million, provided almost entirely by foreign donors, it promises to be a significant operation" 
(Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 356). 
352
 A certain forgetting can be attributed to the minimalist character of the Anlong Veng sites as well as the 
prolonged absence of a "museum" exhibition. Anlong Veng seems to have become a somewhat forgotten 
project. This partial character of the Tourism Ministry's achievements lends credence to Chandler's 
argument regarding the fading focus on Khmer Rouge history. 
353
 In other places, I have argued that Anlong Veng is continuous with government attempts to relegate the 
Khmer Rouge to subhuman status: at Tuol Sleng, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary are portrayed as fanatics unfit to be 
labeled "socialist"; in Anlong Veng, Pol Pot and Ta Mok are shown as outlaws that contested the country's 
new rule of law. "The last breath of the ousted regime emanating from the jungle encampments is framed 
as an outlawed organization that continued to massacre the Khmer people in the bloody offensives it 
executed against the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) savior and, later, the legitimized post-UNTAC 
government" (Wood, "Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge," p. 187). 
54
 Chandler notes that "In a departure from the praxis of previous Cambodian leaders, Hun Sen places no 
iconic value on Angkor, sees the site primarily as a source of revenue from tourism. His refusal to be 
mesmerized by Cambodia's past or by the sociology of victimhood are refreshing aspects of his harsh style 
of rule" (Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 368n49). Similarly, the post-history of the Khmer 
Rouge would be harvested/pimped solely for its potential tourist revenues: "intrinsically unimportant and 
irrelevant to those in power" beyond a money-making scheme (p. 363). The implication of the past at 
Anlong Veng responds to the partiality of the enforced amnesia of which Chandler writes. 
355
 Although there are few re-statements of the communist legacy of the CPP, the Party's origins are still 
celebrated as beginning in 1951. 
356
 Ashley's analysis of the 1985-1991 period starkly lays out the purely pragmatic interests governing the 
PDK, especially in its shedding of its "communist" label and stated embrace of liberal capitalism; re-
examining the nationalist and irredentist rhetoric of the DK period, he shows that post-1985 Khmer Rouge 
political rhetoric was largely pre-occupied with the "ceaseless struggle" against the Vietnamese (Ashley, 
Pol Pot, Peasants and Peace). The move to singularly blame others for their 1979 defeat was obvious in 
the PDK's charge that DK's collapse was brought about by foreign agents. Later, the PDK denied mass 
killings, arguing that "killing fields" were staged by the invaders. These convenient rationalizations 
reinforced the already-established xenophobic rhetoric of DK's leaders. Khieu Samphan provides a 
concise demonstration of a post-DK, former Khmer Rouge worldview in arguing that the past struggle was 
patriotic, pro-independence, and pro-territorial integrity (Khieu Samphan, Cambodia's Recent History and 
the Reasons Behind the Decisions I Made, pp. vi-vii, 118-121). This position—the efforts of the Khmer 
Rouge were consistently aimed at preserving the country from outside aggression—was also recounted by 
many informants in Anlong Veng. 
357
 This move for independence enacted in part at museums, may be akin Pelley's reading of Vietnamese 
"post-colonial" (de-colonization) historiographic endeavors. Cambodia, sometimes framed as "Vietnam's 
Vietnam," parallels this trajectory to the extent that it de-links its national sovereignty from its neighbor in 
the most recent time frame; the de-colonization from France in the Cambodian case remains a separate 
issue. See Sutherland's tracing of this idea through Vietnamese museums in "Repression and resistance? 
French colonialism as seen through Vietnamese museums." 
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 "In the rhetoric of their ruins, these memorial sites seem not merely to gesture toward past events but to 
suggest themselves as fragments of events, inviting us to mistake the debris of history for history itself 
(Young, The Texture of Memory, p. 121). Ledgerwood issues the same quote as it applies to Tuol Sleng 
(Ledgerwood, "Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes," p. 89). 
359
 Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," p. 243. 
360
 The lack of a curator indexes the curatorial accomplishment in Phnom Penh, and the capital's seemingly 
realist exhibit should be subject to at least minimal attention. 
361
 Hughes, "Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes," p. 176; Williams, 
"Witnessing Genocide," p. 235. 
The Cambodian government thereby avoids an Enola Gay-style controversy but arrives at a similar 
unremarked/unremarkable, post-cancellation end-product (see Linenthal & Engelhardt, History Wars, 
especially Kohn, "History at Risk"). However, the guidebook and its unproblematic singular history—the 
script that will properly/truthfully/accurately situate the seemingly self-evident in situ historical area for 
visitors—may bear re/marks. 
363
 "Almost entirely" because torture implements can cut both ways and also because Building D's exhibit 
provides some views of the life of the S-21 staff. As well, more recent video contributions to the building 
have explored the thoughts, actions, and reflections of both the victims and perpetrators of violence. 
364
 An extreme minimalism at Anlong Veng might steer clear of a sympathy/fascination with the 
perpetrators and their murderous logic. Linenthal address this "boundary of representation" with regard to 
the exhibition of Nazi paraphernalia at the commemoratively-conceived US Holocaust Memorial Museum. 
"As in so many Holocaust memorials, the common denominator, wrote council historian Sybil Milton, 'is a 
universal willingness to commemorate suffering experienced rather than suffering caused.'... [quoting 
Appelbaum] 'So we avoided putting out a lot of Nazi memorabilia. The songs and the banners and the 
objects are alluring. So we avoided that and instead we created what we hope to be reverential moments 
with elements of rescue and righteousness..." (Linenthal, Preserving Memory, p. 199). 
365
 While reviewing some audio research materials at my apartment overlooking Tuol Sleng, some 
electricians overheard the hateful speech and songs of VoDK radio which I was reviewing. My apologies 
for allowing the broadcast within earshot were met with fascination and a request to hear more. 
366
 Put differently, the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes demonstrates genocide, marking DK's 
first death, and the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area marks a dying life after death. History museums 
occur, it would seem, twice: "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce" (Marx, "The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," p. 594). Tracing this mist further, Anlong Veng's reminding effect might 
indicate: "Like a conjurer under the necessity of keeping the public gazed fixed" on itself, the Party (a 
Front's substitute) executes a victoire en miniature every day (p. 617). The farcical nature of the project is 
harvested in journalists' ironic celebrations of a future "KR Disneyland." 
367
 The play with Derrida, "with a touch of Rousseau," is intended. The dual sense of supplement offers a 
replacement (supplant, substitute) [suppteance] and addition (surplus) [supplement}; it can signify the 
adding of something to something that is already complete in itself, or it can mean the adding of something 
to complete something (Derrida, OfGrammatology, p. 144-5). 
368
 The "last breath" (trdddr khydl tfiHisjtu) is the self-translated phrase mat Cambodians would offer when 
describing the significance of Anlong Veng. It might be rendered "last gasp," emphasizing how the term 
draws from "to keep trying in spite of fatigue" (trdddr pSi); there is a sense of impending death associated 
with the effort (e.g., someone drowning making an effort to swim). Like apharmakon, breath, air, wind 
(khydl sjni) can be associated with illness—fainting (khydl kor 8jtuH>), dizziness (khydl chap sjtUBitJ), and 
other aches—as well as the remedies that would rectify these ailments, such as the preferred liniment, tiger 
balm (breng khydl trtJttsjni). 
369
 Hughes notes how S-21 the prison and Tuol Sleng the museum come to be confused (misrecognized) in 
the tourist experience (Hughes, "Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide 
Crimes," pp. 184-185). 
370
 And more than a museological supplement to Tuol Sleng (already a supplement to the People's 
Revolutionary Tribunal), the Anlong Veng project can operate as a supplement to justice—the historical-
tourist areas as substitute/additional trial. 
371
 The general trend toward privatization of tourist destinations and their management—giving ticketing 
control to Sokimex at the Angkor Archaeological Park, turning the Choeung Ek "killing fields" over to a 
Japanese firm, and relying on Red Dot for Anlong Veng signage—may also indicate the government's 
desire to cash in on its history. 
372
 Proof of this profit motive—and the underlying priorities of other historical efforts—is found in the 
Tourism Ministry's responsibility for Anlong Veng; the People's Revolutionary Tribunal executed by the 
Ministry of Propaganda; Tuol Sleng and Choeung set up by the Ministry of Information and overseen by 
the cooperative efforts of the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts and DC-Cam; and the Siem Reap War 
Museum's closest government sponsor being the Ministry of National Defense. 
It may also be possible to locate the agential forces on the demand side of the tourism curve, similar to 
Alneng's description of the growing commodification of the Vietnam War spurred by international visitors 
(Alneng, "What the Fuck is a Vietnam?," pp. 483-484). A similar reading of "the whole genocide thing" 
in Cambodia might link the "Killing Fields" (movie) imaginary with extreme tourist possibilities (shooting 
ranges, brothels, etc.—chaotic leftovers) tempered by the tragic narrative of Tuol Sleng/Choeung Ek 
complementing the STV "phantasm" (p. 465) as sidekick (sideshow), in the same flight path of carpet 
bombing consuming. The unruly character of a border town might encourage this reading. As in other 
tourist destinations, the distinction between the global and the local (generated for external consumption) 
becomes blurred; what is up for sale is the historical narrative—responding to the desire for a "Khmer 
Rouge" Cambodia? 
374
 The seemingly picayune tourist offerings of Anlong Veng and the (former) Khmer Rouge may aptly 
engage with the idea of "dark tourism" that has received growing attention. Although the draw of death-
centered tourism makes for an interesting topic, it is beyond the scope of this work to offer a 
comprehensive account of how this new theorization of travel and destination could negotiate the Tourism 
Ministry's efforts in Anlong Veng. The centerpiece of death, disaster, and destruction in tourist sites can 
be visited in several key textual destinations. Much of this work deals with examining visitor motivations 
as well as de-limiting the contours or categories of these destinations. (In fact, much discussion of 
individual sites becomes pre-occupied with definitional issues framed according to an emergent form of 
tourism; for some reflections on categorization and how academic discourse has taken up the new topic, see 
Stone, "A dark tourism spectrum.") The systematic contribution of Lennon and Foley argues that 
commodified death and tourism experiences drawn by death and disaster represent a recent and growing 
phenomenon made possible by and influencing globalizing communications technologies; further, these 
new sites produce a sense of anxiety about the modern world that produces these deaths (and produces 
them as tourist sites) (Lennon & Foley, Dark Tourism). Similarly, Rojek theorizes these fatal attractions as 
postmodern spectacles, called "black spots," which are reliant on new technologies for their report and 
repetition (Ways of Escape and updated in "Indexing, dragging and the social construction of tourist 
sights," pp. 62-64). Dann's work examines the motivational influences governing the attractions of a wide 
variety of sites that "milk the macabre" (Dann, Dark Side of Tourism). Seaton examines historical 
development of death as a draw for visitors to various sites (Seaton, "Guided by the Dark"). 
375
 Williams entertains a number of concerns, many of which suggest a potential for conflict in the post-
peace push for profitable tourist experiences: "Hun Sen's determination to develop more memorial sites 
may increase genocide's value as a tourist ticket. The question of what happens to local memory when 
objects associated with it are turned into tourist attractions is complex. If a site is to uphold local 
significance in most cases, it will contain elements (a stress on regional language or custom, or restrictions 
of use) that are incompatible with a hospitable tourist 'product' This contradiction between sacred space 
and public access is particularly likely if the site is politically and culturally sensitive, or if it possesses 
spiritual significance. A tourist product that ignores the wishes of local inhabitants could turn history and 
suffering into a choreographed spectacle to be consumed as an 'experience.' If the new government-run 
War Museum in Siem Reap is any indication, the Communist [sic] People's Party shows more interest in 
the financial benefit of exhibiting objects of "dark tourism" than in national reconciliation" (Williams, 
"Witnessing Genocide," pp. 250-251). 
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 "Critics assail the idea as bizarre and unlikely to succeed. Some worry it will perpetuate Cambodia's 
image of death and destruction. Others say it exploits the souls of about two million Cambodians who died 
at the hands of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-79, since it seems to commercialize the crime. (The critics 
don't object to tourists at the Tuol Sleng museum in Phnom Penh, because they argue that the one-time 
Khmer Rouge extermination center isn't overtly and tastelessly promoted)" (Wain, "Tourist Trap," p. Al). 
377
 Khmer Rouge (re-)"arrivals" in Anlong Veng (chap. 3nl67), whose discernment is complicated by the 
fog of struggle, are positioned next to the researcher's arrivals into Cambodia (chap. 1), whose over-
determination is made apparent in ethnographic tropes hinting at an already embeddedness—already tied 
to, already unfolding—late on the scene to/in which we have already been connected, attracted to (a 
hosting-parasiting momentum in) movements already in motion. Some similar dynamics can be seen in 
tourism endeavors and travelogues: personal connection to a destination, a draw, a tourist attraction; the 
traumatic arrival; the emersion in all performances of culture. 
378
 Taking the Anlong Veng project according to its constitutive terms re-iterates the contained divergences 
in the undertaking. The historical references a singular, accurate, "true" account of the past; the tourist 
incorporates the priorities of economic benefit and development; and area presents a mystery term that 
alludes to an as-yet ambiguous understanding of space and structure. 
379
 "Who controls tiiepast... controls the future; who controls thepresent controls the past (Orwell, 1984, 
chap. 3). 
380
 The development focus on tourism entails a number of socio-economic challenges for the nation even as 
it produces a disparate array of consequences in terms of historical representation. The key growth sector 
includes an inherently volatile industry, dependent on a number of uncontrollable international factors, and 
recent evidence suggests that the waxing and waning benefits have been largely non-pro-poor. 
381A process in which tourism acts as an agent of (cultural) change has been long established. Tourism 
initially effects the commodification of objects, persons, and spaces for consumption, typically by 
foreigners; the meanings of exhibited cultural objects become quickly eclipsed by their potential exchange-
value (Greenwood, "Cultural 'authenticity'"; idem, "Culture by the Pound"). As the commodification 
effect grows, tourist offerings are shaped/designed to accentuate the perceived draw of the destination, the 
phenomenon of "staged authenticity" (MacCannell, "Staged Authenticity"; Picard, '"Cultural Tourism' in 
Bali"). Cohen describes the ways in which natives are taught to play (at/up) native so as to convey 
authenticity (Cohen, "Authenticity and Commoditization in Tourism"; idem, "The Pacific Islands from 
Utopian Myth to Consumer Product," pp. 19-21). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett provides numerous examples in 
which objects and people are made to perform their meaning (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Destination Culture). 
The intensification of the commoditized performance process leads to the decreasing desire of tourists for 
the authentic and the decreased authenticity for natives at well-developed tourist destinations, a sort of 
mutual alienation effect. In terms of the Cambodian government's recent endeavor in Oddar Meanchey, 
there is certainly no interest in playing up the former Khmer Rouge character of Anlong Veng's present 
inhabitants, but the Ministry of Tourism seeks to re-stage the past structures of the fallen movement. 
MacCannell suggests the possibility of the "staging of a site as remote" to entice (op. cit., p.594), which 
would appear relevant to the project in Anlong Veng; however, the sense of adventure tourism has been 
largely taken up by foreign tour operators, and not a point highlighted by the ministry. In fact, if anything, 
the ministry prioritizes ease and comfort—in travel, accommodation, etc.—in its presentation of the 
developing destination. 
382
 The museum also demonstrates its capacity to offer a national icon, second to Angkor Wat, in its gallery 
of portraits. 
383
 One might say that Tuol Sleng was always already a foreign creation in that 1) Mai Lam, an 
internationally trained curator of Vietnamese nationality, oriented the museum toward an international 
audience, and less obviously 2) the foreign-inspired security techniques that were pursued during S-21 's 
functioning. 
384
 This hierarchical rendering of accurate data appears to fall between Aesop/LaFontaine—"Le raison le 
plus fort... est toujours le meilleur" (The Wolf and the Lamb)—and Mao— "Where do correct ideas come 
from?... Generally speaking, those that succeed are correct and those that fail are incorrect... There is no 
other way of testing truth" (Mao, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, pp. 206-208). 
EPILOGUE 
1
 The highway between Phnom Penh and Siem Reap was paved the entire way (except for maybe 7 
kilometers); travel time has been reduced to four hours. 
2
 Some folks claimed the road's condition had improved, perhaps using its pre-graded state as the point of 
comparison; in any case, "better" becomes quite relative when discussing a dirt road that has been 
subjected to logging trucks and successive wet seasons. 
3
 Activities on the mountain near the border checkpoint make bare that logging and brothels couple as the 
primary industries. 
This was reminiscent of roads out of Sisophon, particularly the one going to Poipet, in the late 1990s. 
5
 The old site remains cleared and flattened; stubby pillars of concrete are scattered about the site, but it 
seems the foundation was never poured. 
6
 Note that this criterion of proximity does not bar the casinos in O Smach from their long runs; both 
gaming houses sit nearly on top of the border, between the crossing gate and the customs checkpoint. 
Although proximity was the stated explanation, it is more likely that assumptions of boundaries was the 
375 
more pressing stake—recalling Ta Mok's motivations for founding residences near the moveable territorial 
boundary. 
7
 Brown, "Cambodia maps out plan to lure tourists to Khmer Rouge sites." 
8
 Above the Khmer Rouge statues but not quite at the summit, there was a road next to a large pond that 
went up a mountain. A Tourism Ministry marker indicated the uphill existence of a munitions factory, but 
nearby was another placard that read: forbidden to enter (presumably due to construction hazards). Perhaps 
150 m beyond this signage atop a very large, flat cleared area, the construction cranes stood multiple stories 
tall, towering above the trees. As access was interdicted, it was impossible to determine how the new 
casino relates with the remains of the Khmer Rouge munitions factory (in addition to complicating 
historical-tourist access). 
9
 During a randomly-timed midday visit, entering through the wide driveway break in stalls, I happened 
upon a session of illegal lumber loading. A large truck and wood pile occupied the ground floor of what 
was Nhoeun's house. A group of about 15 men were busy stacking the wood of various widths and lengths 
onto the vehicle. A man who appeared to be a supervisor (holding a cell phone) did not allow any photos 
to document these dealings. It seems the cuttings on the mountain are shipped down the hill, through town, 
and on to the neighboring district, where a less official (unregulated) border crossing awaits the timber-
laden vehicles. Ever since Global Witness was sacked, the parties involved made less of an effort to hide 
their actions. That did not stop mountaintop porters from eying me with suspicion; maybe it had something 
to do with the fact that through their eyes I might have looked a bit like one particular Global Witness 
worker (tall, long hair, blondish, foreign looking, etc.) who was denied re-entry to the country in 2005. 
10
 O'Connell & Yin, "All that glitters seems to be... Sokimex"; Vong & Marcher, "Sokimex and 
Government revisit Angkor deal"; Kuch, "Japanese Firm to Manage Choueng [sic] Ek"; idem, "Official 
Linked to Choeung Ek Tourism Deal"; Lodish & Prak, "Japanese Lease Results in Better Roads Leading to 
Choeung Ek"; Kinetz & Kuch, "Progress Questioned 3 Years After KR Site Lease"; Kimsong, "Firms 
Eyeing Pol Pot Site as Tourist Draw"; Ramos, "Benefits of Cambodia's Tourism Boom Unclear." 
11
 Thet, "KR museum construction stalls," p. 5; Sam, "For Anlong Veng, there's gold in them there 
atrocities," p. 6; idem, "Ta Mok's property becomes a draw with tourists," p. 4; idem, "KR museum to draw 
tourists north," p. 5; Yun, "KR Photographer Planning For-Profit Museum," p. 16. 
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